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ABSTRACT 
 
EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION 
AS IT RELATES TO THE THEOLOGICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DAVID TRACY, HANS FREI, KEVIN VANHOOZER AND 
HENRI DE LUBAC 
 
 
By 
 
Kevin Storer 
April 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by William M. Wright, IV., Ph.D. 
 This dissertation explores the hermeneutical impasses which have resulted from 
the recent debates about the theological interpretation of Scripture between revisionist 
theologian David Tracy and postliberal theologian Hans Frei and suggests that locating 
the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption would ease many of these 
methodological tensions.  The works of Evangelical theologian Kevin Vanhoozer and 
Ressourcement theologian Henri de Lubac, it is argued, provide helpful resources for 
these discussions as these theologians explicitly seek to explain the role of Scripture in 
mediating the relationship between Christ and the Church.  The dissertation suggests that 
examining the role of Scripture in the context of the economy does provide helpful 
insights for hermeneutical method as it shows the intrinsic unity between the literal 
reading of Scripture and Scripture‟s spiritual interpretation, as well as the intrinsic unity 
 v 
between Scripture and Church in receiving Scriptural mediation.  It is concluded that 
these insights ease ongoing tensions between Frei and Tracy by showing that Frei‟s 
insistence on the plain sense of Scripture is compatible with Tracy‟s insistence on the 
transformative disclosure of Christ in Scripture.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I.  The Debate between Revisionists and Postliberals 
 
In the closing decades of the 20
th
 century, theological dialogues in the United 
States were marked by a prominent debate between two major approaches to the methods 
and purposes of theology, as these two schools engaged in a significant discussion about 
the theological interpretation of Scripture for the Church.  Both sides agreed on several 
major points:  first, that interpretation of Scripture must be seen as a privileged and 
unique locus of the mediation of God; second, that the Scriptures are central of the life 
and practice of the Church; and third, that Scriptural interpretation must go beyond 
employment of higher critical methods in order to understand its subject matter.  Yet the 
discussions were also marked by very different understandings about the methods and 
aims of theology, and these differences have led to a number of impasses in the 
discussion about the interpretation of Scripture in the Church.  This introduction will 
acquaint readers with the main emphases of each side, so that the debate between David 
Tracy and Hans Frei, two major representatives of each school, can be more clearly 
explored.   
Revisionist theology is a trajectory of theology committed to reforming Christian 
belief and practice in dialogue with contemporary culture and philosophy.
1
  One of the 
                                               
1 See William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of 
Theology," The Thomist 49, no. 3 (1985), 392.  Placher (ibid), claims that Revisionist theology should 
probably be considered the most dominant theological trajectory in the United States in the last 50 years, 
and notes such names (besides Tracy) as “Catholics like…Leslie Dewart, Gregory Baum, and Michael 
Novak, and Protestants like Langdon Gilkey…Edward Farley…Schubert Ogden…Gordon 
Kaufman…[and] John Cobb.” 
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distinguishing emphases of this movement is a commitment to the public accessibility of 
theological discourse, which tends to assume a general mode of human understanding by 
which specific religious claims can be related to human reason.
2
  The various Liberation 
and Postcolonial theologies, which have redirected much recent theological conversation 
throughout the world, are related to this trajectory in their insistence that theological 
method continually reevaluate Christian symbols and dialogue based on some external 
norm of reason.
3
  Among revisionist theologians, a group of narrative theologians has 
recently arisen, who have used phenomenological hermeneutics as the starting point for 
critical correlation.  This group includes Paul Ricoeur, David Tracy, and Sallie McFague, 
all of whom are “revisionist, hermeneutical, Gadamerian-inspired correlationists.”4  This 
revisionist focus on narrative is often associated with the university of Chicago, and is 
often called the “Chicago school.”   
This “Chicago school” are also called narrative theologians because they suggest 
that stories have a unique role in the shaping of human beings.  Yet they argue that all 
narrative, including the Scriptures, must be continually renewed and corrected through 
the disciplines applied to all texts.  The “Chicago school” begins their reading of 
Scripture from a general hermeneutics, even though they admit that the very referent of 
Scripture is so reorienting that it stretches the general hermeneutic beyond the 
                                               
2 Placher (ibid, 397), argues that revisionist theologians “seem to presuppose a universal 
human something-or-other which various religions, in their various ways, express.”  Yet Tracy is insistent 
that he and other revisionists have incorporated a hermeneutical turn into their theology (See David Tracy, 
"Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection," The Thomist 49 (1985), 463-65). 
3 For example, see Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist 
Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992) and Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Dogma, 
trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992).  Both claim to work off an explicitly 
“revisionist” model.   
4 Gary L. Comstock, "Two Types of Narrative Theology," Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 55, no. 4 (1987), 688.   
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explanatory power of general rules.  Among these revisionists narrative theologians, 
David Tracy‟s work has had perhaps the most significant impact on contemporary 
theological method.  Tracy insists on keeping theology public discourse by continually 
working to find some ground of commonality between Christian faith and those outside 
the Christian faith.  Tracy grounds his Scriptural interpretation in the phenomenological 
hermeneutical methods of Ricoeur and Gadamer, insisting on a “method of correlation” 
which will keep Scriptural reading „public‟ for all contemporary readers.5   
The revisionist project could perhaps be best described by three characteristics.  
First, while revisionists typically advance the basic insights of Schleiermacher and liberal 
Protestant theology, they differ from liberals in their partial acceptance of insights from 
classical theology which have found new expression in “neothomism” and “neo-
orthodoxy.”6  Revisionists do not believe that the project of liberalism has been entirely 
successful, and they attempt to integrate the insights of modern culture with insights of 
the classical Christian faith in a critical way.  Specifically, revisionists emphasize that 
entry into Christian faith occurs neither through a category of human reason, nor through 
                                               
5 See David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: 
Seabury, 1975)., 12-55, and Tracy, : Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 59-62. For Tracy, revisionist method requires both a phenomenological and metaphysical 
analysis about God.  Tracy (Blessed Rage for Order, 152), claims, “A metaphysical system is a construct of 
concepts designed to provide coherence for all „the facts‟ on the basis of a theoretical model drawn from 
among the facts.”  This is needed because, as Tracy (ibid, 136), claims “the objective ground or referent of 
all limit-experience and limit-language is that reality Christians name God.”  This understanding of God 
requires some method of analysis that goes beyond simply phenomenological reflection.   
6 James J. Buckley ("Revisionists and Liberals," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction 
to Christian Theology since 1918, ed. David and Rachel Muers Ford, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 214).  Buckley (ibid), notes, “Today‟s revisionaries aim to resolve problems 
left by the second stage [the reaffirmations of orthodoxy] precisely by creating a third stage which sublates 
the first two.”  Theologians as diverse as Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Jurgen 
Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, as well as most of the feminist and liberation theologies could be 
characterized as revisionist.   
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some philosophically demonstrable dimension of religious experience, but instead is first 
a gift of faith.
7
   
Second, contemporary revisionist theology has incorporated a hermeneutical turn 
occasioned by focusing on the linguistic constitution of the human being emphasized in 
recent philosophy.
8
  While the quest of contemporary revisionists is to show that theology 
is public dialogue which relates to the common sensibilities of modern human beings, 
revisionists do not necessarily assume that there is some universal pre-linguistic religious 
experience to which all persons are drawn.
9
  Instead, the group focuses on the 
relationship between the linguistic constitution of experience and the universal religious 
dimension of individuals.  
Third, perhaps the most definitive characteristic of the revisionist project is the 
insistence to employ some criterion of correlation between orthodox Christian thought 
and contemporary modern society.  Revisionist theology could be understood as a critical 
response to modernity which seeks to place Christian faith in mutually critical dialogue 
with postmodern philosophical thought.  As revisionists think that the very understanding 
of God, Christ and human beings revealed in Christian faith requires critical engagement 
with the world, revisionists are interested in keeping theology in the public sphere in 
                                               
7 See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 50. 
8 See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, "Naming God," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 34 
(1979)., 216), claims, “In one sense, therefore, texts do precede life.  I can name God in my faith because 
the texts preached to me have already named him.” 
9 Tracy (“Lindbeck‟s New Program for Theology: A Reflection,” The Thomist 49, 1985, 461), 
claims, “The argument among explicitly hermeneutical theologians has been consistent: one can maintain 
the richer and broader understanding of „experience‟ forged by the great liberals…only by dialectically 
relating it to recent understandings of „language‟ (and thereby, inevitably, also to history and society.”  
Placher ("Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies,” 397), argues that revisionist theologians “seem to 
presuppose a universal human something-or-other which various religions, in their various ways, express.”  
This seems to be true, Placher argues, in spite of Tracy‟s argument that he does not start from universal 
human experience.  
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mutual dialogue with secular fields of thought.  Revisionists agree that the Christian faith 
makes truth claims which can be expressed in ways that are intelligible to modern secular 
society.  Revisionists further agree that to make this language intelligible, the language of 
the God of classic theism must be continually corrected and refined through the various 
historical critical disciplines to be “related to human, religious, or specifically Christian 
experience.”10  Traditional language must continually be revised in light of contemporary 
understanding.  Revisionists emphasize that there are no pure or comprehensive texts or 
traditions, and hence critical revision and development must take place in both with the 
help of public criteria.   
Postliberal theology is a recent trajectory of theology which is grounded in the 
work of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck.  The roots of the postliberal movement began at 
Yale in the 1970‟s with the early work of Hans Frei and David Kelsey.11  According to 
George Hunsinger, the first significant use of the term “postliberal” occurred in Frei‟s 
doctoral dissertation, where he compared Barth‟s movement from liberal to 
“postliberal.”12  Yet the movement of “postliberal theology” became visible after the 
publication of George Lindbeck‟s influential 1984 book, The Nature of Doctrine: 
                                               
10 Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals," 217.   
11 See Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) and The Identity of Jesus Christ: The 
Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); as well as David H. 
Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).  James Buckley 
(Modern Theologians, 229), names influential representatives as Stanley Hauerwas, Romald Thiemann, 
James Buckley, Joseph DiNoia, Garrett Green, George Hunsinger, William Werpehowski, Bruce Marshall, 
William Placher, Katheryn Greene-McCreight, Serene Jones, Joseph Mangia, Eugene Rogers, and 
Katheryn Tanner.   
12 George Hunsinger, "Postliberal Theology," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47.  There, says 
Hunsinger (ibid), Frei noted three key emphases in Barth that will be significant for the new project of 
postliberal theology: “critical realism (dialectic and analogy), the primacy of God, and Christocentricity.”  
To over-generalize each movement, it could be said that while the chief theological influence is of the 
“revisionists” is Schleiermacher, the chief theological influence of “postliberals” is Karl Barth. 
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Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.
13
  Among postliberal writers, Hans Frei has 
written the most influential material, specifically on the interpretation of Scripture.  He 
continually emphasized the particularity of Jesus Christ as the center for the Christian 
faith and hence for all Scriptural reading.   
Like revisionist theology, the postliberal trajectory also could be described by 
several distinct emphases.  First, postliberals attempt to understand Christian reality 
primarily through a straight-forward reading of the Gospel narratives.  Postliberals 
propose a model which allows the Scriptural texts to form the identity of the individual 
reader.  Hans Frei‟s hermeneutical project of realistic narrative is driven by a desire to 
allow a plain reading of Scripture render to the reader the unsubstitutable Person of Christ 
depicted in the Gospels.  Frei‟s goal is to eliminate those symbolic and mythical 
renderings of Christ presented by liberals and revisionists in order to allow Gospel-
reading to render a straight-forward, orthodox Christology.  Both Lindbeck and Frei 
emphasize that the Scriptural narratives are the indispensable place to understand the 
Christian God, as these narratives “render a character…offer an identity description of an 
agent,” who is the God of Christian faith.14  As Lindbeck puts it,  
The narrative does this, not through accounts of what God is in and of himself, 
but through accounts of the interaction of his deeds and purposes with those of 
creatures in their ever-changing circumstances.  These accounts reach their climax 
in what the gospels say about the risen, ascended, and ever-present Jesus Christ 
whose identity as the divine-human agent is unsubstitutably enacted in the stories 
                                               
13 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). 
14 George Lindbeck, "Toward a Postliberal Theology," in The Return to Scripture in Judaism 
and Christianity: Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Peter Ochs (New York and Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 1993), citing David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, 48.   
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of Jesus of Nazareth.  The climax, however, is logically inseparable from what 
precedes it.
15
   
 
The whole Christian canon must, for postliberals, be given priority in forming the 
experience of the individual reader, as it provides the language through which the reader 
can enter into religious experience.  Postliberals insist on “the primacy of language as 
creating the possibility of fully human experience, instead of prior experience which 
could then be described in language.”16  Hence Lindbeck and Frei emphasize a return to 
an understanding of the storyline of the Bible to structure the experience of the reader as 
a Christian.   
Second, postliberals propose that theology be developed through “intratextual” 
reflection rather than by critical correlation.  Postliberals are worried that “the liberal 
tendency to redescribe religion in extrascriptural frameworks has once again become 
dominant,” after the movement of neo-orthodoxy.17  Postliberals insist that “religion is 
more like a cultural system that one linguistically inhabits, and within which one is 
shaped into a form of life, so that becoming religious is something like learning a 
language.” 18  One of the focuses of Lindbeck‟s “cultural-linguistic” program is to show 
that experience is formed by language rather than experience forming language.  
Postliberalism, then, “sees its primary task as descriptive rather than apologetic.  Energies 
are concentrated more on explicating the internal structures and logic of Christian life 
                                               
15 Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 95.   
16 William C. Placher, "Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A Conflict of 
Interpretations?," Modern Theology 4, no. 1 (1987), 38.   
17 Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 99.   
18 Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology”, 54.   
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than on translating them into contemporary idioms through thought patterns.”19  
Postliberals shun systematic correlation largely because they follow the trajectory 
established by Karl Barth in emphasizing the priority of God and God‟s self-revelation in 
Jesus Christ over any other reality.
20
  Postliberalism‟s focus on intratextuality does not 
mean that theologians simply recite the biblical narrative.  Rather, as Lindbeck claims, 
“intratextuality cannot be genuine, cannot be faithful, unless it is innovative.  A condition 
for the vitality of these traditions is that they redescribe in their own distinctive idioms 
the new social and intellectual worlds in which their adherents for the most part actually 
live and into which humanity as a whole is now moving.”21  The primary task of 
theology, then, is to continually describe the mysteries of the Christian faith in such a 
way that believers can describe their own existence in light of the Scriptures and self-
description of the Church.   
Third, postliberals emphasize that apologetics must be undertaken in an ad hoc 
fashion.  Fodor defines the term ad hoc as when “the occasion arises, in connection with 
a particular issue, relative to a specific context, with respect to particular interlocutors.”22  
This shift from systematic correlation to ad hoc correlation is intended to prevent a 
particular method or philosophical description from overrunning the self-description of 
the Church and its beliefs and practices.  This movement has led to a general tendency in 
                                               
19 James Fodor, "Postliberal Theology," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology since 1918, ed. David F. and Rachel Muers Ford, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 231.   
20 Hunsinger (“Postliberal Theology,” 52), shows that Frei emphasized in his doctoral 
dissertation on Barth that “God‟s priority” was a major reason for Barth‟s rejection of liberalism.  See Frei, 
“The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909 to 1922: The Nature of Barth‟s Break with 
Liberalism,” unpublished dissertation (Yale University, 1956).   
21 Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 100.   
22 Fodor, "Postliberal Theology," 231.   
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Lindbeck to understand “truth” as a matter of internal coherence, as doctrine is 
interpreted “in „cultural-linguistic‟ or „regulative‟ terms….as communally authoritative 
rules of discourse, attitude, and action.”23  Yet other postliberals, such as Frei, display 
more of a method of critical realism in their ad hoc correlation, continually emphasizing 
the need to implement conceptual schemes to relate the world of the text with the 
contemporary world, yet in such a way that Christianity is not redescribed in terms of 
contemporary experience.
24
   
The distinctive characteristics of these different trajectories have been seen most 
clearly in the debates between David Tracy and Hans Frei.  Frei‟s chief and ongoing 
complaint about Tracy‟s model of theology is that it employs a systematic correlation 
between Christian tradition and human experience, which Frei feels grants authority to 
human experience over text and tradition.  The consequences of Tracy‟s model of 
systematic correlation, as Frei sees them, are the following: Tracy continually gives 
priority to a general philosophical scheme over specific Christian claims; he persistently 
gives priority to apologetics over the internal structure of the Christian faith; he fails to 
                                               
23 Placher ("Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies,” 397, citing Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine, 18), suggests that Lindbeck sees doctrinal “truths” as more a matter of internal coherence to the 
Christian system than “truths” based on some general form of logic.   
24 Hunsinger (“Postliberal Theology,” 46), distinguishes between Lindbeck and Frei, calling 
the former “neoliberal” and the latter “postliberal.” Hunsinger (ibid, 46), claims that Lindbeck‟s “cultural-
linguistic” program is so described because he promotes what Hunsinger calls a “pragmatist” theory of 
truth where “both „doctrine‟ and „truth‟ are so defined as to make them significantly non-cognative” and 
“any conceivable propositional content in theological language is relativized.”  Thus where liberal theology 
has described truth as “experiential-expressive,” and hence non-cognitive, Lindbeck‟s proposal “relativizes 
doctrine‟s propositional content…by redefinition (the „rule theory‟) (47).  Here Hunsinger emphasizes that 
postliberals have largely not been convinced by Lindbeck‟s argument that doctrinal language does not refer 
beyond the community, and concludes that postliberals wish to claim that the Scriptural narratives really do 
render true (but analogical) claims about God, the referent of the text (46). 
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account adequately for the particularity of Christ.
25
  Tracy‟s ongoing criticism of Frei, on 
the other hand, is that Frei‟s exclusive focus on realistic narrative and the self-description 
of the Church will prohibit the Church from developing a truly public engagement with 
the world.
26
  For Tracy, the consequences of failing to establish a correlational criteria of 
intelligibility are the following:  the Church may fail to make its message relevant to 
modern culture; the Church may fail to incorporate truth found outside itself into its own 
identity; and the Church‟s failure to be self-critical may stifle the necessary pluralism 
within the Church rooted in Scripture itself.
27
  These disagreements about the relative the 
priority each accords to the relationship between Christian self-description and general 
systems of meaning have tended to overshadow the strong agreement both theologians 
for the primacy of the “plain sense” of Scripture, the need for narrative reading to render 
the particularity of Jesus Christ, and the need to move from the text itself to the 
disclosure of God in the Scriptures.   
II.  The Problem: Narrowing Hermeneutical Horizons to Text and Reader 
 
The debate between Tracy and Frei about the relative priority of Christian self-
description and general systems of meaning has caused their work on the interpretation of 
                                               
25 I have adapted these three general criticisms from Mike A. Higton, "Hans Frei and David 
Tracy on the Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Christianity," The Journal of Religion 79, no. 4 (1999)., 
566-91, esp. 577-86. 
26 For a summary of mutual criticisms, see David Tracy, "On Reading the Scriptures 
Theologically," in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce 
Marshall (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 36-37; 58-59, nt. 16, and Hans W. Frei, 
Types of Christian Theology, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 60-65.   
27 For these criticisms, see David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and 
the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 113; Dialogue with the Other, the Inter-Religious 
Dialogue (Leuven and Grand Rapids: Peeters Press and Eerdmans, 1990), 114; and "On Reading the 
Scriptures Theologically," 43-57, respectively.   
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Scripture to focus heavily on method as they seek to show how the subject matter of 
Scripture is understood by readers.  Tracy‟s emphasis on the public nature of theology 
and his insistence that all religious texts are potentially disclosive of the divine cause him 
to adopt the phenomenological method of interpretation developed by Paul Ricoeur to 
show that the subject matter of the Bible confronts the reader in front of the text and 
creates a “new-mode-of-being-in-the-world,” or allows the reader to experience new 
existential possibilities.
28
  Frei‟s emphasis on the particular identity of Jesus Christ 
rendered through a realistic reading of Scripture cause him to emphasize the literal sense 
of the Gospel narratives as normative for Christian reading and to extend that story 
throughout the whole Bible through the practice of figural reading.
29
  The debate has 
proven helpful in forcing theologians to more clearly articulate what is the subject matter 
of Scripture as well as how the texts render that subject matter to readers.  Furthermore, 
the debate has forced theologians to reflect more precisely on the relative priority given 
to Christian self-description in relation to apologetic explanations of Christian faith to 
those outside the Church, as well as to gain a new appreciation for Scriptural narrative as 
the normative means by which the Christian faith is mediated to readers.   
Yet while the discussion between Tracy and Frei has identified some important 
issues for the method of Scriptural interpretation, it has also drawn attention away from 
important aspects of a Christian interpretation of Scripture.  While Tracy argues that the 
purpose of reading Scripture is the disclosure of the Divine who is always in radical 
proximity to the reader, and Frei insists that the purpose of reading Scripture is to 
                                               
28 Tracy, The Blessed Rage for Order, 134.   
29 See Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-10. 
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recognize the identity of the Christ who is present to the reader, the narrowing of focus 
almost exclusively to the relationship between text and reader has caused considerations 
about the way in which the Triune God uses Scripture in the economy of redemption to 
be largely ignored.
30
  This attempt to treat the relationship of text and reader in biblical 
hermeneutics in isolation from the larger discussion of Scripture‟s role in the economy of 
redemption has forced a number of polarities which have created certain impasses in the 
discussion about method.  As a result, many important insights by both theologians have 
been overlooked by later theologians who tend to choose one author‟s method over the 
other and likewise focus almost exclusively on the relationship between text and reader.   
This narrowing of the discussion about Scriptural interpretation to the relationship 
between text and reader, ironically, has caused theologians to overlook the moment 
which is most central to Tracy and Frei‟s understanding of Scriptural interpretation: the 
movement from the texts themselves to the spiritual reality disclosed by means of the 
texts.  Central to the work of both Tracy and Frei is the goal of showing how Scripture is 
disclosive of the Triune God.  Both Tracy and Frei would insist that “positive historical 
science is incapable of providing a complete interpretation of those spiritual realities 
                                               
30 The “economy of redemption” refers to the ordering of the various parts of God‟s action in 
salvation history toward God‟s final plan for creation.  See here John J. and R.R. Reno O'Keefe, Sanctified 
Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible (Baltimore and London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), 37, where they give the examples of a “careful sequencing of events in 
historical narratives,” a well plotted story, and an outline of a text.  They also use the examples of narrative 
sequencing which provides a pattern and demonstrates a predictive value about what will be next.  Christ, 
rightly understood, was this interpretive principle which established the meaning of the Scriptures for the 
early Church.  While the term “economy” often referred to the ordering of the Scriptures in light of Christ, 
it also referred to the organization of the various parts of God‟s redemptive action among human beings.  
Not only did God call out a people and establish covenants with human beings in the Old Testament, but 
God continues to mediate salvation to human beings today through the New Covenant, the presence of 
Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit.  According to Christian faith, God has established various realities to 
mediate the Mystery of Christ to human beings for salvation. 
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which are the ultimate subject matter of biblical texts.”31  Consequently, both agree that 
to read the Bible as Scripture, the reader must somehow make a move from text to 
spiritual reality.
32
  Yet when focus remains only on the relationship between text and 
reader, neither is able to articulate this movement.  Not surprisingly, as their respective 
projects remain underdeveloped with regard to Scripture‟s place in the economy of 
redemption (both in discussing the way in which the Triune God uses the Scriptural texts 
for self-mediation to readers and in articulating the unique capacity of the Church to 
receive Christ‟s mediation in the Scriptural texts), Tracy and Frei disagree strongly about 
what it means to move from text to spiritual reality, how the reader makes such a move, 
and what exactly is rendered when the movement is made.  For Tracy, the movement 
from letter to spirit occurs when the reader, through reading the text with the employment 
of a phenomenological system of general hermeneutics, encounters a reality so great that 
it leads the reader beyond what the hermeneutical system could render.  Tracy most often 
describes this as limit-experiences, and he is at times unclear as to whether the ultimate 
referent of the text is human experience or God.
33
  For Frei, the referent of Scripture is 
                                               
31 Marcellino G. D'Ambrosio, "Henri De Lubac and the Critique of Scientific Exegesis," 
Communio 19 (1992), 384.  D‟Ambrosio is speaking of  Blondel and de Lubac, but the claim could 
describe a persistent emphasis in Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer as well, as each attempts to go beyond general 
hermeneutics to account for the unique subject matter.   
32 This movement may be variously described as the movement from reading the Bible to 
reading Scripture, as Joel B. Green, Siezed by Truth: Reading the Bible as Scripture (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2007), or as the movement from the realm of nature to the realm of grace as William Abraham, 
Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).  The 
four theologians in this dissertation are by no means unique in this emphasis, but it is this movement which 
will provide a lens for study since it is here that the crossroad between hermeneutical method and dogmatic 
description most urgently presents itself. 
33 In this, Tracy follows Ricoeur‟s argument in “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 (1975), 34.  
Ricoeur (ibid, 108), later claims, “These limit-experiences, redescribed by the limit-expressions of religious 
language, constitute the appropriate referent of this language.”  For Tracy‟s ambiguity about ultimate 
referent, see especially Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George and William Placher 
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the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ who cannot be thought of except as present to 
the believer.
34
  Frei, then, emphasizes realistic reading (i.e. reading according to the plain 
sense of the text) of the Gospel narratives as the means by which the movement from 
letter to spiritual reality occurs as the risen, present Christ is mediated to readers.   
While both authors disagree about this essential movement, it is difficult to know 
how any further focus on only the relationship between texts and readers could advance 
the discussion beyond its present impasse.  It is only when the hermeneutical discussion 
is broadened to include the way in which the Triune God uses Scripture for self-
mediation to the Church in the economy of redemption that it is possible to show how the 
Scriptures disclose spiritual reality.  Where the relationship between Christ, Scripture and 
Church is left implicit, general principles of method are naturally appealed to in order 
settle theological issues.  Such methodological principles, while important for describing 
the relationship between texts and readers, are insufficient to overcome theological 
lacunas.  Consequently, these result in impasses in hermeneutical discussions.   
III.  Proposal: Widening the Discussion to the Economy of Redemption 
 
The impasses in method between Tracy and Frei can only be investigated and 
advanced by first locating Scripture in the economy of redemption, thus allowing 
discussions of hermeneutical method to flourish within the framework of explicit 
dogmatic concerns.  Locating Scripture in the economy of redemption means to develop 
                                                                                                                                            
Hunsinger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) and William Placher, “Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal 
Theology: A Conflict of Interpretations?” pp. 35-52. 
34 See Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ. As Francis Watson (Text, Church, and World (Grand 
Rapids: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 286, cited in Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology,” 48), puts it, Frei‟s 
“intratextual realism,” is “the irreducibly textual mediation of realities that nonetheless precede and 
transcend their textual embodiment.” 
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an explicitly theological articulation of the relationship between the Triune God, 
Scripture and Church to show how both Scripture and Church participate in the Mystery 
of Christ.  To advance this discussion, I will explore the works of two other theologians, 
Ressourcement Catholic Henri de Lubac and Evangelical Protestant Kevin Vanhoozer.  
These two theologians have been chosen as dialogue partners to Tracy and Frei partly 
because each represents a significant theological trajectory in the past half century which 
is not frequently brought into dialogue with the revisionists and postliberals.
35
  
Furthermore, both have been chosen because they begin their hermeneutical discussions 
with a theological description of the economy of redemption.  This description explicitly 
considers God‟s activity in Scripture and the responsive action of the reading community.  
Vanhoozer‟s project is centered on his claim that God is the primary author of Scripture, 
who uses it as a covenant document to address the Church.  The movement from text to 
spiritual reality, for Vanhoozer, takes place when the reader approaches the text with the 
correct theological presuppositions, thus treating the text respectfully and allowing the 
Spirit to apply God‟s canonical speaking action to the reader.  De Lubac‟s project is 
centered on his claim that the literal sense sacramentally renders the spiritual sense of 
Scripture as Christ, who stands as active Subject of Scripture, uses the Scriptural texts to 
communicate with readers and incorporate them into the Church, the eschatological totus 
                                               
35 The choice of a Catholic and a Protestant representing different theological trajectories is 
also significant, as a number of traditional relationships are being reinvestigated.  Since the Reformation, it 
has been of great importance to Protestants to structure the Scripture/Church relationship in such a way that 
Scripture is able to stand apart from the Church and critique it.  In Protestantism today this separation is 
being reevaluated, due in large part to new developments in hermeneutical theory.  Ecumenically, 
Protestants are learning that interpretive communities play an indispensable role in interpretation, while 
Catholics, Evangelicals, and mainline Protestants are rediscovering the value of premodern exegesis.  
Debates about Scriptural hermeneutics, therefore, are being reformulated around theological issues such as 
the mediation of Christ to the Church, God‟s self-communication to redeem believers, and the relationship 
between Scripture and ecclesiology.   
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Christus.  The movement from text to spiritual reality, for de Lubac, takes place as the 
reader moves from encountering the events of salvation history recorded in the text to 
incorporation into the totus Christus, the eschatological body of Christ.  For both 
theologians, then, reading Scripture correctly requires specific attention to the 
relationships between theological realities in the economy of redemption.  By adding 
insights from Vanhoozer and de Lubac, it will be possible to see how the work of Tracy 
and Frei could be appropriated within the larger context of the economy of redemption in 
such a way that certain impasses between them are overcome.   
IV.  The Project:  Sketching the Development of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation will seek to advance discussions for a theological interpretation 
of Scripture by describing Scripture‟s relationship to Christ and the Church in the 
economy of redemption.  Chapter one will examine the distinctive methods for Scriptural 
reading developed by Tracy and Frei in order to highlight both their unique contributions 
to hermeneutical method and certain impasses which have arisen through their debates.  
The chapter will discuss both constructions of method and ecclesiology to show that the 
discussion of text and reader in Scriptural hermeneutics cannot be accomplished in 
isolation from a discussion of the Church.  This chapter will argue that these impasses 
have been caused by a narrowing of hermeneutical focus to the relationship between text 
and reader, and that such impasses could be overcome by placing Scripture in the broader 
context of the economy of redemption.   
Chapter two will bring Vanhoozer into the discussion to show how an attempt to 
locate Scripture in the economy of redemption can expand hermeneutical discussion.  
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Vanhoozer‟s early work will be used to illustrate a failure in hermeneutical method 
because his singular concern to safeguard the authority of Scripture prevents him from 
locating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption.  This failure is corrected in 
Vanhoozer‟s later work, as Vanhoozer specifically constructs a hermeneutical system 
based on God‟s use of the biblical texts to lead the Church.  Yet even in Vanhoozer‟s 
later project his lack of ecclesiological reflection leaves him with hermeneutical 
difficulties which significantly weaken his project.   
Chapter three will examine the work of Henri de Lubac to show a different 
attempt to locate Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption.  De Lubac‟s 
insistence that Scripture must move from the literal sense to the spiritual senses of 
allegory, tropology, and anagogy will be examined within the context of his claim that 
Christ uses Scripture, as an incorporation of the Logos, to mediate Himself to His body 
the Church.  Here it will be suggested that de Lubac‟s articulation of Scripture‟s place in 
the economy of redemption has allowed him to identify an essential moment in Christian 
reading, the movement from text to spiritual reality which de Lubac calls the “traditional 
hermeneutic.”36  Furthermore, it will be suggested that the integral unity that de Lubac 
finds between Christ, Scripture and Church will provide insights which could advance the 
hermeneutical discussion among all four authors.   
Chapter four will place all four authors in dialogue to advance a more complete 
theological interpretation of Scripture within the context of the economy of redemption.  
The first section will examine the relationship between Christ, Scripture, and Logos to 
specify how Christ is both the subject matter of Scripture and the one who addresses the 
                                               
36 See especially Marcellino G. D'Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the Recovery of the 
Traditional Hermeneutic (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1991), 144-219. 
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Church by means of Scripture.  Here de Lubac‟s central claim that Christ is both Subject 
and Object of Scripture will serve as the hermeneutical lens by which all four authors will 
be evaluated and the dialogue advanced, as it shows the intrinsic connection between the 
Church‟s traditional insistence on the plain sense of Scripture and the inevitable 
movement from text to spiritual reality that takes place in Christian reading.  This section 
will show that when Scriptural interpretation is considered in this broader context, Frei‟s 
emphasis on realistic reading and de Lubac‟s emphasis on spiritual interpretation appear 
to be mutually complementary rather than in opposition to one another.   
The second section will examine the relationship between the Scriptures and the 
Church to specify the unique capacity of the Church to receive the mediation of Christ in 
Scripture.  Here de Lubac‟s articulation of the relationship between Christ as the 
Incarnation of the Logos, Scripture, Church and Eucharist as incorporations of the Logos, 
and all persons as bearing an imprint of the Logos, will serve as the hermeneutical lens 
by which to illumine the varying degrees of participation in the Logos in the economy of 
redemption.  This distinction will show the integral correspondence between Church and 
Scripture and will illumine the way in which the Church as a reading community stands 
in a unique location to receive and participate in the mediation of Christ.  De Lubac‟s 
articulation of the intrinsic connection between Scripture and Church will be used to 
show that the central concern of Vanhoozer and Frei to locate authority in either Scripture 
or the Church is largely a false dilemma, as both Scripture and Church bear authority 
through their participation in and mediation of the risen Christ.  Having argued that the 
problem of authority could be largely overcome by showing the intrinsic relationship 
between Scripture and the experience of the Church, the chapter will return to the debate 
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between Tracy and Frei to argue that Tracy‟s later work contains insights which could 
illumine the relationship between Scripture and the Church and advance the 
hermeneutical conversation.    
 Overall, then, the dissertation will seek to advance the discussion between Tracy 
and Frei in several ways.  First, it will highlight the movement from text to spiritual 
reality, the illusive feature which both Tracy and Frei believe is central to a Christian 
interpretation of Scripture but which neither can adequately articulate because their 
projects narrow hermeneutical focus to the relationship between texts and readers.  
Second, it will show the validity of Frei‟s project of realistic reading in fundamental 
agreement with, and not in opposition to, Tracy‟s emphasis on transformative disclosure 
encountered in reading, since the same Jesus Christ who is rendered to the reader in the 
literal sense is the risen Christ who addresses readers by means of Scripture.  Third, it 
will show the validity of Tracy‟s emphasis on the experience of the reading community in 
fundamental agreement with Frei‟s emphasis on the identity of Christ, as it demonstrates 
the intrinsic correspondence between the Scriptures and the Church in the economy of 
redemption.  By examining hermeneutical debates within this broader context, the 
dissertation will show how these impasses between Tracy and Frei can be advanced to 
produce a more complete framework for the Christian interpretation of Scripture.  Such a 
complete framework for Christian interpretation, it is hoped, can provide guidelines 
which apply to other theological trajectories beyond the immediate North American 
discussion.
37
 
                                               
3737 It should be noted that this discussion about Frei and Tracy is predominantly a North 
American discussion about narrative theology.  Yet the debate between Frei and Tracy, as well as the 
suggestions I propose to move beyond the impasse, do relate to a number of other theological trajectories.   
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Frei tirelessly insists that what is “behind the text” can never replace what is “in the text” as an adequate 
mediation of the particular Jesus Christ; he insists that a particular human ideal not replace the identity of 
the Person of Jesus Christ; and he insists that philosophical correlation be subordinated to the content that 
the texts render.  Here I suggest points of contact between this debate and Latin American liberation 
theology, North American feminist revisionist theology, and theologies forged in inter-religious dialogue.  
First, Latin American liberation theologians such as Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino have emphasized the 
plain sense reading of Scripture and the disclosure of Christ to the Church in ways that are somewhat 
similar to the proposal presented here.  Boff and Sobrino place considerable emphasis on the intrinsic 
relationship between the historical Jesus and the risen Christ experienced by the Church, as the historical 
Jesus provides not only the best model of one devoted to the poor and outcast, but is also the cosmic Christ 
who encounters those who seek liberation today (here Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical 
Christology for Our Time (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978), probably provides the most helpful model 
as it connects the historical person of Jesus Christ with the present cosmic Christ which the Church 
experiences.  See also Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological Reading of Jesus of 
Nazareth (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993).  This insistence on the historical Jesus of the Gospels is admirable, and 
it keeps the Jesus Christ of history related to the Jesus Christ who addresses the Church today.  Frei‟s 
insistence on the identity of Jesus Christ as presented by the Gospel narratives would be largely in 
agreement with this impulse. Yet Frei, for example, would be critical of John Louis Segundo‟s articulation 
of Scripture as divine pedagogy rather than divine inspiration (Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of 
Dogma, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), argues God is the director of a long 
educational process, in which the Scriptures present a record of the ways in which God has caused the 
community to experience divine values.  Segundo (ibid, 119-20), emphasizes that the community must go 
beyond the letter of the text, and uses the example of Jesus sending the Spirit to lead the disciples into all 
truth.).  Frei would insist that the identity of the Person of Jesus Christ not be subordinated to the idea of 
liberation (however important is liberation).  Frei would also insist that the texts themselves, rather than 
historical Jesus research, be considered primary in formulating the Christian understanding of Jesus Christ.  
Second, Frei has provided a valid critique for feminist revisionists such as Elizabeth Johnson and Sallie 
McFague.  The key challenge Frei sees for a post-liberal age is grounding the experience of the Church in 
the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.  Frei would be concerned, for example, that Elizabeth Johnson 
often gives the theme of salvation priority over the identity of Christ as provider of that salvation, thus 
subordinating Christ to an idea of liberation (see, for example, Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The 
Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 6).  Furthermore, Frei 
would see in the work of Sallie McFague the worst of the liberal tradition, as she boldly constructs new 
paradigms for theology which are not related to the plain sense reading of the Gospel narratives (see, for 
example, see Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987), 199, for an account of the resurrection which is completely separated from Jesus‟ 
historical life).  Third, Frei‟s work provides a critique for certain theologies developed in the context of 
inter-religious dialogue.  For example, Frei would be wary of Raimon Panikkar‟s strong distinction 
between the historical Jesus Christ and the risen, cosmic Jesus Christ which make it unnecessary to show 
that the historical Christ is necessary for an understanding of the cosmic Christ (for Panikkar, the 
particularity of Jesus Christ may be important for the Christian, but it is not necessary for those of other 
faiths, and even Buddha, Siva, Krishna, etc. could be Christ, not as many Christs, but as various 
expressions of Christ—see Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1964), 121).  Frei would agree with Peter Phan that the relationship between Jesus and 
other savior figures is “asymmetrical,” as Christ is the finality of revelation (see Being Religious 
Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004, 67).  Yet 
this asymmetry, Frei would argue, should lead to intertextual readings of Scripture which seek to make 
sense of all reality (including other religions) in light of Christ and His story.  Overall, then, although this 
dissertation explores only an American hermeneutical discussion about the reading of Scripture, the 
conclusions which it will draw have relevance to other theological trajectories as well.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPASSES IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN HANS FREI AND 
DAVID TRACY   
I.  Introducing the Discussion Between Hans Frei and David Tracy 
 
David Tracy and Hans Frei both began their publishing careers at about the same 
time, each proposing a very different trajectory for the project of theology.  In 1974 Frei 
published his first (and best known) major work, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative:  A 
Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics.  By then Frei was already in 
his 50‟s, and had been teaching at Yale University for over 15 years.  This major work 
was followed up with another book, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical 
Bases of Dogmatic Theology, in 1975.
38
  Frei was concerned because he felt that the 
whole liberal tradition, and nearly all theology from the 18
th
 century onward, had sought 
to employ hermeneutics in the service of apologetic defense of the Christian faith, and 
consequently hermeneutical method emphasized a combination of historical 
reconstruction and philosophical rationale grounded in general human experience.
39
  This 
Liberal approach was destined to failure, Frei argued, because it pressed the plain sense 
of the texts into the service of contemporary apologetics, thereby “eclipsing” the realism 
inherent in biblical narrative.  Frei calls for a reassessment Christian theological method 
which would start from a return to the plain sense of the Gospel narratives.  These two 
                                               
38 This book had been published in the Presbyterian magazine Crossroads in 1967 as The 
Mystery of the Presence of Jesus Christ.   
39 See here George Hunsinger, "Hans Frei as Theologian: The Quest for a Generous 
Orthodoxy," Modern Theology 8, no. 2 (1992), 105.   
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major works together argue that the only way to understand the meaning of Jesus Christ 
for readers today is to understand the particular identity of Jesus Christ as rendered in the 
plain sense of the Gospels.   
As these two books were being published, David Tracy was finishing his first 
major work, The Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology.
40
  At the time 
of its publication in 1975, Tracy was only 36 and had been teaching at the University of 
Chicago for five years.  Tracy‟s concern was to keep Christian theology relevant to the 
postmodern pluralistic situation, and in this book Tracy seeks to prepare theologians to 
engage pluralism by forming a method of critical correlation by which to relate Christian 
faith with contemporary meaning systems.  Since Tracy had suggested that the two 
principle sources for the development of theology are common human experience 
(reflected upon best in language) and the Christian tradition (as preserved primarily in 
Christian symbols and texts), Tracy argued that phenomenological hermeneutics provided 
the best tools to carry out the task of mutually critical correlation.  As a result, Tracy 
adopts the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer to 
engage this correlational task.   
Tracy does not refer to Frei‟s project until the publication of his second major 
work, The Analogical Imagination in 1981.  In this work, Tracy suggests that Frei‟s 
project is reconcilable with his own system of phenomenological hermeneutics, as he 
sees Frei‟s project as a helpful examination of the genre of narrative among other 
                                               
40 Tracy‟s dissertation, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1970), had been published in 1970.   
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genres.
41
  In this book, Tracy develops a model of the classic to show that the way in 
which texts and symbols in all cultures disclose truth to readers is analogous to the way in 
which Christian texts and symbols disclose the God of Christian faith to believers.  Each 
genre in Scripture, Tracy argues, has disclosive potential as it is part of the whole 
religious text of Scripture.  Tracy insists that the very Christian understanding of God 
requires discussion of God to be public, insisting that, “Any authentic speech on the 
reality of God which is really private or particularist is unworthy of that reality.”42  As a 
result, Tracy argues that the theologian is obligated to establish a method which 
correlates Christian theology with contemporary human experience.   
For Frei, Tracy‟s work represented exactly the „eclipsing‟ of the identity of Jesus 
Christ that was so pervasive in the Liberal theological movement, as Tracy‟s model 
seems to start with some presupposed idea about human understanding and then adapts 
the meaning of the biblical texts into that conceptual scheme.  This method, Frei 
believed, would change the referent of the Gospel narratives from Jesus to the existential 
possibility of the reader, as the texts are said to envision a new “mode-of-being-in-the-
world” for the receptive reader.43  In 1984, Frei‟s colleague at Yale, George Lindbeck, 
wrote his influential work The Nature of Doctrine, accusing Tracy of being an 
“experiential-expressivist” (a theologian who understands doctrine to be simply a witness 
                                               
41 See here David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 251, 263, 288n.16, 291n.46, and 296-
97n.81.   
42 Ibid, 51. 
43 Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 127.   
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to those common expressions of religious experience).
44
  Lindbeck‟s book established 
postliberal theology as an identifiable theological trajectory in opposition to revisionist 
theology, and influenced Frei‟s influential 1986 article entitled “The „Literal Reading‟ of 
Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it Break?,” which 
was directed squarely against the phenomenological hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and 
David Tracy.
45
  In this article, Frei criticized any attempt to start with a general 
hermeneutical method for Scriptural reading, suggesting that general method can only 
lead to a pre-conceived, general conclusion which will depreciate the uniqueness of Jesus 
Christ.  To make this argument, Frei abandoned his earlier claim that „realistic reading‟ is 
a necessary feature of the texts themselves and instead claims that the Gospels must be 
read realistically because the community has established this reading practice.  To ground 
his own argument for a literal reading of Scripture in the structure of the texts themselves, 
Frei realized, would be to simply pose one general hermeneutical system against another.  
Consequently, Frei decided to ground his argument for plain sense reading in community 
consensus rather than in the features of the text itself.   
Unfortunately, Frei‟s unexpected death in 1988 prevented him from completing 
his anticipated work on the history of Christology since the Enlightenment.
46
  Some of 
Frei‟s preparation for that work was published in 1992 as Types of Christian Theology, in 
which Frei compares the relative value accorded to philosophical reflection and Christian 
                                               
44 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).   
45 Hans W. Frei, "Literal Reading,” 36-77.     
46 See David Kelsey, George Lindbeck and Gene Outka, “Forward,” in Hans W. Frei, Types of 
Christian Theology, iiix.    
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self-description by contemporary theologians in the construction of theological method.
47
  
In that work, Frei characterized Tracy‟s method as one in which “external description and 
self-description” are grounded in a “foundational philosophical scheme,” and finds it 
ultimately unhelpful to the development of Christian theology.
48
  However, since it is not 
known exactly when Frei wrote this portion of his work, it is not possible to say with 
certainty how Frei viewed Tracy‟s later work.49   
As early as 1981, Tracy had argued that there was no fundamental incompatibility 
between Frei‟s project and his own correlational program.  Throughout his career and 
especially after Frei‟s death, Tracy has expressed appreciation for Frei‟s insistence on 
realistic reading and has sought to incorporate Frei‟s insights into his own work.50  Yet 
Tracy remains wary of any hermeneutical project which does not seek to make Christian 
theology public, and insists that the task of the systematic theologian is to show the 
                                               
47 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 28-56.   
48 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 6), claims that Tracy “tries to have it both ways,” (i.e. 
allow for the particularity of revelation and determine it by a general philosophical schema) yet in the end 
“either reverts to” type one and allows philosophy to dictate the discussion, or it “simply ends in 
hermeneutical incoherence” of type two.   
49 Hunsinger and Placher (“Editorial Introduction” in Hans Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 
x), suggest that Frei may have tempered his criticism of Tracy as Tracy incorporated Frei‟s insights during 
mid 1980‟s.  However, in the Edward Cadbury Lectures given at the University of Birmingham in 1987, 
Frei uses Tracy as representative of Type 2 of his eventual Types of Christian Theology (See Hans W. Frei, 
"The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith: Mediating Theology as a System," in The Edward Cadbury 
Lectures (University of Birmingham: Yale Divinity School Library, 1987, noted by Mike A. Higton, 
Christ, Providence and History: Hans Frei's Public Theology (London & New York: T & T Clark 
International, 2004), 266).  Any change in Frei‟s perspective, then, would have come in the final year of 
Frei‟s life.   
50 David Tracy, "On Reading the Scriptures Theologically," in Theology and Dialogue: 
Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1990), 64, n. 51, has seen Frei‟s insights as corrective to his own work.  See also David Tracy, On 
Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics and the Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994).  
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relevance of Christian faith to contemporary human experience.
51
  As a result, Tracy has 
never accepted Frei‟s project as a “wholesale” program for theology, but sees it as 
yielding one important about narrative reading which can be integrated into his own 
larger correlational method.
52
   
This chapter will provide an overview of the projects of Tracy and Frei and will 
focus on the basic disagreements between them as they articulate a method for reading 
Scripture in the Church.  In the first section, I will examine the way in which each 
theologian understands the relationship between text and readers in which interpretation 
takes place.  Then I will examine a key difficulty faced by each in articulating a model of 
textual interpretation.  I will suggest that Frei‟s greatest struggle is determining whether 
to ground authority for the plain sense in the text or in the reading community, and that 
Tracy‟s greatest struggle is determining how to let the particular claims of Scripture be 
recognized in a way that is not muted by a general theory of interpretation.  These 
difficulties are heightened, I will suggest, by a nearly exclusive focus on the text/reader 
relationship in the hermeneutical model.  In the second section, I will examine the way in 
which each theologian describes the Church as reading community in the process 
interpretation.  I will suggest that the almost exclusive focus on textual method has 
caused both theologians to focus on the Church as a social reality instead of as a 
theological reality.  I will conclude by showing how an overemphasis on the text/reader 
relationship has led to impasses in the theological discussion and will suggest that these 
                                               
51 Tracy ("On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,"  36), claims that he insists on both a 
criteria of “appropriateness” (that which examines the coherence of the logic of Christian faith) and a 
criteria of “intelligibility or credibility” (that which relates Christian faith to the contemporary situation).   
52 Ibid, 37.   
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impasses could be overcome, in part, by better accounting for God‟s active mediation to 
the Church in the process of Scriptural interpretation.   
II.  Scriptural Interpretation: Emphasizing the Text/Reader Relationship 
 
Tracy and Frei stand together in their insistence both that the Scriptures are 
authoritative for the Church, and that the Scriptures are sufficiently clear to be read 
plainly by all readers.  Furthermore, both Tracy and Frei emphasize that the subject 
matter of Scripture is so unique that it is capable of reorienting the very identity of the 
reader who approaches these texts with an to understand it.  Most significantly, these 
theologians agree that both Scripture‟s authority and the way in which it renders its 
unique content to readers must be identified and safeguarded through a particular method 
of reading.  Yet Tracy and Frei have disagreed sharply about the kind of method needed 
to safeguard both the unique content of the text and the ability of the text to reorient the 
reader.  Early in his career Frei places emphasis on the text itself, arguing that the text 
“renders” or “depicts” the truth contained as the reader simply reads it plainly.  Later in 
his career Frei continues to emphasize the straightforward reading of the plain sense, but 
seeks to ground the use of the plain sense in the authority of the early Christian 
community.  Throughout his career, Tracy places most emphasis on the activity of the 
reader in relation to the text, constructing a phenomenological system of understanding in 
which the text discloses truth to the interpreter.  Tracy makes it clear that his focus 
“principally relates to the tradition which focuses upon the reader‟s response or the 
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reception of the work.”53  This disagreement on method between Tracy and Frei has 
resulted in a number of impasses in Scriptural interpretation and has deepened divisions 
between revisionists and postliberals.   
This section will show the way in which each author focuses almost exclusively 
on the relationship between text and reader to construct his respective method.  The 
tensions between the two theologians about method, I will argue throughout the 
dissertation, can be eased (though not entirely overcome) as the text/reader discussion is 
placed within a larger theological construct of the relationship between the Triune God 
and the Church, and God‟s use of the biblical text for self-communication.  Discussion of 
the economy of redemption will place biblical text, individual reader and Church in 
relationship to one another and understand all three as having a role in God‟s plan of 
salvation.
54
  Placing the Frei/Tracy debate in this broader context will broaden the 
discussion of the relationship between texts and reading community. 
A.  The Focus on Method in Frei and Tracy: Aims and Influences  
 
This section will examine the development of hermeneutical method by Frei and 
Tracy, providing an analysis of the greatest influences upon each theologian‟s project.  It 
                                               
53 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 121.  
54 See John J. and R.R. Reno O'Keefe, Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian 
Interpretation of the Bible (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 37-44, 
84-88, 107-113.  See Mark Allen Bowald, Rendering the Word in Theological Hermeneutics (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 1-2, who claims that the decisive element in hermeneutical decisions is 
either text, reader, or author.  I would suggest that historical circumstances have often caused one element 
to be given priority over another.  Premodern exegesis placed much emphasis on the divine author.  Since 
the Enlightenment the emphasis has shifted almost exclusively to the text and human author.  Most 
recently, in postmodern discussions, emphasis has shifted to reader (and reading communities).   
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will seek to show the contribution they makes to Scriptural hermeneutics as they employ 
philosophical and literary resources to advance their central interpretive aims.  As a result 
of this examination of method, it will be possible to more carefully locate the 
disagreements between Frei and Tracy.   
1. Frei: Scripture Renders the Unsubstitutable Identity of Jesus Christ 
 
Aims:  The primary emphasis of Frei‟s hermeneutics is to show how the Gospel 
texts render the identity of Jesus Christ, and through that identity, His presence today.  
From the beginning of his career, Frei argued that primarily because of modern 
hermeneutical endeavors “anthropological and Christological apologetics” have become 
the primary concern of modern theology.
55
  The chief goal of contemporary theologians 
has been to try to fit the gospel stories into present-day criteria, focusing on historical 
categories, apologetics, and general categories of meaning.  Frei feels that this 
preoccupation with explaining biblical events in terms of present experience has caused 
an “eclipse” of biblical narrative as it has posited the necessity for an external criteria of 
                                               
55 Hans W. Frei, "Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal," in Theology and 
Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27.  Frei 
(ibid), argues that the theological procedures have been the same throughout the Enlightenment and to the 
present.  What has changed “has been the sensibility, the image men have of their humanity, that 
constitutes the raw data on which theological analysis of an anthropological kind goes to work.”  Elsewhere 
Frei actually suggests that the problem of philosophical method overwhelming the plain sense actually 
precedes Enlightenment hermeneutics and goes back to the union of philosophy and theology in the 
medieval academies.  Frei proposed that in the institutional structure of western culture as it developed, 
where theology was regarded “queen of the sciences,” “theology has a generally accessible subject matter,” 
and “theology and philosophy are bound to be closely if perhaps oddly related, especially when philosophy 
is regarded…as being the „foundation‟ discipline providing all-fields-encompassing arguments and criteria 
for meaning and certainty” (Hans W. Frei, "Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative: Some 
Hermeneutical Considerations," in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 95).  This entire structure is suspect to Frei, and he regards it as 
more of a historical accident than as a necessary feature of Christianity.   
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meaning to determine the validity of biblical stories, and hence has subordinated the plain 
ascriptive reading of the biblical narrative to philosophical schemas.
56
  To the modern 
interpreter, both dogmatics and metaphysics must be bracketed in order to attend to a 
critical reading of the biblical text.  Yet Frei proposes that this bracketing has been 
largely responsible for an external meaning structure eclipsing the biblical texts. For Frei, 
modern theology must radically change its focus in order to return to a faithful rendering 
of the essence of Christianity.
57
   
Frei, then, resists a system where anthropological or philosophical concerns 
become the organizing or systematic principle for interpreting the Christian faith.  Frei 
believes that systematic correlation always gives the general philosophical system 
priority over Christian self-description in determining meaning for Christianity, as it 
continues the eclipse.  Ultimately, Frei is worried that “the story of the gospel by itself 
becomes an extended metaphor,” so that we again need “a correlation, a new disclosure 
of a possible mode-of-being-in-the-world that will fit with our contemporary limit 
experience.”58  To avoid this eclipse, Frei believes, modern theology must become more 
self-critical about allowing general philosophical meaning systems to determine the 
meaning of Christianity.  Frei‟s earliest paper reflects his lifelong appeal:  “My plea here 
                                               
56 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-10.  Frei (“Remarks in Connection with 
a Theological Proposal,” 28), notes, “If the aim of the theological enterprise has been almost wholly 
apologetic, its organizing or systematic principle largely anthropological, its doctrinal content has been 
well-nigh exclusively Christological.”  The result is that modern theology has focused on salvation, which 
has been oriented around a modernist notion of the human person in general, so that Christ‟s saving action 
replaces his identity. 
57 Frei‟s proposed alternative, (ibid, 27), to this trajectory of modern theology is “either a 
nonapologetic and dogmatic, rather than systematic, theological procedure in which Christology continues 
to be the crucial ingredient or else a metaphysic or ontology in which Christology would play a peripheral 
role.” 
58 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 62.   
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is—the more formal, the less loaded one can make the notion of understanding, the 
better.”59     
Frei‟s goal in his first two books, The Identity of Jesus Christ and The Eclipse of 
Biblical Narrative, is to restore a focus on the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ as 
the center of the Christian faith through a plain reading of the Gospel narratives.  In both, 
his constructive proposal is that the text itself renders an unsubstitutable identity of Jesus 
Christ in such a way that simply reading it plainly will lead the reader to acknowledge the 
unique identity of Jesus.  This unsubstitutable identity has been eclipsed, Frei believes, by 
the modern quest for grounding all theological claims in categories of human 
meaningfulness.  This extrinsic structure must be removed to allow the Gospels to speak 
for themselves.  The Gospel narratives, he thinks, are quite plain in meaning, even if the 
interpreter struggles to fit them into a general framework of meaning.
60
  In Frei‟s early 
work, then, all the emphasis is on the activity of the text—the text which “renders,” 
“deploys,” “articulates,” “depicts,” “instantiates” its meaning to the reader as the reader 
reads it plainly.
61
   
Influences: Erich Auerbach, New Criticism, Gilbert Ryle:  Yet in order to show 
that extrinsic meaning systems ought to be removed to read Scripture, Frei must show 
how the texts really do render the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ plainly.  Frei 
                                               
59 Frei, “Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,” 29.   
60 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 86), claims, “We can understand more and communicate 
better concerning these texts (and others) than we‟ll ever be able to understand how we understand, or what 
the conditions of the possibility of our understanding them might be…the usefulness of the theories we 
employ is discovered in the process of application, of actual exegesis; their use is indispensable, 
unsystematic, and subordinate to the text and its exegesis.”   
61 I have taken these verbs from George P. Schner, "The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: 
Analysis and Critique," Modern Theology 8, no. 2 (1992), 157. 
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uses a number of concepts not taken from contemporary literary theory and modern 
psychology to emphasize the plain sense of the narratives.  It is clear, then, that Frei 
intends to bring in extrinsic formulations for his explanation of the identity of Jesus 
Christ, although he insists that they are less high-powered than full-blown systems of 
meaning.  This section will focus on Frei‟s use of three major influences:  Erich 
Auerbach, the New Criticism, and Gilbert Ryle.
62
   
Frei refers to the Gospels as “realistic narrative,” a category which he derives 
from Erich Auerbach.
63
  Frei proposes that this genre works this way:  
Realistic narrative reading is based on one of the characteristics of the Gospel 
story, especially its later part, viz., that it is history-like…In other words, whether 
or not these stories report history (either reliably or unreliably), whether or not the 
Gospels are other things besides realistic stories, what they tell us is a fruit of the 
stories themselves.  We cannot have what the stories are about (the „subject 
matter‟) without the stories themselves.  They are history-like precisely because 
like history-writing and the traditional novel and unlike myths and allegories they 
literally mean what they say.  There is no gap between the representation and 
what is represented by it.
64
 
 
Frei uses Auerbach because Auerbach recognizes a quality in the biblical texts 
that began with Homer—a world is proposed into which the reader can enter, regardless 
of if that world is actually existing or not.
65
  The intensity of this realistic quality is much 
                                               
62 In the beginning of The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, vii-viii, Frei specifically mentions his 
debt to Erich Auerbach (especially Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature), Karl 
Barth (especially the “later volumes” of Church Dogmatics), and Gilbert Ryle (especially The Concept of 
Mind).  The influence New Criticism also appears significant.   
63 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, vii, suggests that “no student of the Bible has ever 
denied the power and aptness of the analysis of biblical passages and early Christian biblical interpretations 
in the first three chapters of Mimesis.” 
64 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, xiii-xiv.   
65 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. 
Willard R. Trask (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003)., 13, claims that Homer began a 
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stronger in the biblical narratives, however, because they involve not only the proposal of 
a “realistic” world, but also the absolute belief claim that the world of this text is the 
absolute world.  Auerbach writes that the biblical authors‟  
religious intent involves an absolute claim to historical truth…The Biblical 
narrator was obliged to write exactly what his belief in the truth of the 
tradition…demanded of him…What he produced, then, was not primarily 
oriented toward „realism‟…it was oriented toward truth…The Bible‟s claim to 
truth is not only far more urgent than Homer‟s, it is tyrannical—it excludes all 
other claims.  The world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied with claiming to 
be a historically true reality—it insists that it is the only real world…The 
Scripture stories do not, like Homer‟s court our favor, they do not flatter us that 
they may please us and enchant us—they seek to subject us, and if we refuse to be 
subjected we are rebels.
66
 
 
This world of the text calls the reader to enter and adapt to its world, rather than 
allowing the reader to adapt it to his or her own situation.  As a result, “Far from seeking, 
like Homer, merely to make us forget our own reality for a few hours, it seeks to 
overcome our reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be 
elements in its structure of universal history.”67  This willingness to fit oneself into the 
world of the text was quite “easy” until the Enlightenment when “through the awakening 
of a critical consciousness, this becomes impossible, the Biblical claim to absolute 
authority is jeopardized; the method of interpretation is scorned and rejected, the Biblical 
                                                                                                                                            
“realist” tradition, where a “real world” was proposed, into which we can enter, of which “it does not 
matter whether we know that all this is only legend, „make-believe.‟”  Homer “does not need to base his 
story on historical reality, his reality is powerful enough in itself; it ensnares us, weaving its web around us, 
and that suffices him.  And this „real‟ world into which we are lured, exists for itself, contains nothing but 
itself; the Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no secret second meaning...Later 
allegorizing trends have tried their arts of interpretation upon him, but to no avail.  He resists any such 
treatment…”  See also Auerbach, “Figura,” trans. Ralph Manheim, Scenes from the Drama of European 
Literature, vol. 9 of Theory and History of Literature, eds. Wlad Godzich and Jochen SchulteSasse 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 11-76.   
66 Ibid, 14-15. 
67 Ibid, 15. 
 14 
 
stories become ancient legends, and the doctrine they had contained, now dissevered 
from them, becomes a disembodied image.”68  The Enlightenment, then, contributed to a 
reversal from the “text absorbing the world” to the “world absorbing the text.”69  This 
reversal itself must be reversed and realistic reading restored in order to reestablish the 
primacy of the person and work of Jesus Christ as presented in the Gospel narratives.   
The plain sense of the New Testament, for Frei, also includes figural readings.  It 
must, because the entire Bible must be read as a unified whole.  Reading the gospel 
narratives literally will mean that other parts of the Bible will have to be ordered toward 
the Christ event as part of the literal sense.  As a result, Frei includes figural readings in 
the literal sense because it also is oriented toward the identity of Christ as the center of 
the Christian Scriptures.
70
  Figural readings simply are not foundational—they are able to 
arise only as they are grounded on the plain reading of the Gospel narratives.  Frei 
appreciates Auerbach‟s insight of the great change in the interpretation of the Old 
Testament by the New Testament community. Auerbach had written,  
“Paul and the Church Fathers reinterpreted the entire Jewish tradition as a 
succession of figures prognosticating the appearance of Christ, and assigned the 
Roman Empire its proper place in the divine plan of salvation.  Thus while, on the 
one hand, the reality of the Old Testament presents itself as complete truth with a 
                                               
68 Ibid, 16. 
69 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 118.   
70 Frei disagrees with the Reformers who had rejected all other senses of Scripture to preserve 
the literal sense, insisting that as long as the literal sense is preserved, other senses, and indeed, a plurality 
of readings, may be incorporated.  Examining this relationship as a historian, Frei notes, “In view of the 
centrality of the story of Jesus in the interpretive tradition from the earliest days forward and its crucial part 
in the rise of the sensus literalis to eventual predominance, one may well see a connection between this 
story and the fascinating blurring between allegorical and figural or typological interpretation that one soon 
observes in Christian scriptural reading, for typology is in fact a not easily specifiable and yet definite 
bridge between allegorical and literal reading.”  Frei (“Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 111), 
notes that he has gotten this insight from Auerbach, Mimesis, chapters 2-3.     
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claim to sole authority, on the other hand that very claim forces it to a constant 
interpretative change in its own content; for a millennia it undergoes an incessant 
and active development with the life of man in Europe.”71 
 
Realistic narrative, or a plain sense reading, is oriented to the particular Jesus 
Christ, and all else, including our human situation today is read in that light.  Frei would 
agree with Tracy that the interpreter must take the present situation of the reader into 
account.  But Frei would insist that the present situation will be reinterpreted in light of 
the plain sense of the Gospel passion/resurrection accounts rather than the Gospel 
accounts being interpreted in light of a general, extrinsic understanding of the situation.  
This neglect of a realistic reading is the central concern of Frei‟s most influential book, 
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.  There Frei agrees with Auerbach that a realistic 
reading is central to the Bible.  Early in that book, Frei provides a definition for realistic 
narrative: 
To state a thesis: a realistic or history-like (though not necessarily historical) 
element is a feature, as obvious as it is important, of many of the biblical 
narratives that went into the making of Christian belief.  It is a feature that can be 
highlighted by the appropriate analytical procedure and by no other, even if it may 
be difficult to describe the procedure—in contrast to the element itself.72 
 
Frei argues that interpreters all agreed that this specific feature of realistic 
narrative existed, yet because they had no method to identify it, realistic narrative was 
ignored.
73
  It was this eclipse which forced interpreters to abandon the plain meaning of 
the text and search for some other criteria by which to understand the texts.  Frei does not 
                                               
71 Auerbach, 16. 
72 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 10.   
73 Ibid, 10-11. 
 16 
 
dismiss other readings of Scripture such as allegorical, metaphorical or even 
mythological readings.  Frei simply argues that they cannot be considered the plain sense 
of the text and hence cannot be considered the normative Christian reading which 
provides the identity of the Christian Church.
74
  Once the ascriptive identity of Christ 
through the Gospel narratives has been recognized, it is possible to incorporate many 
other readings, or to employ all kinds of schema of general meaning to help illumine the 
text.
75
       
Frei also makes a second hermeneutical move which is influenced by Erich 
Auerbach, extending the realistic narrative of the gospels to the whole canon by means of 
figural reading.
76
  Frei claims that the literal sense can be extended to the whole of the 
Scriptural canon, so that “Without loss to its own literal meaning or specific temporal 
                                               
74 Hans W. Frei, "Conflicts in Interpretation: Resolution, Armistice, or Co-Existence?," in 
Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 165.  Interestingly, though, Frei does not automatically reject Sallie McFague‟s use of Jesus as 
„parable of God.‟  Instead, he claims that both approaches (his own and hers) are not to be placed in a state 
of “irresolvable conflict.”  Thus “it becomes warfare only if it becomes systematized into a parody of two 
mutually exclusive approaches.  Instead one has constantly to ask oneself which of these can more easily 
accommodate the other in a subordinate position, that is, keep on using it and not leave it behind the 
deployment of the more dominant procedure.” 
75 Ibid, 166.  In fact, Frei (ibid), argues that “if the literal ascriptive sense that has been the 
tradition of the Church is guarded, then why not a recrudescence of other internal textual devices?  Why 
then cannot the critic and the ordinary reader accommodate himself to such purely textual modes as 
structuralism or post-structuralism, that is to say, those modern versions of the allegorical sense?” 
76 Auerbach describes Origin as an early Christian exegete who dismisses the realistic nature 
of the Old Testament, subsuming those events into spiritual reality.  For Frei, a key distinction exists 
between “figural” and “figurative,” where the former retains its historical significance while the latter loses 
its historical importance and is subsumed into the spiritual reality.  According to Auerbach ("Figura," in 
Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, Theory and History of Literature (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984), 39), Augustine, unlike Origen, developed a view of the Old Testament which 
was “pure phenomenal prophecy,” in which the reader must “believe what is read to have actually taken 
place as the reading narrates,” yet is fulfilled in the New.  Ultimately Frei will disagree with Auerbach 
about the literal reading of the Gospels.  Auerbach understands the narrative rendering of the Gospels to be 
the response of the disciples to the passion of Christ, while Frei insists that the Gospels are principally 
about the identity of Christ, which is rendered through His actions.  (See here Frei, Identity, 116, and John 
David Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2002), 158).   
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reference, an earlier story (or occurrence) was a figure of a later one.”77  This means that 
the whole biblical canon is to be read as a unified “world of one temporal sequence” in 
which “there must in principle be one cumulative story to depict it.”78  Frei believes that 
figural reading preserves the historical reality of both type and antitype, as an Old 
Testament figure has a real and new meaning added by means of being incorporated into 
a broader story so that they are “not only preserved but enhanced.”79  Dawson claims, 
significantly, that  
Frei frames the relation between the two testaments using the comprehensive 
category of story rather than meaning.  The image, appropriate to narrative, is 
linear rather than vertical: a single story, like a novel in which only the first half is 
read, appears to be incomplete in itself and calls out of its own incompleteness for 
the remainder of the storyline (a „sense of ending‟) that would complete it.80   
 
Frei, following Auerbach, strongly distinguishes figural reading from allegory, 
seeing the former as intratextual reading and the latter as extratextual reading.  Allegory, 
for Frei and Auerbach, is a universal meaning not grounded in a historical event (and 
therefore abstract), which can be placed as a guiding structure to unify a story.
81
  Frei 
                                               
77 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 2.   
78 Ibid.  
79 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 143.  Figural reading, as Frei (Eclipse, 2), understands 
it, is “literalism at the level of the whole biblical story and thus of the depiction of the whole historical 
reality.” 
80 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 164.   
81 Frei ("Karl Barth: Theologian," in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher 
Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 168-69), claims, “Allegory, we know, is the literary 
personification of abstract qualities, usually personal attributes—virtue, reason, faith, courage.  At the 
opposite end from allegory there is the description of personal, earthly existence, which is just what it is 
and neither is nor „means‟ something else.  And between them there is „figura,‟ which is itself and yet 
points beyond itself to something else that it prefigures.”  Here “figura” is a real historical person or event 
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thinks that Kant is the perhaps the best example of allegorical reading, as Kant develops 
“a description of a stage-by-stage process, in which the stages of the narrative are 
paralleled by similar stages in the real subject matter to which the narrative points, and 
which we know independently of the narrative.”82  Furthermore, Frei thinks that allegory 
has often diminished appreciation for the Old Testament narrative and bordered on 
Marcionite interpretation.
83
  Frei‟s goal, then, is to establish the literal sense as the only 
legitimate sense of Scripture and extend this unified story of the identity of Christ to both 
the “figura” before and the contemporary reader after Christ.   
Frei suggests that the better way to articulate this relationship is as “promise” 
where there exists “the fulfillment of an earlier by a later historical event in a 
chronological sequence,” and “earlier and later are at the same time related as trope to 
true meaning.”84  Frei insists, then, on respecting the temporal structure of the canon, 
reading patiently from figure to fulfillment to observe how the later fulfills the former.  
All figural reading must take place as the reader reads the story in narrative sequence.  
Frei claims, “Because interpretation is part of this flowing stream, meaning emerges only 
                                                                                                                                            
which can be incorporated into a larger history-like narrative sequence, where a further, enhanced meaning 
emerges in the antitype.   
82 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 264, noted in Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 
187.   
83 Frei thinks that the strong opposition between Old and New Testaments established by a 
focus on allegory in the early Church borders on Marcionite interpretation (see Dawson, Christian Figural 
Reading, 163).  Frei (Literal Reading, 41), claims that wherever the “letter” (i.e. the Old Testament) was 
viewed in opposition to the “spirit” of the New Testament, “figural and allegorical” readings are considered 
the same thing, and the “Spiritual reading” which is achieved is done so by those within the Christian faith 
rather than those outside, and the reality disclosed is a “„heavenly,‟ spiritual or religious, rather than 
earthly…” reality. 
84 Frei, Literal Reading, 41.   
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as a sequence is narrated from figure to fulfillment.”85  Although the biblical reader 
knows how the narrative will end, “The task of interpretation is to garner the sense of the 
narrative, and not interfere with it by uniting historical and/or narrative sequence with a 
logically distinct meaning…”86  Frei, then, is wary of any attempt to read the Old 
Testament in light of the New in such a way that meaning is accessed in a way other than 
what the narrative itself renders on its own terms.   
Figural reading extends the biblical narrative, as the “one and only real world,” to 
“embrace the experience of any present age and reader.”87  As the figural reading is 
extended to the reader, the reader finds his or her own identity in Christ.
88
  Christ‟s 
“identity as this singular, continuing individual, Jesus of Nazareth, includes humankind in 
its singularity….To be „the first born among many brethren‟ (and sisters) is his vocation 
and his very being.”89  Hence individuals find their own identity in extending the story of 
Jesus‟ unsubstitutable identity to themselves.  Frei realizes that the decision to read 
figuratively is not an inherent quality of the text itself, but is grounded in a theological 
                                               
85 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 156.   
86 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 36.   
87 Frei, ibid, 3.  
88 According to Frei, ("Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and 
Resurrection," in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 86), readers must “identify themselves with the identity, not of a universal hero or 
savior figure, but of the particular person, Jesus of Nazareth, the manifest presence of God in their midst, 
who has identified himself with them.” 
89 Hans W. Frei, "On the Resurrection of Christ," in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and 
William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)., 204-05.   
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presupposition of God‟s providential action in history.90  Both figure and fulfillment can 
be considered as such because both are part of a larger providential ordering of history by 
God.
91
  Hence in Christ all individuals find their own identity through incorporation into 
the story of God‟s action in history.   
Along with Auerbach‟s concept of realistic narrative, Frei also gained insights 
from the literary development called New Criticism.  New Criticism is not definable as a 
movement, but is better understood a “reading practice”92 in which the reader focuses on 
the “system of relationships” within the text rather than those between the text and the 
outside world.
93
  Thus the “literary text is a free-standing, autonomous object, containing 
meanings that are specific to the context provided by the text.”94  Meaning is contained 
                                               
90 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 14), realizes that when Christians read the Old 
Testament figurally, they do not necessarily follow the realistic, history-like character of the text.  Jews 
may legitimately charge Christians with wrong reading. 
91 Dante is the best expression of this figural reading, for Auerbach.  Auerbach (“Figura,” 71), 
claims that Dante “undertook „to conceive the whole earthly historical world…as already subjected to 
God‟s final judgment and thus put in its proper place as decreed by the divine judgment,…in so doing, he 
does not destroy or weaken the earthly nature of his characters, but captures the fullest intensity of their 
individual earthly-historical being and identifies it with the ultimate state of things…‟”  Mike A. Higton 
(Christ, Providence and History, 130), notes that, “For Augustine, the promise-fulfillment scheme is now 
threefold rather than a simple binary opposition: the new promise, the fulfillment of the old, still looks 
forward to a final, eschatological fulfillment.” 
92 Stephen Matterson, "The New Criticism," in Literary Theory and Criticism: An Oxford 
Guide, ed. Patricia Waugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 166-67. New Criticism is similar to 
formalism in that “Language functions in a different way in a work of literature than it does elsewhere, and 
the first job of the reader is to acknowledge and apprehend this special function and the role it plays in the 
formation of meaning.”   
93 Ibid, 170.  The language of the text is unique since, according to Mattison (ibid), “[L]iterary 
language is non-functional language, because the language is doing more than giving us straightforward 
information… it was through literature that we come to fullest knowledge of reality, since in it language is 
used in a way that reflects all of our human needs and resources, which are not only utilitarian…Being 
different from other uses of language, this system ensures that the literary artifact is autonomous…” 
94 Mattison (ibid, 171), claims that because the text is autonomous, meaning is “context-
specific, but is also part of the overall experience of the poem, how it sounds, how it appears on the page.” 
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completely within the bounds of the text, and is thus “intratextual.”95  The text must be 
distanced from its original composition (the “intentional fallacy”) and tradition of 
interpretation (the “affective fallacy”), in order to be freed to render its contents to the 
reader.
96
   
One effect of this isolation of the text for a plain reading is a denial of the 
authority of the author.  According to Wimsatt and Beardsley, there are two principal 
reasons that the author is irrelevant to the judgment of the meaning of a literary text. The 
first reason is that authorial intent is never quite clear and may always be disputed.
97
  The 
second, and more important, reason is that “to invoke intention was to threaten the 
integrity of the text by introducing the figure of the author.  Once the text‟s boundaries 
were threatened, then the text could not be seen as a system of language operating with 
                                               
95 See Frei, “Literal Reading,” 72.  The term here is from Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine, 
118), who claims, “Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than 
translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories.  It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, 
rather than the world the text.”  
96 See W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of 
Poetry (KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 3-40.  The “Intentional Fallacy is a confusion between 
the poem and its origins…It begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological 
causes of the poem and ends in biography and relativism” (21).  The “Affective Fallacy is a confusion 
between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does)…It begins by trying to describe the standard 
of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism.”  The 
result of both fallacies is that “the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to 
disappear” (21).   
97 Wimsatt and Beardsley (ibid, 10), argue because that internal evidence is “public” (part of 
the work and available to all responsible readers), while external evidence is “private” (“not part of the 
work as a linguistic fact”), only the first should be part of the study of the text.  Even the author‟s notes, 
added to the text, are no longer “external indexes to the author‟s intention;” rather, they are not “parts of the 
poem.”  The author must be kept at a distance if the poem is to be studied with integrity (16). 
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its own rules.”98  The author must be removed if the text was to operate as its own 
semiotic system.
99
   
Frei claims his own use of realistic narrative is similar to “New Criticism” in that,  
Both claim that the text is a normative and pure „meaning‟ world of its own 
which, quite apart from any factual reference it may have, and apart from its 
author‟s intention or its reader‟s reception, stands on its own with the authority of 
self-evident intelligibility.  The reader‟s „interpretation‟ can, and indeed has to be, 
minimal, reiterative, and formal, so that the very term „interpretation‟ is already 
misleadingly high-powered.  In the case of the „realistic‟ novel these are devices 
such as temporal structuring, the irreducible interaction of character and plot, 
ordinary or „mixed‟ rather than elevated style, and so forth.  These devices are 
said to be of the very essence of the text and of its quality as a linguistic 
sacrament, inseparable from the world that it is (rather than merely represents), 
but also the means by which that world is rendered to the reader so that (s)he can 
understand it without any large-scale „creative‟ contribution of his/her own.100   
 
Frei appreciates New Criticism because it provides a model for reading plainly 
that is “less high-powered than hermeneutical theory.”101  The interpreter is freed from 
prolegomenal discussions of meaning and is able to simply interpret the text as it stands.  
One of the benefits Frei sees in New Criticism is that it separates meaning from truth and 
focuses only on meaning, since the text is a self-contained unit.
102
  Truth here refers to 
                                               
98 Matterson, “The New Criticism,” 171.     
99 It is crucial to notice the difference here between New Critics and Structuralists/ 
Poststructuralists on the distanciation of the author from the text.  Matterson (“The New Criticism,” 171), 
notes that “For structuralists and poststructuralists, the removal of the author from critical consideration 
was an act of liberation which meant that the text could be scrutinized in the contexts supplied by historical 
and social discourses, languages outside the text.  For the New Critics, removing authorial intentionality 
was part of a strategy of sealing off the boundaries of the text and ensuring that only the words on the page 
were the true focus of critical judgment.” 
100 Hans W. Frei, "Literal Reading,” 140. 
101 Ibid, 141.   
102 Ibid.  Frei (ibid), claims that study of the text “is confined to „meaning‟ as logically distinct 
from „truth‟” and because “the formal features of realistic narrative about which it generalizes are as often 
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the actual occurrence of the referent of the text.  Truth depends on the correspondence of 
a text to a referent.  Meaning, on the other hand, refers to the sense rendered by the 
configuration of the text itself, irrespective of the referent.  The reader can grasp the 
meaning of the text without knowing anything about the historical referent mentioned by 
the words.  Because the text is a self-contained unit, it is irrelevant to the literary 
approach whether or not the referent actually exists.  What is important is that the reader 
can understand the words of the text.  As we have seen, Frei is suspicious of making 
meaning dependent upon truth because he feels that determining what is true depends on 
meaning structures that are extrinsic to the text, meaning structures that have often been 
imposed on the text with “eclipsing” consequences.  During the reign of Enlightenment 
hermeneutics, Frei argues, the “literary or textual referent and the real or true, 
extratextual referent were thought to be logically one and the same.” 103  The result is that 
many well-intentioned interpreters were guilty of eclipsing the biblical narrative, from 
fundamentalists on the right to liberals on the left. 
Frei notices that secular readers of the text notice the text as a text, while 
Christian interpreters tend, because of their very focus on apologetics, to gravitate from 
“text” to “truth,” thus, perhaps unknowingly, neglecting to attend to the “meaning.”  Frei 
                                                                                                                                            
as not implicit rather than explicit, so that they must be exhibited in textual examples rather than stated in 
abstract terms.” 
103 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 84.  This happened, Frei (ibid), argues, “largely because 
people confused hermeneutics, theory of meaning and understanding, with epistemology, a theory of 
knowledge.  As a result, you had two kinds of literalists now: fundamentalists who thought that the texts as 
they stood were an accurate rendition of the „real‟ or „historical‟ Jesus; and liberals who thought that you 
had to reconstruct a picture from the text in order to get an accurate impression of the literally „real‟ or 
„historical‟ Jesus…It cannot be said often and emphatically enough that liberals and fundamentalists are 
siblings under the skin of identifying or rather confusing ascriptive as well as descriptive literalism about 
Jesus as the level of understanding the text, with ascriptive and descriptive literalism at the level of 
knowing historical reality.” 
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writes, “I do want to suggest that what has distinguished most recent secular interpreters 
of the Bible from their Christian counterparts…is that the former want to emphasize the 
text itself and that they do not wish its interpretation to be governed by a criterion of 
meaning that is strongly connected to one of truth.
104
  Thus for Christians, “There may be 
reasons…to exercise reticence about the transition [from text to truth].  The move from 
text to truth or from language to reality, which ever form it takes, is almost always 
premature and some of us have found the secular literary readers of the Bible very helpful 
in reminding us of the fact.”105  It seems possible, Frei observes, for readers (secular and 
Christian alike) to simply read the text and understand its subject matter (the identity of 
Jesus Christ) without employing any previous theory of meaning.   
Proponents of reader-response theory have strongly criticized certain aspects of 
the New Criticism.  They found two significant problems with locating meaning within 
the bounds of the text alone.  First, the theory “devalues the power of literature to relate 
to a real world.”  When all emphasis is placed on the meaning of the text irrespective of 
its referent, the text consequently cannot say anything about a referent.  Second, the 
theory “is not ideologically innocent, and the claim to focus on the bounded space of the 
text was a gesture arising from a covertly held conservative position.”106  Frei‟s own 
reticence toward New Criticism, seen clearly in his later career, appreciates both of these 
criticisms.  With regard to the first, Frei has always understood the need to show that the 
                                               
104 Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” 162.  Frei (ibid), notes that, “Rather than risking that 
connection, they would drop the very notions of meaning and truth.” 
105 Ibid, 163. 
106 Matterson, 174.  Stanley Fish‟s Literature in the Reader, Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1999, originally published in 1970, is probably the most influential work against New 
Criticism.   
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Christ rendered in the Gospels is the real, living, present Christ who is head of the 
Church.  Frei emphasizes that at the resurrection, the story of Jesus does overflow the text 
and have implications for all of reality.  In this sense, Frei has always emphasized that the 
implications of the Gospel narratives cannot simply remain immanent to their texts.  With 
regard to the second, Frei does acknowledge that New Criticism, and his own use of it, is 
not value-neutral.
107
  As a result, Frei‟s later work argues that a plain sense reading of the 
Gospels is grounded not in a particular literary category, but in “the context of a 
sociolinguistic community,”108 a point to which I will later return.    
A final significant influence on Frei‟s hermeneutical theory is Gilbert Ryle.109  
Ryle‟s great insight for Frei was in showing that there is no such thing as an “inner self” 
which grounds all the actions and intentions of a human being.  There simply is no 
“Decartes‟ myth,” or the “myth of the ghost in the machine” (as Ryle calls it), no 
discoverable “inner self” which can be accessed in its own rite.110  Ryle would insist that 
an action not consist of two actions, “an inner, mental act of will, and an external, bodily 
                                               
107 At the end of Frei‟s “Literal Reading,” 143, Frei notes his continued appreciation with 
New Criticism (namely that it is a “case-specific reading” which “governs, and bends to its own ends 
whatever general categories it shares…”), even as he criticizes the theory‟s value-neutral claim.   
108 Frei, Literal Reading, 143. 
109 In the preface to The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, viii, Frei acknowledges his debt to 
Gilbert Ryle.  In light of this, it is somewhat surprising that Frei only mentions Ryle once after the preface.  
In the preface Frei admits that Ryle‟s book has been rightly criticized on a number of accounts and Frei 
appears to distance himself from Ryle‟s system as a whole, only incorporating Ryle‟s denial of an inner-
self concurrent with outward actions. 
110 See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.  See 
especially chapter 1, “Decartes‟ Myth,” 11-24. 
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act of moving.”111  Ryle would say the action is one action, a deliberate action.  Ryle 
claims,  
What makes the action deliberate is that it is done in a particular way, under 
particular circumstances, perhaps as part of a particular pattern of action, not that 
it is accompanied by some second act, invisible but independent.  Similarly, to do 
or say something intelligently is not to do two things—a physical act of speech or 
movement and a mental act of thought—but to perform one action in a particular 
way and context.  It follows that the human self is not some unknowable inner 
entity, of whose nature may or may not be revealed by the words and body actions 
so mysteriously related to it.  Rather, my words and actions constitute my 
identity.
112
 
 
This insight allows Frei to emphasize in Identity that all we can know of Jesus‟ 
identity is the sum of his actions in relation to others.  We simply do not understand a 
person‟s “identity” by looking for some interior intentional moment all by itself.  Frei 
claims that “For descriptive purposes, a person‟s uniqueness is not attributable to a super-
added factor, an invisible agent residing inside and from there directing the body…An 
intention is an implicit action, an action is an explicit intention.”113  We simply do not 
discover the identity of ourselves or others by,  
[Entering] a mysterious realm of being and meaning, or an equally mysterious 
private-subject world in order to discover what makes any intelligent action 
publicly or commonly intelligible.  Especially in narrative, novelistic, or history-
like form, where meaning is most nearly inseparable from the words—from the 
descriptive shape of the story as a pattern of enactment, there is neither need for 
nor use in looking for meaning in a more profound stratum underneath the 
                                               
111 William C. Placher, "Introduction," 11.  According to the “Descartes‟ myth” a movement 
of an arm is a twofold action. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 42.  Frei does not exclude the possibility of such an inner 
moment—such a moment may, in fact, exist.  According to Placher ( “Introduction,” 12), “There is a real or 
hypothetical „inside‟ description of that transition, of which all of us are aware but of which it is not easy to 
give an account.”  It is just that this inner self is not describable without the passage of intention to action. 
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structure (a separable „subject matter‟) or in a separable author‟s „intention,‟ or in 
a combination of such behind-the-scenes projections.
114
   
 
The import here is that a general theory of human existence, the self, 
understanding, or meaning does not have to be developed before one can begin to 
understand the text.  This has consequences in two different directions: First, an 
interpreter really can understand the text before a general theory of understanding is 
developed.
115
  Second, one can understand the identity of Jesus Christ only as the text 
renders the movement of his intentions to actions.  Frei writes, “Identity is essentially the 
action and testimony of a personal being by which he lays true claim to being himself and 
the same at an important point as well as over a length of time.”116  Frei applies Ryle‟s 
understanding of a human being to the narrative rendering of Jesus Christ:  
What is a man?...A man—in this instance [i.e. in the New Testament depiction of 
Christ] the fully human savior who, by his action peculiar to himself, bestows a 
particular human identity upon the mythological savior figure—is what he does 
uniquely, the way no one else does it.  It may be that this is action over a lifetime, 
or at some climactic moment, or both.  When we see the loyalty of a lifetime 
consummated at one particular point, but even if we see several hitherto 
ambiguous strands in his character pruned and ordered in a clear and decisive way 
at that point—then we are apt to say: „Here he was most of all himself.‟117 
 
                                               
114 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 281.  Here Ryle is invoked to show that “to 
perform intelligently is to do one thing and not two things.” 
115 Frei, “Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,” 37.  Frei (ibid), claims, “One 
can, I think, describe the passage of intention into action…and the unity and mutual dependence of 
intention and action, without appealing to the ontological ground of that unity, of which we have no direct 
or descriptive knowledge such as we have of the unity and passage from intention to action itself.”  This 
calls into question the project of modern interpretation theory, and Frei singles out especially Bultmann and 
phenomenological hermeneutics for critique.   
116 Frei, "Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection," in 
Theology and Narrative, ed. George Hunsinger and William Placher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 60. 
117 Ibid, 57. 
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Thus Frei, praising Karl Barth for bringing Jesus‟ person and work closer 
together, argues, “Jesus was what he did and underwent, and not simply his 
understanding or self-understanding…The unity of Christology and soteriology is their 
unity in the narrative rather than a conceptual unity in which the two concepts „person‟ 
and „work‟ become perfectly integrated.”118  This identity is rendered through a plain 
reading of the Gospel narratives, as the identity of Jesus Christ could not be discoverable 
anywhere else. 
Frei is unwilling to align himself closely with any theory of human personhood.  
Frei does not reject the possibility that something of an inner self exists.  He only argues 
that at present such an entity cannot be known in itself.
119
  Frei‟s goal is to show that 
interpreters are not required to begin with a particular understanding of the self in order 
to understand the plain sense of the text.  In this light, Ryle proves a useful ad hoc ally in 
combating both phenomenological hermeneutics
120
 and the New Quest for the historical 
                                               
118 Hans W. Frei, "Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence," in Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. and Robert F. Streetman Duke (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988), 184.   
119 Frei (“Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus‟ Death and Resurrection” 73), 
claims, “What then do we mean by a man‟s identity? Until a supertheory comes along, we will be content 
to say that we know him when we can say of him over a period of time or in a crucial occurrence, „when he 
did and underwent this, he was most of all himself,‟ and when we can say of him, „his self-manifestation 
was a rightful expression of who he was.‟  A person‟s identity is known to us in the inseparability of who 
he was and what he did.” 
120 Frei, (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, viii), writes, “Ryle‟s work (although not directly 
about hermeneutics and whether or not finally successful) is a marvelous antidote to the contorted and to 
my mind unsuccessful efforts of certain phenomenologists and philosophers of „Existence‟ or „Being‟ to 
tackle a similar dualism.” 
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Jesus.
121
  Only if identity is constituted as intentions become actions can the texts narrate 
who Jesus really is.   
From the very beginning, then, Frei thinks that the Gospel narratives can plainly 
render their meaning to a responsible reader, provided that extrinsic meaning systems are 
kept at bay so that the interpreter can plainly read the text.  To make space for the texts to 
render their plain meaning, Frei employs a number of low-level conceptual schemes as ad 
hoc allies which allow the text itself to render realistically the unsubstitutable identity of 
Jesus Christ.  Authority for this rendering of identity is granted to the text itself, and 
readers are required to recognize what the text plainly presents.   
2.  David Tracy: Scripture Discloses the Present Christ to the Reader 
   
Aims:  Public Theology and Disclosive Texts:  David Tracy‟s theological project 
focuses on the public nature of the Church and its theological discourse.  As a result, the 
primary emphasis of Tracy‟s hermeneutics is to show in a publicly intelligible way how 
the biblical text discloses the existential significance of the Christ event for readers who 
                                               
121 It is significant that Frei writes an “Excurse” after “Theological Reflections on the 
Accounts of Jesus‟ Death and Resurrection,” 88, on the New Quest for the Historical Jesus, illustrating this 
problem.  Here Frei argues that the chief problem of the New Quest is that it really never questions the 
“inherited scheme of existentiell understanding of the self,” and hence believes that “the true identity of a 
person lies in existentiell self-understanding” (90).  Frei argues that this new quest has gained more 
significance than it deserves, primarily because it has become commonplace in “German Idealism and now 
Existentialism” to “take for granted two assumptions: (1) That the written word (especially in the case of 
the New Testament writers) represents not the proper expression but the frozen „objectification‟ of the mind 
that lies behind it; (2) that the proper way to grasp one‟s own intention, indeed identity, as well as that of 
others, is by entry into the basic self-reflective act of the self, into that which is never „merely given‟” (88).  
Ryle proves a useful ad hoc ally for Frei in showing how quests for the inner-consciousness of Jesus are 
fundamentally flawed, as they presuppose “the Decartes‟ myth.”  It is the text which renders Christ‟s 
identity, and not a particular quest behind the text for the purpose of understanding Jesus‟ inner 
consciousness. 
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encounter it today.  Tracy frequently uses general explanatory schemes to articulate better 
the meaning of the Christian faith. 
The key to Tracy‟s argument about the publicness of the Church and its 
theological discourse is “the classic.”122  For Tracy, classics are public and grounded in a 
tradition.  They become a primary source for the self-identity of the tradition which bears 
them.  Classics arise in every culture, and since a classic is grounded in a particular 
tradition, it “will always be in need of further interpretation in view of its need for 
renewed application to a particular situation.”123  A theory of the classic nature of the 
Christian texts ensures that the Church, theology, and interpretation of the Scriptures will 
all remain public, because classics appeal to our common human experience.
124
   
Influences: H.G. Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur:
125
  In The Analogical Imagination, 
Tracy develops a model of the classic which owes much to Hans-Gorg Gadamer.
126
  
                                               
122 The “classic” is the central theme of Tracy‟s most influential book, The Analogical 
Imagination.  Here Tracy moves in progression from a description of the classic (99-153) to the religious 
classic (154-230) to the Christian classic (248-338).   
123 David Tracy, On Naming the Present, 115.   
124 Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 115), claims, “Whenever we actually experience even 
one classic work of art we are liberated from privateness into the genuine publicness of a disclosure of 
truth.  It seems foolish, therefore, to develop theories of aesthetics which effectively deny the truth-
character of the experience of art as a realized experience of the essential…Instead we need, I believe, a 
rehabilitation of the notions of the normative, the authoritative—in a word, the classical—now freed from 
the private domain of elitist classicists and welcomed again as the communal and public heritage of our 
common human experience of the truth of the work of art.” 
125 This list of influences is by no means comprehensive.  Much of Tracy‟s appreciation for a 
“Manifestation” model of the divine is greatly influenced by Mircea Eliade (see Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the 
Sacred, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 48-56.  Much of Tracy‟s attention to theological method 
was developed from Bernard Lonergan.  Tracy‟s first publication, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), shows the appreciation Tracy held for Lonergan‟s focus on 
theological method.  Tracy‟s own project moves beyond Lonergan‟s, though, in that Tracy thinks that 
Lonergan simply assumes the truth of Christian dogmatic claims rather than grounding them critically.  
Tracy argues that Scripture and dogmatic formulations must be subjected to a critical criteria which is 
developed from the Western historical consciousness (see Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 
214-17, and T. Howland Sanks, "David Tracy's Theological Project: An Overview and Some Implications," 
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Tracy explores the nature of three categories of classics: general classics (disclosive of 
some truth), religious classics (disclosive of a claim to the whole), and the Christian 
classic (disclosive of the person-event of Jesus Christ).  It is by subject matter that Tracy 
categorizes classics into three groups.  Each category of classic is specific in the kind of 
content which it reveals, yet all classics are similar in the manner in which they disclose 
that truth.  A religious classic differs from a cultural classic in that while a cultural classic 
discloses a truth about a particular dimension of life, a religious classic discloses truth 
about the whole of reality.  Tracy writes, those “explicitly religious classic expressions 
will involve a claim to truth as the evidence of a disclosure-concealment of the whole of 
reality by the power of the whole—as, in some sense, a radical and finally gracious 
mystery.”127  As such, a religious classic involves a “risk” that this classic “may prove 
genuinely disclosive of a reality that cannot be denied.”128  The Christian classic differs 
from the religious classic in that the truth it discloses is a particular one: the subject 
matter of the Christian classic is the event of Jesus Christ.  Thus while the manner of 
disclosure is the same in all classics, the content of the disclosure is particular to the 
particular kind of classic.   
Classics for Tracy are not only texts, but can also be “events, images, persons, 
rituals and symbols which are assumed to disclose permanent possibilities or meaning 
                                                                                                                                            
Theological Studies 54 (1993), 700-02).  Here I am only developing Tracy‟s project with a view to 
Gadamer and Ricoeur, since Tracy‟s disagreement with Frei is grounded in hermeneutical differences.   
126 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Garrett and John Cumming Barden 
(New York: Continuum, 1970; reprint, 2nd rev. ed.), Part 1: “The question of truth as it emerges in the 
experience of art,” 1-36. 
127 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 83.   
128 Ibid, 716.   
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and truth.”129  The Christian faith, then, is bearer of a number of different classics.  All 
classics, are, by definition, disclosive of truth.  Hence they have a certain authority within 
their tradition to disclose that truth.  The normative “classic” for the Christian tradition is 
the “event and person of Jesus Christ.”130  The Christian Scriptures are a classic of the 
Christian community, but they do not replace the primary classic.  Rather, they are a 
derivative classic, as they authoritatively witness to that primary classic.
131
   
The classic, “by definition, is assumed to be any text that always has the power to 
transform the horizon of the interpreter and thereby disclose new meaning and 
experiential possibilities” for Tracy.132  All classics disclose truth analogously to the way 
in which a work of art discloses truth.
133
  Following Gadamer, Tracy writes,  
[W]hen I experience any classic work of art, I do not experience myself as an 
autonomous subject aesthetically appreciating the good qualities of an aesthetic 
                                               
129 Ibid, 68.   
130 Ibid, 233.  Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 241, n. 1), admits that there are other 
“responsible” candidates for the „Christian classic‟ (“Spirit,” “God,” “human,” “church”) yet he argues that 
Christ has been the major “classic” since the New Testament, and that the other candidates can only be 
understood in light of the Christ event.   
131 Ibid, 248.  They are derivative because they “serve not as the object of the community‟s 
worship…but as the normative, more relatively adequate expressions of the community‟s past and present 
experience of the Risen Lord, the crucified one, Jesus Christ.”  The Scriptures are the “original and 
normative responses to the Christ event are those expressions of the earliest communities codified in the 
texts named the New Testament.”  As responses, they are “only a relatively adequate expression of the 
earliest Christian community‟s experience” and “remain open to new experiences—new questions, new and 
sometimes more adequate responses for later generations who experience the same event in ever different 
situations” (The Analogical Imagination, 249).     
132 Tracy, On Naming the Present, 115.  Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 108), claims, 
“My thesis is that what we mean in naming certain texts, events, images, rituals, symbols and persons 
„classics‟ is that here we recognize nothing less than the disclosure of a reality we cannot but name truth.”  
This disclosive power sets classics apart from other works which have not been recognized to 
paradigmatically disclose truth:  “Only classic works of art, whatever their period, whatever their culture, 
can be counted on to allow, indeed to compel, that kind of experience and that kind of paradigmatic 
recognition” (113).   
133 Ibid, xii.  
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object set over against me.  Indeed, when I reflect after the experience upon the 
experience itself, shorn of prior theories of „aesthetics,‟ I find that my subjectivity 
is never in control of the experience, nor is the work of art actually experienced as 
an object with certain qualities over against me.  Rather the work of art 
encounters me with the surprise, impact, even shock of reality itself.  In 
experiencing art, I recognize a truth I somehow know but know I did not really 
know except through the experience of recognition of the essential compelled by 
the work of art.  I am transformed by its truth when I return to the everyday, to the 
whole of what I ordinarily call reality, and discover new affinities, new 
sensibilities for the everyday.
134
 
 
Tracy claims that the disclosure in a work of art is an experience in which the 
interpreter finds herself to be passively caught up in moment of truth.  He writes, “When 
anyone of us is caught unawares by a genuine work of art, we find ourselves in the trip of 
an event, a happening, a disclosure, a claim to truth which we cannot deny and can only 
eliminate by our later controlled reflection.”135  It is the classic that encounters the 
interpreter, and a genuine disclosure affects the interpreter.  Gadamer has written, “In the 
experience of art we see a genuine experience induced by the work, which does not leave 
him who has it unchanged, and we enquire into the mode of being of that which is 
experienced in this way.  So we hope to understand better what kind of truth it is that 
encounters us there.”136  The experience, then, is more disclosive than constructive, 
giving priority to the subject matter of the classic.  It must be the subject-matter which 
controls the discussion between text and reader.  As a result,   
Real conversation occurs only when the participants allow the question, the 
subject matter, to assume primacy…we are carried along, and sometimes away, 
by the subject matter itself into the rare event or happening named „thinking‟ and 
„understanding.‟  For understanding happens; it occurs not as the pure result of 
                                               
134 Ibid, 111-12.   
135 Ibid, 114.   
136 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 89. 
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personal achievement but in the back-and-forth movement of the conversation 
itself.
137
   
 
This experience of disclosure, Tracy thinks, is much like the gracious, gifted 
moment of faith in Christian theology.  In a footnote, Tracy specifically claims that his 
argument about the religious classic “is directly parallel to the earlier claim for the classic 
work of art,” and as a result, Tracy suggests, “The claims to truth in both art and 
religions, I believe, stand or fall together.”138  Consequently, Tracy argues that the faith 
encounter of Christians with the event of Jesus Christ occurs in much the same way all 
classics disclose truth:   
The interpreter may of course, in a later reflective, distancing moment, question 
that original religious experience and reinterpret it as some „as-if‟ experience 
produced by the human imagination.  But in the moment of encounter-response 
itself, the moment Christians call „faith,‟ there is no „imagine-reality-as-if-it-were-
this-way‟ experience.  There is, rather, the realized experience of a recognition as 
that response of trust called faith to the reality of the whole disclosed in the 
religious classic: a reality experienced as liberating one to trust that how we ought 
to live and how things in reality are, are finally one.
139
   
 
Here the “moment of encounter-response itself” is described as precisely “the moment 
Christians call „faith.‟”  This moment takes place, Tracy believes, in all religious classics.  
The experience of disclosive truth in art is very much like the experience of disclosive 
truth in religious faith, and, more specifically, in the disclosure of the Christ event.   
                                               
137 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 101.   
138 Ibid, 185, n. 37.  This is a strong statement, since it could be taken to imply that Tracy may 
have built his Christology upon a framework of phenomenological hermeneutics of disclosure which may 
allow the truth of the Christ-event to “stand or fall” with the truth claims of art.  However, it does not seem 
that this statement is central to Tracy‟s project, since even within The Analogical Imagination Tracy 
distances himself from putting too much stake in the classic, saying, “An appeal for a focus upon the 
classics is merely one strategy for clarifying some major paths through the conflict” (Analogical 
Imagination, 372).  I simply notice the inevitable tension here as Tracy tries to speak about the particularity 
of revelation through general categories. 
139 Ibid, 164. 
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Yet Tracy, following Ricoeur,
 
does not believe that his use of general 
philosophical hermeneutics determines his reading of Scripture.
140
  In fact, Tracy believes 
that he and Frei are both simply using a general hermeneutic which can “inform without 
„taking over‟ a theological analysis of scriptural texts.”141  Tracy insists that his 
explanation of the Scriptural texts as a religious classic does not limit their contents to 
that of a secular classic.  Tracy specifies that his argument about the classic moves “from 
the abstract to the concrete, not, as too often interpreted, from the concrete 
(foundationalist) to the specific.”142  Tracy does not think that he bases his analysis in 
some general, identifiable human experience (i.e. foundationalism) and then arguing 
particular Christian claims.  Rather, he believes that he has found in the classic an 
analogy for understanding how Christians experience disclosure in their Scriptures.  I will 
later discuss how this general model of disclosure affects interpretations of the 
particularity of Jesus Christ.  For now, it simply ought to be noticed that when Tracy 
                                               
140 Paul Ricoeur ("Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics," Studies in 
Religion/Sciences Religieuses 5 (1975), 17), claims, “The task of interpreting these specific texts [the 
Bible] will require that theological hermeneutics ultimately encompass philosophical hermeneutics and 
transform it into its own organon.” Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, trans. Don Ihde (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 51, argues, “There is no general hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis, but only 
disparate and opposed theories concerning the rules of interpretation” (cited in William C. Placher, "Paul 
Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A Conflict of Interpretations?," Modern Theology 4, 1 (1987), 51). 
141 Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 59, n. 16).  Here Tracy cites his work in 
Analogical Imagination 233-305.  Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 376, further claims that “general method 
may guide but not control the specific demands of the particular theological point at issue in a particular 
instance of interpretation: the general method guides; particular interpretations rule.” 
142 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 59, n. 16.  Higton (“Ordinary,” 581-82), 
also argues with Tracy that Frei has overstated his case.  While the description of the general classic is 
dependent on Gadamer, in the second step to analysis of the religious classic, “the religious intensification 
transforms the hermeneutical frame” and adds “new material” not able to be gleaned from the general 
classic.  The third step, in which “the focus on this particular religious tradition with its central classic, the 
man Jesus of Nazareth, transforms and even perhaps „subverts‟ the more general hermeneutics” (582).  
Higton is correct that new information is added in each step.  However, it is the subject matter of the 
disclosure, and never the manner of disclosure which changes.  In this sense, Tracy does employ a general 
hermeneutical method to all texts, including Scripture.  
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appeals to special hermeneutics, his emphasis is on the unique subject matter disclosed in 
Scripture which may require a unique preunderstanding and a unique response, but not 
necessarily a unique manner of disclosure.   
For Gadamer, tradition is the major constituting force behind any act of 
interpretation.
143
  The interpreter engages in the interpretative work from within the 
stream of tradition, and the fusion of horizons likewise takes place within this stream.  
Tracy follows Gadamer in claiming,  
Indeed, as Hans-Georg Gadamer…has argued on strictly philosophical grounds, 
„belonging to‟ a tradition (presuming it is a major tradition which has produced 
classics) is unavoidable when one considers the intrinsic, indeed ontic and 
ontological historicity of our constitution as human selves.  Moreover, tradition is 
an ambiguous but still enriching, not impoverishing reality.  Any serious 
recognition of the radical finitude of any single thinker‟s reflection and the wealth 
of experience, insight, judgment, taste and common sense which enculturation 
into a major tradition offers enriches all participants willing to be „formed‟ by that 
tradition.
144
   
 
As a result, “the theologian, in risking faith in a particular religious tradition, has 
the right and responsibility to be „formed‟ by that tradition and community.”145  Tracy 
typically understands the Church in much the same way that Gadamer understands 
tradition.  The Church, the tradition which bears the Christian classic, carries on the 
memory of Jesus, so that Jesus is “the Jesus remembered by the tradition which mediates 
                                               
143 Maurizio Ferraris, History of Hermeneutics, ed. Hugh J. and Graeme Nicholson Silverman, 
trans. Luca Somigli, Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Humanities Press International, 1996), 178.  Ferraris (ibid), claims, “Gadamer‟s position is idealist 
insofar as it makes tradition the ultimate instance of reality.” 
144 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 66.   
145 Ibid, 67. 
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the event in the present through word, sacrament and action; the Jesus remembered as the 
Christ, the presence among us of God‟s own self.”146  
Where Tracy parts company with Gadamer is in Tracy‟s emphasis on the need for 
critical readings of Scripture.  Specifically, Tracy thinks Gadamer gives too much 
authority to the role of tradition in the interpretation of the biblical text.
147
  Tracy affirms 
a need, not only to be formed by tradition, but to be able to critique it.  Although one‟s 
preunderstanding is formed by the tradition, Tracy feels that Gadamer does not provide a 
self-critical moment in the interpretative process by which the interpreter can question the 
validity of a particular reading.  Tracy worries that a “purely hermeneutical approach can 
too often serve simply to affirm a tradition, to disallow the emancipatory function of 
critical reason and eventually to capitulate to, not transform, the status quo.”148  Unless 
the interpreter can provide a critical moment in the interpretation process, tradition may 
hold a tyranny over the text itself.  Consequently, Tracy shows an appreciation for the 
contributions of the “Masters of Suspicion” who have shown ideological totalizing to be 
the result of uncritical acceptance of text.  Totalizing schemes are perhaps inherent to 
textual privileging, and hence narratives, even the Scriptural narratives, Tracy feels, are 
open to ideological critique.  Tracy believes that Ricoeur‟s appreciation for a 
                                               
146 Ibid, 234. 
147 Ibid, 136, n. 16.  Tracy (ibid), disagrees with Gadamer on his “strained polemic against all 
„method‟, and “some of his formulations for the necessary moment of „application‟ in interpretation.” 
148 Ibid, 73.  Tracy appreciates Habermas‟s critique of Gadamer.  Tracy (The Analogical 
Imagination, 74), worries that hermeneutical theologians will be “too content with a relatively unexamined 
trust that the rhetorical persuasiveness of those retrieved meanings will prove sufficient to transform 
individual and societal practice,” and hence Tracy sees value in liberation and political theologies to call 
continually into question the reformulation of Christian classics.  The goal of all critical methods, for Tracy 
(ibid, 324), is to advance the “necessary reformatory impulse at the heart of gospel and the Christian 
tradition.” 
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hermeneutics of suspicion provides more resources for the continual self-critical role that 
theological hermeneutics must play.  As a result, it will be helpful to summarize the key 
points of Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics.   
Paul Ricoeur starts his project from the presupposition of “distanciation,” the 
ability of the interpreter to create critical space between him/herself and the text or 
author.
149
  Ricoeur‟s theory requires the distinction between the “event” of discourse and 
the “meaning” which results.150 Meaning, understood as the “propositional content” of 
the sentence, gives the original event permanence
151
 because it transcends the “utterer‟s 
meaning” and becomes the “utterance meaning.”152  As this happens, Ricoeur and 
Gadamer agree, the interpreter‟s quest to understand the meaning of the discourse shifts 
from trying to understand the author‟s intention to understanding the meaning of the text.  
In written discourse, distanciation becomes more intense because it takes place on two 
levels:  First, the author is distanced from the text (so that the text now means more than 
                                               
149 Distanciation occurs even in the act of discourse, but is intensified in the written text.  
Ricoeur (“The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” 130), claims, “For me the text is much more than 
a particular case of inherhuman communication, it is the paradigm of the distanciation in all 
communication…Now discourse, even in oral form, presents an elementary characteristic of distanciation.” 
150 Paul Ricoeur (Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, 
TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 12), claims, “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all 
discourse is understood as meaning.”   
151 Ricoeur (ibid, 146), writes, “An act of discourse is not merely vanishing.  It may be 
identified and reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words.  We may even say it in 
other language or translate it from one language to another.  Through all these translations, the 
„propositional content‟ preserves its identity: the „said as such.‟    
152 Ricoeur (ibid, 12-13), writes, “Meaning can be understood as the utterer‟s meaning (what 
the speaker means, the noetic aspect), and utterance meaning (what the sentence means, the propositional 
content, the noematic aspect).  Utterer‟s meaning should not be reduced to mere psychological intention.  It 
is given in the utterance meaning itself.  The mental meaning can be found nowhere else than in discourse 
itself.  The utterer‟s meaning has its mark in the utterance meaning.”  
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the author meant—a „surplus of meaning‟).153   Second, the text is distanced from the 
original audience so that the text now requires a reader response.
154
  As the reader 
understands the text, he finds that the text refers beyond itself to the world outside the 
text (here Ricoeur disagrees with the New Criticism, which argues that the text never 
refers beyond itself to the real world).  This reference to the outside world is called a 
“split reference,” and includes both ostensive reference, a real event, thing, etc. to which 
the text refers, and non-ostensive reference, a manner of being in the world disclosed 
through the text.
155
  In poetry, fiction, etc. the non-ostensive reference replaces the 
ostensive reference, so that the reader can encounter a text which refers to existential 
possibilities.
156
   
This disclosure of a non-ostensive reference (a world in front of the text) must be 
engaged in a responsible manner.  Ricoeur suggests a two-step process.
157
  The first step 
                                               
153 Ibid, 33.  Ricoeur (ibid), claims that the text is now a “structured work,” characterized by 
composition, genre, and style so that “Thanks to writing, the works of language become as self-contained 
as sculptures.”   
154 Ibid, 28-31. 
155 Ibid, 87.   
156 Ibid, 36-37.  Ricoeur (ibid), claims, “The effacement of the ostensive and descriptive 
reference liberates a power of reference to aspects of our being in the world that cannot be said in a direct 
descriptive way, but only alluded to, thanks to the referential value of metaphoric and, in general, symbolic 
expression” (37). 
157 Ricoeur‟s movement in Interpretation Theory (pp. 75-89), from guess to validation and 
from explanation to comprehension is somewhat different from his threefold Mimesis, prefiguration, 
configuration, refiguration (see Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 52-87).  I provide here only Ricoeur‟s 
earlier construction of the hermeneutical arc, as that is the one used by Tracy in Analogical Imagination.  
For an excellent analysis of at least five tensions between the early hermeneutical arc and the later 
hermeneutical arc, see Dan R. Stiver, Theology after Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 56-78.   
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is the movement from what is essentially a naïve “guess158 to validation” of what the text 
means as a whole.
159
  Ricoeur‟s second step is a movement from “explanation” to 
“comprehension,” as readers overcome the distanciation of the text in order to come to 
understanding.  Through studying the internal structure and content of the text, the 
interpreter is led “from a surface semantics…to a depth semantics, that of the boundary 
situations, which constitute the ultimate „referent,‟” as Ricoeur calls it.160  Explanation is 
the transition between the initial naïve guess and the moment of disclosure of the world 
in front of the text to the reader.  Understanding is the appropriation of the world of the 
text to the individual.  Hence the interpreter must move on from explanation to 
understanding or appropriation.  To do so, the interpreter must encounter the sense of the 
text, the world in front of the text, which opens new possibilities for the interpreter.  
Ricoeur claims,  
The sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it.  It is not something 
hidden, but something disclosed.  What has to be understood is not the initial 
situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the 
                                               
158 Ricoeur (Interpretation Theory, 76), writes, “The problem of correct understanding can no 
longer be solved by a simple return to the alleged situation of the author.  The concept of guess has no other 
origin.  To construe the meaning as the verbal meaning of the text is to make a guess.”  Interpreters can 
only validate this guess in retrospect.   
159 Ibid, 79.  Ricoeur advocates that the criteria of both falsifiability and probability be used at 
this point to sort through the various interpretive possibilities:  Ricoeur (ibid), claims, “If it is true that there 
is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal.  We always 
move between dogmatism and skepticism.”  
160 Ibid, 87.  Ricoeur (ibid 81), believes the options here are either structuralism (suspending 
the search for reference in the text), or proposing a “world in front of the text.”  Hence Ricoeur, (ibid, 81), 
claims, “As readers, we may either remain in a kind of state of suspense as regards any kind of referred to 
reality, or we may imaginatively actualize the potential non-ostensive references of the text in a new 
situation, that of the reader.”  Structural analysis (the component of interpretation emphasized by 
Structuralism), then, is not wrong, but may end the interpretive task too early. 
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non-ostensive reference of the text.  Understanding…seeks to grasp the world-
propositions opened up by the reference [i.e. sense] of the text.
161
   
 
The world in front of the text is not, according to Ricoeur, simple projection of 
meaning by the reader onto the text.
162
 Rather, it is the text which has the power to 
disclose “new modes of being” or “new forms of life.”  The interpreter “is enlarged in his 
capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself…It is 
the text, with its universal power of world disclosure, which gives a self to the ego.”163  
Ricoeur insists that priority in the interaction between text and reader be given to the text, 
so that, “Only the interpretation that complies with the injunction of the text, that follows 
the „arrow‟ of the sense and that tries to think accordingly, initiates a new self-
understanding.”164   
At this point it is possible to see how the concept of distanciation causes an 
essential difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur and why Tracy sides with Ricoeur.  
Where Gadamer understands interpretation as a game in which interpreters find 
themselves being played rather than controlling the action,
165
 Ricoeur inserts a moment 
of explanation on the way to understanding which allows the reader a critical moment in 
the interpretative process.  As Gary Aylesworth notes,  
                                               
161 Ibid, 87.   
162 Ricoeur (Interpretation Theory, 94), states the objection in two ways:  “If we must 
„believe‟ in order to „understand,‟ then there is no difference between preunderstanding and the mere 
projection of our prejudices,” and “Are we not putting the meaning of the text under the power of the 
subject who interprets it?” 
163 Ibid, 94-95.   
164 Ibid, 94.   
165 For example, Gadamer (Truth and Method, 420), claims, “The hermeneutical experience 
must take as a genuine experience everything that becomes present to it.  It does not have prior freedom to 
select and discard.” 
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On Gadamer‟s model, there is no distanciation of meaning from event.  Rather, 
meaning itself is temporal and processive.  As the subject-matter of the dialogue 
between text and reader, meaning is produced in an event of disclosure, not as 
something fixed by the text, i.e., not as an ideal object, but as a third moment that 
neither the reader nor the text already contains.
166
   
 
For Ricoeur, meaning is already codified in the text—it does not result, strictly 
speaking, from the action of the reader in dialogue with the text.  Instead, that dialogue of 
interpretation “actualizes” a meaning that is already present.167  Meaning is a relatively 
stable feature of the text, and a relatively stable self is able to analyze and actualize such 
meaning.
168
   
Meaning is only relatively stable, however, because meaning emerges in dialogue 
with the reader as interpretation takes place.  Gadamer, Ricoeur and Tracy all agree that 
understanding has not really taken place unless a fusion of horizons has occurred.  This 
fusion of horizons will necessarily change both the original meaning of the text and the 
identity of the interpreter.  Tracy claims,  
                                               
166 Gary E. Aylesworth, "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Confronting Gadamer and Ricoeur," in 
Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, Continental Philosophy (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1991)., 73.   
167 Ibid, 70.  Aylesworth (ibid), notes the fundamental difference: “For Gadamer appropriation 
itself produces meaning, where for Ricoeur appropriation actualizes a meaning already produced.”   
168 Aylesworth (ibid), argues, “On Ricoeur‟s model, then, philosophical hermeneutics is a 
rehabilitation of the reflective tradition, and of Huserlian egology in particular.  The ability to exercise a 
critical moment in interpretation does not, despite Frei‟s contention of Ryle‟s „ghost in the machine,‟ 
propose a stable inner-self which is able to be analyzed on its own.”   Paul Ricoeur claims, “The 
philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not what they 
appear to be.  But he never doubts that consciousness is as it appears to itself….Since Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud, however, we doubt even this.  After doubting the thing, we have begun to doubt consciousness” 
(Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 101).  Ricoeur in this context highlights Husserl‟s conception of the inner-self as a 
continuation of the problem which he is seeking to overcome.  In his early writings, Tracy does not 
incorporate this tenet.  David Tracy defines common human experience as “that immediate experience of 
the self-as-self which can be reflectively mediated through such disciplines as art, history, cultural analysis, 
human scientific analysis, and philosophical analysis” (Blessed Rage for Order, 39).  It is this which is to 
be correlated with the Christian tradition.  Tracy, however, attempts to correct this in his later writings.   
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It is worth noting that every good interpretation is a new interpretation involving 
application to the situation…It is important to note even here, however, that both 
text and reader (as well as their dialogical interaction) are realities-in-process, 
never purely static constants.  All three realities (text-reader-interaction) include 
the ambiguities intrinsic to the human situation.  Interpretation is, by definition, 
an ongoing process related to these realities-in-process.  Even classic texts exist as 
classics only when actually read; the reader exists as a good reader only by 
allowing his or her present horizon to be provoked or vexed by the classic text 
into dialogue.
169
 
 
The difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur, then, is the degree to which the interpreter 
is able to distance him/herself from the tradition and critique it through interpretation.  
Gadamer believes that application constitutes meaning in the fusion of horizons,
170
 while 
Ricoeur and Tracy believe that texts contain a meaning that is actualized in the 
interpreter.
171
   
Ricoeur appreciates the insights of the “masters of suspicion,” Marx, Nietzsche 
and Freud.
172
  Ricoeur thinks that these three writers have shown the fragmented nature 
                                               
169 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 90, n. 59.     
170 Gadamer (Truth and Method, 275), claims, “The text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be 
understood properly, ie according to the claim it makes, must be understood at every moment, in every 
particular situation, in a new and different way.  Understanding here is always application.” 
171 Tracy‟s disagreement with Gadamer is first with “his understandable but strained polemic 
against all „method,‟” and second with his “formulations for the necessary moment of „application‟ in 
interpretation.”  Tracy argues that, while Gadamer has correctly described the role of application for the 
judge and the preacher, Gadamer has made these instances normative for all interpretation.  Tracy is 
optimistic that the sense of a text can be gleaned (the moment of explanation) as a distinct step from 
application.  As a result, Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 136, nt. 8), appeals to “Ricoeur‟s more 
adequate paradigm…of „understanding-explanation-application.‟”   
172 For example, Ricoeur ("Two Essays by Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and the 
Language of Faith," Union Theological Quarterly Review 28, no. 3 (1973), 209), writes, “A Marxist 
critique of ideology, a Nietzschean critique of resentment and a Freudian critique of infantile distress, are 
hereafter the views through which any kind of mediation of faith must pass.”  Richard R. Topping, 
Revelation, Scripture and Church: Theological Hermeneutic Thought of James Barr, Paul Ricoeur, and 
Hans Frei, Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007), 178).  Paul Ricoeur (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis 
Savage, The Dwight Harrington Terry Foundation Lectures on Religion in the Light of Science and 
Philosophy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), 33), argues that these three moved 
beyond “skepticism” to affirming a “more authentic word” through critical interpretation.  They “triumph 
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of all interpretation, and hence they have demonstrated that all interpretation must be 
critical.  There will never be absolute assurance of truth from now on—all interpretation 
will require a wager of hope.
173
  Christian readings of Scripture as well must always be 
subjected to suspicion, and this confrontation will necessarily change both parties.
174
  
Thus Ricoeur is committed to an ongoing ideological critique in the Christian reading of 
Scripture.
175
   The primary benefit of suspicious readings is to allow a more fruitful 
reading of the text to take place, in which the text may become more disclosive to the 
interpreter.  When idols are “destroyed”176 and the ideologies of the reader are chastened, 
the “matter of the text is allowed to emerge and present its fresh possibilities for the 
self.”177 
B.  Hermeneutical Difficulties and Mutual Critiques 
 
                                                                                                                                            
over the doubt as to consciousness by an exegesis of meaning.  Beginning with them, understanding is 
hermeneutics: henceforward, to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to 
decipher its expressions.”  Ricoeur (ibid, 34), claims, “All three begin with suspicion concerning the 
illusions of consciousness, and then proceed to employ the stratagem of deciphering; all three, however, far 
from being detractors of „consciousness,‟ aim at extending it.”  As a result, their skepticism, leading to self-
critical readings, is beneficial for all readings, including (perhaps “especially”) readings of Scripture.   
173 Stiver, Theology after Ricoeur, 144.   
174 Ricoeur (Freud and Philosophy, 551), claims, “The faith of the believer cannot emerge 
intact from this confrontation, but neither can the Freudian conception of reality.”  Hence the goal is to 
“separate[e] idols from symbols.”   
175 This does not, however, mean that Ricoeur is holistically opposed to Gadamer‟s portrayal 
of the relationship between text and tradition.  In fact, Ricoeur (Phenomenology and Hermeneutics, 110-
11), writes that “distanciation is the dialectical counterpart to the notion of belonging, in that sense that we 
belong to an historical tradition through a relation of distance which oscillates between remoteness and 
proximity.”   
176 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 54, 551. 
177 Topping, Revelation, Scripture and Church, 179. 
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Having explored the aims and influences which have informed the projects of Frei 
and Tracy, this section will specify the central hermeneutical difficulty in the method of 
each theologian.  The section will show the way in which Tracy and Frei have revised 
their hermeneutical projects in light of criticism from the other.  The section will suggest 
that while each has developed significant revisions in method, impasses still remain 
which cannot be resolved until Scripture is located in the broader context of the economy 
of redemption.   
1.  Frei‟s Difficulty: Locating Authority in Interpretation  
 
During the early part of his career, Frei placed all authority for reading in the text 
itself, and called readers to be accountable to a realistic reading.
178
  In fact, for Frei, the 
very essence of Christianity is dependent on a realistic reading of the Gospel narratives.  
Frei writes,  
It seems to me that the crucial point about the authority of the New Testament—
and the beginning, at least, of an answer to the question, What is Christianity?—is 
precisely that we must start at some point where meaning is firmly grounded in 
the text and nowhere else.  This identity or unity of text and meaning does not of 
itself bestow authority, but without it there can be no authority.
179
   
 
If authority for defining the essence of Christianity lies in the assumption that 
“meaning is grounded in the text and nowhere else,” then Frei must explain exactly how 
                                               
178 Frei‟s early career could be characterized as the time from his first published book, The 
Identity of Jesus Christ in 1973 until the late 1970‟s.  During this time Frei emphasized realistic narrative as 
a genre of Scripture, and felt that this genre would render plainly the unsubstitutable identity of Christ.  
From the late 1970‟s onward, what I will call Frei‟s later career, Frei seeks to ground realistic narrative in 
the Christian community which has insisted upon a literal reading of the Gospels.  As a result, a shift of 
emphasis from text to readers takes place in his writings.   
179 Frei, “Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,” 42.   
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this is so.  The difficulty of establishing an authoritative reading of Scripture is more 
pronounced for Frei than it is for Tracy because, where Tracy develops a general theory 
of Scripture as a classic, continually preserved and renewed by a tradition in a plurality of 
readings, Frei desires to ground authority for Christian readings in a particular reading of 
the text itself.  As Frei becomes more and more self-critical about pressing meaning into 
any external system, he moves from dependence on literary theories such as New 
Criticism to an analysis of the Church as a socio-linguistic community.  Frei does not 
temper his insistence on the necessity of a plain reading of the Gospels, but he does 
attempt to provide a somewhat different account of why the Gospels must be read 
ascriptively.   
Determining the relationship of the early Frei to the later Frei has proven 
notoriously difficult for all interpreters of Frei‟s works.180  Does Frei abandon his literary 
category of „realistic narrative‟ when he makes the cultural-linguistic turn?181  Does Frei 
                                               
180 Determining the relationship of the early Frei to the later Frei on the issue of authority of 
the text has divided readers of Frei.  In general, more recent scholarship has tended to observe a stronger 
continuity between Frei‟s early work and his later writings.  Mike A. Higton (Christ, Providence and 
History: Hans Frei's Public Theology (London & New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 178), calls 
it a “simplification” of his theoretical procedure (CPH, 178) and Mark Allen Bowald (Rendering the Word, 
101), calls it a “greater chastening of the agency of the reader.”  This change is due, in large part, to the 
availability of the whole corpus of Frei‟s written work.  Older scholarship has tended to emphasize the 
discontinuity.  For example, Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A 
Study in Hermeneutics and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174), asks, “[I]n 
turning from realistic narrative to cultural-linguistic description, has not Frei simply exchanged theories?  
Does not the claim that meaning and truth are context-dependent notions betray a general theory as much 
(if not more) than the earlier allegiance to the category realistic narrative?  Is not Wittgenstein‟s adage 
„Look not to the meaning but to the use‟ itself a manifesto for a general theory of meaning?”   
181 Under the influence of his college, George Lindbeck, Frei shifts his attention from literary 
theory to the self-description of the Church.  Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 30-41), contrasts his 
own “cultural-linguistic” understanding of theology to the “experiential-expressive” model which he thinks 
characterizes Tracy.  While the “experiential-expressive” view, on Lindbeck‟s account, sees religions as 
social organizations which reflect prior inner experiences, the “cultural-linguistic” view suggests that 
religions are social organisms which construct the grammar through which religious experience takes place.  
Religions are “comprehensive and interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myth or narratives and 
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simply move interpretive authority from a quality of the text to the decision of the 
Church?  Frei‟s 1983 paper entitled  “The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative in 
Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it Break?” is often seen as the turning-point in 
Frei‟s thought, due to his self-criticism of his conception of realistic narrative.  In this 
essay, Frei criticizes his previous work primarily because his attempt to hold meaning 
and truth together in realistic narrative requires an explanatory model not found in the 
text itself.  Frei claims, “There may or may not be a class called „realistic narrative,‟ but 
to take it as a general category of which the synoptic Gospel narratives and their partial 
second-order redescription in the doctrine of the Incarnation are a dependent instance is 
first to put the cart before the horse and then cut the lines and claim that the vehicle is 
self-propelled.”182  In other words, Frei believes it is problematic to force readers to 
engage the text according to a general schema like realistic narrative and then expect to 
them derive the particular claims of the Christian faith from that general method.  In this 
sense, Frei judges his previous proposal for realistic narrative to have been unsuccessful.   
Yet throughout his career Frei insists on grounding the essence of the „Christian thing‟ in 
a plain reading of the Gospel narratives.  But why must this be so, if the meaning of the 
text is not based on a literary theory, and if not from the text itself?  Frei realizes that he 
needs to develop further the way in which the authority for literal sense is grounded in the 
                                                                                                                                            
heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self and world” (33).  This 
model places primary attention on the structure and rules of the Church as a foundation for Scriptural 
reading.  In his later work, Frei finds this to be a plausible model for grounding the authority of the literal 
sense (see Frei, “Literal Reading,” 67).   
182 Frei, Literal Reading, 64-66.  Frei‟s rejection of New Criticism seems to be based on two 
criticisms.  First, it also unconsciously places an external meaning system on the text, so that the reader 
must make a prior commitment (by faith) to read the text in this way.  Second, it “comes close to 
enthroning verbal repetition as the highest form of understanding…” (64).   
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Christian community.  In a 1984 letter to Gary Comstock, Frei spells out his revised 
understanding of meaning in Scripture:   
For me „meaning‟ in the gospel narratives is more and more a combination of 1) 
the communal-religious interpretive tradition and what it has seen as their primary 
meaning; 2) the fact that the tradition has given primacy to their realistic, 
ascriptive sense; 3) that outside of that tradition there is no reason to think of any 
single interpretive move or scheme as the meaning of these stories; 4) and even 
within it there is room for others, provided they do not conflict with the primary, 
realistic or literal sense; 5) that subordination of understanding to the text…is in 
no way the same as the elimination of interpretive understanding and of a possible 
multiplicity of interpretations.
183
   
  
Frei insists that no external system of understanding ought to be allowed priority 
in determining what is the meaning of Scripture.  The meaning of an amorphous text is 
relatively indeterminate.  Meaning is not self-evident simply because of the literary 
structure of the Gospels.  But it is bound up with the early Christian community‟s reading 
practices.  A text without a tradition cannot simply have a plain meaning.  This decision 
moves Frei toward grounding authority for a literal reading in the reading community 
rather than in the text alone.
184
   
Frei must still explain why the community chose such a reading, and how the 
Scriptures can critique the subsequent readings of the Church.  According to Frei, the 
                                               
183 Frei, Letter to Gary Comstock, 5 (unpublished manuscript, 1984), cited in Higton, Christ, 
Providence, and History, 84.   
184 Certainly several influences have led to the change.  First, different literary theories, 
especially deconstructionism, had begun to pose new questions for literary theory.  Placher (“Introduction,” 
18), suggests that “one could to some extent map changes in Frei‟s account alongside changes of fashion in 
literary theory—from the New Critics and Auerbach at the time of his early work—with their careful 
attention to the formal structure of texts—to deconstructionists and Stanley Fish in the 1980‟s—with their 
interests in the social context in which interpretations take place.”  Second, the influence of George 
Lindbeck‟s use of a “low-level theoretical…analysis of religions” as a “cultural linguistic approach” also 
influenced such a change (see Frei, Literal Reading, 71). Finally, Frei‟s own studies in the history of 
modern Christianity changed throughout the later 1970‟s from a history of Christianity in the academy 
“towards a more sociologically aware form of writing” (Higton, Christ, Providence, and History, 178).   
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“plain sense” (or “literal”) reading of Scripture was given primacy by the Church 
precisely because such a reading of the Gospel narratives adequately rendered the 
ascriptive identity of the unsubstitutable Person, Jesus Christ.  Literal reading was not 
something of a historical accident, but it is an outworking of the community‟s 
foundational belief in the risen Christ.  For Frei, a Christian must at least say “that the 
subject matter of these stories is not something or someone else, and that the rest of the 
canon must in some way or ways, looser or tighter, be related to this subject matter or at 
least not in contradiction to it.  This is the minimal agreement of how „literal‟ reading has 
generally been understood in the Western Christian tradition.”185  This plain reading, says 
Frei, can be studied fruitfully in its development.  In the early Church, we find that the 
“narrative rendering of an intention-action sequence” became the orienting principle of 
the Scriptures: 
 “Thus, the parables of the Kingdom of God, whatever their original intent, were 
soon used as figurations of Jesus that substantiated his messianic identity as 
enacted in his story so that their point of signaling the „limit experience‟ of the 
Kingdom of God, although very real, was not logically independent of that other 
theme.  Jesus…was himself the subject of what he said in the use of the parables 
by the interpretive tradition.  The identity of the messenger became the clue to the 
character of the message and this, in turn, was due to the priority of his 
identification in agency or enactment over his identification as speech act, 
linguistic performative or embodied, innovative metaphor.”186   
 
                                               
185 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 5.  Frei has already clarified (Literal Reading, 72), “The 
reason why the intratextual universe of this Christian symbol system is a narrative one is that a specific set 
of texts, which happen to be narrative, has become primary, even within scripture, and has been assigned a 
literal reading as their primary or „plain‟ sense.  They have become the paradigm for the construal not only 
of what is inside that system but for all that is outside.  They provide the interpretive pattern in terms of 
which all of reality is experienced and read in this religion.” 
186 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 110-11.   
 50 
 
Frei develops his thought on the relationship between the plain sense and the 
reading community in Types of Christian Theology.  Frei gives three rules which govern 
the community‟s use of the literal sense.  The first rule appears to make the literal sense 
itself a function of community decision:  “[T]he literal meaning of the text is precisely 
that meaning which finds the greatest degree of agreement in the use of the text in the 
religious community.  If there is agreement in that use, then take that to be the literal 
sense.”187  This rule seems to indicate a significant change from a self-evident genre of 
realistic narrative to community use.  Frei‟s next two rules serve to disarm the 
contemporary reader from claiming interpretive authority over the text today.  The 
second rule states, “it is the fit enactment of the intention to say what comes to be in the 
text…you cannot…go behind the written text to ask separately about what the author 
meant or what he or she was really trying to say.  You had better take it that the author 
said what he or she was trying to say.”188  This rule solidly reestablishes the authority of 
the text by prohibiting the contemporary reading community from changing the decision 
of the early Church.  Authority is granted to the early community for establishing the 
foundational reading, analogously to the way in which the early community 
authoritatively established the bounds of the canon.  In both cases (the canon and the 
plain sense) the reading community exercises authority, but in neither case is the 
contemporary reading community allowed to change that foundational decision.
189
  The 
                                               
187 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 15. 
188 Ibid, 15-16.   
189 When Frei‟s argument is viewed in this way, criticisms such as Vanhoozer‟s can be 
overcome.  Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 174), writes, “In the end, 
Frei‟s strongest argument seems to be that, as a matter of fact, the believing community decided to read the 
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third rule simply clarifies the first two, as it “has to do with the descriptive fit between the 
words and the subject matter” so that the plain sense establishes this “coincidence 
between sense and subject matter.”190  The Church has reached such a consensus reading 
(first rule) and the contemporary reading community cannot go behind what is written 
(second rule) precisely because the words render the subject matter.  Once again, the 
foundational decision for the plain sense is similar to the Church‟s decision about the 
boundaries of the canon.  Different words (different canonical texts) or a different reading 
(any other than the plain sense) would render a different subject matter (one that is not 
Christian).   
What, then, is the role of the Church in biblical interpretation for Frei?  It appears 
to be twofold:  First, the early Church established the plain reading of Scripture as 
normative.  This decision is foundational, and the Church today must read literally in 
continuity with the early Church.  Second, however, the reading community today is to 
employ all kinds of redescriptive schemas on an ad hoc basis in order to better 
understand the ascriptive identity of Christ rendered in the plain sense.   
Frei insists that explanatory models are always necessary for the Christian faith, 
yet those models must be severely subordinated to the text itself.  Frei claims,  
The text means what it says, and so the reader‟s redescription is just that, a 
redescription and not the discovery of the text as symbolic representation of 
                                                                                                                                            
Gospels literally.  But surely the centrality of the ascriptive subject Jesus Christ is a function more of the 
literal sense of the text than of the historical decision (accident?) of the believing community to read the 
Gospels literally?  If this is so, then we must conclude that Frei‟s earlier insistence that the Gospels are 
realistic narratives better preserves the indispensability of the unsubstitutable subject Jesus Christ.”  
Vanhoozer would not suggest that the early church community chose their canon by means of historical 
accident.  In both cases, canon and plain sense, the community made their decision based on their 
fundamental belief in the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.   
190 Frei, Types, 16.   
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something else more profound.  But in the process of redescription we can—and 
indeed cannot do other than—employ our own thought structures, experiences, 
conceptual schemes; there is neither an explicit mode for showing how to 
correlate these things with the job of redescription, nor is there a fundamental 
conflict between them…it is an article of faith that it can be done; it is done.191   
 
Mark Allen Bowald concludes that Frei‟s later model establishes a “greater chastening of 
the agency of the reader in his hermeneutic insofar as he now is more cognizant of the 
inescapability of reading from a stance which, as part of its creaturely limitations, must 
employ both descriptive and explanatory schemes.”192  Bowald continues, “In his early 
work the literal meaning was defined primarily in terms of a quality of the text itself 
which impresses itself on the reader.  Now, the agency for the literal meaning is shared 
between text and tradition.”193  This new equation, in turn, means that the Church 
(tradition) acts in “codetermining” the meaning of the text,194 in a primary sense by 
establishing the literal reading of the narrative as the normative reading, and in a 
secondary sense by using its intratextual language of faith while incorporating all kinds 
of external conceptual schemes.  The twofold role of the Church in interpretation, then, 
shifts Frei‟s focus from text alone to the interaction between reading, and text.  If it is 
truly an “article of faith,” as Frei claims, that there is no “fundamental conflict between” 
what the text says and the contemporary Church‟s redescription, then it is the duty of the 
interpreter to read within the bounds established by the Church.   
                                               
191 Ibid, 44.   
192 Bowald, Rendering the Word, 101.   
193 Ibid, 104.   
194 Bowald (ibid, 106), claims the later Frei “adds an emphasis on the role of the Church‟s 
traditional reading in co-determining the meaning.  Nevertheless, „truth‟ is still not directly attributable to 
human agency but to gracious divine action which may indirectly assert itself via text, tradition and 
community.”   
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2.  Tracy‟s Difficulty: Articulating the Uniqueness of Jesus Christ 
 
Tracy‟s most acute hermeneutical challenge comes from Hans Frei.  Frei‟s 
sharpest critiques against Tracy fault him for failing to read Scripture in light of the 
identity (and hence particularity) of Jesus Christ.
195
  Frei levels two criticisms against 
Tracy in this regard.  First, Frei thinks that when the general system of phenomenology is 
applied at the beginning of interpretation, the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ will 
always be reduced to a mode of consciousness.  Frei thinks that within phenomenology, 
“What narratives present…is not in the first place ascriptive selves that are the subjects of 
their predicates…but the „mode-of-being-in-the-world‟ which these selves exemplify and 
which is „re-presented‟ by being „disclosed‟ to „understanding.‟”196  Consequently, Christ 
may present a new existential modes of being for human possibility, but his unique 
identity will be secondary.  Frei harshly states that, “Tracy‟s…intention is clear.  What 
the story of Jesus is about is not Jesus storied or historical, but „existential possibility,‟ 
which is not a temporal cumulative qualification of a specific character in his or her own 
story, but a successful or unsuccessful evocation of a mode of present consciousness.”197  
The identity of Christ, Frei fears, will be considered important only insofar as it discloses 
                                               
195 For example, Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 64), argues that for Tracy, “the apparent 
literal sense of the New Testament, in which Jesus as „real‟ or „historical‟ seems to have an irreducibly 
unique and unsurpassable place in relation to salvation, is quite dispensable… Symbolic-experiential 
Christology thinks of Jesus or rather the story of Jesus (why not both?) as perhaps the highest re-
presentation of the authentic agapic mode, but certainly not unique or indispensable.” 
196 Frei, Literal Reading, 47.  Frei (ibid, 48), is convinced that in Tracy‟s account, “the 
ascription in the story is simply a temporary personal thickening within the free-flowing stream of a general 
class of describable dispositional attitudes.  „Jesus‟…names a meaning, namely (the disclosure of) a 
generalizable set of attitudes.”     
197 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 62-63. 
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possibilities for human existence.  Tracy is seen as a chief perpetrator of Ryle‟s “the 
Descartes myth” because phenomenological method assumes an interior self which 
experiences and an outer self which conceptualizes, both of which are held together by 
meaning.
198
  Tracy is accused of perpetrating the Descartes myth as he tries to explain 
Christ in terms of existential meaning rather than through the narrative rendering of his 
identity.   
Frei repeatedly accuses Tracy of making the reading of Scripture a regional 
application of a general model, fearing that the emphasis on the manner of disclosure will 
determine the subject matter that is studied.  Frei argues that for Tracy, “finally the 
correlation is a matter of subsuming the specifically Christian under the general, 
experiential religious, as one „regional‟ aspect.”199  Tracy‟s insists that the subject 
matter,
200
 not a method, must be allowed to control the discussion.
201
  Yet Frei would ask, 
if the manner of disclosure is the same in all classics, how can the subject matter possibly 
                                               
198 Frei, ibid, 33.  This means that “there is no cutting difference between external description 
and Christian self-description, largely because the context for both is the „meaning‟ structure supplied by 
the notion of the self as consciousness and by the phenomenological procedure that analyzes it.  Meaning, 
as the internal experience of selves, and religious experience in particular, is the glue that allows external 
and internal description to be one, and Christian description or self-description is one instance of the 
general class „religious meaningfulness.‟” 
199 Frei, ibid, 34.   
200 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 136, n. 8 defines “Subject matter” as “the common 
subject matter expressed through the form in the text which provokes the questions for the 
preunderstanding of the interpreter.  It is not a synonym for „the text‟” (Tracy here refers to Paul Ricoeur, 
"The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," Philosophy Today 17, no. 2 (1972)., pp. 128-29).  
201 Cf. David Tracy and Robert Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 
Second edition ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 170.  Tracy (ibid), argues, “The phrase „mutually 
critical correlations‟ also explicates what otherwise remains merely implicit: the fact that there is no general 
model which can be allowed to determine any particular interpretation.”  This simply means that one 
always interprets for a particular situation, and hence one cannot add the rules before beginning the 
process.  Tracy (171), goes on to claim that “a correlation logically allows a full spectrum of possible 
interpretations ranging from confrontation…through a similarity-in-difference…to an identity.”  
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control the text/reader interaction?  Frei claims, “For the Christian theologian adoption of 
this view of the description of religious phenomena will finally amount to a commitment 
that theology must be grounded in a, or more specifically, this foundational philosophical 
theory in order to be intelligible; and that the interpretation of Christian self-description 
will never be more than a „regional‟ embodiment of this more comprehensive 
undertaking.”202   
Second, Frei thinks that phenomenological hermeneutics will tend to turn the 
unsubstitutable person of Jesus Christ into a symbol.  Frei claims, “For Professor Tracy, 
the fruit of New Testament interpretation is that Jesus Christ is a most powerful symbol; 
his reality, an idealization of the represencing, through the expressive and evocative 
language of the story, of his life-stance.”203  As Frei (rather ungraciously) constructs the 
argument, Christ for Tracy is reduced to a symbol, because it is easier to incorporate the 
conceptualization a symbol into a phenomenological system then to incorporate the 
ascriptive identity of a person realistically rendered.  Frei suggests two hypothetical but 
devastating consequences which could result from this reduction.  First, Frei suggests that 
if symbols can become outdated and die (as Tracy has argued), then it is hypothetically 
possible that the symbol of Jesus Christ could die in the Christian community, and Christ 
Himself could become expendible to the Christian faith.
204
  Second, Frei argues that in 
Tracy‟s system the historical Jesus could have never existed, so long as the existential 
                                               
202 Frei “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 100. 
203 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 63  Frei seems to see phenomenology as continuing (in 
a tempered form) the basic thrust of Bultmann‟s existential theology.   
204 Frei, Literal Reading, 64. 
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story and the response remain.
205
  Though Frei does not see Tracy employing either 
reduction in practice, Frei believes Tracy‟s phenomenological method implicitly tends 
toward these errors.   
Both the charge of reducing Christ to a mode of conscience and the charge of 
reducing Christ to a symbol are closely related.  The second may be overstated, but it 
may hold weight insofar as it is related to the first.  Tracy has never specifically said that 
Christ is a symbol.
206
  Yet his language does approach making those events which are 
most important to Christ‟s identity, His crucifixion, resurrection and incarnation, into 
symbols.
207
  Identifying these as symbols is a dangerous move, Frei would claim, because 
all three constitute the identity of an unsubstitutable Person and identity is constituted 
through the character‟s interaction with other events, characters, etc.  These events are 
not symbols of general meaningfulness in their own right, but only as they emphasize the 
identity of Jesus Christ.  Requiring that existential significance be the criteria for good 
reading can make Christ‟s identity a means to an end—his identity is seen as important in 
so far as it discloses possibilities for human meaningfulness. 
The true enemy of the plain sense (and the cause of the eclipse of biblical 
narrative), Frei believes, is any extrinsic principle of interpretation which is given power 
                                               
205 Frei, ibid. 
206 Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 234), does write that, “One need not be a believer in 
that event to accord the Christ symbol a major role in Western and other classics.  That symbol clearly 
functions as at least a cultural classic.  One need not be a believer in Christianity to accord it authentically 
religious status: a manifestation from the whole by the power of the whole.”  
207 Tracy (ibid, 249), writes, “The classic event for the Christian is the religious event of 
God‟s self-manifestation in the person Jesus the Christ: an event that happened, happens, and will 
happen…The classic images for the Christian are those related to that event and that person: the dialectics 
of the symbols of cross-resurrection-incarnation.” 
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to orient all interpretation around itself.  Such a principle will necessarily usurp and 
replace the plain meaning of the text.  One influential usurper today, Frei argues, is the 
phenomenological tradition, which, Frei believes, cannot, of its very nature, allow for the 
primacy of the literal, ascriptive sense of the text.  Holistic employment of this general 
method (as any general method) will result, Frei thinks, in the loss of the particularity of 
Jesus Christ.  Frei specifically criticizes Tracy for deciding before even engaging in 
interpretation that there must be “compatibility between two apparently autonomous 
factors” (i.e. Christian tradition and the situation).208  As a result, good theology for Tracy 
is seen to be largely a matter of showing the two to be compatible.  Because Tracy has 
chosen phenomenological hermeneutics as his philosophical system, Frei feels he will 
always frame the distinctiveness of the Christian fact in terms of phenomenology, thus 
limiting the message to those elements accessible to phenomenology‟s categories of 
meaning.  Frei argues that theologians as diverse as Schleiermacher and Barth understood 
the need for ad hoc correlation,
209
 but Tracy‟s project of systematic correlation ends 
                                               
208 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 31. 
209 Frei attempts to make Schleiermacher and Barth the champions of his concept of ad hoc 
correlation. In Types of Christian Theology, Schleiermacher is contrasted to Tracy.  For example, Frei notes 
that for Schleiermacher, “Phenomenology and doctrinal content are correlated, but to talk of their identity 
would be inappropriate.  This is a far cry from David Tracy, for whom it seems to be the case that Christian 
„meanings‟ may be fairly represented as one specific mode of general religious consciousness” (Types of 
Christian Theology, 37).  (See also Types of Christian Theology, 71, where Frei promotes his own project 
of “ad hoc correlation” by claiming it has the same meaning as Schleiermacher‟s phrase, “A little 
introspection”:  “„A little introspection,‟ rather like common sense—nothing high-powered here!  It‟s as 
though the principle of correlation could have been something else if he hadn‟t lived in Prussia when he did 
and experienced the philosophical possibilities of his time.  General criteria for meaning on the one side, 
the specificity of Christian faith and language on the other, and an ad hoc conceptual instrument for 
bringing them together—distinctiveness and reciprocity together.”) 
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either in the sublimating of Christianity by employing a general system of philosophy or 
in “hermeneutical incoherence.”210   
Overall, Tracy appreciates Frei‟s criticism.  Tracy realizes he has not adequately 
emphasized the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ in its narrative rendering, and 
attempts to overcome this weakness.  Tracy notes that Frei has clarified for him just why 
the Gospel narratives are the key to understanding the Scriptures.  Gospel is, Tracy 
claims, “that peculiar, perhaps unique, compositional mode that unites Word-as-
proclamation and disclosive Word rendered present through written narrative,” and 
serves as “the major genre for the original Christian communities‟ self-interpretation.”211  
Thus, Tracy continues, the “passion narratives are the principle stories by which the 
Christian community first rendered in written form its understanding of who this singular 
Jesus of Nazareth proclaimed as the Christ is.”212  Gospel narrative is foundational 
because only Gospel narrative can render the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.  
Appreciating Frei‟s critique, Tracy claims,  
The confessional genre and the kerygmatic categories state but fail to show what 
can only be shown in explicitly narrative terms...just how and why the identity 
and presence of Jesus as Jesus the Christ is indeed confessed in the common 
Christian confession, but is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details 
of the interaction of the unsubstitutable character of Jesus and the specific 
circumstances of his passion and resurrection…This, for me at least, is Frei‟s 
                                               
210 Frei (ibid, 6), claims Tracy “tries to have it both ways,” (i.e. allow for the particularity of 
revelation and determine it by a general philosophical schema) yet in the end “either reverts to” type one 
and allows philosophy to dictate the discussion, or it “simply ends in hermeneutical incoherence” of type 
two.  Frei‟s appropriation of Tracy in type two seems to reflect Tracy‟s Analogical Imagination, because 
his first book, Blessed Rage for Order is noted by Frei as “returning to Kant,” and therefore would best fit 
in type one.   
211 David Tracy, "Writing," in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 390. 
212 Ibid, 390. 
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great contribution: to show, in narrative terms, how the Christian confesses not 
merely through the genre of confession but through affirming the passion 
narrative as the full meaning of that confession.  The passion narrative shows us 
how and why the Christian community „believes in Jesus Christ with the 
apostles‟…only the narrative can show, and not merely state (confess), who this 
Jesus Christ, present to us in word and sacrament, really is for the Christian.
213
 
 
Tracy says that while he always stressed the “proclamatory aspect of these 
narratives as gospel,” he failed to “engage in the further task: an analysis of how the 
highly particular narrative interactions of the passion accounts actually render the identity 
and presence of Jesus Christ in order further to clarify my affirmation (then and now) of 
the ecclesial „plain sense‟ of these narratives.”214  Thus Tracy believes that Frei has 
uniquely demonstrated both the necessity of this hermeneutical task and has shown why 
it provides an essential foundation for understanding the meaning of the Christian faith.   
Tracy remains concerned that Frei‟s insistence on realistic narrative will restrict 
legitimate readings of the Gospel narratives.
215
  Yet Frei‟s understanding of the literal 
sense may not be nearly as restrictive as Tracy seems to think.  Frei‟s insistence is that 
                                               
213 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 39-40. 
214 Ibid, 39.   
215 See Tracy (“Dialogue with the Other,” 104-14), where Tracy calls Frei‟s “Literal Reading” 
a “narrow” and “peremptory” reading of Scripture for its emphasis on the plain sense as realistic narrative, 
and “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 43-51.  Tracy‟s own critique of Frei (and Lindbeck) 
suggests that although their emphasis on the plain sense is extremely valuable and fundamentally correct, 
their emphasis has become one-sided and results in a reductionistic articulation of Scripture.  Tracy claims, 
“The centrality of the plain sense of the passion narratives, moreover, should reopen rather than close 
Christian theological attention to many other theological readings.  As long as the plain sense reading of the 
passion narratives is understood as the fullest rendering of the common Christian confession, then a 
diversity of readings of both confession and narrative will inevitably occur” (“On Reading the Scriptures 
Theologically,” 42).  Specifically, Tracy thinks that the New Testament itself is quite pluralistic, even if it 
is normatively oriented toward the ascriptive identity of Christ.  “If one grants the importance of the plain 
sense of the passion narratives, then a further question occurs.  Should a theologian also affirm: first, all the 
differences in the individual passion narratives; second, all the differences in all the other parts of the 
gospels (the ministry and sayings); third, all the differences in all the other genres of the New Testament?” 
(Ibid, 43).  Hence Tracy claims, “A resting in „realistic narrative‟ alone may occasion a refusal to take those 
other ways [namely non Anglo-Saxon readings] with full theological seriousness” (Ibid, 38).  Under the 
guise of „realistic narrative,‟ Scripture could, in fact, be muted. 
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part of the Gospel texts, the passion-resurrection sequence, be read as realistic 
narrative.
216
  These texts must be read plainly as a foundation for other readings of 
Scripture, because they plainly render the identity of the unsubstitutable Person for the 
Christian faith.  Where Tracy is worried that realistic narrative may stifle the surplus of 
meaning and hence the legitimate diversity of readings of the text, Frei would only insist 
that the interpreter first attend to what is plainly written as foundational to the Christian 
faith (the literal, ascriptive sense of the Gospels), and then he or she may add a wide 
range of subordinate and secondary interpretations ordered to the plain, literal sense of 
the text.  Hence Frei would not see the plain/literal/realistic sense of the Gospels as 
restricting interpretation—only establishing the ground of the Christian faith upon which 
all subsequent interpretation may take place and must be continually ordered.   
Tracy is convinced that he can incorporate Frei‟s insights into his own 
correlational project without much amendment to his earlier works.
217
  Tracy emphasizes 
here that Frei has developed “„fuller‟ not „different‟ criteria of appropriateness than 
                                               
216 Hans W. Frei, "Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection," 
in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993).113, claims, “I am speaking only of an aspect of the passion-resurrection sequence.  Obviously there 
are also other elements, e.g., tragic and epic motifs, about the Gospel story as a whole and the passion 
narrative in particular…it is difficult and even undesirable to reduce the gospel story by formal analysis to 
any one type of literature…” Furthermore, Frei (ibid), realizes that other kinds of biblical genres will 
require different methods of interpretation:  “Understanding texts may differ in accordance with different 
texts and their differing contexts.  Didactic letters may demand different skills from realistic narratives, and 
parables may differ from both.  This does not necessarily mean that „to understand‟ is many things, but 
simply that it may not be of the sort for the unity of which an explanatory theory is available.”    
217 Tracy thinks that he has specifically incorporated Frei‟s critique into his model of theology 
without changing his phenomenological model of interpretation.  Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures 
Theologically,” 35-36), argues that while he remains an “unrepentant correlational theologian,” he has 
“learned from the incomparable Hans Frei just how central that „plain sense‟ should be for all Christian 
theology,” and how it orients the Christian confession to the unsubstitutable Person of Christ. 
 61 
 
those” previously employed by Tracy himself.218  Frei‟s project provides “fuller” criteria 
for Tracy because he had previously made two “valuable but incomplete genre moves”: 
first by emphasizing the “„event and person‟ (not only the „event‟) of Jesus Christ,” and 
second, by “reflect[ing] on the implications of the common Christian confession that „I 
(we) believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles.‟”219  These two criteria of adequacy, Tracy 
believes, are capable of allowing for pluralism in Scriptural readings while still retaining 
the essence of Christianity.  Tracy claims that the “limitation” of his earlier work (which 
Frei has helped him to see), is that even in his description of narrative, “„event‟ and 
„person‟ remain merely implicit.”220  “[T]hanks to Frei‟s work,” Tracy claims, “I would 
not change the basic categories and genres of my own attempt at an analysis of the New 
Testament.  But I would reorder them so that the „realistic narratives‟ played a yet more 
central role.”221   
                                               
218 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 59, n. 17. 
219 Ibid, 39.  Tracy (A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 176), claims the 
Scriptures “are nothing less than the authoritative witness to that event—a witness to which all later 
Christian communities hold themselves accountable.”  This criteria of appropriateness gives Scripture 
authority to critique the Church and its subsequent interpretations.  Tracy (ibid), continues, “To believe in 
Jesus Christ with the apostles means, for the Christian, that every present personal and communal Christian 
belief in Jesus Christ is in fundamental continuity with” the Scriptures. Such criteria are necessary because, 
Tracy (ibid), says, “Criteria of appropriateness insist that all later theologies in Christian theology are 
obliged to show why they are not in radical disharmony with the central Christian witness expressed in the 
Scriptures.  In that restricted sense, scripture…norms but is not normed…by later witnesses.”  
220 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 39. 
221 Ibid, 59-60, n. 20.  See also Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, 104, where Tracy gives 
additional praise to Frei and shows where he still disagrees with him.  Tracy finds “persuasive” Frei‟s 
description of the loss of realistic narrative, and admits that among religions, Christianity has a unique 
appreciation for narrative because their gospels are the foundation of their faith.  Gospel, Tracy claims, is 
that “peculiar genre which unites proclamation, witness, and narrative…If one wants to know who Jesus 
Christ is for Christians, the passion narratives are the first place to look.  For there we find in realistic and 
history-like fashion the central Christian construal of who this Jesus confessed to be the Christ is and even 
why he and he alone is thus construed…Through the rendering of the singular identity of Jesus Christ in the 
passion narratives, Christians also discover their principle clues to who God is and who human beings as 
free agents are empowered to become” (114).   
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As a result of Frei‟s critique, Tracy has seemingly added a second criteria of 
appropriateness to his theological project, while still insisting that a responsible 
theological program must include an overarching criterion of intelligibility (i.e. a general 
system of correlation).  Throughout his career, Tracy‟s chief criteria of appropriateness 
was his insistence on theological continuity with the confessional formula, “I believe in 
Jesus Christ with the apostles.”222  Tracy maintains that this remains a proper criterion, 
but he now supplements it with Frei‟s criterion of realistic narrative.  In his 1994 book, 
On Naming the Present, Tracy suggests that it is “possible that these two…theological 
candidates for unity-amidst-diversity: the common Christian confession and the common 
Christian passion narrative…together may function to show a pervasive unity of 
Christian theological understanding of the scriptures without in any way denying the need 
for great variety.”223  Both the common Christian confession and a realistic reading of the 
passion narratives are indispensable criteria of appropriateness.  As a result, Tracy writes,  
In sum, any Christian theology which confesses its faith in the presence of Jesus 
Christ (and the Spirit released by Christ) „with the apostles‟ will always 
theologically need the plain ecclesial (apostolic) sense of these narratives to 
achieve what neither symbol alone, nor doctrine alone, nor historical-critical 
                                               
222 Tracy (ibid, 112), restates his insistence that Christians continue to use the confession, “We 
believe in Jesus the Christ with the apostles.”  This, in fact, will safeguard the Identity of Jesus Christ in the 
way Frei envisioned doing so through realistic narrative.  Tracy (ibid, 112-13), claims, “To eliminate any 
element of this central confession is to change (sometimes radically, sometimes subtly) the Christian 
understanding of all reality.”  Three cautions follow from this: First, Tracy (ibid), claims “the confession is 
not „We believe in Christ‟ so that the Sophia-Logos tradition unrelated to the ministry, teaching, death and 
resurrection of this Jesus of Nazareth confessed to be the Christ can suffice.”  Second, Tracy (ibid, 113), 
claims “the confession is also not „We believe in Jesus‟ so that a Jesusology or an alternative portrait of 
Jesus (e.g., the various quests for the „historical Jesus‟ can replace the ecclesial Christian confession „We 
believe in Jesus Christ.‟”  Third, Tracy (ibid), claims “the preposition „with‟…cannot be allowed to be 
replaced by the preposition „in,‟” for if the Church believed in the apostles, “the tradition or doctrine or 
church or apostolic office or text would replace Jesus Christ as that divine reality which the Christian 
ultimately believes in.”    
223 Tracy, On Naming the Present, 121.   
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reconstruction of the original apostolic witness alone, nor conceptual theology 
alone, nor confession alone, can achieve: a theological clarification of how the 
reality of Christ‟s presence is manifested through the identity of that Jesus 
rendered in the realistic, history-like narrative of the passion and resurrection: a 
narrative-confession of this one unsubstitutable Jesus of Nazareth who is the 
Christ of God.
224
 
 
As long as both the confession, “I believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles,” and the plain 
rendering of the passion narratives are emphasized (the two criteria of adequacy), the 
theologian may proceed boldly in adding a criteria of intelligibility (systematic 
correlation) to the interpretative project without eclipsing the identity of Christ.   
Tracy also realizes, as a result of Frei‟s critique, that his specific interpretation of 
individual parables in the Gospels must be reformulated to better emphasize the priority 
of the identity of Jesus Christ.
225
  Significantly, Ricoeur also changes his emphasis on the 
role of parables, although he does not specifically credit Frei‟s critique.226  Frei has 
argued that Tracy‟s interpretation of parables shifts focus away from realistic narrative 
                                               
224 Ibid, 125.   
225 Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 59, n. 16), specifically admits that 
some of his interpretations of parables in Blessed Rage for Order were “not specifically enough related to 
the passion narratives.”  Tracy cites Blessed Rage for Order, 124-46, as example of this, but insists that he 
has not made such an error in the Analogical Imagination (see “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 
64, n. 51).   
226 It is significant to note that Frei‟s 1982 essay, “Theology and the Interpretation of 
Narrative,” 94-116, was presented in a joint-presentation with Ricoeur, responding to Ricoeur‟s 
hermeneutics.  Hence they were, by that time, familiar with each other‟s arguments, and it is quite possible 
that Ricoeur‟s perspective changed in dialogue with Frei.  Later in his career, Ricoeur also admitted he has 
failed to adequately appreciate “that the narrative-parables are narratives within a narrative, more precisely 
narratives recounted by the principle personage of an encompassing narrative” (Paul Ricoeur, "The Bible 
and the Imagination," in The Bible as a Document of the University, ed. Hans Dieter Betz (Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1981), 55).  Ricoeur ("Biblical Hermeneutics," Semeia 4 (1975), 105), goes on to 
emphasize, “The hero‟ of the Gospel narrative, who is also the „donor‟ of the parables as secondary 
narratives tends to become the indirect referent of the parable as metaphor.”  It is clear, then, that Ricoeur 
wishes to understand the individual narratives in light of the realistic narrative, and not the other way 
around.  Yet Ricoeur does not, as William Placher ("Introduction," 45), claims, “go on to give a systematic 
account of how to interpret that overarching narrative.”   
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and hence the plain rendering of the identity of Jesus Christ.
227
  Frei thinks Tracy‟s 
interpretation of parables tends to predominate because parables better fit Tracy‟s 
phenomenological description of religious language.
228
  Ricoeur has explained religious 
language as having a referent grounded primarily in religious experience:  “What 
religious language does is to redescribe; what it redescribes is human experience.  In this 
sense we must say that the ultimate referent of the parables, proverbs, and eschatological 
sayings is not the Kingdom of God, but human reality in its wholeness.”229  Frei worries 
that human experience has shifted emphasis from the identity of Christ to the situation of 
the contemporary reader.
230
  Tracy, however, thinks that through Frei‟s work he is able to 
explain how parables can be subordinated to the identity of Christ.  As long as 
                                               
227 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 65), argues that Tracy naturally focuses his work away 
from realistic narrative and onto parables which “disorient” and “re-describe” and disclose a world for the 
reader, since these are better suited to bring out existential significance.  Naturally, says Frei (ibid), this 
linguistic “limit” situation is most likely to be found in “proverbs, eschatological sayings, and parables…” 
and hence the realistic narrative is usurped.   
228 Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, 134.  Tracy continually stresses the parables as disclosive 
of limit.  Tracy (ibid),  writes, “In the peculiar limit-use of narrative and metaphor in the parables these 
fictions redescribe the extraordinary in the ordinary in such a manner that the ordinary is transgressed and a 
new and extraordinary, but possible mode-of-being-in-the-world is disclosed.”  As a result, Tracy (ibid), 
writes, “Religious language in general re-presents that basic confidence and trust in existence which is our 
fundamental faith, our basic authentic mode of being in the world.”  The reason parables are essential for 
Tracy is because, as fiction, they disclose the “disorienting” and “reorienting” of a claim to the whole, 
which is the basic thrust of the religious dimension. 
229 Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 127.  Furthermore, Ricoeur (ibid, 34), notes, “the 
ultimate referent of parabolic (proverbial, proclamatory) language is human experience centered around the 
limit-experiences which would correspond to the limit-expressions of religious discourse.”  
230 Frei believes that phenomenology will move toward something like Gnosticism in its focus 
on teachings and sayings as the center of the text rather than the identity of Jesus Christ.  It is worth noting, 
however, that Frei is not against existential readings of parables, provided that they are directed toward and 
grounded in the identity of Jesus Christ.  Frei (“Conflicts in Interpretation,” 166), simply claims that in 
parables “one moves better from the self-identification of Jesus through the Passion and Resurrection 
stories toward the parables rather than the other way around.” 
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interpretations of parables are grounded in the two criteria of appropriateness they should 
be considered Christian readings of the text.
231
  Tracy claims,  
[I]f the parables of Jesus are not explicitly related to the passion narratives (as 
they are in the plain sense of Scripture), then it is true that the parables may begin 
to play too solitary and too prominent a theological role for Christian self-
understanding.  For the full theological meaning of Jesus‟ parables of the Reign of 
God is only clarified when the interpreter, through careful readings of the passion 
narrative, shows how Jesus is fully manifested in the passion narratives, and not 
earlier, as the enacted parable of God.
232
   
 
   So what of Frei‟s argument that phenomenological hermeneutics will “break” 
rather than “stretch” the literal reading of Scripture?  Will simply adding a further 
criterion of appropriateness without eliminating phenomenological hermeneutics restore a 
foundational focus on the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ as an orienting principle 
for Christian identity?  Frei would say no.  Frei is bothered that Tracy (following 
Ricoeur) posits a “split reference” for the Scriptures which places “meaning” in the world 
in front of the text, hence making the existential significance of the passage for the reader 
the ultimate referent of the text.
233
  The interpreter simply cannot give priority to both an 
extrinsic system of meaning and the unique claims of the Christian texts.  As a result, 
when a systematic correlation becomes a requirement for theology,  
                                               
231 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 64, n. 51.  Tracy (ibid), insists “that if 
the parables are to play their full theological role they should be related to the common confession and to 
the diversity of genres (as in The Analogical Imagination) or the common narrative (as in Frei).” 
232 Ibid, 47.   
233 See Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 64-65, who claims that Tracy must “indicate that 
the straightforward literal description or reference to the ordinary world is not what is at stake in the New 
Testament.”  To do this, Tracy follows Ricoeur in using a “double or split reference…in which the real 
meaning is the innovative linguistic thrust from the first to a second level, to a newly created linguistic 
world, and it is this second rather than the first referent that gives us the true referent or meaning of the 
language.”   
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[E]ither you provide an allegorical interpretation of the New Testament, in which 
the predicate exemplified by Jesus overpowers the ascriptive subject himself and 
then you return to Kant, as does David Tracy in Blessed Rage for Order, or your 
interpretation ends up having two meanings or referents at the same time, Jesus 
and some general experience, as Tracy does in a later book, The Analogical 
Imagination.
234
 
 
Frei explains that having two “meanings” is not a problem as long as one is 
allowed to order them (as the four senses were used in premodern exegesis).  The 
problem with Tracy‟s later account, for Frei, is that a “systematic correlation of the two 
meanings” (i.e. the incorporation of two ordering principles at the same time) forces him 
into “hermeneutical incoherence.”235  In other words, Tracy may have to break his 
hermeneutical rules to put the identity of Christ as rendered in the text ahead of the 
existential mode-of-being-in-the-world rendered in front of the text.  Within the world in 
front of the text, will the meaning of the words or the meaning disclosed in a fusion or 
horizons be granted priority?  The claims of Scripture, he feels, are relatively clear, even 
if a criteria for understanding is not clear.  Frei insists,  
There may well be an affinity, structural, moral, aesthetic, between reader and 
text.  On the other hand there may not be.  The conditions for a proper reading of 
biblical narratives may be quite accessible, even if one fails to discover such a 
general type of affinity, especially a structural affinity…the specificity of the 
narrative text, its literal sense if you will, is not to be ignored, no matter in what 
way the reader may find (s)he adjusts to it.
236
 
 
It seems that Frei is still concerned that Tracy‟s willingness to incorporate a 
realistic reading of the Gospels has come about precisely because it is able to fit into 
                                               
234 Ibid, 82.   
235 Ibid, 82. 
236 Frei, “„Narrative‟ in Christian and Modern Reading.” 160. 
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Tracy‟s already established correlational model, and not because Tracy is now committed 
to a plain reading of the biblical narrative.  When tension does arise (as Frei believes it 
does in the case of the particularity of Jesus Christ), Tracy has two options: either he can 
give hermeneutical priority to the unique claim of Scripture (and hence break his own 
correlational model), or he can incorporate the unique claim to the extent that it fits (and 
hence reduce the claim to what can be articulated coherently in a philosophical model).  
Either choice, Frei believes, will demonstrate the inadequacy of systematic correlation 
and the need for an ad hoc alternative.   
C.  Scripture‟s Role in the Economy 
 
In this dissertation I suggest that the way to ease the impasse of method between 
Tracy and Frei is to locate Scripture in the economy of redemption, showing how the 
Triune God uses Scripture to communicate to the Church.  Despite their nearly exclusive 
emphasis on method, I wish to argue that both Tracy and Frei see the movement from 
text to spiritual reality as the central problematic governing their hermeneutical projects.  
Frei insists on the plain sense reading of Scripture precisely because he desires to show 
that the Jesus Christ rendered in the Gospels is the Christ who is present to the reader.  
Tracy also develops his system of phenomenological hermeneutics because he wants to 
show that Scriptural reading involves more than simply the interaction between texts and 
readers, but leads to the very disclosure of the living, present Christ to readers.  However, 
because neither Frei nor Tracy examines this broader context of the divine economy, the 
relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church is left undeveloped, resulting in an 
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impasse in method.  This section will show the implicit suggestions each makes about 
God‟s use of Scripture and the movement from text to spiritual reality in a Christian 
reading of Scripture in order to highlight essential hermeneutical discussions that need to 
be developed.   
1. God‟s Use of Scripture  
 
Neither Tracy nor Frei says anything explicit about God‟s use of the Scriptural 
texts in the economy of redemption.  Throughout his work, Tracy‟s focus remains on the 
reader‟s reorienting experience of disclosure in the text, and hence does not articulate the 
way in which God uses the texts.  Yet Tracy insists that the disclosure is always a gift.
237
  
Consequently, although Tracy never develops this idea, the reorienting of the reader in 
encounter with the text must depend somehow on the action of God rather than being 
simply a function of the interaction between text and reader.  In his later work, Tracy 
does suggest that the Logos is somehow uniquely present in the Scriptural texts, but he 
never explains how this presence is linked to God‟s possible use of the texts for self-
communication to readers.
238
   
Frei‟s later writings at times seem to presume an ontology of God‟s action in the 
text, although Frei makes only a few tentative suggestions about God‟s use of the text.  In 
a 1986 lecture, Frei makes an interesting comment that moves beyond the text/reader 
relationship to a discussion of God‟s activity in the text.  Frei writes, “The textual world 
                                               
237 See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 50. 
238 Tracy, “Writing,” 390.   
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as witness to the Word of God is not identical with the latter, and yet, by the Spirit‟s 
grace, it is „sufficient‟ for the witnessing.”239  The Scriptures are somehow sufficient 
witness, and hence authoritative, because of God‟s gracious action (not specifically a 
quality of the text or a decision by the reading community).  Thus, “the reign of the One 
who is beyond all description, beyond all metaphorical thrusts, is depicted fitly by 
ordinary, realistic, literally referential language…”240  Frei notes later that he has a 
fundamental trust for the language of Scripture because God has caused this language to 
be adequate.
241
  The only confidence the interpreter could have that God is indeed 
sufficiently depicted in the text is if God caused that fit depiction to occur.  Frei 
concludes that this is the reason readers must trust in the adequacy of the literal sense:  
I plead then for the primacy of the literal sense then and, it seems to me, its 
puzzling but firm relationship to a truth toward which we cannot thrust.  The 
modus significandi will never allow us to say what the res significata is.  
Nonetheless, we can affirm that in the Christian confession of divine grace, the 
truth is such that the text is sufficient.  There is a fit due to the mystery of grace 
between truth and text…The Reformers saw the place where that fit was realized 
in the constant reconstitution of the Church where the word is rightly preached 
and where the sacraments are rightly administered.
242
   
 
                                               
239 Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” 164.  This text, published in Theology and Narrative, 
153-66, was originally delivered as the Alexander Thompson Memorial Lecture at Princeton Theological 
Seminary in 1986 and a transcript was made from a surviving tape by Richard Burnett (see Theology and 
Narrative, ch. 5, “Conflicts in Interpretation: Resolution, Armistice, or Co-existence?” 153-66. 
240 Ibid, 165. 
241 Frei (“Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 110), claims, “Language is, for 
Christians, a created good and not in principle fallen, and therefore it is not „absent‟ from the 
truth…Language is not fallen, not absent from truth or meaning…We have language and that is all we 
have, and to intercalate „meaning‟ into it is the very temptation we must resist.  We have texts and 
intertextuality and no other realm.” 
242 Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” 166.   
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Essentially Frei‟s cumulative argument is that the text of Scripture can be 
considered sufficient in its plain sense because God has determined that Scripture will be 
adequate as a witness to Christ.  Scripture is adequate because God has somehow caused 
it to be sufficient.  The sufficiency of the text is constituted and preserved by “divine 
grace.”  This claim shifts the emphasis from the Christian community to God‟s action.  It 
appears that Frei is focused on God‟s providential action, seeing to it that these texts were 
adequate and preserved, yet Frei never develops this aspect.  Thus neither Tracy nor Frei 
really explain God‟s use of the text, although the logic of each seems, at times, to press 
them to say more about how God may use Scripture. 
2.  The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality 
 
Given their lack of explicit reflection on God‟s use of the Scriptural texts, it is 
significant that Frei and Tracy both develop their respective projects with the goal of 
showing that Scriptural reading leads to spiritual encounter with the referent of the text.  
In fact, I suggest that although articulation of this movement remains implicit for each, it 
is the central problematic in each of their projects.  For Tracy, Scripture is significant 
precisely because it can lead to disclosure with the divine, while, for Frei, Scripture is 
significant precisely because it renders to readers the Christ who is present.  Here it 
appears to be the nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and reader 
prevents each from describing this movement.   
In his early work, Tracy‟s implicit movement from text to divine reality occurs at 
the level of dialogical encounter between text and reader which occurs in any religious 
classic.  Hence Tracy‟s central claim is that “The Christ event, in sum, is re-presentative 
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of the same „that-it-happens-now‟ event from the whole disclosed in every religious 
classic.”243  The subject matter disclosed in the Christian classic texts is unique, but the 
manner of disclosure is common to all classics.  Each genre, in its own way, discloses 
possibilities for human existence as it discloses a claim to the whole, which finds its 
greatest instantiation in the event of Christ.  The reader, in encounter with the text, is 
brought by the text‟s unique subject matter to a moment of disclosure, in which a new 
mode of being in the world is opened up.  The subject matter disclosure is a dual referent, 
simultaneously God as the ground of all reality, and a claim to the whole, expressed in 
Christian faith as the “dangerous memory” of the person/event of Jesus Christ.  As the 
reader encounters this unique subject matter, he or she is brought by the text to an 
experience of limit, in which the world of the reader is reoriented by the subject matter.  
Later in his career Tracy also provides a deeper description of the movement from 
text to spiritual reality.  In a little essay entitled “Writing,” Tracy argues that all writing is 
always fragmented, always constituted in absence.  Consequently, “In Christian self-
understanding, except for the unique status of Christ-as-Logos, there is no claim to full or 
simple self-presence in either manifesting Word-as-Logos or proclaimed word as 
rendering present the Word in distance (Bultmann) or sacrament.  There is some 
presencing, to be sure, but mediated in and through writing/scripture.  Presence is never 
full, simple, or whole.”244  Because there is no full presence of either author or reader to 
writing, the interpreter must always be self-critical, lest a particular ideology drive his/her 
                                               
243 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 235.   
244 Tracy, “Writing,” 390.  There Tracy appreciates the critiques of Barthes and Derrida about 
the tendency toward “presence” in writing and argues that presence is always partial when mediated 
through texts.   
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interpretation.
245
  This articulation on the need for suspicious readings of Scripture 
positively supplements Tracy‟s previous articulations of this subject, because he now 
explicitly links Scripture to a theory of the presence of the divine Word.
246
  The promise 
of presence allows the Church to understand their Scriptures as unique:  “This decisive 
Word-event of divine self-manifestation is understood among Christians as the divine 
self-presencing in the currently enacted Word and Eucharistic sacrament and in the 
written words of Scripture.”247  Yet Tracy struggles to show, in general terms of textual 
interpretation, exactly how these texts are unique in their rendering of Christ.  Locating 
Scripture‟s role in the relationship between Christ and Church may allow Tracy to 
explain the unique presence of the Logos in Scripture in a more complete way.   
Early in his career, Frei makes an equally provocative statement about the 
presence of God in Scripture.  In The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei claims,  
The center of the Christian message is a mystery—the presence of God…the 
feeble, often naïve and simple word of written Scripture…becomes a true witness, 
yet more than a witness.  The Word does indeed witness to that which it is not, the 
presence of God in Jesus Christ.  But far more important is the fact that indirectly 
(rather than directly, as in the case of Jesus Christ) God witnesses to it, that he 
makes himself present to it so that the Word may become the temporal basis of 
the Spirit who is the presence of God in Jesus Christ.  The witness of Scripture to 
                                               
245 Tracy (ibid, 391), claims, “Scripture and writing does not simply participate in presence 
but can indeed function paradoxically as the warning of the idolatrous Christian temptation to illusions of 
full self-presence or divine presence to the Christian.” 
246 The Word is both present and absent in these texts, and hence there is need for both trust 
and criticism.  Tracy (ibid, 389), notes the “originating Christian dialectic of revelation-as-Word: Jesus the 
Christ understood as both self-presencing Logos and self-distancing Kerygma.”  This “dual function” of 
“proximity and distance, presence and absence, similarity and difference, participation and interruption” of 
the self-understanding of Christ in writing demonstrates that “the Word, Jesus Christ, is for Christians 
testified to and rendered present in written words, that is, Scripture.” 
247 Ibid, 387. 
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God is sure, not by itself, but because the witness of God to Scripture is faithful 
and constant.
248
   
 
Here Frei seems to claim that the Scriptures are “faithful and constant” because 
God “makes himself present to it.”  Carter Aikin argues that implicitly in Frei‟s thought, 
“[T]he reason that we can orient our own identity in that which is given in the Bible is 
because God gives God‟s self as present in scripture.”249   
Frei insists that this movement from text to the (indirect) presence of God takes 
place in realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, where the unsubstitutable identity of a 
Christ is rendered to the reader in such a way that the reader cannot think of Christ as not 
present today.  Realistic reading, for Frei, finds its climax in the crucifixion and 
resurrection accounts in such a way that one who grasps the identity of Christ through 
Scripture cannot but understand Christ to be resurrected and present today.
250
  As 
Cowdell says,  
                                               
248 Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 165. 
249 See Wm. Carter Aikin, "Narrative Icon and Linguistic Idol: Reexamining the Narrative 
Turn in Theological Ethics," Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 28, no. 1 (2008), 93.  Aikin (ibid, 
88), notes two trends in narrative theology, one which “speaks of the scriptural narrative itself as the core 
of Christian community, identity, convictions, and so on, and the adherence to this narrative in and of itself 
is the source of Christian moral transformation” (Hauerwas is the chief example).  The second trend 
“speaks of the scriptural narrative as that which renders God present to the Christian individual and 
community.  This mode of God‟s presence through scriptural narrative, then, constitutes the core of 
Christian community, identity, convictions, and so on” (Frei is the chief example).  Aikin suggests that 
Hauerwas‟s approach comes close to making the text into an idol rather than an icon (using Marion‟s 
categories) because it reflects the interpreter‟s own image rather than pointing beyond itself to God. 
250 Summarily Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 149), gives the “identity of Jesus Christ” as 
rendered in the Gospels:  “He is the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his helplessness, in perfect 
obedience enacting their good in their behalf.  As that same one, he was raised from the dead and 
manifested to be the redeemer.  As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he cannot not live, and to conceive 
of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is.”  Thus in reading the resurrection accounts literally, Frei 
(ibid, 145), claims, “To know who he is in connection with what took place is to know that he is…What the 
accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of Jesus in the resurrection are such that his 
nonresurrection becomes inconceivable…however impossible it may be to grasp the nature of the 
resurrection, it remains inconceivable that it should not have taken place.” 
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[B]y giving a purely aesthetic (arguably) description of the text, [Frei] has made 
the transition from text to reality claim.  Thus the revelatory claim of the text does 
not lie, as with Ricoeur, in the establishment of a moment of understanding in the 
reader, but it remains an intra-textual event.  Here the reader understands who 
Jesus is and this understanding is identical with another understanding: that Jesus 
is.
251
   
 
Frei claims that this move from text to divine reality takes place entirely at the 
level of the literal sense, as the reader recognizes the unique subject matter of Scripture 
rendered in a fitting way.  Frei claims, “The primacy of the sensus literalis is in effect an 
assertion of the fitness and congruence of the „letter‟ to be the channel of the spirit. It is 
the assertion that the text is more nearly perspicuous than not….For the Protestant 
Reformers, governance by the sensus literalis in the reading of Scripture as well as its 
perspicuity entailed that in principle there is no interpretive outsider.”252  Using the 
exegesis of Calvin, Frei claims, “Calvin has it that our hearts and minds may need 
illumination, the text does not.  It is plain for all to read.”253  Yet while this realistic 
rendering is open to all readers, Frei admits that belief in the resurrection is a passage to a 
different realm.  Although “there is a kind of logic in a Christian‟s faith that forces him to 
say that disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally impossible,” Frei says, 
“whether one actually believes the resurrection is, of course, a wholly different 
matter…no matter what the logic of the Christian faith, actual belief in the resurrection is 
                                               
251 Scott Cowdell, Is Jesus Unique? A Study of Recent Christology (New York & Mahwah, 
NJ: Paulist Press, 1996), 208.  For Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 146), this “argument holds good only 
in this one and absolutely unique case, where the described entity (who or what he is, i.e., Jesus Christ, the 
presence of God) is totally identical with his factual existence.  He is the resurrection and the life.  How can 
he be conceived as not resurrected?”  Frei (ibid, 148), adds, “To think of him dead is the equivalent of not 
thinking of him at all.” 
252 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 108.   
253 Ibid. 
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a matter of faith and not of arguments from possibility or evidence.”254  Thus Frei implies 
that while a straight-forward reading of the Gospels renders belief in this Christ logically 
necessary, the logic of coming to believe is a gift given by God to which human beings 
can only respond when given.  Hence for the reader to move from reading realistically to 
believing the implications of the realistic narrative is the passage to a different realm of 
reality.  A paradox, then, is present within Frei‟s work:  The letter of the text realistically 
renders the divine reality, but does not mechanistically lead the reader to an encounter 
with that reality.  Spiritual understanding is a movement beyond realistic reading.  As we 
will see, this claim brings Frei‟s realistic reading very close to de Lubac‟s move from 
history to allegory, where the text is a reliable guide to and necessary sign of the spiritual 
reality, yet it is the action of the Spirit which occasions the movement from one to the 
other.  
Frei also appears to articulate a movement from text to spiritual reality in a second 
way which is dependent on the plain sense of the Gospel narratives.  Here a move to 
figural reading takes place which must be grounded in theological presuppositions about 
God‟s providence and the meaning of history.  It is here where Frei explicitly speaks of a 
“spiritual understanding” of Scripture.  For Frei, following Auerbach, spiritual 
understanding appears to be the ability to recognize, through the lens of God‟s ordering 
providential actions in history, the connection between figure and fulfillment.
255
  Dawson 
shows that Frei, following Auerbach,  
                                               
254 Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 151-52.   
255 Frei (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 28, citing Auerbach, Mimesis, 73), claims, “Figural 
interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons in such a way that the first signifies 
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restricts the scope of the „spiritual‟ by distinguishing it from the historical reality 
of figure and fulfillment….Only the mental process by which a figural reader 
„comprehends‟ their „interdependence‟ can be called spiritual….Like meaning, 
spirit denotes a divinely enacted relation between two persons or events, a relation 
altogether different from the causal connections of science or scientific 
historiography.
256
   
 
Hence spiritual understanding is the grasping of the relationship between figure 
and fulfillment which can only be understood in light of the theological presupposition 
that God has ordered history into a unified whole.  For Frei, “The only spiritual act is that 
of comprehension—an act of mimesis, following the way things really are—rather than 
of creation, if it is to be faithful interpretation.”257  The movement from text to divine 
reality, then, is first a realistic reading of the Gospels which render the unique identity of 
the present Christ, and second a comprehension, through the use of theological 
presuppositions, how the reader fits into the figural unity of the Scriptural world.   
For both Tracy and Frei, then, these texts are unique precisely because they lead 
the responsive reader to an encounter with God and they enable the responsive reader to 
see all reality in the way God intends it to be understood.  The Scriptural texts go far 
beyond imparting information about God; they lead the reader to the self-disclosure of 
God.  For both, the theological interpretation of Scripture is intended to facilitate the 
mediation of the same spiritual reality, yet because they both focus only on the way in 
                                                                                                                                            
not only itself but also the second, while the second involves or fulfills the first.  The two poles of a figure 
are separated in time, but both, being real events or persons, are within temporality.  They are both 
contained in the flowing stream which is historical life, and only the comprehension, the intellectus 
spiritualis, of their interdependence is a spiritual act.” 
256 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 153.   
257 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 36.    
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which the reader encounters the text, and not on God‟s use of the texts for self-revelation 
to readers, this discussion has reached an impasse.   
3.  Conclusion and Remaining Challenges 
 
Observing the absence of discussion about the place of Scripture in the economy 
of redemption reveals why certain methodological impasses remain between Tracy and 
Frei.  Frei‟s difficulty with locating authority and Tracy‟s difficulty in naming the 
referent of the text, I will suggest, can only be resolved through explicit theological 
reflection on the place of Scripture in the divine economy.  Frei‟s attempt to establish a 
realistic reading of the Gospels is an honorable attempt to preserve the text from 
manipulation by human readers through engagement with contemporary literary theory.  
Frei provides a strong argument that the Gospels, if read realistically, render a picture of 
Christ that is relatively clear and determinate.  Yet Frei‟s concern about the location of 
authority for the realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, whether it arises from the texts 
themselves or from the consensus of the Church, simply cannot be resolved until Frei has 
articulated the relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church.  Both Frei and Tracy 
agree that only a plain reading of the Gospel narrative shows “just how and why the 
identity and presence of Jesus as Jesus the Christ is indeed confessed in the common 
Christian confession, but is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details of the 
interaction of the unsubstitutable character of Jesus and the specific circumstances of his 
passion and resurrection.”258  Yet the extent to which this realistic rendering of Christ can 
                                               
258 Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 39. 
 78 
 
be correlated to other philosophical disciplines can only be decided when Scripture is 
examined in the broader context of the economy of redemption.  The next section will 
turn to an examination of the ecclesiology of each author to show how the understanding 
of the Church influences the hermeneutics of each.   
III.  Ecclesiology: Describing the Church as a Theological and Social Reality  
 
Both Tracy and Frei seek to ground interpretive authority for Scripture in the 
reading community.
259
  Consequently, a thorough description of the Church as a reading 
community would seem to produce significant implications for hermeneutical procedure.  
Yet here again the emphasis of each on method, along with the insistence of each that 
Scripture can be plainly read by all readers, prevents Tracy and Frei from adequately 
articulating the way in which the Church uniquely receives the mediation of Christ in the 
Scriptures.   
While Tracy and Frei argue that the Church must be described both as a 
theological reality and as a sociological reality, their ongoing debate about correlation 
appears to shift the emphasis of each to a one-sided description of the Church as a social 
reality.  This description of the Church which emphasizes the social dimension of the 
                                               
259 Because the Scripture is the Church‟s book, a more explicit articulation of ecclesiology 
should seemingly produce a better understanding of the Scriptures.  To decline attention to the character of 
the Church in order to get a more “objective” reading of Scripture by the individual interpreter has been a 
chief fault of modern readings, and both Tracy and Frei agree it must be overcome.  For Frei (especially the 
later Frei), the literal sense is to be taken as foundational to Christianity precisely because the Church has 
decided to read their Scriptures in that way.  Frei spends the later part of his career studying the continuous 
identity and self-description of the Church throughout the ever-changing philosophical models of the 
modern period.  For Tracy, Scripture is the Church‟s book, the Church is the bearer of the Christian classic 
texts, and the interpreter must not say anything that is in discontinuity with the confession, “I believe in 
Jesus Christ with the apostles.”  Both theologians believe it is necessary to ground Scriptural interpretation 
in the Church.   
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Church almost to the exclusion of the theological dimension has led to impasse between 
the two theologians, as each uses a different model of social description to support 
implicit dogmatic assumptions.  Tracy typically describes the Church as a “tradition” in 
the philosophical sense used by Gadamer and Ricoeur.  Thus the Church can be fruitfully 
described in terms of a general philosophical system of meaningful interaction between 
text (Scripture) and tradition (Church).  Consequently Tracy critiques Frei‟s 
understanding of the “plain sense” of Scripture as being too Protestant260 and too limited 
261
 to explain how the Scripture is the Church‟s book.  Frei, on the other hand, typically 
describes the Church as a “socio-linguistic community,” using the work of Wittgenstein 
and Geertz.
262
  The Church can be fruitfully described in terms of its self-description: 
those practices, rules, customs, etc. which are internal to its existence.  Consequently Frei 
accuses Tracy of not developing his model with reference to the self-understanding of the 
Church, replacing the unique, self-description of the Church with the general category of 
                                               
260 Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 37), claims that his own emphasis on 
the plain sense (which he feels includes a broader range of readings than Frei‟s construal) “clarifies the 
Catholic sense of how the Scripture is the church‟s book.” 
261 Tracy (Dialogue with the Other, 108), writes, “Personally I remain persuaded (de Lubac, et 
al.) of the value of the patristic and medieval allegorical readings…The contemporary emphasis on „literal‟ 
readings, although clearly fruitful for the reasons cited in the text (and distinctively emphasized by Aquinas 
and Luther), seems both too narrow in focus and too peremptory in their discussions of „allegorical,‟ or 
„mystical‟ or even „general hermeneutical‟ readings and concerns.”  
262 Lindbeck has been influential in Frei‟s development of ecclesiology.  The Church, for 
Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine, 33), is that community which provides a “comprehensive interpretive 
scheme” which “structure[s] human experience and understanding of self and world.”  Frei wishes to give a 
“thick description” of the Church (a term used by Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New 
York: Basic Books, 1973)), in order to understand why the literal sense is so essential (see Frei, “Literal 
Reading,” 71).   
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human experience.
263
  Each theologian accuses the other of failing to address the Church 
adequately in reading the Scriptures theologically.  Yet both are committed to descriptive 
schemas of the Church that focus on the Church more as a social reality rather than as a 
distinctively theological reality.   
So long as focus remains almost exclusively on the relationship between 
Scriptural texts and individual readers, it will be almost impossible to decide whether 
Tracy or Frei has more adequately described the reading community.  It remains unclear 
why describing the Church‟s identity as a socio-linguistic community (as Frei does) is 
methodologically advantageous to describing it philosophically as a tradition (as Tracy 
does).
264
  Both approaches illumine certain important aspects of the Church‟s identity.  
Yet both fail to provide a thorough enough theological description of the Church to show 
how it is unique in its reception of Christ by means of the Scriptures.  In this section I 
will show that Tracy and Frei‟s lack of theological description of the Church has 
prevented them from placing Scriptural interpretation in the broader context of the 
economy of redemption, as they do not adequately show the normative purpose of the 
Church‟s reading of Scripture.  Explicitly placing the text/reader relationship in its larger 
context of God‟s self-mediation to the Church, I suggest, will lead to a better description 
                                               
263 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 33), writes, “It is interesting that the Church as the 
necessary context for the use of Christian concepts and language plays no part at all in Tracy‟s layout of his 
method.  Experience is its substitute.” 
264 Tracy‟s implicit critique in Dialogue with the Other, 109, seems to be that philosophical 
descriptions are not inherently worse than literary theories or social-scientific descriptions of the Church.  
Tracy (ibid), thus notes, “In Frei‟s reading, therefore, the only hope of recovering Christian identity is to 
recover a „plain sense‟ reading of the biblical narratives again.  For Frei, this demands abandoning the futile 
hope of „correlating‟ this narrative to some more general notions of „narrativity‟ or „religion‟ (or both).  
This also demands reading the narratives more like literary critics read them (at least certain kinds of critics 
like Cleanth Brooks or Eric Auerbach).”  Tracy remains unconvinced that either the abandonment of 
correlation or the use of literary critics or social scientists will, in the end, prove decisive to “recovering 
Christian identity.”   
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of the receptive activity of readers and hence will allow for a more complete explanation 
of Scriptural reading. 
A.  Frei‟s Ecclesiology: The Church as a Socio-linguistic Community  
 
Frei appears to have developed two strands of ecclesiology, one relating to his 
early focus on the identity of Jesus Christ and the other relating to his later “cultural-
linguistic turn.”  In Frei‟s early model, the Church is constituted in response to the 
identity of Jesus Christ and thus has its own identity in relation to Christ its head and in 
relation to the world.  Furthermore, Frei suggests that the Church is the indirect presence 
of Christ.  In Frei‟s later model, an additional step takes place (additional, because it does 
not nullify the former model, but largely presupposes it).  Since the Church has its own 
identity (dependent on and in relation to the identity of Jesus Christ), the identity of the 
Church must be allowed its own self-description in order to show how Scripture must be 
normatively read.  Throughout both ecclesiological strands Frei insists that general 
hermeneutical method does not determine the Church‟s reading of Scripture, nor should 
ecclesiology be suspended in order to improve Scriptural reading.
265
   
1.  Frei‟s Early Ecclesiology 
 
                                               
265 Topping (Revelation, Scripture, and Church, 195), notes that “on Frei‟s depiction of the 
hermeneutic field…One does not suspend church doctrine and practice (ecclesiology) in order to submit 
Bible reading to a methodologically and institutionally independent analysis; rather, one suspends 
historical-critical discussion (of meaning and reference) in order to attend to either the literary features of 
the Bible (in his early work) or follow the church‟s ruled use of the Bible (in his later work), particularly 
those which govern Gospel reading in relation to the rest of the Bible and, indeed, to the rest of reality.” 
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Frei‟s early ecclesiology, developed in The Identity of Jesus Christ, sketches an 
identity of the Church that analogously follows the identity of Christ.  Using the same 
intention-action schema he had applied to the Christ depicted in the Gospels, Frei argues 
that the identity of the Church is constituted as a follower of the identity of Christ.
266
  In 
the same way Jesus‟ identity in the Gospels is rendered in His relation to others, so the 
identity of the Church is constituted as it acts in relation to Christ and to the world.
267
  
Just as “Jesus‟ identity was the intention-action sequence in which he came to be who he 
was,” and just as Jesus “was constituted by the interaction of his character and 
circumstances…So also is the church.  Like Jesus, like the people of Israel, the church is 
its history, its passage from event to event…”268  As a result, Frei can claim that “the 
church has a history, indeed it is nothing other than its as yet unfinished history 
transpiring from event to event.”269  This identity is understood by paying attention to the 
relationships between Christ, the Church, and the world.   
The Church is constituted both as follower of Christ and as indirect presence of 
Christ.  As a witness to the identity of Christ, the Church is faithful to the extent that it 
                                               
266 Mike Higton ("„A Carefully Circumscribed Progressive Politics:' Hans Frei's Political 
Theology," Modern Theology 15, no. 1 (1999), 63), notes three traits of Frei‟s early ecclesiology:  The 
Church “is the place where the accessible identity of Jesus is re-presented,…it has its own identity as an 
unsubstitutable corporate follower of an unsubstitutable Lord, and it witnesses to the fact that the one 
whom it follows is present beyond the church to the whole of history.” 
267 Because the identity of a person is the action of the person in relation to others, the Church 
could be said to be constituted in such action as well.   
268 Frei, Identity, 160.  Frei (ibid 159), proposes, “The identity description that we applied to 
Jesus in the Gospels must, to a lesser extent and in merely analogous fashion, be applied to the church as 
his people.”  The identity must remain “merely analogous,” because “no community or institution is a 
„subject‟ in the same way in which the term applies to an individual.”    
269 Ibid, 159. 
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reflects the Christ depicted in the Gospels.
270
  The Church “must be a follower rather than 
a complete reiteration of its Lord…The church has no need to play the role of „Christ 
figure.‟  Rather, it is called upon to be a collective disciple, to follow at a distance the 
pattern of exchange…”271  At the same time, however, the Church is more than simply a 
partially obedient follower.  The Church is the locus of the indirect presence of the 
unsubstitutable person of Jesus Christ.  The Church is “both the witness to that presence 
and the public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes…”272  
Significantly, Frei states that the Church is constituted by both Word and Sacrament, and 
claims that eliminating one or the other of these would make Sacrament into “religious 
ritual” and Word into “humane ideology.”273  However strongly Frei claims the Church is 
constituted on the identity of Jesus Christ, the Church is also constituted by sacrament as 
well.   
Although the identity of the Church is primarily constituted in relation to Christ, it 
is only recognizable in relation to the world.  Frei claims, “History is public history—the 
intention-action pattern formed by the interaction of the church with mankind at large; 
                                               
270 Ibid, 159.  The Church‟s identity is one of witness to the Christ who is at the center of 
history.  Frei (ibid), claims, “The church is simply the witness to the fact that it is Jesus Christ and none 
other who is the ultimate presence in and to the world in its mysterious passage from event to event in 
public history.” 
271 Frei (Ibid, 160), claims, “First, …In the church‟s case, that neighbor is the human world at 
large, to which the church must be open in gratitude without forsaking its own mission and testimony.  (It is 
surely difficult—seemingly impossible—to claim that the church is even unambiguously true to this 
discipleship.).”  
272 Ibid, 157.  It is, in fact, the indirect presence of Christ in the Church that gives the Church 
its identity.  Frei (ibid, 159), claims, “The given and instituted, spatial and temporal bases for the indirect 
presence of Christ allow the church that relatively permanent institutional structure without which no 
community can exist or be self-identical…”  This indirect presence of Christ is also mediated to the Church 
by the Holy Spirit, yet the Spirit is not the direct presence of Jesus—Jesus‟ identity is that of an 
unsubstitutable individual.   
273 Ibid, 158. 
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and it is this history which forms the mysterious pattern of meaning to be disclosed by the 
presence of God in Jesus Christ in the future mode.”274  This means that, in some way, 
the identity of both the Church and Christ become apparent as the Church interacts with 
the world.  God is at work in secular history in a way that the Church may not be able to 
recognize, but must trust in faith.
275
  Frei claims,  
[The] providential presence of God in Jesus Christ” [happens in] “history that 
takes place in the interaction of the church with humanity at large.  In a sense, that 
means that the really significant events may well transpire among the „Gentiles‟ 
from whom the church („Israel‟) receives the enrichment of her own humanity.  
Humanity at large is the neighbor given to the church, through whom Christ is 
present to the Church.
276
   
 
While Christ‟s indirect presence has “spatial, temporal bases” in the Church 
(through Word, Sacrament and the Holy Spirit), Christ is clearly working beyond the 
Church in history.
277
  Just as the indirect presence of Christ is seen in the Church by the 
world, so it is also seen in the world by the Church.  The Church learns to recognize 
                                               
274 Ibid, 161.  
275 Ibid, 161.  Thus, for the Christian, Frei (ibid), claims that “history is neither chaotic nor 
fated, but providentially ordered in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, who is Lord of the past, 
the present, and the future.”  Frei (ibid, 163), claims further that, “The parabolic application of Christ‟s 
passion and resurrection is limited.  It does not light up all history…This is the clue it provides: There will 
be a summing up of history, a summing up of the history of the church together with the world…This is the 
Christian‟s hope in the future mode of the presence of Jesus Christ, of which the interaction of life in the 
church and world is for him a token and a pledge.”  This means that “not even the event of Jesus Christ can 
be…an absolute clue” to the future.  Frei (ibid, 164), claims, “That is why Christians, precisely because 
they believe in providence, know far less than certain ideological groups about the shape of the future, e.g., 
the Marxists.”  
276 Ibid, 162. 
277 Ibid, 157-58.  Thus Frei (ibid), insightfully notes, “The church is constituted by the one 
(his presence, which must be spatially and temporally based—even though these bases are not identical 
with his presence) as well as by the other (his presence to the course of human history) and by their unity.” 
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Christ in the world, although it cannot ever claim it knows the meaning of history.
278
  
Clearly Frei wishes to take seriously the identity of the Church in relation to the identity 
of Christ and world. 
For Frei, understanding the place of the Church in relation to Christ and world is a 
product of figural reading.  Frei claims that figural reading depends “on the conviction 
that the narrative renders temporal reality in such a way that the interpretive thought can 
and need only comprehend the meaning that is, or emerges from, the cumulative 
sequence and its teleological pattern, because the interpreter himself is part of that real 
sequence.”279  Frei‟s project of figural reading attempts to establish the reader between 
Christ‟s first and second coming, and hence to show, in de Lubac‟s language, the 
allegorical and anagogical dimensions of Christian understanding.
280
  Dawson claims that 
for Frei, figural reading is “a patient „working through‟ the spiritual dynamics of the 
disciple‟s movement from his or her state of figure to one of fulfillment, a working 
forward in light of the assurances of Christ‟s first coming but also of the uncertainties of 
his not-yet-realized second coming.”281  Finding the Church‟s identity between the poles 
of Christ‟s first and final advents establishes a certain agnosticism about the meaning of 
                                               
278 Ibid, 161.  Frei is reticent to say too much about the Church‟s understanding of the future 
from examining the world.  Frei (ibid, 161), claims, “In our endeavor to narrate the as-yet-unfinished 
pattern of history, we reach for parables that might serve to set forth a kind of pattern, though not to confine 
history and the mysterious providence of God to these symbolic meanings.  Sequences of events differ from 
each other sufficiently widely and always take place in a sufficiently unexpected manner so that we cannot 
claim that any set of images or parables can give us the clue to the pattern of history.” 
279 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37.   
280 Frei‟s figural reading, Higton (Christ, Providence and History, 166), claims, contains “a 
willingness to wait upon the particularity of the world rather than digging beneath the particularity in 
search of some stabilizing religious bedrock.” 
281 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 212.   
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history apart from Christ.  In a 1986 paper, Frei insists that “to believe that God‟s 
kingdom holds the human future [is] not to know how it will supersede the present, in fact 
to know very little about the future for sure...”282  Higton claims that “The secular, 
skeptical sensibility of which Frei speaks is, we might say, a commitment to an unending 
learning of the world which does not know in advance what it will find, and which is not 
simply recalling or confirming general truths already known.”283  The one presupposition 
that one must carry, for Frei, in order to do justice to the particularity of Christ, is that no 
stable meaning pattern can be found apart from Christ.  Hence the systematic theologian 
has no need to look for one, and all such looking will result in failure.  The Church, then, 
forms its identity as it follows what Scripture reveals about Christ and remains patiently 
agnostic beyond what is revealed through the narrative structure of the text extended in 
figural reading.   
At this point, a few tentative suggestions can be made about the import of this 
early ecclesiology on Frei‟s hermeneutical project.  First, for Frei, priority must be given 
to self-description of the Church over any extrinsic philosophical system of meaning.  
Because Frei‟s focus is on identity rather than existential experience (as Tracy), Frei will 
practically favor a self-referential description of the Church rather than a description 
based on a particular philosophical model.  Second, because the Church gains its identity 
by following the identity of Christ, Frei struggles to show the implications of the 
                                               
282 Higton, Christ, Providence and History, 170, citing Frei, “Comments” (YD S 18-268, 11-
173), emphasis his.  Frei apparently wrote this draft of this conference paper overnight in reaction to the 
optimism toward understanding history that Frei had sensed at the conference the previous day (see Higton, 
ibid, 164-65).  Frei says later in the paper that Christians should be “uneasy about thinking that the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus are the clue to the shape of the political future.  The limits of time and 
space remain, and yet we have the promise of God” (Frei, “Comments,” cited in Higton, 170). 
283 Higton, ibid, 166.   
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presence of the living Christ in the community.  Frei will tend to give priority to the 
unique identity of Christ to such an extent that he never really explains what the indirect 
presence of Christ in the Church means for this reading community.  Third, Frei sees the 
Church as a “public” (to use Tracy‟s term) because it exists in relation to the world.  Frei 
does not wish to explain the Church only as a self-referential community, engaged only 
in reading its own texts without the possibility of external critique.  In fact, such a 
communitarian description of the Church would be quite incompatible with Frei‟s 
ecclesiology.  The Church can only be understood as it interacts with the world.  Fourth, 
Frei‟s figural reading is heavily balanced toward explaining how identity is shaped rather 
than how transformation occurs.  Frei is so interested in safeguarding the unique identity 
of Christ that he does not say much about the way the Church encounters Christ.  We will 
see that this is a key difference between Frei‟s figural reading and de Lubac‟s allegorical 
reading, and that Frei leaves undeveloped much theological reflection about Christ‟s 
mediation to the Church by means of Scripture.  In the end, Frei‟s focus on method, 
unattended by a complete theological description of the nature of the Church or of God‟s 
use of Scripture in mediating Christ to the Church prevents him from developing the full 
dimensions of his figural reading.   
2.  Frei‟s Later Ecclesiology 
 
Much of Frei‟s ecclesiology is developed as a product of his project of ad hoc 
correlation.  The priority, for Frei, is to subordinate philosophical models to Christian 
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self-description while allowing each to influence the other.
284
  Ad hoc correlation will 
always be necessary for adequate self-description of the Christian faith (Christianity 
cannot adequately understand itself without it),
285
 while systematic correlation always 
risks imposing an extrinsic structure on the Christian faith, and through that, to reduce the 
faith to philosophy.  The interpreter must always maintain vigilance against allowing 
philosophy to overtake Christian self-description.  Frei realizes that ad hoc correlation 
will be more ambiguous and more difficult to employ than a system of systematic 
correlation.
286
  Necessarily, Frei states, this new program for theology will “obviously 
mean a humbler hermeneutics for rather low-level guidance in interpretation than we 
have become accustomed to.  It will raise doubts about a theory or the possibility that is 
logically prior to the actuality of interpretation, and it will be a theory of descriptive 
                                               
284 In a 1984 letter to Gary Comstock, (unpublished letter, cited in Higton, Christ, History, 
and Providence, 84), 1-2, Frei claims, “Christian theologians will have to make use of philosophy…I‟m 
saying two things simultaneously: First, Christian theology is quite distinct from philosophy…Second, 
despite their mutual distinctness, theology as a second-order discipline cannot dispense with philosophy, 
and their relation remains complex and has constantly to be worked out, rather than being of one invariable 
shape.” 
285 Higton (Christ, History and Providence, 197), points out that Frei has three problems with 
systems of theology which claim to be independent of philosophical constructs.  First, such a theology 
would make repetition the highest theological expression.   Second, such a theology is, in fact, determined 
by philosophical constructs (see Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 4).  This model includes both 
“Wittgensteinian fideists” and evangelicals, thus being “a chameleon that can wear either conservative or 
liberal theological colors.”  Interestingly, Frei notes that this model is just as determined by philosophy as 
is types 1 or 2, since “its sharp rejection of the other types is a purely philosophical rather than theological 
argument—namely, the rejection of universal, transcendental Wissenschaftstheorie and the appeal instead 
to the metaphor grammar” (ibid, 4).  Third, as a logical consequence, it limits the Christian faith by 
imposing an external structure which will not let the faith speak provide a true self-description.   
286 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 86), cites Karl Barth: “We must be clear that every 
scheme of thought which we bring with us is different from that of the scriptural word which we have to 
interpret, for the object of the latter is God‟s revelation in Jesus Christ, it is the testimony of this revelation 
inspired by the Holy Ghost, and it can become luminous for us only through the same Holy Ghost” (Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics 1.2, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 730).  Frei (ibid, 
86), then adds, “To that we might well reply, „That‟s all very well, but now tell us how to apply these 
rules.‟  But there‟s the rub, and the rub is the point.  If he could tell us how, the rule would no longer be a 
rule but a method, a systematic and general theory for how to read.  „Subordination‟ of a scheme to the 
scriptural text means inescapably taking a real risk…”  
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elements that go into but do not constitute a unified description of „understanding.‟”287  
Yet such a program, Frei thinks, will be more faithful to the Christian faith, because “the 
language of a Church is always community-specific and can never be dissolved…into a 
more general culture or, for that matter, a philosophical-technical vocabulary.”288   
Yet despite Frei‟s insistence that the identity of the Church not be forced into a 
general schema of meaning, Frei‟s later turn to grounding authority of the plain sense in 
the decision of the early Church community actually pushes Frei to describe the Church 
less as a theological reality (as in his early ecclesiology) and more as a social reality.  In 
his later works Frei focuses on the Church in largely social categories:   
Christianity is a religion, a social organism.  Its self-description marks it typically 
as a religion in ways similar to those given by sociologists of religion or cultural 
anthropologists.  It is a community held together by constantly changing yet 
enduring structures, practices, and institutions, the way religious communities are: 
e.g. a sacred text; regulated relations between an elite…and a more general body 
of adherents; and by a set of rituals—preaching, baptism, the celebration of 
communion; common beliefs and attitudes; all of these linked…with a set of 
narratives connected with each other in the sacred text and its interpretive 
tradition.  All of these are, for social scientist and theologian…not the signs or 
manifestations of religion; rather they constitute it, in complex and changing 
coherence.
289
   
 
                                               
287 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 113.   
288 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 37. 
289 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 96-97.  Note that social scientists can 
go wrong here just as phenomenologists do.  Frei is quite critical of social scientists who posit an “essence” 
of the religion and then study the religion in light of its “essence.”  This is just as bad as the 
phenomenologists who begin with a structure of meaning and read Christianity in light of that.  Here again 
Frei attacks the phenomenological tradition in its description of religion.  The problem with this group is 
that it “mistakes some secondary phenomena of religion for its essence.  The essence that social scientists 
cannot capture is indelibly bound to its self-expression in adherents‟ experience and description…that 
uniqueness is a function of linguistic as well as prelinguistic experience, and understanding them is 
conditional upon understanding the circular relationship between the experience and its meaning-referent, 
the essence of religion” (99).   
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Frei‟s primary appreciation for the arguments of philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein and anthropologists such as Geertz seem to be that they clear a space for the 
Church to read its own Scripture without being required to conform to an external 
meaning system.  Frei praises this interpretive tradition for refusing to incorporate 
general meaning systems wholesale:  
They [followers of Wittgenstein] believe that „understanding‟ a text is more 
nearly an ability to use it appropriately in specific contexts (and the appropriate 
skill of judgment about whether or not to activate that capacity) than to know the 
rules for proper „interpretation.‟  To construe the text properly is part of learning 
the requisite conceptual skills.  To understand concepts is to have the ability both 
to explicate and to apply them, without necessarily resorting to a theory that 
would indicate how to couple the two.  In the case of the Bible, this finally cannot 
be done without learning how to use the Bible, including its narratives, within the 
church and as its canon, i.e., as authoritative „in the coincidence of letter and 
spirit.‟290   
 
Biblical interpretation must be accountable, first of all, to the Church, and the 
chief criteria for determining a good reading of Scripture is its coherence to the 
established language of the Church.  This language is only able to be understood in its 
use, as the Church practices its faith.
291
  Because the Church is the location where the 
indirect presence of Christ is located, it would be illegitimate to begin with general 
theories of human understanding and apply them to the Church‟s reading of Scripture 
before describing the rules and practices of the Church.  This would, in effect, eclipse the 
reality of the Church in the same way that Biblical narrative was eclipsed.  Ecclesiology 
has, in a sense, become the foundation of Frei‟s hermeneutical work, since the Christian 
                                               
290 Frei, “„Narrative‟ in Christian and Modern Reading,” 160.   
291 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 100.   
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tradition establishes the “language” through which the Scriptures can be read and 
adequately interpreted.   
Frei, then, is making a (necessarily) circular claim: Scripture‟s ability to norm the 
tradition is established precisely because Scripture‟s reading is grounded by the tradition.  
Frei‟s proposal is not a sola scriptura of the Gospel narratives.  Although the Church is 
sustained by reading the plain sense of the Gospels, the plain sense is not determined or 
understood apart from the self-reflection of the Church.  This includes both a constant 
attention to the past tradition of the Church,
292
 as well as a continual wariness that a 
philosophical system may eclipse the Christian language.
293
  When Frei speaks of the 
Church, he necessarily speaks of Scripture, and in his later work, he rarely speaks of 
Scripture without the Church.  While Frei recognizes that Scripture is grounded in the 
community, he still wishes to give the Scriptures primacy over the Church to critique it.  
Frei makes this priority clear by claiming, “In the self-description of the Christian 
community, the function „scripture‟ as a concept—it does not contain a „meaning‟ apart 
from the interpretation or use in the Church—is to shape and constrain the reader, so that 
he or she discovers the very capacity to subordinate himself to it.”294   
                                               
292 Frei, “„Narrative‟ in Christian and Modern Reading.” 160.  Hence Frei (ibid), insists that, 
“No Christian reflection on the biblical narratives, no matter how technical, is apt to ignore the connections 
between those narratives and the focus of Christian identity they helped shape over the centuries.” 
293 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 100.  Frei (ibid), claims, “No 
theologian here speaks for himself without first speaking for the community, and his first task is, therefore, 
to give a normative description rather than positioning himself to set forth or argue Christian truth claims.”  
Description of the Christian language is top priority, Frei (ibid), claims, because “Christianity, precisely as 
a community, is language forming, not purely, of course, but sufficiently so that language as embodied in 
its institutions, practices, doctrines, and so on, is a distinctive and irreducible social fact.  The language is 
religion-specific, and theology is the constant testing of the way it is used in a given era…” 
294 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 86. 
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One indication that Frei has not simply transferred authority from text to Church 
is his critique of any narrative theology which places emphasis first on the narrative 
rendering of the human being and then looks for coincidences with the narrative of the 
text.
295
  Frei‟s own narrative theology is always “text-bound,” so that the narrative of the 
text constitutes the identity of the Church.
296
  Consequently, Frei would be critical of any 
narrative theology which gives the narrative identity of the reader or community priority 
over the narrative identity of the text.  No self description of the Church can replace the 
plain sense of the text.  Frei writes,  
The difference between a textually focused inquiry, working with the specificity 
of the narratives, and a more generally focused one, for which the biblical 
narratives are an illustration or illumination of „narrativity‟ as an elemental aspect 
of being human and of human experience, is not absolute.  But it is important.  
The „hermeneutical‟ (or anti- or non-hermeneutical) instruments we have looked 
at have been shaped toward the text, even in the case of phenomenological theory.  
Consequently, if they make a contribution toward the definition of the shape(s) of 
Christian identity, it will be derivative, i.e., „text-bound.‟297 
 
Frei judges these narrative theologies to be no better than phenomenological 
hermeneutics because they also impose an extrinsic meaning system on the text and on 
Christian identity.  In fact, much of Frei‟s response to Lindbeck‟s book, The Nature of 
Doctrine, seeks to curtail those who would use it to promote “Wittgensteinian fideism.”  
“The cultural-linguist theory,” Frei notes, “is there solely for the service it can render to 
                                               
295 Frei, “„Narrative‟ in Christian and Modern Reading,” 161.  
296 Ibid.   
297 Frei, ibid, 160-61.  This kind of narrative theology, Frei (ibid), claims, is much different 
from his own, in that it “proceeds from a conviction and analysis of human nature in general and/or religion 
in general…the „recital‟ [of “our personal history or autobiography, or a more general, perhaps archetypal 
story”] of it constitutes (a) the condition for the meaningfulness of biblical narrative, and (b) the description 
of the coincidence between divine influence (Spirit?) and human/Christian identity.” 
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the ongoing description or self-description of the Christian community.”298  Even 
narrative theologies must continually practice vigilance against allowing an external 
meaning system to usurp the text, even if it is the self-description of the Church.   
3. Relationship between Ecclesiology and Scriptural Interpretation 
 
The consistent weakness of Frei‟s ecclesiology is that it never explicitly develops 
how Christ‟s indirect presence in the Church constitutes and sustains the Church through 
Word, Sacrament, etc.  The texts are a witness to the identity of Christ and render that 
identity, yet Frei never explains exactly how the Scriptures are used by the Triune God 
for self-communication to the Church.  This underdevelopment of theological 
explanation has several consequences.  First, and most noticeable, is Frei‟s ongoing 
problem of grounding authority for a plain sense reading of the text.  All of the burden is 
placed on the text in his early work, and nearly all of the burden is shifted to the 
community in his later work.  Explaining how both text and readers are integral parts in a 
much larger reality would relieve both from bearing the hermeneutical burden of 
authority.
299
  Second, studying only the social nature of the Church does, in practice, tend 
                                               
298 Hans W. Frei, "Epilogue: George Lindbeck and the Nature of Doctrine," in Theology and 
Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 278. 
299 According to Topping (Revelation, Scripture and Church, 205), Frei‟s model “leans too 
heavily upon the positivity of interpretative-ecclesial and not divine action with respect to the critical use of 
Scripture in the church.  The methodological space gained both by Frei‟s deployment of poetic and social-
scientific categories in order to protect the priority of Christocentric figural interpretation requires 
theological rooting in the doctrine of God in order to gain interpretative integrity.”  Frei may be correct in 
his proposals, but he will always place too much burden on either text or Church without placing them in 
the larger context of God‟s action.   
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toward communitarianism.
300
  To describe the Church as only a social reality tends to 
make the reason for literal reading a function of community consensus, rather than a 
result of the ongoing activity of the universal God who constitutes and sustains the 
Church.
301
  Tracy is rightly worried that an explanation of the Church as a social reality 
would lapse into a kind of relativism that is not consistent with the Triune God named by 
the Church.
302
  Frei may be correct about the priority of Christian self-description over 
philosophical correlation, but he must use more theological terminology to develop his 
argument.  Frei must show why the Church was theologically compelled to read Scripture 
realistically in order to show that authority is not grounded in community consensus.  For 
example, Frei claims that “There is no a priori reason why the „plain‟ reason could not 
have been „spiritual‟ in contrast to „literal‟….The identification of the plain with the 
literal sense was not a logically necessary development…”303  While Frei is correct that 
this move may not have been “logically” necessary, but it is, in Christian description, 
theologically necessary, and could be more effectively described if Frei had focused on 
                                               
300 Tracy reads Frei well enough to realize that Frei‟s project does not revert to the “obvious 
charges of „relativism,‟ „confessionalism,‟ and even „fideism‟” that Tracy fears Lindbeck‟s cultural-
linguistic model is susceptible to (see David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology, 461).  Tracy 
appreciates the willingness of Frei to not reduce his theology to a self-description of the Christian 
community, praising “Hans Frei‟s reluctance to call his position a „narrative theology‟” (Tracy, “On 
Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 62, n. 32).  Yet Tracy has reason to worry that Frei‟s program for 
theology could be easily used to justify such an approach. 
301 Topping (Revelation, Scripture and Church, 205), claims, “Moreover, by grounding his 
proposal for the critical interpretation of the Bible on embedded church practice, Frei potentially brackets 
out, not critical interpretation by the church, but critical interpretation of the church by the One who 
accosts, creates and sustains the church by means of the witness of Holy Scripture.” 
302 For example, David Tracy ("The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological 
Method, Modernity, and Postmodernity," Theological Studies 50 (1989), 568), argues that “Apologetics 
must always be an intrinsic aspect of all Christian theology”  This is shown on  “intratextual…grounds” 
based on “the logic of the claims of the reality of God” (586, n. 79).   
303 Frei, Literal Reading, 41.   
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the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption instead of simply the relationship 
between texts and readers.
304
   
B.  Tracy‟s Ecclesiology: The Church as a Tradition  
 
A driving focus of Tracy‟s work is affirming the public nature of the Church and 
theology.  Tracy insists that all authentic theology is “discourse available (in principle) to 
all persons and explicated by appeals to one‟s experience, intelligence, rationality, and 
responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with appropriate 
warrants, backings, and rebuttal procedures.”305  The Church is a public among two other 
publics, the academy and the society, and as such, the Church must establish a system of 
correlation (a criterion of intelligibility or credibility) which will allow for dialogue 
between the Church and other public realities.  For Tracy, the Church must be a public 
reality, and theology must be a public discipline primarily because the God referred to by 
both is universal.  The “God as understood by the Jewish, Christian and Muslim believer 
is either universal in actuality or sheer delusion….Any authentic speech on the reality of 
God which is really private or particularist is unworthy of that reality.”306  Christians, 
then, have a responsibility to formulate a criterion of intelligibility because of the 
universal nature of the God to whom they refer. 
                                               
304 Frei (ibid, 41-42), does make some hints in this direction, claiming that the “rule of faith” 
guided the Church‟s decision to emphasize the “primacy of their literal sense,” and that the identity of Jesus 
as “subject, the agent, and patient of these stories” formed this understanding, but he does not focus on why 
the Scriptures play such a role. 
305 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 57.     
306 Ibid, 51.  Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 13), is also bothered that religion has 
become so privatized that it has become a matter of personal taste.   
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1.  Church as a Tradition and a Public Reality 
 
The Church, as the tradition that mediates its classic, provides the possibility for 
an intensification of the general human dimension of religious experience which is 
disclosed in its religious classic.  Tracy‟s description of religious experience in the 
Church is again articulated in general categories, focusing on the common religious 
dimension found in all human beings through the concept of “limit experiences.”  Tracy 
writes,  
In more secularized human beings, this limit-experience of a religious dimension 
to one‟s everyday existence sometimes serves as the sole clue to the character of 
religious experience and thereby to all personal appropriation to the languages of 
revelation…for those who possess any genuine lived-experience of an 
authentically living religious traditio grounded in a revelation, the possibilities for 
experiential religion are wider, deeper, and far more intense than the earlier 
shared experience of a religious-as-limit dimension to the everyday…for 
Christians, revelatory limit-experiences of both manifestation and proclamation 
are available in the authentic lived-experience of church. [The] originating 
revelatory experience of Jesus Christ…is present more immediately through the 
proclamation and the manifestations of an authentic sacramental, ecclesial life, 
including the struggle for justice in church and world.
307
   
 
Those within a religious tradition will experience disclosure from the religious 
dimension in a quantitatively greater way.  Because tradition is the bearer of any classic, 
it consistent to expect that immersion of an individual into that tradition will allow a 
greater disclosure of the classic.  It is only natural, then, that the disclosure of the Christ 
                                               
307 Tracy, On Naming the Present, 113-14.  Tracy (ibid), claims further, “That same 
experience is present in more mediated forms through the critical reflection present in the second-order 
discourse of theologians.  It is further intensified by the continuing presence of authentic witnesses to the 
reality of revelation in the community…Yet these experiential resources for rethinking the doctrine of 
revelation are best rendered theologically (as distinct from religiously) available, once a theory of the 
hermeneutics of first-order discourse has been united with a theory of tradition that includes a sociocritical 
dimension.” 
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event will be greater for the believer than for one outside the Church.  One could 
rightfully conclude that in the Christian faith, 
The church tradition is and remains the major mediator of the Christ-event to the 
church community today…The strangeness of the „strange, new world of the 
Bible‟ is experienced most concretely within the believing community itself.  For 
there—when a conversation with the subject-matter event witnessed to by these 
texts is genuinely risked—there the disorienting power of these scriptural texts is 
felt with fullest force.
308
   
 
Tracy emphasizes the need for a “heightened consciousness of the tradition‟s 
mediating role for the memory of Jesus in interpreting the event of Jesus Christ as 
analogous to the role of tradition in the interpretation of every classic.”309  Tracy would 
even argue that the individual cannot as deeply understand the Christ event without the 
aid of the Christian tradition.  Tracy claims, “If we are to know Jesus as he was and is, we 
must know him through the mediation of the whole tradition as witness to him and 
immediately as we have ourselves experienced him either individually or communally in 
our experience of the Christ event as from God and happening now.”310  Yet within 
Tracy‟s model, disclosure is intensified in the tradition, not specifically for theological 
reasons, but for philosophical reasons.  Immersion of the interpreter into the tradition is 
necessary for greater disclosure for several reasons:  First, the “preunderstanding” of the 
interpreter “must involve at least a horizon open to the religious dimension of existence,” 
(i.e. a willingness to ask “religious questions”).311  This basic step allows for a second, as 
                                               
308 Tracy, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 184. 
309 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 245, n. 19. 
310 Ibid, 236.   
311 Ibid, 199, n. 7. 
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the interpreter must “recognize some claim to serious attention in the event under 
interpretation.”312  Third, the interpreter will experience the Christ-event as meaningful 
by recognizing the continuity of the original event with the Church today.
313
  Christian 
tradition, then, has the role of developing within the individual interpreter a horizon of 
preunderstanding, an openness to the subject matter of the text, and a recognition of the 
continuity of event from past witness to present tradition.  So far, these are qualities 
present in all traditions.    
If Tracy emphasizes that the Christian tradition heightens the disclosure of the 
classic, then what is it about Tracy‟s methodology that allows Frei to claim that “the 
Church as the necessary context for the use of Christian concepts and language plays no 
part at all in Tracy‟s layout of his method?”314  At first this appears to be a curious claim, 
since we have seen that Tracy emphatically supports both a sociological and theological 
description of the reality of the Church and argues that greater immersion into the 
Christian tradition will allow for greater disclosure of the Christ event.  Yet it could be 
                                               
312 Ibid, 199, n. 7. 
313 Certainly the Church, as a tradition is essential to the understanding of the Christ event 
today.  Tracy (ibid, 237), claims, “The tradition is the major constitutive mediating reality of the event of 
Jesus Christ.  For the immediate personal response to the Christ event becomes a communal response as 
soon as the Christ event is recognized as the event of Jesus Christ—the Jesus remembered as the Christ by 
the tradition and its fidelity to the original apostolic witness.”  It is the tradition which safeguards the 
apostolic witness to the particular Christ, and through that mediates the present experience of Christ today.  
“In so recognizing and naming the Christ event as the event of Jesus Christ, Christians also affirm that the 
event itself is mediated to them principally through the tradition, community and church which remembers 
this Jesus and keeps alive his dangerous memory.  Why that memory is kept alive in the event is a question 
primarily for the tradition and community mediating it to answer…The Christ event is represented as the 
event of Jesus Christ because the tradition itself has witnessed that this man Jesus is the Christ, this Jesus 
Christ is God‟s own self present among us—decisively present in Jesus himself, mediately present through 
word, sacrament, action in every later classic Christian expression where the Christ event happens” (The 
Analogical Imagination, 235-6).   
314 Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 33.  (It may be significant to note that Frei here only 
refers to BRO, where, by Tracy‟s own admission, a less “hermeneutical” approach is developed.) 
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asked what the Church does, in Tracy‟s model, beyond what a “tradition” does for 
Gadamer and Ricoeur.  In fact, for Tracy, the Church does very little that is unique to its 
theological description.  The manner in which the Christian tradition mediates their 
classic is essentially the same as the way in which any tradition mediates their own 
classic.  Almost completely absent from Tracy‟s work is a discussion of how particular 
theological claims might be capable of destabilizing hermeneutical method.
315
  Frei‟s 
legitimate and persistent question to Tracy seems to be, “What is the Church that no other 
„tradition‟ can be, and how does that practically affect the process of Scriptural 
interpretation?”   
2.  Church as a Theological Reality 
 
While Tracy insists that the Church must be described as both a theological reality 
and a social reality, Tracy claims that adequate theological description is beyond the 
scope of his own project, and chooses to focus on the Church only as a social reality.
 316
  
Tracy thinks that at his present time there is an imbalance in ecclesiology favoring 
                                               
315 Tracy, (The Analogical Imagination, 41, n. 75), finds the “theological character of the 
Church” of particular need of explanation, and promises to spell out the relationship later in AI (esp. in the 
Introduction to Part II and chaps. 6, 7, and 10).  Yet it is interesting that what is emphasized in those 
chapters is specifically how the Christ event ought to be understood as phenomenological disclosure by 
contemporary readers.  We see the distinct philosophical description of the tradition when we move to AI 
ch. 6-7 and see how it is that tradition mediates the continuity of the apostolic witness of Christ to the 
present Christ today.  Christ is mediated as meaningful to human experience today, through Ricoeur‟s 
phenomenological model.   
316 Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 21), claims, “our present interest is not in an adequate 
theology of the church but in the church as a sociological phenomenon, i.e., as one of the three publics of 
every theology.”  Yet Tracy (ibid, 21), agrees that the theologian must develop an ecclesiology in order to 
do systematic theology, since “on inner-theological terms all Christian theology is, in some meaningful 
sense, church theology.”  Tracy, (ibid, 42, n. 76), even admits that this is an area where both “Barthians” 
and Schleiermacher agree, and quotes Schleiermacher: “Since Dogmatics is a theological discipline, and 
thus pertains solely to the Christian Church, we can only explain what it is when we have become clear as 
to the conception of the Christian Church.”  
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theological description over social description, so that theologians often do not appreciate 
the nature of the Church as a social reality.  Thus Tracy claims,  
As a generalization, it seems fair to observe that in theology the more usual 
temptation is to understand society and academy primarily as social realities and 
only peripherally as theological…The problem with understanding the third 
public, church, is usually the exact opposite.  A theological understanding is 
almost overwhelmingly operative.  A sociological understanding may be implicit 
but is rarely explicit…The church is primarily considered, in Christian self-
understanding, a theological reality…The key concept here is reductionism.  
Indeed, so frightened by this reductionist prospect do some ecclesiologists seem 
that they are incapable of undertaking, or even appreciating, strictly sociological 
understandings of the reality of the church.  For this reason, they become trapped 
in their own form of reductionism.
317
   
 
Tracy proposes that the theologian develop both a mutually critical correlation 
between Christian tradition and common human experience, and between the Church as a 
theological reality and the Church as a social reality.  This will keep the theologian from 
falling into a reductionism about the nature of the Church.
318
   
As a result, Tracy spends far more time describing the interpretive method of the 
reader then he does describing the theological nature of the reading community.  Other 
than a few comments (most of them in footnotes) about the Church as a theological 
reality, Tracy is rather silent about a theological description of the Church.
319
  Tracy 
                                               
317 Ibid, 23-24.   
318 Tracy (Ibid, 24), argues that “the theologian should in principle use a correlation model for 
relating sociological and theological understandings of the reality of the church in the same way one uses a 
correlation model for the more familiar relationship between philosophy and theology.”  A correlation 
model will allow the theologian “To account theologically for the full spectrum of possible relationships 
between church as a theological and as a sociological reality.”   
319 When Tracy does describe the Church theologically, he usually refers to it as a sacrament.  
The Church is constituted in “its engifted participatory reality in the event of Jesus Christ” (The Analogical 
Imagination, 44, n. 90), and thus is “sacrament of Christ and eschatological sacrament of the world” 
(following Rahner and Schillebeeckx (see ibid, 43, n. 90).  This theological description works comfortably 
with Tracy‟s emphasis on “The always-already reality of a graced world is made present again decisively, 
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typically describes the Church as that tradition which keeps alive the memory of the 
person/event of Jesus Christ (as the primary Christian classic) and mediates that same 
present Christ today.  Not surprisingly, Tracy explains this mediation of the Christ event 
analogous to the disclosure of all religious classics:  “The Christ event, in sum, is re-
presentative of the same „that-it-happens-now‟ event from the whole disclosed in every 
religious classic.”320  Later Tracy claims, “For here, as in all religious classics, the truth 
of one‟s existence may be at stake; here a disclosure and concealment from and by the 
power of the whole may be present…”321  This disclosure of the Christian classic is 
accorded the same dynamic working as all religious classics, and hence the religious 
tradition mediating the Christian classic (the Christ event) has already been determined to 
work much like other religious traditions mediate their religious classics.   
Tracy does provide elements of a theological description of the Church.  Tracy 
claims, “In Christian self-understanding, to repeat, the church participates in, as primary 
mediator of, the gift of God in Jesus Christ.  The church is a theological reality.  As such, 
the church is an object of faith, of trust in and loyalty to its reality.”322  Tracy is aware 
that the interpretation of the Scriptures by the Church is unique inasmuch as the 
disclosure of the Christ event requires faith.  Tracy insists that a response of faith is 
                                                                                                                                            
paradigmatically, classically as event in Jesus Christ.  The event, as re-presentative of the reality always 
already present to us as human beings, is present again as the decisive that it happens” (ibid, 234).  The 
Church, then, as sacrament of Christ, mediates the living, present Christ to the present moment.   
320 Ibid, 235.  And yet, for Tracy (ibid), this is not a general event of human experience, but 
one grounded in a particular Person: “The Christ event is also the event of Jesus Christ” and thus the 
tradition which mediates that event, “remembers this Jesus and keeps alive his dangerous memory.”  Tracy 
is insistent here on the particularity of Jesus Christ, even if this event is mediated through general 
categories of meaning. 
321 Ibid, 250.   
322 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 50. 
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essential for a true disclosure of the text, and that faith is a gift, and hence a response to, 
God‟s prior gracious action.323  Tracy wishes to make clear that all “disclosure” in 
Scripture is a gift, and not simply a product of human construction.  Furthermore, Tracy 
claims that the Church itself is a gift.
324
  Yet this unique characteristic of both disclosure 
and Church goes largely underdeveloped because of Tracy‟s formal categories.  Speaking 
of the unique disclosure of Christ in Scripture, Tracy writes, “Hermeneutically, the 
category event (Ereignis) is applicable even to Word-as-Word-event (Sprach-Ereignis)—
as a happening of language itself and, therefore, not under the control of the modern 
subject.”325  This statement appears to capture a central ambiguity in Tracy‟s work.   
3. Relationship Between Ecclesiology and Scriptural Interpretation 
 
Tracy‟s project lacks developed description of the relationship between Church 
and Scripture in the economy of redemption.  While God‟s gracious action to the world is 
the backdrop for Tracy‟s discussion, it remains largely a formal explanation, and there is 
very little explanation of how God‟s acts by and through the texts of Scripture to 
communicate to the Church.  On the other hand, there is very little theological description 
of the Church which would provide it any ability to read Scripture which other 
communities do not possess.  Tracy‟s insistence on establishing a general correlation 
                                               
323 Tracy (“Writing,” 386), is explicit that the “event” of Scriptural disclosure should be 
understood as “the purely gratuitous or „gracious‟ character of divine revelation.” 
324 Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 23), claims, “in most Christian theologies, the church 
is understood as „gift,‟ more exactly, as participating in the grace of God disclosed in the divine self-
manifestation in Jesus Christ.”  
325 Tracy, “Writing,” 386. 
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between text and reader keeps him from explaining how Scripture‟s disclosure is 
qualitatively different within the Church than outside it.  It remains unclear whether the 
disclosure of Christ to the Church is qualitatively different from or simply a 
quantitatively heightened expression of what occurs in religious texts elsewhere.  For the 
Christian, the subject matter of revelation, Jesus Christ, is no doubt distinct (qualitatively 
and quantitatively unique) from what is disclosed in the other religious texts, but the 
manner of disclosure of this event is in continuity with disclosure as a religious 
dimension in the secular person or a person with another religious identity.  Both in 
Tracy‟s ecclesiology and in his Scriptural interpretation, then, the same difficulty in 
moving from general categories to theological description is seen.  The insistence on 
beginning with general categories both for Scripture and for Church make it difficult to 
say anything distinctive about the reading of Scripture within the Church.   
Tracy does say that the Scriptures are the Church‟s book, and that the experience 
of the Christian community must be in continuity with the realistic rendering of the 
identity of Jesus Christ.  This insight, I will argue, has tremendous potential to further the 
discussion between Tracy and Frei.  Yet Tracy‟s own ecclesiology does not provide the 
tools to show why and how this intrinsic unity must exist between Scripture and the 
Church, and only after the deeper ecclesiological reflection of Henri de Lubac is 
incorporated into the discussion will it be possible to use Tracy‟s insight.   
IV.  Beyond the Impasse: Locating Scripture in the Divine Economy 
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The debates between Frei and Tracy have yielded a number of important insights 
for developing a theological interpretation of Scripture.  Yet the debate has also narrowed 
the hermeneutical emphasis to simply the relationship between texts and readers, thus 
leading to impasses and preventing certain of their insights from being used.  This section 
will summarize the most important achievements and impasses and will suggest that 
certain achievements could be advanced and certain difficulties could be resolved if 
Scripture were examined within the context of the relationship between Christ and the 
Church.   
Frei‟s insistence that the plain sense reading of Scripture is the normative means 
by which the Christian community understands the particular identity of Christ is an 
essential insight for all Christian readings of Scripture.  Furthermore, Frei‟s retrieval of 
the normative practice of figural reading to show that the whole Scriptures must be read 
as one story unified in Jesus Christ, has provided a number of resources for developing 
hermeneutical method regulated by plain sense reading.  It is this plain sense reading 
which renders the unique identity of Christ and forms the identity of the Church.   
Yet Frei‟s nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and reader has 
also produced some hermeneutical difficulties which cannot be overcome without 
broadening the context to the economy of redemption.  On the one hand, Frei‟s reluctance 
to explain God‟s use of Scripture makes the location of Scriptural authority nearly 
impossible to determine.  Frei has insisted that authority be given to plain sense readings, 
but without discussing God‟s use of the text it is difficult to show whether that authority 
grounded in the consensus of the Church or in the literary qualities of the texts 
themselves.  In the next chapter, we will investigate how Vanhoozer‟s proposal that God 
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uses Scripture to speak to readers provides a different option which could strengthen 
Frei‟s argument.  On the other hand, Frei‟s description of the Church as a socio-linguistic 
community which responds to the identity of Christ has led to two difficulties, the first 
ecclesiological and communal, and the second soteriological and individual.  First, Frei‟s 
preservation of the identity of Christ makes him wary of showing how Christ is related to 
the Church as head to body.  Frei suggests that the Church is the locus of the indirect 
presence of Christ through the Spirit, yet Frei never really explains how the risen Christ 
acts as head of the Church, guiding and transforming the through its realistic reading of 
Scripture.  Second, Frei never adequately explains how the individual believer is 
transformed by the unique identity, and hence presence, of Christ.  This seems to be John 
Milbank‟s criticism when he asks, “What difference does the mere fact—however 
astounding—of God‟s identifying with us through incarnation make to our lives?”326  
Frei‟s attempt to preserve the unique identity of Christ needs to be supplemented with a 
theological description of incorporation into that identity through the Church, and hence 
how the Church participates in the economy of redemption.  In the fourth chapter, we will 
investigate how de Lubac‟s proposal of a more complete ecclesiology could show how 
Christ uses Scripture to build His Church.  
Tracy‟s insistence on the disclosure of the present, risen Christ in Scriptural 
reading, as well as his creative use of Ricoeur to show the disclosive potential of all 
genres of Scripture have likewise produced essential insights for Christian interpretation 
of Scripture.  Tracy shows that the consistent witness of the Church has insisted that 
                                               
326 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, ed. John et al. 
Milbank, ed., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (New York: Routledge, 1999)., 149.   
 106 
 
Scriptural reading brings the reader into contact with a subject matter so great and unique 
that the reader can experience a reorienting power occasioning a new-mode-of-being-in-
the-world.  Thus Tracy has rightly insisted that readers approach the text with expectation 
to encounter a subject matter whom they name God.     
Yet, like Frei, Tracy‟s nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and 
reader makes it difficult for him to incorporate phenomenological hermeneutics with a 
plain reading of the Gospels.  At times Tracy appears to say that the existential situation 
of modernity sets the agenda for Scripture, so that Christ is the type who best fits the 
potential existential disclosure as antitype.
327
  Here the world in front of the text creates 
the economy by which the world of the text is fit together.  Yet at other times Tracy 
emphasizes the centrality of the identity of Christ to the Christian story and insists that 
the reader‟s own story be reoriented by His particular identity.  This remains a genuine 
ambiguity in Tracy, and further emphasis on method will not bring resolution.  Instead, 
what is needed is a thorough theological account of the role of Scripture in mediating the 
present Christ to the Church and transforming readers through just these texts.  In the 
fourth chapter de Lubac‟s insistence on a spiritual sense of Scripture will be examined in 
order to show that it is possible to emphasize the particular identity of Christ while also 
showing how that Christ transforms and reorients readers in disclosive Scriptural 
readings.   
                                               
327 See here John J. and R.R. Reno O'Keefe, Sanctified Vision, 86, who argue that all 
contemporary interpretive schemes need an “economy” to relate different parts of the economy of Scripture 
to one another.  They conclude that “For most modern theological readers the logos of the economy is 
something much more abstract” than Christ (87).  Yet, “The economy of Christ was as real and as totalizing 
form them as various modern economies of historical or spiritual experience are for us” (87).  In Tracy‟s 
work, the absence of figural interpretation as an extension of the literal story of Jesus is striking.  In place 
of figural reading is a theory of the disclosure of existential possibility of the One beyond knowing who is 
revealed through encounter with the text. 
 107 
 
In the next two chapters, I will examine the hermeneutical projects of Kevin 
Vanhoozer and Henri de Lubac, who seek to articulate the unique place of Scripture as 
God‟s self-communication to the Church in the economy of redemption.  In those 
chapters it will become more apparent how the relationship between Christ and Church 
provides a broader context for exploring the relationship between texts and readers.  
Adding these new voices to the discussion will allow for new insights to emerge which 
could help to advance the impasses between Frei and Tracy.   
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CHAPTER 2: 
KEVIN VANHOOZER:  SCRIPTURE AS GOD‟S SPEAKING ACTION 
I.  Placing Vanhoozer in Discussion with Frei and Tracy 
 
In the last chapter I suggested that much of the impasse between Frei and Tracy 
was due to an almost exclusive emphasis on the relationship between text and reader.  
This impasse, I suggested, has occurred in part because issues of method have dominated 
discussions of Scriptural interpretation to the neglect of theological reflection about the 
place of Scripture in the divine economy.  In this chapter I will consider the work of 
Kevin Vanhoozer, who, throughout his career, has specifically attempted to move beyond 
the impasse between Frei and Tracy.
328
  Vanhoozer has attempted to advance the 
discussion in two distinct ways, the first by proposing a new method which will 
safeguard the literal sense, and the second by grounding all methodological discussions in 
the theological matrix of the economy of redemption.  Vanhoozer‟s overall project is 
instructive both in its failure and in its success, as I will argue that his early proposal of 
an alternative method fails to advance the discussion, while his later proposal, by locating 
Scripture in the economy, has great potential for advancing the interpretation of 
Scripture.   
                                               
328 Vanhoozer‟s doctoral dissertation is a study of Paul Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics, and it devotes 
a chapter to the debate between Tracy and Frei.  Vanhoozer‟s first articles make suggestions about how to 
move past the impasse between the two.  See Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur, pp. 148-89 and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "The Spirit of Understanding: Special Revelation and 
General Hermeneutics," in First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 207-35. 
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In his early work, Vanhoozer tries to advance the discussion of Tracy and Frei by 
proposing a new general method for reading which will establish the authority of 
Scriptural meaning.  Vanhoozer‟s suggestion to move beyond them is to broaden the 
discussion of text and reader to also include a return to authorial intent, thus showing that 
the text must be read as a purposeful act of communication by an author to an audience.  
If readers agree to seek the intention of the author, Vanhoozer feels, they can reach 
relative consensus on the meaning of the text.  Yet this early proposal is notable for its 
almost complete absence of any discussion about the place of Scripture in the economy of 
redemption.  While focus on the literal sense may help readers grasp the meaning of the 
human authors, it does not articulate how God uses just these texts to speak to readers.   
After the publication of his first book, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 
Vanhoozer realizes that this approach does not really do justice to the Christian 
Scriptures as a theological reality.  In his later work, then, Vanhoozer abandons much his 
early proposal and seeks instead to articulate the way God communicates to the Church 
by means of Scripture.  While not abandoning his quest for authorial intent, Vanhoozer 
suggests that Scripture‟s primary author is God rather than the human author.  Yet as 
Vanhoozer focuses on God‟s authorship of Scripture, he is forced to broaden his 
methodology from what is primarily a discussion of literary theory defending the 
importance of authorial intent to a discussion of ontology and the economy of 
redemption.  Vanhoozer‟s two major later works could be described as substantial 
responses to postliberal theology (Drama of Doctrine) and revisionist theology 
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(Remythologizing Theology).
329
  In them Vanhoozer suggests that the cure for revisionist 
and postliberal ailments alike is to understand the unique and authoritative role of 
Scripture in God‟s Trinitarian self-communicative action.   
Relationship to Frei:  Vanhoozer appreciates Frei‟s insistence on reading 
Scripture in such a way that the particularity of Christ is proclaimed without 
incorporating some pre-determined criteria of meaningfulness.
330
  Vanhoozer likewise 
appreciates the early Frei‟s category of “realistic narrative,” yet insists that ostensive 
reference should not be dismissed as unnecessary to establishing meaning.
331
  
Vanhoozer‟s greatest complaint against Frei concerns Frei‟s later decision to invest 
authority in the community rather than in the text itself.  Vanhoozer complains that Frei 
has “exchanged his hermeneutical birthright for a mess of pottage, or rather Fish-
stew?...It is the community, ultimately, that enjoys interpretive authority…”332 
Vanhoozer is worried that the later Frei seems to propose a “certain optimism with regard 
to the believing community.  Interpretive might makes right.”333  Frei‟s later work is, for 
Vanhoozer, perhaps the clearest example of the troubling trend of abandoning authority 
in the text in order to grant authority to the community.   
                                               
329 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to 
Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship, ed. Daniel W. Hardy, Cambridge 
Studies in Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
330 Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 154.  Vanhoozer (ibid 
178), appreciates that Frei is not a “pure narrativist...Rather, Frei is an Anselmian theologian who is 
seeking to understand the Christian faith, particularly its central narrative expression, on its own terms.” 
331 Vanhoozer (ibid, 225), argues that the whole reason one should take the realistic narrative 
of Scripture seriously is grounded in the assumption that it is, in fact, true.  God did enter human history 
and act.   
332 Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 219. 
333 Ibid.   
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As its title implies, Vanhoozer‟s book, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-
Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, offers a critical appropriation of George 
Lindbeck‟s The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age for 
Evangelical readers.
334
  In it, Vanhoozer argues that postliberals (the chosen dialogue 
partners of this book) have obscured the nature of doctrine by shifting authority from 
canon to community.
335
  In response to the postliberal project, Vanhoozer suggests, “The 
present book sets forth a postconservative, canonical-linguistic theology and a directive 
theory of doctrine that roots theology more firmly in Scripture while preserving 
Lindbeck‟s emphasis on practice.”336  The answer to the postmodern shift of authority to 
the Church is to reinvest authority in Scripture.   
In order to show the obligation which the Church has to respect the meaning of 
Scripture, Vanhoozer distinguishes between “ecclesial performance interpretation” (in 
which “the church‟s habitual use/performance of Scripture is seen to be constitutive of 
the literal sense”), and “canonical-linguistic” interpretation (in which “[t]he grammar of 
                                               
334 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).  As the title of Vanhoozer‟s book suggests, Lindbeck‟s “nature” 
of doctrine will be changed to a description of doctrine as “drama,” and the determining factor of “culture” 
is replaced by “canon” as the constituting feature of the Church.  (See here especially Vanhoozer, The 
Drama of Doctrine, 133-41, in the section entitled, “How Scripture Constitutes the Church,” 133-41).  
Vanhoozer (ibid, 3), suggests that doctrine is strangely absent in the Church today for several reasons:  
“sound doctrine is suffering from confusion about its nature, from disagreement concerning the locus of its 
authority, and above all from its captivity to a debilitating dichotomy between theory and practice.”  As the 
book progresses, it becomes quickly apparent that the first problem (confusion about doctrine‟s nature) 
finds its roots in the second (disagreement about doctrine‟s authority).  Vanhoozer suggests that the Church 
will continue to be confused about the nature of doctrine until it understands that its authority comes from 
the Scriptural canon, not the Church.   
335 Vanhoozer (ibid, 10), notes,  “Though Lindbeck‟s postliberal proposal initially appears to 
swing the pendulum of authority back to the biblical text, a closer inspection shows that he relocates 
authority in the church, that singular „culture‟ within which, and only within which, the Bible is used to 
shape Christian identity.”   
336 Ibid, xiii.  Emphasis Vanhoozer‟s.  Vanhoozer italicizes many points in his books, and all 
italicized quotes in this chapter are his.   
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Christian faith is embedded an enacted in the use of language in the canon”).337  By 
distinguishing between these two kinds of interpretation, Vanhoozer establishes two 
trajectories:  Frei, Lindbeck, Fish, Kelsey and Childs are all said to be located on the 
(wrong) trajectory toward ecclesial performance interpretation, while Vanhoozer, Barth, 
and Wolterstorff are located on the (right) trajectory of canonical-linguistic interpretation.   
Relationship to Tracy:  Vanhoozer appreciates Ricoeur and Tracy‟s emphasis on 
the importance of the “plurality of biblical genres” (form) to communicate the text‟s 
message (content), as well as Ricoeur‟s explanation of how the biblical text, as a text, is 
disclosive of transformative truth.
338
  Yet Vanhoozer complains that Ricoeur and Tracy, 
despite their stated appreciation for the various genres of Scripture, are guilty of imposing 
a single, phenomenological schema of interpretation which prohibits full appreciation of 
certain genres, such as Gospel.
339
  Furthermore, Vanhoozer believes that Ricoeur and 
Tracy‟s method for biblical hermeneutics ultimately collapses into general hermeneutics.  
                                               
337 Ibid, 167.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 184), calls the latter “performance” because interpreters must 
see “canonical discourse as itself an instance of triune performance” and must see “the canon as a script 
that requires not merely information processing but ecclesial response.”     
338 See Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 216 and Remythologizing Theology, xv.  
Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 218), sides with Tracy, claiming that “Frei‟s emphasis on a 
unified coherent narrative overlooks the plurality and ambiguity within the canon itself.  What theology 
needs is the full spectrum of forms in the Bible itself, with Jesus Christ as the supreme „form‟ that informs 
all Christian understanding of God.”  
339 Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 150.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 158), feels 
that this reduction of Scripture to one schema has its most negative consequences in Tracy‟s early work, 
where Tracy‟s analogy between religious classics and art, cause “[t]he claims to truth in both art and 
religion” to “stand or fall together.”  
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Beginning as it does with the reorienting power of all texts, their method cannot articulate 
any significant distinction between Scripture and other texts.
340
   
Ricoeur‟s great weakness, as Vanhoozer sees it, is that, “By attributing to the 
poetic word the sacramental function of manifesting transcendence, Ricoeur erases the 
very distinction between nature and grace that was so important to Barth.…For 
Ricoeur…revelation is not so much an „impossible possibility‟ as a natural possibility 
shared by sacred and secular narratives alike.”341  The root of this problem, Vanhoozer 
believes, is that Ricoeur and Tracy privilege a manifestation model over a proclamation 
model of revelation.  Vanhoozer agrees with Tracy that the proclamation/manifestation 
distinction is the primary distinction in hermeneutical trajectories, but argues against 
Tracy that the manifestation model is an entirely inadequate model for showing the 
radical newness of the Gospel.
342
  For Vanhoozer, the manifestation model is ultimately 
inadequate because,   
First and foremost is the consequence that the truth disclosed by the Gospels 
refers to an always-already state of affairs.  The story of Jesus discloses a way of 
being in the world that is always-already open to human beings by virtue of the 
always-already graced nature of the world…The Gospels manifest universal 
truths about humanity.  The contrast between manifestation and proclamation, in 
which the Gospels say something new, particular and unique, could not be 
sharper: do the Gospels disclose a universal truth, or do they announce something 
new and unprecedented?
343
   
                                               
340 Ibid, 225.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 155), claims, “Ricoeur has not shown us that theological 
hermeneutics is significantly different from his philosophical hermeneutics, only that his philosophical 
hermeneutics receives its most fruitful development when applied to the Biblical texts.” 
341 Ibid, 180.   
342 Vanhoozer (ibid, 167), claims, “The goodness of Being which Ricoeur presupposes finds 
its decisive manifestation in the event of Jesus Christ.  But the point is that without reflection on art or 
classic texts, this truth of the trustworthiness of existence could not be had.” 
343 Ibid, 168. 
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Vanhoozer makes a very close connection between revelation and grace.  
“Universal truths about humanity” are, for Vanhoozer, something in the realm of nature, 
while “something new and unprecedented” is ultimately a disclosure from the realm of 
grace.  Any system which tends away from the proclamation model, ultimately 
misunderstands both the uniqueness of revelation and the relationship between nature and 
grace.  Beginning with the manifestation model, Vanhoozer believes, will place the 
emphasis (and hence authority) on universal experience (nature) instead of the 
particularity of Christ and the particularity of the biblical text (grace).
344
  Vanhoozer 
claims that ultimately, “For Ricoeur [and Tracy], the referent of the Gospels is the 
Kingdom of God as it qualifies human experience…For Frei, the referent of the Gospels 
is Jesus Christ.”345  For Vanhoozer, as for Frei, one cannot have it both ways.  It is the 
manifestation model which wrongly understands and “erases” the distinction between 
nature and grace, and consequently is unable to safeguard the uniqueness of Christian 
revelation.
346
  As a response to this perceived mistake, Vanhoozer will develop a program 
                                               
344 Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 220), is disturbed by Tracy‟s claim that he can 
give primacy to the literal sense while being a pluralist.  Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy 
of Paul Ricoeur, 168-69), is chiefly worried that all religious traditions can be smoothed over by assuming 
a manifestation model—persons of every religious tradition can “experience similar manifestations of the 
whole by the power of the whole” through their own particular faiths.  This, Vanhoozer believes, destroys 
the very notion of particularity.   
345 Ibid, 171.   
346 Ibid, 170.  Vanhoozer‟s claim that Ricoeur is a manifestation theologian shows just how 
strongly Vanhoozer favors the proclamation model.  While Tracy has claimed that Ricoeur stands more on 
the side of proclamation, Vanhoozer (ibid,, 169), argues that for Ricoeur the moment of “critical 
distanciation” is more properly a proclamation moment, but the surrounding moments of “understanding” 
and “appropriation” are manifestation moments. Vanhoozer claims that “for Ricoeur, the poetic word 
functions sacramentally,” and hence both “Ricoeur and Tracy, though they try to incorporate both 
proclamation and manifestation in their theologies, ultimately privilege the manifestation pole…Ricoeur‟s 
whole hermeneutical arch is slightly off-balance, tilted slightly but decisively towards the manifestation 
model (170).”  
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which operates distinctly from the proclamation model, giving clear priority to the 
biblical text over experience or the modern sensibility.   
Vanhoozer‟s latest book, Remythologizing Theology, seeks to establish a clear 
trajectory beginning from a proclamation model and privileging the authority of Scripture 
over any other source. Vanhoozer suggests,  
The real dividing line [between theologians] is between those who view theology 
only as talk about God-talk and those who believe in the possibility of true talk 
about God…Among the latter, there is a further distinction between those who 
seek to speak of God on the basis of nature (including human nature) and those 
who believe that speaking well of God is ultimately possible only on the basis of 
God‟s own communication.347 
   
The first division separates some postliberals (Lindbeck) and revisionists alike, 
while the second division further separates off virtually all other correlational approaches 
to theology.
348
  For Vanhoozer, contemporary revisionist theology provides a wrong 
direction for theology because theologians begin from human experience and use 
Scripture as a foundational expression of religious consciousness.  In some ways, 
Vanhoozer‟s project of remythologizing theology is intended to provide as sweeping and 
radical a challenge to contemporary systematic theological method as Frei‟s “great 
reversal” provided to post-enlightenment Christology.349  Vanhoozer notes that his 
primary goal “is to complete Paul Ricoeur‟s „second Copernican Revolution‟ that 
                                               
347 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 182. 
348 Vanhoozer names George Lindbeck and Sallie McFague as the chief referents of the first 
distinction, while in the second distinction Vanhoozer includes nearly everyone else on the revisionist 
trajectory, including Elizabeth Johnson, David Tracy, Jurgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Robert 
Jensen.    
349 Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 29, thesis 5), argues that to “remythologize 
theology is to reverse what Hans Frei called the „great reversal‟.”   
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dethrones the autonomous knowing subject in order to hearken to the one whose creative 
word forms, informs, and transforms us.”350  Vanhoozer thinks that Ricoeur could not 
accomplish this task because his project has started from a general theory of texts rather 
than a Triune First Theology.
351
  Remythologizing must reverse this direction and 
emphasize that the Scriptures are first God‟s action to which doctrine is a response.352  
Reevaluating the action of God in the economy of redemption, Vanhoozer feels, will 
reestablish Scripture as the authoritative foundation for the Church‟s life and practice.   
II.  Scriptural Interpretation:  The Literal Sense as God‟s Speaking Action 
 
Vanhoozer‟s primary emphasis throughout his career is to allow establish a 
method of Scriptural interpretation wherein readers understand and submit to the plain 
meaning of the text.  Vanhoozer argues that because meaning is encoded in texts by 
authors, the meaning of a text can only be grasped as readers seek to understand the 
speech act of the author.  Meaning is encoded in the text by the author to be discovered 
by the reader.  The Scriptures are understood, then, by readers rightly grasping what the 
author communicated in the text. 
                                               
350 Ibid, xv. 
351 Vanhoozer (ibid, xv), feels that “neither Ricoeur nor those who stand on his shoulders have 
given much attention to the doctrine of God, either to the question of divine action in general or to the 
doctrine of the Trinity in particular.”  
352 For example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 272), argues, “Whereas Christian doctrines are for 
Schleiermacher descriptions of human passions (e.g., the feeling of absolute dependence)—„accounts of the 
Chrisitan religious affections set forth in speech‟—the remythologizer conceives doctrine as the conceptual 
elaboration of divine action.  Better: doctrines are accounts of triune communicative action set forth in 
speech.” 
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Vanhoozer‟s career, much like Tracy and Frei‟s, can be divided into a class of 
early writings and a class of later writings, between which certain key emphases have 
changed across a generally continuous project.  Vanhoozer‟s early works span from 1989, 
with the publication of his dissertation on Ricoeur, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy 
of Paul Ricoeur to 1998 with his publication of his first major book on biblical 
hermeneutics, Is There a Meaning in This Text: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality 
of Literary Knowledge.
353
  This stage is marked by an almost exclusive focus on a 
theological general hermeneutics in which authorial intent is restored as basis for 
understanding the meaning of the text.  In his early work, Vanhoozer sought to protect 
biblical interpretation from postmodern “undoers” of meaning, such as literary theorists 
as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish.  In response to these 
writers, Vanhoozer proposes a theological general hermeneutics, a program for reading 
all texts as one must read the Bible.  A return to authorial intent is necessary in all texts, 
just as it is paradigmatically in Scripture.  Vanhoozer‟s later works run from 1998 to the 
present, and include the significant works The Drama of Doctrine (2005) and 
Remythologizing Theology (2010).  This stage is marked by a shift from human authorial 
intent to divine authorial intent, so that Scripture is now located within the economy of 
redemption as a unique and integral part of God‟s self-communicative action.  In 
dialogue with postliberal and revisionist theology, Vanhoozer realizes that the reason 
Scripture provides a unique authority for the Church is because Scripture is a unique set 
of documents which can be identified as God‟s communicative action.  Proper reading of 
                                               
353 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,and Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998).   
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Scripture, then, can only start with a right First Theology, a stance of faith and response 
toward God. 
Two factors seem to account for Vanhoozer‟s change of focus from defending the 
authority of Scripture in terms of secular literary theory to an explanation of the role of 
Scripture in the economy of redemption.  First, many of the changes in Vanhoozer‟s 
writing can be traced to his social context.  Vanhoozer‟s early work begins in discussion 
with secular literary theorists at the University of Edinburgh, where one of his primary 
concerns became the safeguarding of meaning in any text.
354
  Vanhoozer‟s later work 
takes place in dialogue with fellow Evangelicals at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 
Deerfield, Illinois, and subsequently in discussion with the North American 
postliberalism and various forms of revisionist theology.  Thus while Vanhoozer‟s early 
work proposes a challenge to the current secular postmodern tendency to disregard the 
authority of any text, Vanhoozer‟s later work proposes a challenge to the Christian 
postmodern tendency to grant authority to experience or community over Scripture.  
Vanhoozer feels that the secular literary mistake is best challenged by defending the role 
of authorial intent, while the Christian doctrinal mistake is best challenged by 
reevaluating God‟s use of Scripture in the economy of redemption.   
Second, Vanhoozer‟s change of location in 1998 takes place at the same time as 
the publication of his first major work, Is There a Meaning in This Text?  While the 2009 
                                               
354 Vanhoozer‟s early works were forged in dialogue with secular literary theory at the 
University of Edinburgh, where he taught on Paul Ricoeur in the Department of Comparative Literature.  
Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 2), admits that he struggled to get students to seriously 
consider Ricoeur‟s claim that the text carries a meaning to which the reader must respond.  Vanhoozer‟s 
research and writing reflected his desire to set forth a response to deconstructionists and reader-response 
theorists.  Vanhoozer‟s move to Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1998 allowed his later work to 
develop in dialogue with American Evangelical thought at Trinity Seminary in Chicago.  
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“Tenth Anniversary Edition” testifies to the popularity of the book, the primary criticism 
of it has been its lack of attention to the uniqueness of Scripture and lack of focus on 
God‟s agency in precisely these texts.  These criticisms have forced Vanhoozer focus 
more on the uniqueness of Scripture as God‟s communicative action and to draw out the 
implications of God as triune communicative Being.
355
  This change of focus presses 
Vanhoozer to develop a distinctly Christian approach to understanding the role of God as 
author and the place of Scripture in the divine economy.   
Despite these significant changes in Vanhoozer‟s approach, much of his project 
remains the same.  Vanhoozer‟s clearest hermeneutical emphasis throughout his career is 
to respect the author of any text as a communicative agent.  When applied to human 
authors, the reader must respect the meaning encoded in the text.
356
  When God is viewed 
as author of Scripture, the reader will be forced to work out the implications of God‟s 
self-communicative action.  Consequently, the reader must understand who this God is 
(God as Triune self-communicative Act), what this text is (God‟s covenant document to 
the Church), and where this text fits in the economy of redemption (Scripture constitutes 
the Church).  Throughout his work, then, Vanhoozer will seek to articulate the 
relationship between God, Scripture, and Church in a way that will establish the priority 
of God, through Scripture, to the Church in the economy of redemption.  Theological 
themes, such as sola scriptura and covenant, and philosophical tools such as speech-act 
theory, authorial intent, and the distinction between meaning and significance, all remain 
                                               
355 Vanhoozer (ibid, 6), notes, “Much of my academic life subsequent to Is There a Meaning? 
has been spent doing penance for its sins of omission.”   
356 Vanhoozer has not changed his claim that a fixed meaning is encoded in a text for readers 
to discover and understand.  Vanhoozer (Ibid, 1), claims, “I still think the substance of the argument—a 
proposal about textual meaning—is essentially correct.”   
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important parts of Vanhoozer‟s project as they promote the authority of Scripture over 
Church in the economy of redemption.   
A. Vanhoozer‟s early Work:  Theological General Hermeneutics 
 
Vanhoozer‟s early works are written primarily to safeguard biblical meaning from 
postmodern “undoers” (esp. deconstructionists and reader response theorists), who claim 
that the biblical texts, like other all other texts, have no determinate meaning.  In 
response, Vanhoozer seeks to develop an apologetic for reading which will not dismiss 
the author or reduce the content of the text to the reader‟s own interpretive aims.  
Vanhoozer‟s first major hermeneutical work, Is There a Meaning in This Text, sets the 
agenda for his early career by attempting to develop a “theological general hermeneutic” 
in which “the Bible should be read like any other book, and…every other book should be 
read like the Bible.”357  Because all human communication is a gift grounded in the 
communicative action of God, all reading is a necessarily a moral and theological 
activity.  Rules for a proper reading of all texts, Vanhoozer argues, should be modeled on 
a proper reading of Scripture.  As a result, a certain morality of reading exists which 
obligates readers to respect the author of any text.  I will argue that this approach has 
resulted in failure both because it cannot overcome inherent hermeneutical difficulties, 
and because it does not accomplish Vanhoozer‟s desired result of establishing the 
authority of God‟s communicative action in Scripture.   
                                               
357 Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding:”, 208), follows Barth and Ricoeur, who have 
made suggestions that reading the Bible has implications for the reading of all texts.   
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1.  Theological Presuppositions of a Theological General Hermeneutics  
 
In the beginning of his career, Vanhoozer proposes an ontology of reading which 
assumes that the triune God is the ground of all communicative action.
358
 God somehow 
„underwrites‟ all language, and it is the understanding this reality which grounds rules for 
reading, both in Scripture and in all texts.
359
  Vanhoozer proposes that all reading is 
ultimately a theological activity because all reading is a generally moral activity.  This 
argument includes several key elements, which will be discussed below:  all reading must 
be open to transcendence, the author of the text must be respected, all language must be 
understood to be covenantal, and the reader must assume a stance of critical realism.   
Hermeneutical Openness to Transcendence: Vanhoozer‟s general hermeneutic 
has a theological center.  Vanhoozer claims that since language is a gift given by God to 
allow persons to interact morally with one another, “All hermeneutics, not simply the 
special hermeneutics of Scripture, is „theological.‟”360  The argument for a theological, 
general hermeneutic rests on a “certain methodological analogy between theology and 
literary theory, based on their shared concern to speak of transcendence: of that which 
transcends the world (God) and of that which transcends language (meaning).”361  The 
grounding assumption is that both author and the content communicated by the author 
                                               
358 Vanhoozer (ibid, 231), specifically claims that he is “advocating a Trinitarian hermeneutic 
for all interpretation.” 
359 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 456.   
360 Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 231.  Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This 
Text?, 205), claims all use of language has moral implications because, “Language is a God-given capacity 
that enables human beings to relate to God, to the world, and to one another.” 
361 Ibid, 161. 
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transcend the text, and hence the author can indeed say something to someone by means 
of a written text.
362
  Hence, Vanhoozer writes, “Interpretation is theological if it is based 
on the belief that there is something that „transcends‟ the play of language in writing.”363  
The ground of such transcendence is ultimately God, and Vanhoozer thus argues that 
hermeneutical decisions are ultimately rooted in theological presuppositions:  
All textual understanding is a theological matter—an encounter with something 
that transcends us and has the capacity to transform us, provided that we approach 
it in the right spirit.  Such is the fundamental thesis of my argument.  The 
interpretive virtues are in reality spiritual virtues: without faith—an openness to 
transcendence—we would never find something in the text that is not our own 
creation, or our own reflection  Hence the struggle with the text is ultimately a 
spiritual struggle—with the text and with ourselves.364   
 
Interpretation is moral, Vanhoozer argues, if it is “open to transcendence,” and it 
becomes immoral when transcendence is disregarded.  Interpreters act morally as they 
respect both the communicator and the communicative intent which transcends the text, 
and they act immorally when they suggest there is nothing outside the text.
365
  In the end, 
Vanhoozer argues that only Christian theology provides adequate resources for a general 
hermeneutics, because, “Only from the vantage point of Christian faith, perhaps, does 
                                               
362 Vanhoozer (ibid, 395), argues that a communicative act is ultimately “a verbal work 
whereby an author says something about something to someone.” Vanhoozer (ibid, 214), claims, 
“Discourse has a sense (something said), a reference (about something), and a destination (to someone).” 
363 Vanhoozer, "The Spirit of Understanding,” 211.   
364 Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 381.   
365 Consequently, the methods of Deconstructionism and Structuralism are inherently immoral 
ways of reading (See Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 369-74).  Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of 
Understanding,” 211), suggests that the moral reader of the text is one who is a follower of the text while 
those who are “users” and “critics” are immoral readers.  As a result, “Barthes and Jacques Derrida are 
countertheologians: there is nothing outside the play of writing, nothing that guarantees that our worlds 
refer to the world.  The loss of a transcendent signifier—Logos—thus follows hard upon the death of the 
author.”      
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language appear not as a system of differences that reflects political power but as a form 
of divinely instituted communicative action that can be performed responsibly or 
irresponsibly, to the glory of God or to the undoing of humanity.”366  Since God has 
established communication as the structure within which human morality takes place, the 
reader‟s decision about how to interpret a text is always a moral decision.   
Vanhoozer‟s project, then, seeks to identify the proper moral virtues that one must 
nurture and develop in order to be a moral reader of all texts.  The development of certain 
interpretive practices place one on a trajectory toward moral reading, while the denial of 
those same practices place one on a trajectory toward immoral reading.  Vanhoozer 
understands his moral grounding of all reading in theological virtues to apply to all texts, 
not just Scripture.  Vanhoozer writes,  
My contribution to the epistemology of meaning is to stress the extent to which 
literary criticism is not simply a problem of the morality of knowledge, but a 
problem that ultimately demands theological resources—specifically the virtues 
of faith, hope, obedience, and love: faith, that there is a real presence in the text 
that demands a response; hope, that the community of interpreters can reach, at 
least ideally, a reasoned agreement; obedience, that the interpreter will observe 
the context of the text itself and follow the literary sense where it leads; love, that 
the interpreter will indwell the text and attend to it on its own terms.
367
  
 
In the end, for Vanhoozer, it seems that the Holy Spirit turns all general 
hermeneutics to theological hermeneutics.  By respecting transcendence in the text or 
denying it, the interpreter is really participating in or resisting the mission of the Holy 
Spirit.  Hence Vanhoozer argues that “[t]he interpretive values…are none other than the 
                                               
366 Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 369. 
367 Ibid, 283. 
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fruit of the Spirit.”368  Vanhoozer carries this insight through to its logical conclusion.  
Vanhoozer claims, “If I am right that genuine interpretation affirms transcendence…that 
all hermeneutics is ultimately theological hermeneutics,” then it follows that “the Spirit 
plays a role in general hermeneutics as well” as in a hermeneutics of Scripture.369  Since 
right reading is always a moral activity which requires certain distinctly theological 
presuppositions, and since all moral action requires the activity of the Holy Spirit, 
Vanhoozer logically concludes that responsible reading of all texts requires the work of 
the Holy Spirit.   
The Spirit, then, has an underlying role in all human understanding by making 
communication effective.  The Spirit works within all language to move readers from 
self-centered interpretations to other-centered interpretation.  Vanhoozer claims,  
[I]t is the Spirit‟s unique role to bridge distances that impede understanding…The 
Spirit enables us to avoid falling prey to self-deception, not by working a miracle 
or our rational faculties, but by shedding grace abroad in our hearts…The Holy 
Spirit aids understanding in general, not least by cultivating the interpretive 
virtues in individuals and in believing community.
370
 
 
While Vanhoozer realizes that his claim that the Spirit works in all language may 
be difficult to prove, he argues that it is nonetheless reasonable.
371
  While the fallen 
human tendency is to distort texts rather than to respect them, it is reasonable to think that 
                                               
368 Ibid, 379-80.   
369 Ibid, 407.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 414), seems to base this whole pneumatology of general 
hermeneutics on Ricoeur‟s claim that a text “both „reveals‟ and „transforms,‟” and on Barth‟s claim that 
“those schooled in biblical interpretation are best able to appreciate what it is to do justice to textual 
otherness.”   
370 Ibid, 415. Vanhoozer (ibid), appeals to the “renewing of your minds” (Rom. 12:2), as the 
Spirit‟s help to “receiving textual meaning.” 
371 Vanhoozer (ibid, 428), is quite aware of the strong nature of his claim, “The Spirit enables 
understanding” in all texts.       
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the Spirit may influence understanding without human knowledge.
372
  As we will see, 
this insistence on the Spirit‟s work in all reading will come at a high price, because it will 
stand in tension with Vanhoozer‟s overall pneumatology.     
Meaning as Authorial Intent: If moral reading is open to the transcendence of 
both author and message, Vanhoozer must rehabilitate the quest for authorial intent as a 
legitimate interpretive goal.  Vanhoozer‟s argument for authorial intent centers on 
answering the question, “What is an author?” rather than the questions, “Who was the 
author?” or “What was the psychological intent of the author?”373  Vanhoozer claims, 
“Any theory of interpretation that misunderstands what an author is cannot hope to 
understand what a text is and how it conveys…meaning.”374  Vanhoozer‟s foundational 
analogy is that the author is best viewed as a creator.  Drawing a parallel from God‟s 
creation ex nihilo, Vanhoozer asks, “Why is there something rather than nothing in texts? 
                                               
372 Vanhoozer (ibid, 428), suggests, “Distortion is a real possibility whenever readers are 
faced with texts that require behavioral change…Interpretation never takes place in a cognitively and 
spiritually clean environment.”  Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 229), argues that the “Spirit of 
understanding” enables ethical interpretation as he “progressively convicts us of our biases and conforms 
us to reality,” even without the interpreter‟s knowledge. Vanhoozer (ibid), calls this the “bias principle,” 
namely that “we never know the world apart from biases that influence our perception of reality.”  Just as 
interpreters naturally have a distorting bias toward texts, so the Spirit can affect a bias toward morally 
respecting the other without the interpreter being aware of it. 
373 Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 5), is clear that he is not trying to 
rehabilitate a notion of authorial intent that depends on “conscious awareness.”  Instead, Vanhoozer (ibid), 
claims that authorial intent is an “aspect of action.  Specifically, authorial intention is a form of agential 
intention...By authorial intention, then, I have in mind not what authors wanted to do (too psychological) 
but what they did.”  Because “to be human is to be always having to interpret what other people are doing” 
(no human can avoid such action), interpreters must interpret the speech acts of authors.  This means 
interpreting what persons are saying by “counting their sentences as promises, questions, commands, 
assertions, and the like.”  Interpretation for authorial intent means understanding the correct illocutions 
inscribed by the locutions.  Because this is encoded in the text, the search for authorial intent is not a 
speculation about the consciousness of the author.   
374 Ibid, 228.   
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Because someone has said something about something to someone.”375  The author “is 
responsible both for the existence of the text (that it is) and for its specific nature (what it 
is).”376  The text‟s “what it is,” for Vanhoozer, includes the text‟s determinate meaning, 
codified by the configuration in a particular genre.  Hence the author “is the one whose 
action determines the meaning of the text—its subject matter, its literary form, and its 
communicative energy.”377   
The author‟s creative work of codifying a determinate meaning (i.e. content) in a 
text in a particular manner (i.e. form) allows Vanhoozer to move beyond the analogy of 
creation to another theological analogy.  Drawing on a Christological analogy, 
Vanhoozer suggests that the author‟s meaning in the text is the incarnation of the author‟s 
intent.  Vanhoozer explains, a “text is an extension of one‟s self into the world, through 
communicative action.”378  On this account of authorship, it becomes clear why meaning 
must be so closely connected to the author.  If all human communicative acts are 
analogously modeled after the triune God‟s extension of the divine Word as a 
communicative act, there are definite reasons for respecting and attending to the speech 
act of the human author.  God is the paradigmatic author because of God‟s paradigmatic 
communicative act.  As Christians respect God by attending to God‟s self-communicative 
act, so they respect human authors by attending to the author‟s self-communicative acts.   
                                               
375 Ibid, 218. 
376 Ibid, 228. 
377 Ibid, 230.   
378 Vanhoozer, (Ibid, 229), claims that analogous to the manner in which “[t]he divine author 
embodied his message in human flesh,” the “text is…a kind of „body‟ of the author.  It is this body, this 
medium of authorial agency, that I have sought to resurrect.”  Vanhoozer claims to have gotten this analogy 
from Anthony C. Thistelton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming 
Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 75.   
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Relying heavily on speech-act theory, Vanhoozer does not differentiate greatly 
between speech and writing.  Vanhoozer follows Ricoeur‟s claim that writing is, at 
bottom, a form of discourse, yet he feels he must give more priority to the author than 
Ricoeur does.
379
  Vanhoozer strengthens Ricoeur‟s thesis that a text is “any discourse 
fixed by writing” to the stronger thesis that all “language as „discourse,‟” whether 
speaking or writing, consists of “something said to someone about something.”380  
Vanhoozer believes that much modern literary theory has fundamentally misunderstood 
how cultures use texts.  While modern literary theory emphasizes the distance between 
text and author (and thus the separation between author and meaning), Vanhoozer feels 
that cultures have always used texts precisely to preserve meaning.  Since both writing 
and speaking are discourse, “Texts are able to communicate at a distance because writing 
preserves discourse.  Writing…does not alienate authors from readers but makes shared 
meaning possible.  Indeed, it is humanity‟s chief resource for overcoming spatial, 
temporal, and cultural distance.”381  Abandoning the connection between author and 
                                               
379 Vanhoozer (ibid, 328), uses Ricoeur‟s phrase, “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all 
discourse is understood as meaning,” to ground all writing in discourse.  See Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation 
Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 
12).  Yet where Ricoeur goes on to discuss the difference between writing and discourse, Vanhoozer (ibid, 
328), emphasizes the similarities, noting that, “Communication is the unifying act that orders all the other 
acts” both in writing and in speaking.   
380 See D. Christopher Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the 
Theological Interpretation of Scripture (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2007), 87 (cf. Vanhoozer, Is 
There a Meaning in This Text?, 214.)  Vanhoozer claims, “Often overlooked is Ricoeur‟s 
acknowledgement that discourse fixes not only the locutionary but the illocutionary act…Ricoeur knows 
that one cannot cancel out this main characteristic of discourse—„said by someone‟—without reducing 
texts to natural (nonintentional) objects like pebbles in the sand” ("From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: 
The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant," in First Theology: God, Scripture and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 190).  As a result, 
Vanhoozer has moved from Ricoeur‟s claim that meaning remains in the text to an insistence that such 
meaning remain attached to an author.   
381 Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 214.   
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meaning in a text undermines one of the fundamental reasons that societies use writing 
for communication.   
Since author and meaning remain intrinsically connected in the text, Vanhoozer 
understands the failure to respect meaning in the text as a failure to respect the author as a 
legitimate „other.‟  In all texts, Vanhoozer writes, “The voice of the communicative agent 
confronts us with a moral demand: „Heed me. Hear me. Understand. Do not bear false 
witness.‟”382  Vanhoozer calls this the “hermeneutical imperative,” the moral demand on 
the reader to “respect the author‟s intended act.”383  This insistence on respecting the 
author as „other‟ draws a characteristically postmodern response to a characteristically 
postmodern tendency.  Francis Watson observes that in much postmodern literary theory 
“the text must be dragged before a tribunal and subjected to interrogation about its own 
ideological tendencies, its tacit support for an unjust status quo, its stereotyping of 
marginalized groups.”384  For Vanhoozer, Watson continues, this “inquisitorial practice” 
is “unethical because in dealing with texts we are dealing with persons whose 
                                               
382 Ibid, 401.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 368, 375), etc. claims that “in reading we encounter an other 
that calls us to respond.” Vanhoozer (ibid, 185), agrees that deconstructionism may be good insofar as it 
chastens the reader and brings interpretive humility, yet, (ibid, 187), rejects “the postmodern contention 
that suspicion—the critical moment—is all there is to the ethics of interpretation…Fortunately, there is an 
alternative between the absolutely knowable and the absolutely undecidable.  A proper fear of the other, of 
the author, is the real beginning of literary knowledge.”  
383 Vanhoozer (ibid, 401), makes it clear that this does not mean that interpreters cannot look 
for other things in texts as well: “„Seek ye first understanding‟ may be the interpretive norm, but it need not 
exhaust the reader‟s interpretive aims.  The hermeneutical imperative—to respect the author‟s intended 
act—is nevertheless a sieve through which all interpretive aims must pass.”  What Vanhoozer is really 
doing here is to rank interpretive aims, showing that one stands out as an underlying priority over all the 
others.  There are many different legitimate interpretive aims, yet the only morally acceptable starting-point 
is to respect the intention of the author.  To disregard this interpretive aim in principle would be immoral.   
384 Francis Watson, "Review of Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The 
Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge," Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society 44, no. 4 (2001), 745. 
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communicative actions the texts embody.”385  Since “[a]ll texts…invoke a certain debt 
that readers owe authors,”386 Vanhoozer responds to Barthes‟s declaration of the “death 
of the author” by suggesting that interpretive “understanding” leads to the “death of the 
reader.”387  The chief goal of interpretation is not to decipher the text‟s oppressive 
ideology, nor to impose one‟s own meaning on the text, but “to gain literary knowledge, 
to discover what an author is doing in tending to words as well as what those words are 
about.”388  Since the “undoing of interpretation rests on a theological mistake,” namely 
the immoral treatment of the author, Vanhoozer claims that “Christian theology, not 
deconstruction, is the better response to the ethical challenge of the „other.‟”389  The way 
to reverse the immoral trend of disconnecting author and textual meaning is to turn to the 
distinctly Christian understanding of discipleship as respecting the communicative act of 
God.  As a result, a respectful interpretation of the Bible provides the foundation for 
interpreting all other books.  Vanhoozer claims, “I prefer to say, not that we should read 
the Bible like any other book, but that we should read every other book as we have 
learned to read the Bible, namely, in a spirit of understanding that lets the text be what it 
is and do what it intends.”390   
                                               
385 Ibid. 
386 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 228-29.   
387 Ibid, 405.  Just as the essence of Christian discipleship is to understand the author of the 
Biblical text and die to self, so all interpretive understanding seeks to respect the intentions of the author.  
To disregard the author (i.e. to make oneself author of the text), is fundamentally immoral. 
388 Ibid, 328.   
389 Ibid, 199.   
390 Ibid, 379.   
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All Language as Covenantal: In Vanhoozer‟s early work, human language is the 
medium by which readers and authors enter into a kind of “covenant” with one another to 
act morally toward one another.
391
  Vanhoozer claims that all “texts are „covenants‟ of 
discourse,”392 since through language authors take a public stance, establishing moral 
obligations on themselves and others.  Thus Vanhoozer puts forth his thesis that “the 
design plan of language is to serve as the medium of covenantal relations with God, with 
others, with the world.”393  Vanhoozer calls his claim that all language is covenantal the 
“presumption of covenantal relation,” suggesting that “implied in every speech act is a 
certain covenantal relation—a tacit plea, or demand, to understand.”394  Language is a gift 
given by God with a specific “design plan” to produce understanding.395  In written 
discourse, then, “Covenant faithfulness to what is written is the necessary condition for 
receiving the covenant blessing: understanding.  Understanding is a covenantal 
agreement between competent authors and competent readers about the rule-
governedness of every kind of text.”396  Seeking to understand the meaning 
communicated by the author “is a proper response to the text as a communicative act, for 
                                               
391 Vanhoozer, “From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 201.  Language is only the medium of 
such moral action, and only when transcendence is presupposed humans use language analogously to God‟s 
use of language.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 201), clarifies, “Language itself cannot make this demand on us” 
because language “has no rights.” 
392 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 4. 
393 Ibid, 206.   
394 Vanhoozer, “From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 201.   
395 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 205.   
396 Ibid, 374.   
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it respects the design plan of language (and literature) and increases my self-
understanding precisely by giving me knowledge about something other than myself.”397   
This claim that all language is covenantal is grounded in God‟s own covenantal 
communication, so that,  
From a Christian perspective, God is first and foremost a communicative agent, 
one who relates to humankind through words and the Word.  Indeed, God‟s very 
being is a self-communicative act that both constitutes and enacts the covenant of 
discourse: speaker (Father), Word (Son), and reception (Spirit) are all interrelated.  
Human communication is a similarly covenantal affair…398 
 
The Bible operates as the paradigm for all communication as it uniquely testifies 
to the paradigmatic communicative action of God and as it is the covenantal document 
par excellence.  Learning to read Scripture appropriately, then, is the best way to learn 
how to enter the covenantal structure of language in general and hence to respect morally 
the author, who has also entered this structure of communication.   
Vanhoozer emphasizes not only that texts have determinate meaning, but also that 
there is ultimately only one right interpretation of a speech act.
399
  In opposition to Frei‟s 
distinction between “meaning” and “truth,” Vanhoozer proposes an opposite position:  
meaning and truth are ultimately united in God, and thus all interpretations are oriented 
toward, though will never completely reach, the fullness of meaning/truth.
400
  Vanhoozer 
                                               
397 Ibid, 328. 
398 Ibid, 456.   
399 Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 302), suggests that ultimately, “There is one 
determinate meaning in light of which the many interpretations must be judged inadequate or incorrect.” 
400 Vanhoozer ("The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Truth and Scripture's Diverse Literary 
Forms," in Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon, ed. D.A. and John Woodbridge Carson (Grand Rapids: 
Zonderban, 1986), 85), claims, “Because God is all-knowing and omnipresent…Truth must be 
comprehensive and unified (at least for God, if not always for us).”   
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assumes that if interpreters abandon the presupposition that there is only one correct 
interpretation, they will also abandon the quest to do justice to the author.  While 
interpreters can never have complete confidence that they have attained the one right 
interpretation, Vanhoozer argues that it is a faulty conclusion to abandon the search for 
determinate meaning.
401
  Since the author has entered into the covenant of 
communication, the text must have some determinate and intelligible meaning.   
2.  Use of Speech-Act Theory to Defend the Role of the Author 
 
It is the connection between author and determinate textual meaning allows 
Vanhoozer to show that all communication is a moral activity and ultimately grounded in 
God.  Speech-act theory provides Vanhoozer with the conceptual tools to locate 
determinate meaning in a text and connect it to the author.  In the case of Scripture, 
speech-act theory will allow Vanhoozer to suggest that God is involved in both authoring 
and reading.   
Meaning and the Parts of a Speech Act: Speech-act theory proposes that all 
speech acts have three parts:  locutions (the words themselves), illocutions (the stance 
taken by the author, i.e. commanding, requesting, etc.) and perlocutions (the effect 
produced by the author‟s communication) in a speech act.  Following this structure, 
Vanhoozer defines a text as a written “complex communicative act with matter 
(propositional content), energy (illocutionary force) and purpose (perlocutionary 
                                               
401 Against the deconstructionists, Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 334),writes, 
“The argument, „If no absolutes, then skepticism,‟ is fallacious.  Between „all‟ and „nothing‟ stands „some.‟  
Hermeneutic rationality yields some literary knowledge.” 
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effect).”402  Yet while each component of the speech act is necessary to a text, Vanhoozer 
locates the meaning of the text in the locutions and illocutions only.  Meaning is 
determinate in texts because the author encodes that meaning in the text by means of 
locutions and illocutions.   
Interpretation, then, is the art of grasping this meaning, not creating meaning in 
dialogue with the author.  Since meaning is bound to the illocutions and locutions of a 
text, perlocutionary effect does not add to the meaning of the text.  Vanhoozer articulates 
this distinction between meaning and perlocutionary effect in various ways, at times 
distinguishing between “meaning” (the product of the illocutions and locutions of the 
author) and “significance” (the “effects that the text produces in its community of 
readers),” and at other times between the “literal sense” (“what it meant to the author and 
the original audience”) and the “ecclesiastical sense” (“what it means to us today in the 
community guided by tradition or by the Spirit”).403  In Scripture, while “perlocutionary 
effect,” “significance” and “ecclesial sense” may continually change based on the 
response of the Church, the determinate meaning of the text remains unaffected.   
To associate perlocutionary effect with meaning would be to make both a 
philosophical mistake and a theological mistake.  Philosophically, to allow for 
“confusion” between illocutionary efficacy and perlocutionary efficacy would be a 
“confusion of text and commentary,” and hence would be just “another version of the 
                                               
402 Ibid, 228.   
403 Ibid, 408-09.   
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affective fallacy.”404   Meaning must be set (i.e. determinate) before perlocutionary effect 
is able to occur.
405
  Theologically, it is immoral to confuse “textual meaning with its 
[perlocutionary] effects,”406 because this would prohibit the interpreter from genuinely 
being confronted by the voice of the other in the text.  Vanhoozer argues, “The task of an 
ethics of interpretation, I submit, is to guard the otherness of the text: to preserve its 
ability to say something to and affect the reader, thus creating the possibility of self-
transcendence.”407  For Vanhoozer, assuming that determinate meaning exists is a 
necessary prerequisite for any communication.  To enter the process of communication, 
interpreters must trust that the “illocutionary intent is usually recognizable” in all texts.408  
As a result, the isolation of meaning from perlocutionary effect is necessary to preserve 
moral reading.   
Vanhoozer grounds his distinction between locutions, illocutions and perlocutions 
in God‟s self-communicative action.  Vanhoozer finds an analogy between the Trinity 
and speech-act theory that allows him to relate persons of the Trinity to specific parts of a 
communicative act.  Vanhoozer suggests,  
                                               
404 Ibid, 386 (cf. 409).  For a description of the affective fallacy, see Frei‟s use of the New 
Criticism in chapter one.   
405 Vanhoozer (ibid, 427), clarifies that there exists both an illocutionary efficacy and a 
perlocutionary efficacy in Scripture. The “illocutionary efficacy,” intended by the author, (which “is a 
matter of meaning”), and perlocutionary efficacy, the effect the text has on the reader, (which does not 
affect that meaning).  
406 Ibid, 386.   
407 Ibid,  383. 
408 Ibid, 427.  Vanhoozer (ibid), argues that the “external clarity” of Scripture is similar to the 
“external clarity” of all texts.  Notice that all textual meaning is placed on an equal playing field here: “The 
suggestion that either the church magisterium or the Spirit‟s illumination is a prerequisite for understanding 
would call this presumption into question.”   
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Speech act theory serves as handmaiden to a Trinitarian theology of 
communication.  If the Father is the locutor, the Son is his preeminent illocution.  
Christ is God‟s definitive Word, the substantive content of his message.  And the 
Holy Spirit—the condition and power of receiving the sender‟s message—is God 
the perlocutor, the reason that his words do not return to him empty (Isa. 55:11).  
The triune God is therefore the epitome of communicative agency: the speech 
agent who utters, embodies, and keeps his Word.  Human speakers, created in 
God‟s image, enjoy the dignity of communicative agency, though as sinners their 
speech acts (and interpretations) are subject to…imperfections and distortions.409 
 
In this schema, the Father and Son are most appropriately related to locutions and 
illocutions respectively, and the Spirit is most appropriately related to perlocutionary 
effect.  If the divine Persons can be analogously associated with the parts of a speech act 
in this way, then “the Trinitarian language of „procession‟ is apt: as the Spirit proceeds 
from the Father and the Son, so the literary act proceeds from the author, and so too does 
the perlocution (persuading, convincing) proceed from the illocution (claiming, 
asserting).
410
     
Both the Son and Spirit cannot be responsible for meaning, Vanhoozer suggests, 
because attributing meaning to the Spirit would make the Spirit a “rival author” setting 
“Spirit against Word.”411  The Spirit does not contribute to illocutionary meaning, but 
instead “renders the Word effective.”412  Vanhoozer applies his axiomatic statement: “the 
Spirit is tied to the written Word as significance is tied to meaning,” in order to show that 
“the role of the Spirit is to serve as the Spirit of significance and thus to apply meaning, 
                                               
409 Ibid, 457.   
410 Ibid, 410.  This analogy is used repeatedly by Vanhoozer.  See, for example, Vanhoozer, 
"The Spirit of Understanding,” 227; Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 457, 429, etc.   
411 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 427.   
412 Ibid. 
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not to change it.”413  Since Scripture is complete in meaning (locutions and “illocutionary 
success”), but indeterminate in bringing about the appropriate response in the reader 
(“perlocutionary success”), it is naturally the Holy Spirit who accomplishes the meaning 
determined by the Father and Son.
414
  The Spirit has a specific role in the literary act, just 
as the Spirit has a specific role in relation to Father and Son:  “The Spirit‟s role in 
bringing about understanding is to witness to what is other than himself (meaning 
accomplished) and to bring its significance to bear on the reader (meaning applied).”415  
Practically, this means that the Spirit “ensures that [the illocutionary acts] are recognized 
for what they are,” by means of “conviction,” “illumination,” and “sanctification.”416   
Vanhoozer‟s association of perlocutionary effect with the work of the Spirit 
should be seen in light of his pneumatology.  Vanhoozer wishes to develop a 
pneumatology that will tie Spirit and Scripture closer together than either Tracy or 
postliberals are willing to do.  On the one hand, Vanhoozer criticizes Tracy and Ricoeur 
                                               
413 Ibid, 265.  This separation of perlocutionary effect from meaning allows Vanhoozer (ibid, 
413), to say Spirit has the role of “bringing about understanding is to witness to what is other than himself 
(meaning accomplished) and to bring its significance to bear on the reader (meaning applied).” 
414 Vanhoozer‟s argument becomes more refined as he works out his view of the determinate 
meaning of Scripture as God‟s Word in contrast to Barth.  Vanhoozer feels that Scripture is the Word of 
God in regard to its locutionary and illocutionary dimensions, yet Scripture becomes the Word of God in 
regard to its perlocutionary and interlocutionary dimensions.  Hence Vanhoozer claims, “The external 
testimony of the apostles is fixed; the internal testimony of the Spirit is free” ("The Apostolic Discourse 
and Its Development," in Scripture's Doctrine and Theology's Bible: How the New Testament Shapes 
Christian Dogmatics, ed. Markus and Alan J. Torrance Bockmuehl (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2008), 197).  See also Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "A Person of the Book? Barth on Biblical Authority and 
Interpretation," in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology: Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung Wook 
Chung (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 57. 
415 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 412.   
416 Ibid, 428 and 412, respectively.  This argument is difficult to understand in light of 
Vanhoozer‟s simultaneous insistence that Scripture has an “external clarity” in regard to its meaning.  
Vanhoozer (ibid, 427), has suggested that the covenant of communication makes the illocutionary stances 
sufficiently clear without the aid of the Holy Spirit.  This argument will be a continual tension in 
Vanhoozer‟s work.   
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for associating the work of the Spirit more with the universal work of creation than with 
Christology, believing that such a model will de-emphasize the particularity of 
Christianity.
417
  On the other hand, Vanhoozer criticizes postliberals for their tendency to 
“confine the Spirit to the church by making the Spirit‟s work a function of community 
reading practices,” believing that this will de-emphasize the authority of Scripture.418  
Vanhoozer‟s own proposal ties the work of the Spirit to the Scriptures, for it suggests a 
model in which the Spirit primarily works in Scripture rather than the practices of the 
Church or in the created order at large.  This model seeks to call revisionists and 
postliberals alike to respect the ways in which the literal sense of Scripture establishes the 
bounds for the Christian faith.   
Establishing the Literal Sense:  The literal sense is the combination of locutions 
and illocutions intended by the author within the context of the whole communicative act.  
It is the illocutions, however, which are finally decisive for determining the literal 
sense.
419
  Interpretation takes place when a reader moves from discerning the locutions to 
“inferring illocutionary intent from the evidence, which includes both the primary data 
(the text) and secondary considerations (context).”420  Vanhoozer‟s paradigmatic example 
                                               
417 Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 227.  The claim is developed fully in Biblical 
Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ch. 9, esp. 248-57.)     
418 Vanhoozer, "The Spirit of Understanding,” 226.   
419 Vanhoozer ("From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 178), defines the literal sense as “the 
sum total of those illocutionary acts performed by the author intentionally and with self-awareness.”  Yet 
he also insists, “The literal sense, I maintain, is not a matter of locutions alone; every utterance has an 
illocutionary force as well (e.g., assertive, directive, expressive, etc.)…To ignore the role of illocutions is to 
succumb to „letterism,‟ or to what could also be called „locutionism‟” (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 
310-11).   
420 Vanhoozer, ("From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 183).  It is important to note the stress 
on illocutionary acts for establishing the literal sense—locutions alone are not sufficient (182).  For 
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here is the interpretation of legal documents (a will, for example) where the thought 
process of the author must be reconstructed in order to understand the communicative act 
intentionally preserved by writing.
421
  The reader must use the locutions in order to move 
to the illocutions, and hence the meaning, of a text.
422
   
Vanhoozer further shows the importance of illocutions by likening interpretation 
to translation.  Good translation, Vanhoozer claims, occurs when the illocutions and 
perlocutions are preserved as the locutions are changed.  This produces “an „equivalent 
response‟ in a new context.423  While something is always added and lost in translation, 
“Moral interpretation respects and responds to the illocutions of the text in the way 
intended by the author.”424  Through this explanation, it is possible to see how closely 
tied authorial intent remains to meaning.  The very ability to grasp meaning depends on 
one‟s ability to grasp the illocutionary efficacy of the text while using different locutions.  
In the structure of language, “illocutions „supervene‟ on locutions,” so that, “One can 
perform an illocutionary act only on the basis of locutions—words, sentences—though 
                                                                                                                                            
Vanhoozer, the movement from simply recognizing locutions to understanding the supervening illocutions 
of an author is analogous to the movement from semiotics to semantics (182).  For example, Vanhoozer 
(ibid, 183), claims that the information transmitted by the locution „Wet paint‟ is one thing; the illocution—
„Do not touch‟—is quite another.”   
421 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 332. 
422 Christology provides a pivotal analogy for Vanhoozer‟s understanding of the literal sense.  
Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 357, n. 143), claims, “One cannot read divine revelation off 
of the body of Jesus.  It is only in other contexts, on higher descriptive levels, that we can see Jesus as the 
Christ and as the Son of God.  „Christ‟ supervenes on „Jesus.‟  His divinity cannot be reduced to his 
humanity, but it cannot be discussed apart from it either.” In the same way, one must move from locutions 
to supervening illocutions to understand the literal sense.   
423 Vanhoozer (ibid, 387), claims, “In order to preserve the nature and content (proposition 
and illocution) of the message, however, it is often necessary to change the form (locution).” 
424 Vanhoozer (ibid, 335), claims, “What we are after as readers is not an interpretation that 
perfectly corresponds to the text (whatever that might mean), but rather an interpretation that adequately 
responds to it.  In responding to the text we allow the text to complete the purpose for which it was sent.” 
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illocutions cannot be reduced to locutions.”425  The literal sense is understood by moving 
from the words of the text to the authorial intent which created those words and 
supervened on them in an illocutionary stance.   
Up to this point, Vanhoozer has only given a general description of the literal 
sense which would apply to all texts.  As he transitions to an explanation of the literal 
sense of Scripture, some sharp tensions arise.  In the next section, I will show that 
attempting to employ general hermeneutical rules to Scripture, even if those rules are 
grounded in the notion of God‟s communicative acts, fails to provide an adequate 
framework for understanding dual authorship, the unity of the canon, progressive 
revelation, and reading all Scripture in light of Christ.
426
   
C.  Persistent Tensions in Vanhoozer‟s Early Work 
 
While Vanhoozer‟s early work articulates a philosophically interesting, 
theologically grounded argument for reading Scripture and consequently all other texts 
with respect for their authors and messages, this early work suffers from a number of 
difficulties in establishing rules for reading Scripture.  Specifically, Vanhoozer‟s early 
project lacks adequate articulation of the uniqueness of Scripture and the activity of God 
in communicating the Scriptural texts.  Too often, Scripture appears to be governed by all 
                                               
425 Vanhoozer, "From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 178.   
426 Vanhoozer (ibid, 178), claims that the Bible is unique because of its “pedagogical nature 
and function”—its status is “canon” and its “nature” is as a “guidebook for the believing community.” 
Vanhoozer, (ibid, 103), further demonstrates the uniqueness of Scripture in that the literal sense of 
Scripture means “taking it as testimony to Jesus Christ,” and thus the literal sense must regard Christ as the 
center of Scripture. 
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the same rules that govern the reading of other texts, and God appears to be little more 
than a necessary presupposition for moral reading.   
In this regard, Vanhoozer‟s early work may be more instructive in its failure than 
it is in its success.  Vanhoozer criticizes both Tracy and Frei for focusing on general 
hermeneutics to the exclusion of special hermeneutics, yet Vanhoozer‟s own early 
approach exhibits many of the same problems.  These difficulties in Vanhoozer‟s work 
show the importance of developing rules for reading within the context of the whole 
economy of redemption rather than trying to move beyond the impasse by simply 
imposing a different literary method.  This section will highlight several key difficulties 
in Vanhoozer‟s early work in order to show that the discussion must be broadened further 
to include a discussion of the divine Author as well as the place of Scripture in the 
economy of redemption.   
The Movement From Human Authorship to Divine Authorship:  While most of 
Vanhoozer‟s early works focuses on the speech acts of the human author, Vanhoozer 
knows that ultimately he must move from a theological general hermeneutics to a special 
hermeneutics of Scripture as he deals with dual authorship.  Vanhoozer‟s move to special 
hermeneutics is made by claiming that God brings canonical meaning to completion by 
supervening God‟s own divine illocutions on human speech acts.  Since God acts upon 
the biblical texts in this way, the whole canon can be considered a unified speech act, of 
which God is the primary author.  Vanhoozer calls this supervening action, which 
becomes apparent at the level of the whole canon, either the canonical sense or the sensus 
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plenior.
427
  Ultimately, Vanhoozer suggests, the literal sense is the canonical sense as the 
canon provides the full context for understanding God‟s communicative act.   
For Vanhoozer, determining textual meaning is a function of understanding both 
the locutions and the illocutionary stance of the author.  Understanding the full meaning 
of the author can best occur as one examines the speech act in its whole context; e.g., an 
author‟s whole text in the context of its genre, with the cultural situation of the author, 
etc.  Vanhoozer applies this same logic to Scripture as he moves from human authorship 
to divine authorship to determine Scripture‟s divine canonical sense.  While individual 
authors wrote the individual texts of Scripture as speech acts, the fullest meaning of 
Scripture emerges only at the level of the canon where the whole of Scripture can best be 
understood as God‟s unified speech act.  Thus the “canon as a whole becomes the unified 
act for which the divine intention serves as the unifying principle.”428  Vanhoozer 
explains that the whole completed canon is the context within which God‟s speech act 
can be determined:  
A text must be read in light of its intentional context, that is, against the 
background that best allows us to answer the question of what the author is doing.  
                                               
427 The term sensus plenior is associated with Raymond Brown, who defines the term as 
“additional meaning…in the words of a biblical text (or group of texts, or even a whole book) when they 
are studied in the light of further revelation or development” (Raymond Brown, The Sensus Plenior of 
Sacred Scripture (Baltimore: St. Mary‟s University, 1955), 92, cited in David M. Williams, Receiving the 
Bible in Faith: Historical and Theological Exegesis (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2004)).  Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in this Text, 313), suggests that the “„fuller sense‟ is in fact 
the literal sense, taken at the level of its thickest description.”  Thus the sensus plenior, for Vanhoozer, 
ends with the closure of the canon.  Vanhoozer‟s chief aim is to protect the codified meaning of the Biblical 
text from human detractors at all costs; hence his articulation of Scripture as God‟s speech act is only a 
secondary emphasis.   
428 Ibid, 265. This position does not deny that God was influential (providentially, 
communicatively, etc.) in the production of the individual texts of Scripture; rather, it only claims that 
God‟s speech act is best understood within the whole canonical context and should be discerned by using 
that whole context—i.e. that all Scripture testifies to Christ.   
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For it is in relation to its intentional context that a text yields its maximal sense, 
its fullest meaning.  If we are reading the Bible as the Word of God, therefore, I 
suggest that the context that yields this maximal sense is the canon taken as a 
unified communicative act.  The books of Scripture, taken individually, may 
anticipate the whole, but the canon alone is its instantiation.
429
   
 
Since this “fuller meaning…emerges only at the level of the whole canon,” 
Vanhoozer argues that the „fuller sense,‟ the „literal sense‟ and the „canonical sense‟ are 
all ways of referring to the same unified, divine speech act of God.
430
 
This movement from human authors to divine authorship proves an extreme 
challenge for Vanhoozer‟s theological general hermeneutics.  Up to this point 
Vanhoozer‟s whole argument has rested on the „hermeneutical imperative,‟ the claim that 
readers have a moral obligation to respect the speech acts of human authors.  Now, 
Vanhoozer must show how God can supervene God‟s own speech act on human speech 
acts in such a way that God does not do interpretive violence to the human authors.  In 
order to show that “[t]he divine intention does not contravene the intention of the human 
author but rather supervenes on it,” Vanhoozer suggests that textual meaning in 
Scripture was indeterminate until the closure of the canon, at which time it became 
determinate.
431
  Using Brevard Childs‟s canonical approach, Vanhoozer claims that “a 
                                               
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid, 264, 313.  The “fuller sense,” for Vanhoozer (ibid, 313), is “the literal sense, taken at 
the level of its thickest description.”  Using this argument, Vanhoozer will argue that the literal sense is the 
canonical sense.  Carrying this argument through in his later work, Vanhoozer writes, “If one takes divine 
authorship of Scripture seriously, then literal interpretation must have recourse to the canonical context, for 
the meaning of the parts is related to the whole of Scripture.  The literal sense of Scripture as intended by 
God is the sense of the canonical act (the communicative act when seen in the context of the canon)” 
(Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Body Piercing, the Natural Sense and the Task of Theological Interpretation," in 
First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 2001)., in First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 292).   
431 Ibid, 265.   
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work‟s potential is its capacity to function in future circumstances, a capacity that for 
Childs is precisely the canonical function.”432  On this account, the individual texts which 
were originally indeterminate in meaning opened beyond themselves so that future 
generations could “provide the descriptive framework within which to understand new 
events.”433  Yet, with the closure of the canon, the indeterminacy of just these texts ended 
as God‟s speech act supervened on them and established the meaning.  Vanhoozer 
explains,  
What this means is that the literal sense—the sense of the literary act—may, at 
times, be indeterminate or open-ended.  However—and this is crucial—the 
indeterminacy we are considering is intended; moreover, it is a definite feature of 
the meaning of the text…If there is a sensus plenior, then, it is on the level of 
God‟s gathering together the various partial and progressive communicative acts 
and purposes of the human authors into one „great canonical Design.‟434 
 
The argument seems to be that God providentially caused the indeterminacy of 
the human speech acts of the texts so that God could establish determinate meaning in 
them with the completion of the canon.
435
  As the canon was closed, those providentially 
indeterminate texts could be recognized as a unified speech act of God, closed with 
regard to meaning.
436
   
                                               
432 Ibid, 313.  Vanhoozer is using Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.  
Tr. Vern W. McGee.  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 4.   
433 Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 313. 
434 Ibid, 314.   
435 Here a distinction again appears between reading Scripture and reading other texts.  
Unfortunately, Vanhoozer provides no distinguishing criteria for reading the Bible differently, except that 
all the books must be read as a canonical whole.   
436 Ibid, 313.  Vanhoozer (ibid), has just used Bakhtin to show that the interpreter must not  
“„enclose‟ the work „within the epoch,‟” yet he appears to do precisely that once the canon itself is closed.   
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This argument seems incompatible with Vanhoozer‟s project for two reasons.  
First, if God was involved providentially in the text in this unique way, then the biblical 
texts simply cannot be read with the same rules as other texts.  Readers must read for 
divine authorial intent often instead of human authorial intent.  In Scripture, God is 
uniquely responsible both for the indeterminacy and the final determinacy of textual 
meaning, and the individual texts must be read in that light.  The previous decision about 
whether one reads to understand God‟s speech acts or the human speech acts in Scripture 
will affect the subsequent method of reading more than Vanhoozer‟s method can account 
for, especially when explaining the use of the Old Testament in the New.
437
  For example, 
Vanhoozer claims that “New Testament testimony does not „spiritualize‟ but „specifies‟” 
the Old Testament reference, so that “Jesus Christ…is the literal referent of biblical 
testimony.”  Vanhoozer argues that the “meaning” of the Old Testament is not changed in 
the New, but that God has “rather rendered its referent—God‟s gracious provision for 
Israel and the world—more specific.”438  It seems Vanhoozer can make this claim only 
by understanding “meaning” and “referent” in a very general sense.439  It is quite difficult 
to preserve the radical newness of Christ while saying that the New Testament is simply a 
                                               
437 Spinks (The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 92), notes that Vanhoozer‟s safeguarding of 
the term “meaning” becomes very difficult to defend as it is extended “from sentence to text to canon while 
all the while maintaining authorial intention, both human and divine.  In other words, Vanhoozer‟s term 
„meaning‟ seems to have to bear a good deal of weight as it moves to incorporate the whole of Scripture.” 
438 Ibid, 423.   
439 And Vanhoozer does exactly that.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 423), claims, “What is of continuing 
relevance across the two Testaments is God‟s promise to create a people for himself and the divine action 
that fulfills that promise.”  It is the covenantal structure, it seems, that is constant, and the final covenant 
specifies the previous.  Of course this is true, but surely the matter is not that simple.  It is doubtful that 
Vanhoozer will be satisfied with this general a concept of meaning when attending carefully to the 
particular genres of Scripture as parts of a speech act.   
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specifying of the textual indeterminacy of the Old Testament.
440
  As we will see in the 
next chapter, de Lubac argues that this is not really a Christian reading of Scripture at all.   
Second, this description of the movement from human to divine authorship causes 
Vanhoozer to land remarkably close to Tracy and Frei in precisely his disregard for the 
significance of the human author.  For Tracy, investigating authorial intent would simply 
be a part of excavating the world behind the text in order to move on to the meaning in 
front of the text.  For Frei, investigating authorial intent is unnecessary because the text is 
sufficiently plain.  By claiming that Scripture is ultimately God‟s speech act, constituted 
as such by God‟s supervening illocutions on the human speech acts, it appears that 
Vanhoozer must say that the speech act of the human author is a means to God‟s speech 
act.  God, the primary author, is able to supervene additional illocutions on the locutions 
of the human author, thus making the text mean something different than the original 
intention of the human author.  It is unclear, then, why interpreters must maintain a quest 
for human authorial intent at all.
441
   
                                               
440 Drawing the now familiar distinction between meaning and significance, Vanhoozer (ibid, 
423), claims, “Significance just is „recontextualized meaning.‟  Just as Jesus Christ recontextualizes the 
meaning of the Old Testament, so the church is called to recontextualize the meaning of Jesus Christ.”  I 
am not sure how this can possibly escape blurring the distinction between progressive revelation and 
interpretation of encoded meaning that Vanhoozer has set up his argument precisely to preserve.   
441 Interestingly, Adonis Vidu notes precisely this difficulty even without adding a quest for 
the divine author.  Vidu argues that if authorial intent means the speech act of the author which is 
sufficiently plain in the text, it is unclear why we must call it authorial intent?  Vidu (Adonis Vidu, "Is 
There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge," Trinity 
Journal 21, no. 2 (2000). 211), writes, “The question which remains to be asked, by way of criticism, is 
whether Vanhoozer doesn‟t too easily collapse the author back into the text…But if the act (the text) tells 
us all we need to know, why bother with the author?  While Vanhoozer succeeds in avoiding to describe 
authorial intention in terms of the psychology of the author, it is not clear whether the author is not merely 
a postulate, perhaps a useless one.”  I would suggest that the tension is greatly heightened when interpreters 
concede that meaning is not located in the human speech acts at all, but in the supervening divine speech 
acts.   
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A Distinctly General Hermeneutic:  After arguing that general hermeneutics 
overshadowed and effectively nullified Ricoeur‟s special hermeneutics, it is somewhat 
surprising that Vanhoozer starts his own Scriptural hermeneutics from a general morality 
of reading.  Besides Vanhoozer‟s occasional emphasis on the uniqueness of Scripture‟s 
subject matter, there appears to be very little difference between Scripture and other 
books.  This ambiguity about the place of special hermeneutics can be illustrated at the 
end of Vanhoozer‟s book, where he summarily claims,  
On the one hand, we should read the Bible like any other text, though due 
consideration must be given to those factors that set it apart (e.g., its divine-
human authorship, its canonical shape, its function as Scripture).  On the other 
hand, we should read every other text with the same theological presuppositions 
that we bring to, and discover through, our study of the Bible.
442
 
 
While the first sentence of this statement highlights some key differences between 
Scripture and other books (namely, uniqueness of authorship, canon, and use in the 
Church), it is Vanhoozer‟s lack of attention to these issues which is most striking 
throughout his early work.
443
  The second sentence of this quote provides a manifesto for 
Vanhoozer‟s theological general hermeneutics, yet it must be asked whether the very 
thesis may be flawed.  Do not Christians turn to Scripture precisely because they bring 
different theological presuppositions to this text?
444
  Overall, the very argument for a 
                                               
442 Ibid, 455-56.   
443 In fact, Vanhoozer (ibid, 4), claims in his 10 year anniversary edition, “To be sure, biblical 
interpretation is a special case (hence the term „special hermeneutics‟), not least because God is uniquely 
involved in the process of composition, canonization, and interpretation.”  These are precisely the issues 
that Vanhoozer has noted but left undeveloped in his early career.  In his later career, Vanhoozer will start 
from these issues and develop them thoroughly.   
444 At the very least, these presuppositions would include a conviction that the illocutions of 
the Author deserve to be heard and responded to in a qualitatively greater way, that the locutions of this 
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theological general hermeneutic appears to be both philosophically and theologically 
problematic.  The attempt is philosophically problematic because writing does not 
summon the ethical response of a reader in quite the way speaking does.  The 
distanciation between author and reader does allow the reader to first decide if she wishes 
to enter the covenant of communication at all.  The covenant of communication operates, 
then, in most written texts, on a previous decision by the reader to enter into that 
covenant.
445
  Further, the attempt is theologically problematic because its attempt to 
establish authority in all texts based on a general moral obligation toward human authors 
actually detracts from the special importance of reading Scripture because it is God‟s 
word.  While it is true that language establishes a structure in which human beings are 
able to interact morally or immorally with one another, Vanhoozer seems to realize that it 
does not necessarily follow that readers are morally obligated to investigate the meaning 
proposals of all authors equally.  In his later work, Vanhoozer will soften his claim to a 
                                                                                                                                            
text were somehow uniquely attended to by the Holy Spirit, and that the perlocutionary efficacy of this text 
is capable of producing different results than other texts.   
445 In this sense, writing does appear to be a different kind of communicative act than 
speaking.  In writing, the author is distanced from the reader so that no direct summons by a speaker to a 
hearer occurs (with the exception of legal documents, which provide the basis for Vanhoozer‟s argument—
see Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 332).  This difficulty may be seen more clearly by putting Vanhoozer 
and Tracy in discussion about other potentially disclosive religious texts, say, the Koran.  Tracy would say 
that the Koran is disclosive in the same way as is the Bible, because each, as a religious text, makes a 
„claim to the whole.‟  Vanhoozer would agree with Tracy that treating the author/text as an „other‟ would 
force readers to genuinely seek understanding (in Vanhoozer‟s case, the locutions and illocutions of the 
author).  Yet Vanhoozer would likely not yield to the claim to the whole in the Koran in the same way he 
yields to the Bible.  Would Vanhoozer, then, be an immoral reader on his own account?  The answer seems 
clear:  Vanhoozer does not think the author of the Koran deserves to be understood or responded to in quite 
the same manner as does the primary author of the Christian Scriptures.  This example clarifies 
Vanhoozer‟s difficulty.  The hermeneutical imperative only works if one first decides that it is important to 
read the author.  Human authors do deserve the respect of readers to adequately identify their locutions and 
illocutions if readers decide to enter that covenant (i.e. if readers choose to say, “The author meant…”, they 
are obligated to correctly identify what the author, in fact, meant).  However, it seems clear that readers 
read for understanding to the level that they believe such understanding matters.  Such a decision of worth 
is not an inherently immoral action toward the author.  Rather, it is the necessarily prior decision to any act 
of interpretation.   
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covenant of communication and propose that language is only “quasi-covenantal,” and 
that what is needed in reading Scripture is a “first theology” which will establish the 
moral demands on readers to read for understanding.   
Pneumatology of all Reading:  One of the most apparent tensions in Vanhoozer‟s 
early work is his insistence that moral reading of all texts is grounded in the activity of 
the Spirit.  This insistence appears incompatible with Vanhoozer‟s project in several 
ways.  First, it works against Vanhoozer‟s overall pneumatology, which seeks to 
associate the work of the Spirit more closely to the biblical text.  Vanhoozer‟s intent has 
been to show how the Spirit‟s activity is tied distinctly to Scripture.  Yet now it appears 
that Vanhoozer must associate the Spirit‟s work with the reading of all texts in 
qualitatively the same way as the Spirit works in Scripture.
446
  It is quite unclear how 
Vanhoozer can simultaneously maintain both the uniqueness of the Spirit‟s work in 
Scripture and the presupposition of the Spirit‟s work in all texts.   
Second, Vanhoozer‟s claim that pneumatology is a grounding presupposition for 
all reading may blur the very distinction between nature and grace that Vanhoozer so 
strongly wishes to maintain.  On this general argument, it remains unclear whether 
Vanhoozer intends the moral reading of any text to be ultimately a matter of nature or of 
grace.  At some points Vanhoozer appears to simply be claiming that Christians have 
better resources for reading general texts which will allow them to read morally (namely, 
                                               
446 One telling sign of Vanhoozer‟s struggle here is to observe how quickly Vanhoozer retreats 
from a general theory of the Spirit‟s work in all texts back to a discussion of the Spirit‟s perlocutionary 
efficacy in Scripture, leaving his explanation of the Spirit‟s work in all other texts undeveloped.  For 
example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 415), appeals to the “renewing of your minds” (Rom. 12:2), as the Spirit‟s help 
to “receiving textual meaning.”  Vanhoozer cannot (morally!) appeal to the authorial intent of Paul to apply 
this transformation to all textual interpretation.   And, in fact, Vanhoozer does not, for his argument simply 
switches back to the transformation brought about by the Spirit‟s perlocutionary effect in Scripture alone. 
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the grounding presupposition that God stands behind all communication).  On this 
account, moral reading is in the realm of nature, although Christians are better prepared 
for moral reading because they presuppose a framework of transcendence.  At other 
points, however, by suggesting that the Spirit grounds all reading, Vanhoozer appears to 
be claiming that all moral reading ultimately participates in the realm of grace.  When the 
reader develops interpretive virtues for reading Homer, he or she is participating in the 
fruit of the Spirit.  It is one thing to say that all texts should be read with the same general 
rules of interpretation as the biblical text.  But it is quite another to say that the Spirit‟s 
effective action operates in all texts as it does in the perlocutionary efficacy of the 
biblical texts.  The latter dismisses the very uniqueness Vanhoozer is attempting to 
establish.   
Third, Vanhoozer‟s early work fails to associate the work of the Spirit with the 
Church in any qualitatively different way than in other institutions.  Vanhoozer claims,  
[T]he Bible is best read in the context of community of disciplined readers…not 
because there is no meaning in the Bible apart from its reception of the Spirit-led 
community, but because the Church is the place where the Spirit cultivates 
righteousness and the willingness to hear the one who leads the community into 
the single correct interpretation: the literal sense
447
.  
 
The Church provides the best context for reading Scripture primarily because it is 
the best context for developing the proper response to Scripture.  This conclusion appears 
                                               
447  Ibid, 415.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 430), does give several reasons in favor of interpreting 
Scripture in the Church: 1. “What reading Scripture in the church does is to provide a context for 
cultivating the interpretive virtues and a conducive environment in which to discern and to do the Word.”  
2. “The church is the community dedicated to discovering the Bible‟s meaning and to attesting its 
continuing significance.”  3. “It is, above all, the significance of Scripture that cannot be discerned apart 
from the receiving, believing community.”  Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the plain sense of all texts can be 
determined sufficiently outside the Church and that all reading is grounded in the influence of the Holy 
Spirit, makes it quite difficult for him to locate the Spirit‟s activity in the Church in any distinct way.   
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to give Vanhoozer the same difficulty that Tracy has faced in explaining the difference 
between reading Scripture within the Church and outside it.  The encounter with the text 
does not appear to be qualitatively different inside and outside the Church—it only 
provides the community of a group of persons who are like-minded and able to formulate 
the correct virtues for reading.  This awkward result appears an inescapable conclusion to 
the claim that meaning is determinate in all texts and that the Spirit underlies the moral 
reading of all texts.  
God‟s Activity in Scripture:  Perhaps the greatest difficulty in Vanhoozer‟s early 
work is in articulating God‟s action in Scripture.  Vanhoozer proposes that the Triune 
God is the backdrop to all human communication, as human communication analogously 
models the action of the Triune God.
448
  Vanhoozer claims, “The thesis underlying the 
present work takes God‟s trinitarian communicative action as the paradigm, not merely 
the illustration, of all genuine message-sending and receiving…The triune God is 
therefore the epitome of communicative agency.”449  It is clear that Vanhoozer wants 
readers to understand that the Triune God is the ground of all communicative action, and 
that the reality of the Trinity establishes the very rules for reading.  Vanhoozer insists, 
therefore, that he is building a truly “theological general hermeneutics” which starts from 
                                               
448 Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 231), specifically claims, “I am advocating a 
Trinitarian hermeneutic for all interpretation.”  Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 161), 
explains that self-communicative action is an attribute both of the immanent Trinity (God is “essentially the 
one who communicates himself to others in trinitarian fashion…In the beginning was the communicative 
act…”) and of the economic Trinity (“The incarnation…grounds the possibility of human communication 
by demonstrating that it is indeed possible to enter into the life of another so as to achieve understanding”). 
449 Ibid, 457.   
 151 
 
a theology of God and moves to hermeneutical theory, rather than a “general 
hermeneutics” which presupposes God as a ground.450     
Despite this persistence, however, it is far from clear that Vanhoozer has actually 
accomplished such a project.  When Vanhoozer explains the role of the Trinity in 
interpretation, he suggests that “The Trinity thus serves the role of what Kant calls a 
„transcendental condition‟: a necessary condition for the possibility of something humans 
experience but cannot otherwise explain, namely, the experience of meaningful 
communication.”451  While God is a “transcendental condition” of communication, it is 
not apparent what the Triune God actually does apart from establishing a (covenantal) 
ground of morality and influencing all readers to read morally.  Vanhoozer‟s early work 
has focused one-sidedly on the necessity of Trinity as a backdrop to human 
communication, neglecting the ongoing economic action of the Trinity in Scripture.
452
  
While God may have providentially brought together the different books of Scripture and 
                                               
450 For example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 456), argues, “I have been at pains not to use the Trinity 
merely as an illustration of a point obtained elsewhere…God somehow „underwrites‟ language and [I] have 
attempted to clarify it from an explicitly Christian point of view.”  Vanhoozer (ibid), argues even more 
insistently that “[t]he Trinity is not merely an illustration of a general intellectual process.  I am not 
beginning with a philosophical framework and saying, „The Trinity is like that.‟  Nor am I using the Trinity 
to justify a particular interpretive approach…” 
451 Ibid, 456, (emphasis his).  
452 Indeed, the thesis of Bowald‟s book may be justified in this statement by Vanhoozer.  
Bowald (Rendering the Word in Theological Hermeneutics, 1-23), has argued that the post-Enlightenment 
tendency in biblical hermeneutics is to understand God‟s action in Scripture in much the same way Kant 
has defined a “notional judgment”:  a piece of knowledge we need to conduct investigations, but which 
does not affect the process of investigation.  Hence while terms like “inspiration,” “infallibility,” 
“inerrancy” may be necessary backdrops for Biblical studies, they do not affect the process of “operational 
judgments”—those which influence the process of reasoning.  Vanhoozer appears here to use the 
communicative action of “Trinity” in the same way—it is a necessary backdrop for human communication, 
but does not affect the process of humans communicating.   
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supervened illocutions on them at the level of the canon, it is still unclear what special 
consequence God‟s authorship of Scripture may have on the process of reading today.453   
Conclusion:  The early Vanhoozer‟s contribution to the debate between Tracy and 
Frei appears to be one of instructive failure rather than providing a helpful alternative.  
The tensions mentioned above appear to be the inevitable result of attempting to ground a 
reading of all texts and a reading of Scripture on the same theological presuppositions.  
Simply changing the philosophical tools from theories such as the New Criticism (as 
Frei) or phenomenology (as Tracy) to speech-act theory (as Vanhoozer) does not ease the 
tensions in Scriptural hermeneutics when only the relationship between text and reader is 
developed.  Instead, the whole discussion of Scriptural interpretation must be placed in a 
broader context which includes God‟s use of Scripture to the Church, as well as the role 
of the Church in receiving Scripture.  Fortunately for Vanhoozer, the difficulties inherent 
in his early approach will cause him to develop this broader context during his later work.   
B.  Vanhoozer‟s Later Work: Starting from God as Self-Communicative Act  
 
In his later work, Vanhoozer specifically claims that his first work failed to 
adequately appreciate the uniqueness of Scripture since he did not adequately show that 
“God is involved in the production and reception of the Bible in a way that is so 
qualitatively different that it makes of biblical interpretation a special case.”454  
Vanhoozer‟s 2001 book, First Theology, marks a distinctly new trajectory in his 
                                               
453 Bowald (ibid, 65), claims that with regard to Scripture, “There is still no clear indication 
for how the actual influence or participation of God‟s speech action occurs with human speech action.”   
454 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 4. 
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hermeneutical approach.
455
  Vanhoozer has taken the idea of First Theology from David 
Kelsey, and summarizes it in this way:  
[T]he way Scripture functions authoritatively in theology is inseparable from a 
view of God, an inseparability that I call „first theology‟; [and] one‟s first 
theology invariably involves an „imaginative construal,‟ a decision to take the 
Bible as something or other based on our discernment of how God relates to the 
community of readers via Scripture.
456
   
 
Vanhoozer argues that an “imaginary construal” about what Scripture is will 
determine how Scripture is to be read.  This “first theology” now forms a starting point 
for all Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutics, and allows Vanhoozer to locate Scripture more 
precisely in the economy of redemption.  Rather than focusing almost exclusively on 
epistemological concerns like meaning and literary theory, Vanhoozer now focuses on 
the way in which the triune God has graciously used Scripture to call and sanctify a 
people in covenant relationship.  Whereas Vanhoozer previously explained interpretation 
as a morally responsible quest for the (human) author‟s meaning, he now claims that “the 
interpretation of Scripture is the means by which human discourse participates in the 
„strange new world of the Bible‟—the divine discourse of the blessed Trinity.”457  
Interpretation, then, is a response to and participation in the triune God.   
                                               
455 Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2002).  This book is composed mostly of articles which range throughout the 1990‟s, 
and hence are of little use in illustrating Vanhoozer‟s new focus.  Vanhoozer‟s introduction to the book, pp. 
15-44 is the most helpful in showing his new trajectory in thought.   
456 Vanhoozer, "The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 192.  See David H. Kelsey 
(The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 159), who claims that prior 
to the theologian‟s use of Scripture stands “a decision a theologian must make about the point of engaging 
in the activity of doing theology, a decision about what is the subject matter of theology.  And that is 
determined…by the way in which he tries to catch up what Christianity is basically all about in a single, 
synoptic, imaginative judgment.” 
457 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 80. 
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This First Theology helps press Vanhoozer to broaden the discussion of 
hermeneutics to include an articulation of the relationship between God, Scripture, and 
the Church.  Vanhoozer‟s most recent book, Remythologizing Theology, sets forth an 
ontology of the economy of redemption.  There Vanhoozer writes,  
[Remythologizing theology] is a way of viewing God, Scripture, and 
hermeneutics in terms of their mutual implications, all coordinated by the notion 
of communicative action: the triune God is the ultimate communicative agent of 
Scripture; Scripture is an element in the triune God‟s communicative action; 
interpretation is the way the church demonstrates her understanding of what God 
is saying and doing in and through Scripture by right theodramatic 
participation.
458
  
 
This refocusing of the discussion specifically on the economy of redemption 
allows Vanhoozer to make a substantive contribution to Scriptural hermeneutics which 
will move beyond the debate between Frei and Tracy.  God will now be understood not 
simply as the necessary ground for all human communicative acts, but as Pure, Triune 
self-communicative Act who extends communication to human beings uniquely through 
Christ and Scripture.  It is now specifically the doctrine of God which establishes the 
roles that Scripture and the interpretive community have in the divine economy.  
As a doctrine of God now uniquely grounds his hermeneutics of Scripture, 
Vanhoozer simultaneously softens his use of speech-act theory so that it is clear he is 
beginning with the Trinitarian theology rather than speech-act theory to build an 
argument that God, both in essence and in Personal relations, is communicative.  
Vanhoozer‟s later claim is that,   
                                               
458 Ibid, 30. 
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God is the communicator, communication, and communicatedness.  The triune 
God is the agent, act, and effect of his own self-communication.  As Voice, the 
Father is the speaking subject who initiates the process of communication.  As 
Word, the Son is what the Father speaks, the content of the communicative act.  
As the Breath that accompanies and conveys the Father‟s Word, the Spirit is the 
channel or medium of the communicative act as well as its efficacy.
459
  
  
Vanhoozer now begins his hermeneutical project specifically from an 
understanding of the Trinity and attempts to work out the implications of the doctrine of 
God for hermeneutics, rather than starting with rules for reading and grounding them in 
the doctrine of the Trinity.  Speech-act theory is still the philosophical tool of choice, but 
the priority of Trinitarian doctrine over philosophical concepts has been established.  
Vanhoozer‟s later project is characterized by two moves: the attempt to develop an 
ontology of God as Pure Communicative Action, and an attempt to demonstrate that God 
should be considered Author of Scripture.  Both steps will require a discussion of God‟s 
use of the Scriptural texts and the role of these texts in the Church.   
1.  Developing an Ontology of Communicative Action 
 
In Remythologizing Theology, Vanhoozer moves beyond hermeneutics to a 
theological explanation of God which will advance theology proper.
460
  Observing that 
                                               
459 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 261.  Bowald, 67, nt. 79, suggests that Vanhoozer 
gradually moves from a strict dependence on speech act theory to an ancillary use of this philosophical 
method in describing God.   
460 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology.  (The basis for this book appears in a 2001 article 
by Vanhoozer, entitled, "The Love of God: Its Place, Meaning and Function in Systematic Theology," in 
First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 71-95.)  
Vanhoozer realizes that theological hermeneutics will never be an extremely helpful movement for 
Christian theology until it can enhance articulation of the nature of God as well as God‟s relation to 
Scripture.  Vanhoozer, (Remythologizing Theology, xiv), claims, “The recent interest in theological 
hermeneutics, together with the church‟s recovery of the practice of interpreting the Bible in the context of 
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recent theologians have said much about God‟s self-communication, Vanhoozer finds it 
surprising that very few have actually explained what self-communication means.
461
  To 
fill this theological void, Vanhoozer attempts to set forth a “communicative ontology 
(i.e., a set of concepts with which to speak of God-in-communicative-action).”462  This 
program of communicative ontology has several emphases:  First, while Vanhoozer 
argues that Christian theology cannot abandon a holistic system for understanding reality, 
he is insistent that such a holistic quest must start from God‟s self-revelation in Christ 
and Scripture rather than from some predetermined system of truth.
463
  Second, 
Vanhoozer insists that metaphysics should not begin with a system of causality but by 
understanding God as Pure communicative action.
464
  Vanhoozer‟s unique contribution is 
to unite these insights into a constructive proposal.   
Post-Barthian Thomism: Describing himself as a “post-Barthian Thomist,” 
Vanhoozer suggests that Aquinas‟s metaphysical system can best be employed today 
                                                                                                                                            
God‟s triune activity, welcome though these be, must be matched by an equal attention to the nature of the 
God of whose communicative activity the Bible is an ingredient.” 
461 Vanhoozer (ibid, xiii), claims, “Western theologians as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, John 
Owen, Karl Rahner, and Karl Barth freely employ the notions of communication and self-communication 
in the contexts of divine revelation and/or redemption, yet usually without explicit analysis.  Finally, few 
theologians have made use of the available linguistic, philosophical, literary, and rhetorical resources 
conceptually to elaborate the nature of God‟s communicative action.”  
462 Ibid, xv. 
463 Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 199), believes Barth was correct in his emphasis 
that any ontology of God must be based (a posteriori) on God‟s own self-revelation in Jesus Christ, and 
only from there move to philosophy.  Yet Vanhoozer (ibid, 217), suggests that “faith that stops its search 
for understanding short of ontology risks falling back into mere mythologizing.  By contrast, 
remythologizing renews and revitalizes…by letting Scripture serve as our primary interpretative 
framework.”   
464 Vanhoozer (ibid, 217), believes Aquinas was correct in his emphasis that “being is not a 
static substance but a dynamic, existential act,” and that this revised ontology will call for a more modest 
metaphysics of God as Being-as-self-communicative-action which starts from God‟s self-revelation rather 
than God as First Cause which starts from a system of philosophical logic. 
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after it has been chastened by Barth‟s priority of revelation over reason.  465  The most 
important “Barthian anxiety” is Barth‟s insistence on Christology as the starting point for 
God‟s self-communication.466  Vanhoozer will develop his program using Aquinas‟s 
conception of God as Pure Act, and Barth‟s focus on God‟s self-communication.     
Vanhoozer agrees with Aquinas‟s description of God‟s Being as Pure Act.  
However, Vanhoozer wishes to emphasize that communication instead of causality is the 
proper starting point for metaphysics.  In shifting emphasis from communication to 
causality, Vanhoozer intends to “bring out a communicative sense to which the church 
has not sufficiently attended.”467  Vanhoozer begins by agreeing with Aquinas‟s claim 
that to be is to act, as well as W. Norris Clarke‟s claim that “Action is the self-revelation 
of being; every being, insofar as it is in act, is self-communicative.”468  This brings Barth 
and Aquinas very close, since Barth attempted to overcome an idea of God as perfect 
being by beginning with God as act.  This initial correlation of God‟s being with God‟s 
action allows Vanhoozer to move from God‟s action to God‟s self-communication.  To 
be is to act and to act is to communicate.  Following Clarke, Vanhoozer claims that “it is 
                                               
465 Vanhoozer (ibid, 222), claims that remythologizing “has Thomistic ambitions yet is 
tempered by Barthian anxieties: we begin with faith in revealed truth and proceed to reason, sometimes 
with the aid of philosophical concepts.”  Vanhoozer will follow a form of Aquinas‟s metaphysics and 
Barth‟s Christology.  Vanhoozer‟s claim to be a “post-Barthian Thomist” has taken its cue from Ricoeur‟s 
claim to be a “post-Hegelian Kantian” (See Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 1975).    
466 As Vanhoozer sees it (Remythologizing Theology, 222), the key difference between 
Aquinas and Barth is that “Aquinas asks what God the creator must be given the existence of creation while 
Barth asks what God must be given the history of Jesus Christ.”  The other noted difference is that 
“Aquinas employs a single conceptual scheme, that of Aristotle, while Barth is more eclectic” (222).   
467 Ibid, 28 (see thesis 4 and n. 109, respectively).  Vanhoozer stresses that he does not wish to 
entirely dismiss the notion of God as cause; rather, he wants to personalize the notion.   
468 See Ibid, 24-25, citing William Norris Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, 
Person (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 37. 
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the very nature of real being…to pour over into action that is self-revealing and self-
communicative.”469  Vanhoozer further follows Clarke‟s suggestion that “All action is 
communication, and all communication is action.”470  In other words, Being-in-action 
always is Being-in-communication.
471
  As a result, for Vanhoozer, „Being-as-Pure-Act‟ is 
„Being-as-Pure-Communicative-Act.‟   
Vanhoozer sees his own project as an advancement of “Barth‟s unfinished task of 
rethinking God‟s being on the basis of his revelation in „word‟ and „act.‟”472  The way to 
finish Barth‟s project, Vanhoozer feels, is to “includ[e] other instances of divine speaking 
and acting alongside the Incarnation.”473  Practically, this means Scripture must be 
included in the economy of God‟s speaking and acting.  The contents of the biblical texts, 
as well as the diverse forms in which they are recorded, ought to be seen as “part of a 
                                               
469 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 224, citing William Norris Clarke, The One and 
the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (South Bend: University of Notre Dame, 2001), 32.   
470 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 224, citing Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics, 9.  
Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 225), cites Clarke (Explorations in Metaphysics, 215) who claims 
that being as “intrinsically self-communicative” is “one of the few great fundamental insights in the history 
of metaphysics.”  
471 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 225.  Human persons are the best example of this, 
because persons are most authentically „being‟ as they are self-communicative.  Humans only analogously 
reflect the personhood of God.  Thus Vanhoozer (ibid, 207), claims, “God is God in large part because his 
communicative capacity far outstrips that of humans.  In particular, God has the ability to „communicate‟ 
his own life to others, through Word and Spirit, thereby establishing communion and fulfilling his word…”  
472 Ibid, 31. 
473 Ibid, 207.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 207), feels that “Barth unnecessarily delimits the set of divine 
communicative acts by making divine ontology a function of the incarnate life of Jesus alone.”  On Barth‟s 
account, since God is God‟s self-revelation, Scripture cannot be considered God‟s self-communication, lest 
God be identified with Scripture (Bibliolatry).  Vanhoozer (ibid, 211), responds that Barth, in equating 
revelation only with the event of Jesus Christ, may “overlook other things that speakers do with their 
words…It is not clear on Barth‟s account how God can do the things the Bible depicts him as doing (i.e., 
commanding, warning, promising) if he is not the agent of properly verbal communicative acts as well as of 
the revelatory act of incarnation.”  Speech act theory, then, provides Vanhoozer with resources to describe 
God as a properly speaking agent, and one who is able to speak in Scripture. 
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prior economy of divine self-projection.”474  As a result, to remythologize theology is “to 
put our discourse of what is under the discipline of the biblical accounts of God‟s 
speaking and acting.”475  Remythologizing means “rendering explicit the implicit 
„metaphysics‟ of the biblical mythos.  Its aim is to let the biblical texts govern one‟s 
understanding of being, not to deploy an independently derived concept of being to 
govern one‟s reading of the biblical texts.”476  Thus Vanhoozer‟s goal in remythologizing 
is to “deploy metaphysical categories…for the sake of a project that is ultimately 
governed by the biblical accounts of God‟s self-presentation in speech and act.”477   
Remythologizing from Scripture: The project of remythologizing theology can be 
best understood in contrast to the post-Enlightenment tendency to demythologize God‟s 
communicative acts.
478
  Demythologizing is generally defined by Vanhoozer as “a 
strategy for translating biblical statements about God into existential statements about 
human being.”479  This action does not respect the covenant of communication, but looks 
behind the particular genre to find the kernel of truth.
480
  It is this quality of projection 
                                               
474 Ibid, 197.   
475 Ibid, 182. 
476 Ibid, 183.   
477 Ibid, 223.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 220), describes the choice before theologians in his familiar 
either/or construal:  “Should theologians derive their understanding of actus from God‟s communicative 
action or should they understand God‟s communicative action against the background of an independently 
derived general conception of being-in-act?  Put differently: is theology merely a regional instance of a 
general metaphysic?” 
478 Vanhoozer (ibid, 30), claims that “remythologizing is best defined in contrast to 
demythologizing as a type of first theology.” 
479 Ibid, 15.   
480 Vanhoozer (ibid, 16-20), uses Bultmann and Feuerbach as interlocutors in order to contrast 
his own project of remythologizing with their project of demythologizing.  Bultmann is described as a 
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(allowing existential concerns to dictate language about God), which remythologizing 
seeks to challenge.
481
   
Remythologizing Scripture means articulating an ontology that proceeds from 
God‟s self-communicative action in Scripture rather than first configuring a metaphysics 
into which God and Scripture are placed.  Vanhoozer suggests that the goal of his project 
is “not ontotheology but theo-ontology, not general but special (remythologized, 
biblically governed) metaphysics.”482  Ontotheology (a “unified system of thought that 
employs concepts such as Supreme Being or Unmoved Mover as conceptual stopgaps to 
prevent infinite metaphysical regress”)483 must be expelled and replaced by “theo-
ontology” (“A „theodramatic‟ metaphysics [which] provides a systematic account of the 
categories needed to describe what God has said and done to renew all things in Jesus 
                                                                                                                                            
“soft” demythologizer because he insists that God still “encounters” the believer, in his/her “inner life,” 
while Feuerbach is a “hard” demythologizer, in that everything said about God is merely the projection of 
the ideal self.  Hence, “On [Feuerbach‟s] view, the secret of reading is authoring: what appears to be the 
creation of an author—meaning—is actually the invention (projection) of the reader.” 
481 Interpreters should not read Vanhoozer‟s project in Remythologizing Theology as a 
referendum on most of contemporary theology any more than Drama of Doctrine was designed to be a 
referendum on all aspects of postliberal theology, or Is There a Meaning in this Text? was designed to be a 
referendum on the whole of postmodern interpretive method.  In all three books, Vanhoozer is simply 
pointing out a feature of contemporary method that he feels is leading theology in a harmful direction.  
Vanhoozer‟s use of Feuerbach as paradigmatic demythologizer is not to associate contemporary revisionist 
theologians with Feuerbach as much as it is to apply a lesson learned from Feuerbach to contemporary 
theology:  any speech about God that starts from our own experience rather than God‟s self-communication 
has the potential to lead us away from what God has, in fact, communicated about Godself.  Vanhoozer is, 
then, highlighting the difference between two trajectories, the trajectory of demythologizing (represented 
by Feuerbach and Bultmann), and the trajectory of remythologizing (uncompleted by Barth, approached by 
Ricoeur, and advanced by Vanhoozer). 
482 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 222.   
483 Ibid, 8.  Ontotheology is also defined by Vanhoozer (ibid, 8), as a “unified system” 
developed “from below” which projects God as the greatest Being in our conceptual schema.  
Ontotheology arises from “totalizing” metaphysics, the “underlying assumption that there is one set of 
categories, accessible to unaided human reason, which applies both to the world and to God, created and 
uncreated reality.” 
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Christ through the Holy Spirit.”)484  Ontotheology is “bad” metaphysics because it 
“imposes a system of categories on God without attending to God‟s own self-
communication,” and must be replaced by a “good” metaphysics of theo-ontology, which 
is a “descriptive metaphysics,” which “derives its system of categories from the train of 
God‟s own communicative action (i.e., theodrama).”485  The goal, then, is to allow 
Scripture to form the foundation for understanding all reality by understanding Scripture 
as God‟s “communicative agency.”486   
Because Scripture is the self-communication of God, all literary forms are used by 
God for self-communication.  Vanhoozer claims,  
If God‟s activity is best construed in terms of triune communicative agency, then 
it behooves us to attend to the concrete manner in which God „projects‟ his own 
story.  Hence my thesis:  the mythos of the Bible—the Christological content and 
canonical form—is the written means of God‟s triune self-presentation.  In a 
word, the mythos is the medium (and the message).
487
   
 
Remythologizing means respecting the communicative act as it appears in a 
particular genre, because in doing so one is respecting the God who exists as Pure 
Communicative Act.  From God‟s own “rainbow of divine communicative acts” given in 
                                               
484 Ibid, 222. 
485 Ibid, 8, n. 27.   
486 Ibid, 24. 
487 Ibid, 11.  Vanhoozer‟s use of mythos is central to the argument of the book.  Mythos, 
originally Aristotle‟s term for dramatic plot, is defined by Vanhoozer (ibid, 5-6), as a “unified course of 
action that includes a beginning, middle, and end,” a “mode of discourse that configures human action so as 
to create a form of wholeness (i.e., a unified action) out of a multiplicity of incidents.”  Mythos is the 
narrative figuring of events into a whole system of meaning.  By beginning with mythos, Vanhoozer places 
himself in the narrative tradition and claims he is in continuity with both Frei‟s “realistic narrative” and 
Ricoeur‟s “configuring mimesis.”  Yet Vanhoozer (ibid, 7), extends mythos beyond Ricoeur‟s use (and 
Frei‟s narrative) by using it to “refer to all the ways in which diverse forms of biblical literature represent, 
and render, the divine drama.”  As a result, all of Scripture will be God‟s self-revealing mimesis. 
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the various genres of Scripture,
488
 Vanhoozer proposes that readers should read Scripture 
with the presupposition of God as pure self-communicative Act.  As a result, Vanhoozer 
believes that God‟s revelation in Scripture can itself be the basis for a holistic system of 
understanding the Christian life in such a way that critical correlation is not needed.   
2.  Establishing Divine Authorship of Scripture 
 
The foundation for Vanhoozer‟s understanding of Scripture is what he calls the 
“Scripture Principle,” the Christian preunderstanding that the Bible is, in fact, the Word 
of God.
489
  This Scripture Principle seems grounded in the phenomenological and 
traditional observation that the Church does, in fact, recognize Scripture as the Word of 
God.
490
  As we have seen, in Vanhoozer‟s early writings, he struggled to move from 
human authorship of Scripture to divine authorship.  In his later work, Vanhoozer builds 
an argument for divine authorship as he seeks to clarify just how God is the primary 
speaker/author in these unique texts.  Vanhoozer‟s argument for divine authorship can be 
systematized into several steps.   
                                               
488 Vanhoozer, "First Theology: Meditations in a Postmodern Toolshed," in First Theology: 
God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 35. 
489 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 63-68), claims, “Theology‟s first principle is God in 
communicative action,” and the “Scripture principle maintains that the Bible itself is ultimately a species of 
divine discourse.”  This is said to be held by the early Church, and is grounded theologically in the concept 
of God‟s covenant communication.  
490 Vanhoozer (ibid, 205), claims, “The church has traditionally acknowledged the Bible‟s 
self-attestation as the word of God.  It follows that the various biblical texts are forms of divine discourse 
and should thus be counted as figuring among the divine repertoire of communicative action.”  Vanhoozer 
("The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 197), argues that the practice of the Church is the 
primary reason Scripture should be understood as God‟s word.  There he claims, “Suffice it to say that the 
church has taken the apostolic discourse as authoritative precisely because it communicates the word of 
God.” 
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God Can and Did Speak in Scripture: The first step in articulating how God is 
author of Scripture is to emphasize that God can and does communicate with human 
beings.  For Vanhoozer, affirming that God can speak is part of the essence of the 
Christian faith.
491
  God‟s communicative acts, of course, are analogous to human speech 
acts, although for communication to take place God must use symbols which are able to 
truly communicate.
492
  In contrast to those who think that symbols about God are merely 
human symbols, Vanhoozer feels that the Christian faith depends on God‟s actually 
taking up human symbols and using them for communicative purposes.  For God to act in 
the public sphere (i.e. in the economy of redemption), God must be able to perform 
speech acts, i.e. to communicate himself and take up illocutionary stances in the public 
realm.
493
  Hence Vanhoozer suggests that, “A great deal of God‟s communicative work, 
perhaps more than has hitherto been appreciated, involves language, the most 
sophisticated medium of discourse.”494  If God truly desired to communicate to human 
                                               
491 Vanhoozer (Ibid, 206), claims, “From the fact that God dialogues with human beings we 
may infer at the very least that he has the capacity to communicate.  From the incarnation of the Word we 
may further conclude that God has the capacity to communicate himself.  God‟s presence is thus in the first 
instance personal, agential, and communicative rather than merely spatial, substantive, or metaphysical.” 
492 Vanhoozer (ibid, 212), defines communication as “interaction by means of mutually 
recognized signals,” and “manipulation of symbols by one person to stimulate meaning in another person,” 
or “social interaction through messages.”  Vanhoozer (ibid, 210), specifies, “It is not self-evident that 
„employing vocal cords‟ is an essential element in acting… it is entirely possible that God could achieve 
fundamentally the same result by other means.”  Vanhoozer introduces the distinction between “mode of 
action” and the “action done” to show that God can perform the same action, although in a different way.  
Vanhoozer (ibid, 210-11), notes, “It is therefore legitimate to say „God (literally) speaks‟ (because he 
performs communicative acts via words, which is what „speaking‟ ordinarily means) even though „speaks‟ 
is not being used univocally with regard to God and human beings (because the mode of God‟s speaking 
may be extraordinary).” 
493 Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 210), heightens the intensity of this claim by 
arguing, “The stakes could not be higher: to the extent that one refuses to ascribe specific (communicative) 
acts to God‟s personal agency, one revises what the Bible and Christian faith are primarily about.”   
494 Ibid, 277. 
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beings, and yet failed to perform the most fundamental of all communicative acts, i.e. 
speaking, humans could hardly assume that God had desired to communicate.   
Yet even if God is able to communicate through human symbols, Vanhoozer must 
go further to show why the Church should think that God did, in fact, speak in Scripture.  
Vanhoozer‟s next argument is that God‟s revelatory action in the world must be backed 
up by explanatory communication or else it would remain too ambiguous to be useful.  
Vanhoozer argues that, “Without an event of divine speaking, we are unable to say either 
who is acting or what this person is up to: „behavior unaccompanied by speech remains 
inherently ambiguous.‟”495  Apparently, for Vanhoozer, all “revelatory” acts performed 
by God require God‟s speech acts to accompany them.  When God acts in a decisive 
(revelatory) way, God will also provide a speech act (Scripture) to explain the action.  
The Church, in turn, has recognized the Scriptures as just this adequate and authoritative 
explanation of God‟s interaction in the human sphere.  
God as Author of Scripture:  At this point, having moved from a defense that God 
can speak to an argument that God must have spoken in Scripture, Vanhoozer can move 
to his crucial argument that God should be considered author of Scripture.  For 
Vanhoozer, the claim that God is author of Scripture and the claim that Scripture is 
authoritative over the Church stand or fall together.
496
  Vanhoozer defines authorship as 
                                               
495 Ibid, 209.  Here Vanhoozer is citing Basil Mitchell, „Revelation Revisited,‟ in Sarah 
Coakley and David A. Palin (eds.), The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in Honour of 
Maurice Wiles (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 182.  See also Vanhoozer‟s claim, 
(Remythologizing Theology, 213), “Only speech disambiguates behavior.  Only God‟s word disambiguates 
God‟s deed.” 
496 Vanhoozer, (The Drama of Doctrine, 64), writes that “the Bible is Scripture—the 
authoritative Word of God—precisely because it is a word for which God assumes the rights and 
responsibilities of authorship.  The church‟s script is ultimately a matter of divine discourse.”  (See also 
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“a convenient shorthand for the notion of verbal communicative action” in general,497 
although the term “verbal” is much broader than simply human words.  When applied to 
God, “„Authoring‟ covers what God does as creator, reconciler, redeemer, and perfecter, 
and so serves as a metaphor for the economic Trinity as well: the Father „authors‟ in 
Christ through the Spirit.”498  God is even the “author” of God‟s own Being.499  At this 
point, the role which the concept of authorship plays in Vanhoozer‟s system becomes 
clear: authorship is a broad description for God‟s self-communicating action.  The 
advantage of attributing authorship to God is that it provides a way of explaining “God‟s 
relation to the world, and to Scripture, in terms of an „economy of communication,‟” 
which, in turn, “enables us to better conceive…the absolute distinction between Creator 
and creation.”500  The economy of redemption is best called an economy of 
communication, as Vanhoozer feels many theologians have implicitly suggested.
501
  
Since “redemption entails revelation,” and hence self-communication, “The canon is a 
rule and criterion… precisely because of its place in the divine economy of 
                                                                                                                                            
Vanhoozer, (ibid, 179):  “In sum: it is the divine illocutions—God‟s use—that constitute biblical authority” 
and Vanhoozer, (ibid, 63): “It is not enough to begin simply with the sensus literalis (the Bible read like 
any other book), nor with a sensus divinitatis, nor with a sensus fidelium.  No; the first principle we require 
is a sensus scripturalis; the sense that the Bible is „of God‟ and hence authoritative for the Church.”)   
497 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, xiii. 
498 Ibid, 26.   
499 Ibid, 206. 
500 Ibid, 26. 
501 Vanhoozer (ibid, xiii), refers especially to  Aquinas, Rahner, and Barth.   
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redemption.”502   Here it becomes clear that Vanhoozer‟s argument about authorship is 
really an explanation of God‟s action and the role of Scripture in the divine economy.   
Scripture as Covenant Document:  In the end, though, it is the theological concept 
of covenant which does most of the heavy lifting in establishing an argument that God is 
author of Scripture.
503
  Vanhoozer‟s basic claim is that “the Bible is a divine 
communicative act that exists for the sake of covenantal relations.”504  When establishing 
covenant, God always “takes the communicative initiative to enter into covenantal 
relation,” and “this covenant-making involves both oral and written communicative acts 
on God‟s part.”505  This is the final step in showing that God is author of Scripture, 
because Vanhoozer can now show what kind of speech act Scripture ultimately is.  Now 
Vanhoozer can summarily say, “Scripture is triune discourse: something (covenantal) 
someone (Father, Son and Spirit) says to someone (the church) about something (life with 
God).”506   
As covenant document, the text, as a canonical whole, must be understood to be a 
unified speech act of God.  The Christian must enter the interpretive process 
understanding that “inspired Scripture” is “the discourse therefore of one single 
                                               
502 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 147.   
503 While Vanhoozer uses speech act theory to show how God can be considered a speaker, 
and hence an author, Vanhoozer realizes that he needs a theological argument, not simply a philosophical 
construct, to show that the Scriptures should be granted authority as God‟s speech act.  Vanhoozer unites 
the theological concept of covenant with speech act theory to show that covenant is a kind of speech act.  
Vanhoozer (ibid, 64), appeals to J.L. Austin, who “listed „making a covenant‟ as one of the things we do 
with words: „Our word is our bond.‟”  (See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
MA:  Harvard University Press, 1975), 10.)   
504 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 68.     
505 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 263.  
506 Ibid, 64.   
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speaker…a single body of discourse, which serves the consistent purpose of a single 
authoritative agent.”507  If Scripture is a document of covenant, God must be the primary 
speaker, and the words must be considered to be God‟s own communication.  
Vanhoozer, in opposition to Barth, argues that because God enters into real 
obligation to humanity through Scripture, Scripture must be equated with revelation.
508
  
The real obligation between God and human beings occurs because “[t]o covenant is to 
enter into a personal relationship structured by divine promises to behave in certain ways 
and to do certain things.”509  In every covenant recorded in Scripture, Vanhoozer claims, 
“The words…were the communicative medium by which the people approached God and 
vice versa, so much so that to engage the words of Scripture is to engage God in 
communicative action.”510  Understanding Scripture God‟s covenantal stance in the 
public sphere is qualitatively different from understanding Scripture as a witness to God‟s 
                                               
507 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 231.   
508 Vanhoozer‟s discussion of the canon as God‟s communicative covenant document takes 
place in dialogue with Barth, who had argued that Scripture cannot be God‟s word because God‟s freedom 
cannot be tied to human language.  Vanhoozer responds that if Barth had started from the assumption that 
the Bible is the document preserving God‟s covenant with human beings, Barth would likely not have 
difficulty accepting that God could, in freedom, enter into obligation with human beings by extending 
God‟s self-communication to the Bible.  Vanhoozer‟s argument (ibid, 136-40) against Barth runs like this:  
First, God can enter a covenant only by communicative action (136).  Second, the canon is the 
documentation of these covenantal initiatives, it “„documents‟ our covenantal privileges and 
responsibilities” (137).  Third, the canon was completed because the new covenant needed a written, 
binding witness (138).  Fourth, God still ministers the covenant today through the Scriptures (139).  Fifth, 
the canon constitutes the community with whom God has committed Godself to covenant relationship 
(140).  These five points together build a strong case that God indeed could bind his freedom to human 
communicative acts in Scripture.   
509 Ibid, 136.   
510 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 263.  Vanhoozer ("Triune Discourse: Theological 
Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Part 2)," in Trinitarian Theology for the Church: Scripture, 
Community, Worship, ed. Daniel J. and David Lauber Treier (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 
65), claims, “The Bible is the God-ordained means of communicating the terms and the reality of the 
covenant whose content is Jesus Christ.  The Son is both the promise of God and the obedient response of 
humanity.” 
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actions in history.  Scripture, then, cannot be considered simply a witness to revelation, 
but must, in fact, be revelation.   
Vanhoozer‟s use of covenant in his later work is significantly different from his 
earlier construction.  In his early work, Vanhoozer argued that precisely because all 
language is covenantal, Scripture imposes a demand on its readers to read to understand 
the intentions of its human authors.  Now, Vanhoozer significantly softens this argument, 
claiming, “While discourse in general creates a quasi-covenantal situation inasmuch as 
speakers and hearers assume certain obligations in the process of communicating, this is 
particularly the case when the discourse is explicitly covenantal.”511  While language does 
create a structure of rights and obligations, it is precisely because God has authored 
Scripture for use as the covenant document in the economy of redemption that Scripture 
has authority in the Church.  This change from all language as covenantal to God‟s 
unique use of Scripture as a covenant document, in turn, establishes the authority of text 
over the Church.
512
  Since Scripture is a document of covenant, Scripture can even be 
said to constitute the Church, just as in all covenants God called and constituted a people 
for relationship.
513
     
                                               
511 Ibid, 67.   
512 Thus Vanhoozer (ibid, 133), claims, “The most important reason for doing theology in 
accord with the canon, then, is that Scripture is a divine covenant document before it is an ecclesial 
constitution.”  The concept of covenant provides, for Vanhoozer, the single greatest reason why divine 
authorial intent in Scripture must not be dismissed.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 139), claims, “The origin (and hence 
the authority) of the canonical Scriptures is thus far removed from that of human constitutions.  
Constitutions can be amended; not so the canonical covenant.”      
513 Vanhoozer, (ibid, 135), claims, “It is the divine drama—the communicative action of the 
triune God creating and covenanting with what is other than God—that gives rise to the church, and not 
vice versa…” 
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Scripture as God‟s Unified Speech-Act:  Genres are, for Vanhoozer, the key to 
proposing determinate meaning in the text, as they provide the form in which the 
„covenant of communication‟ takes place.514  Genres are the common literary structure by 
which communication is possible, and God enters into precisely this human structure to 
extend covenant to human beings.  Literary forms, for Vanhoozer, “are the indispensable 
means of conforming our minds to the „divine genius‟ of Scripture.  For the way God 
communicates, and the point of view that gets communicated, „is as much part of the 
story as the events it tells.‟”515  Both form and content are essential “elements in the 
divine drama of revelation and redemption,” as God has used just these forms (genres) to 
communicate just this message (Christ) to just this covenant people (the Church).
516
  
Ultimately, God‟s communicative action in Scripture is that of “offering a theologically 
thick description of Jesus Christ” and bringing believers to be covenantally incorporated 
into him.
517
  Yet this “thick description” requires God‟s use of many genres, as each 
genre provides an aspect of God‟s testimony about Christ.518  The theological concept of 
                                               
514 Adonis Vidu ("Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality 
of Literary Knowledge," Trinity Journal 21, no. 2 (2000), 211-12), claims that for Vanhoozer, “Genres are 
essential to Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutics because they provide the key to the illocutionary aspect of the 
literary act.  One of Derrida‟s charges against determinate meaning is that each text becomes 
decontextualized by its being fixed in writing.  The text therefore floats from one context to another, 
missing any anchor for its meaning.  However, if Vanhoozer is right, genre creates a shared literary context, 
the context of a practice with its history and virtues.  What writing pulls asunder, genre joins together.” 
515 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 190. 
516 Vanhoozer, "The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 194.   
517 Vanhoozer (ibid, 68), adds, “It is precisely by responding to the various illocutions in 
Scripture—by believing its assertions, by trusting its promises, by obeying its commands, by singing its 
songs—that we become „thickly,‟ which is to say covenantally, related to Christ.” 
518 Vanhoozer (ibid, 287), argues,  “Each literary form in the canon…renders true testimony to 
the truth of Jesus Christ…„What God is doing in Jesus Christ for the salvation of the world‟ is Scripture‟s 
ultimate propositional content, though Scripture proposes this content for our consideration in many ways, 
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covenant, for Vanhoozer, includes “not only promise but other aspects of the covenant—
stories, stipulations, sanctions—that together constitute the relationship between God and 
his people.”519  As a result, the content of the covenant could not be adequately 
communicated without precisely the many genres represented in the canon.  
Speech acts operate, for Vanhoozer, at the level of genre, since authors choose a 
particular genre in order to establish a particular illocutionary stance.  Vanhoozer argues 
that illocutionary stances can be offered within a particular genre at the level of the whole 
text. For example, “In choosing to write in the narrative genre, authors choose to take up 
a stance…an ideology, a „worldview.‟”520  The same would be true for any genre.  
Vanhoozer uses the phrase “generic illocution” to describe “what an author is doing at the 
level of the whole text,” and claims that “every genre in Scripture…performs its distinct 
illocutionary act (or acts).”521  Vanhoozer suggests, then, that “genre…describes the 
illocutionary act at the level of the whole, placing the parts within an overall unity that 
serves a meaningful purpose.  It follows that genre is the key to interpreting 
communicative action.”522   
Since the Bible has many different genres, many different illocutionary stances 
(generic illocutions) are taken in Scripture.  Yet these are not where God‟s supervening 
                                                                                                                                            
through diverse forms.” Yet it is important to remember that this communicative act is not simply a 
description about Jesus, but it is Christ‟s active work toward the Church:  “In the context of the divine 
drama, the canon is the external means by which Christ exercises his authority over the Church” (The 
Drama of Doctrine, 114).   
519 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 137.  This causes Vanhoozer (ibid, 273), to agree with 
Ricoeur and Tracy‟s concern to not allow narrative to overrun other genres. 
520 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 341. 
521 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 283.   
522 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 341. 
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speech-act comes to light.  Rather, the whole canon should be understood as its own 
unique genre, with its own divine illocutionary stance.  Vanhoozer suggests in his later 
work that the whole canon operates something like a “super-genre.”523  The “various 
literary forms” may be “taken together” at the level of canon where they yield a larger 
illocutionary stance.
524
  Vanhoozer proposes the phrase “canonical illocution” to show 
“what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at the level of 
the canon.”525  This overarching stance, as a canonical illocution, is “something that 
comes to light only on the canonical level, when the divine playwright speaks in and 
through the various human authorial voices.”526  Identifying this supervening 
illocutionary stance provides the key to articulating what the Bible finally is, and thus 
allows the theologian to formulate a theology of Scripture.  Vanhoozer identifies this 
unique “macrogenre” as “divine address” or “theodrama,” descriptions which allow for 
the existence of other genres within them.  
The meaning of the human authors, then, is unified by the supervening illocution 
of God at the canonical whole.  Brevard Childs has objected that the possibility of 
supervening illocutions would mean that, “By performing an illocutionary act with the 
noematic content of the human discourse, God can say something entirely different” than 
                                               
523 Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 100.   
524 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 342.  This supervening illocution is 
variously suggested to be: „confessing faith‟ (349), „proclaiming God‟s salvation‟ (342), „testifying to 
Christ‟ (342), “bearing witness” (349), or “providing guidance for future generations” (380).   
525 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 179. 
526 Ibid, 287.   
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what the human authors wrote.
527
  Vanhoozer can escape Childs‟s critique because 
Vanhoozer‟s own model proposes that God‟s supervening illocutions ceased with the 
closure of the canon.  Since recognizing God‟s supervening illocutions in Scripture is a 
matter of deciding which full context rightly encompasses the whole communicative act, 
Vanhoozer feels God‟s intention becomes clear at the level of the whole canon.  
Vanhoozer, then, refers to the “plain canonical sense” as the literal sense, the whole in 
which God‟s speech acts come to light.528   
Vanhoozer knows that his own proposal for identifying the essence of Scripture is 
a single, philosophical formulation placed upon Scripture.  Yet while Vanhoozer 
responds that while this articulation of God‟s supervening action through the use of 
speech-act theory is indeed new, it simply provides a new way to illumine the lasting 
claim that God speaks in Scripture.
529
  Furthermore, Vanhoozer knows that the 
construction of a single, overarching construct for Scripture often reduces Scripture one 
                                               
527 Brevard S. Childs, "Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 58, no. 4 (2005), 387.  Childs‟s concern is directed specifically against Wolterstorff, who 
proposes that God can today provide illocutions which supervene on the original speech acts.  Wolterstorff, 
in distinguishing between a first hermeneutic (understanding the locutions and illocutions of the human 
author) and a second hermeneutic (understanding the locutions and illocutions of the divine author), claims 
that some common sense presuppositions about who God is and what he is doing allow one to move from 
the first hermeneutic to the second hermeneutic today.  God might be saying something today using the 
canonical context that he did not say in the canon itself (see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: 
Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995)esp. 183-222).  Childs‟s difficulty with Wolterstorff‟s construal, ("Speech-Act Theory and Biblical 
Interpretation," 387), is that “There is no privileged canonical context, but the context for interpretation is 
the critical stance of modernity.” As we have seen, Vanhoozer will privilege precisely the canonical context 
and will work to keep interpreters from adding anything to what is already enclosed in it. 
528 Vanhoozer, "The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 198.   
529 Vanhoozer, "The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 202.  Vanhoozer‟s argument 
is in response to Brevard Childs ("Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 58, no. 4 (2005), 380), who argues that this understanding of God‟s supervening speech acts is 
simply an imaginary construct placed on Scripture which ignores “the role of the church in collecting, 
shaping and interpreting the Bible, which is the issue of canon.”   
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kind of literary text.
530
  Yet Vanhoozer feels that his own proposal does not succumb to 
such reductionistic tendencies because his own construal works requires respect for all 
the genres of Scripture as indispensable elements of the single, supervening illocutionary 
stance which unites all the other individual illocutionary stances.   
C. Scripture‟s Role in the Economy 
 
Vanhoozer‟s later work is a sustained attempt to locate Scripture in the economy 
of redemption which opens a number of interpretive options beyond those suggested by 
Tracy and Frei.  Vanhoozer‟s theological project advances the hermeneutical discussion, 
not by providing a superior method for reading through the employment of more useful 
philosophical resources, but by showing that Christian interpretation of Scripture can 
never be confined to the relationship of text and reader.  As Scripture is a species of 
God‟s communicative action to the Church, Scriptural reading must always attend to 
theological presuppositions which will influence interpretive outcomes.   
1.  God‟s Use of Scripture 
 
Vanhoozer‟s most significant contribution to a theological interpretation of 
Scripture is his insistence that the Scriptures are an extension of the Triune missions of 
God and are God‟s communicative action by which salvation history is mediated to 
                                               
530 Vanhoozer (ibid, 200), agrees with Kelsey that systematic theologians regularly construe 
the entirety of Scripture as a singular genre “so that everything becomes apocalyptic (Pannenberg), or 
wisdom (Bultmann), or narrative (Barth), or doctrine (Hodge).”  Yet Vanhoozer believes that his own 
proposal that Scripture is one genre, discourse, avoids imposing a reductionistic structure on Scripture, and 
instead opens it to a greater appreciation of its literary forms.   
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readers.  Vanhoozer‟s early work is unsuccessful insofar as it attempts to locate the 
authority of Scripture in the literal sense without showing how the literal sense is God‟s 
communicative action.  Vanhoozer‟s later work advances the discussion between Frei and 
Tracy as it suggests that the authority of Scripture is grounded not in experience or in 
community consensus, but in the communicative action of God who extends salvation to 
the Church.  Vanhoozer‟s later model, consequently, advances Tracy‟s appeal to 
appreciate all the genres of Scripture, as Vanhoozer shows that God uses the various 
literary styles to communicate to readers.  At the same time, Vanhoozer‟s model 
appreciates Frei‟s insistence on the plain reading of Scriptural narrative by showing that 
the whole Scriptures is a unified story of salvation history communicated to the Church.  
Vanhoozer‟s ontology of communicative action places Scriptural hermeneutics within the 
broader context of the divine economy and hence prevents readers from handing 
authority over to either the exegete or the community consensus, but to show that correct 
Scriptural reading can only take place when believers understand that these texts are a 
species of God‟s speaking action.   
2.  The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality   
 
Vanhoozer puts forward two proposals for moving from text to divine reality, one 
based in figural reading and one based in speech-act theory.  These two proposals, 
although quite different, are complementary.  In the first proposal, Vanhoozer adopts 
Frei‟s understanding of figural reading and emphasizes the participatory aspect of such 
interpretive practice.  Figural reading is “the rule for present-day Christians to make 
sense of their stories as Jesus did of his, precisely by reading their own lives in light of 
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the life of Jesus.”531  Vanhoozer concludes that through figural reading, “The canon thus 
teaches us to see, trains us in crucial epistemic practices that, in conjunction with the 
Spirit‟s work, are necessary for the renewing of our minds and for perceiving „the whole 
in Christ.‟”532  Vanhoozer‟s whole subsequent project of theodrama is intended to show 
how the reader is formed by Scripture to a new understanding of the world.  Vanhoozer, 
like Frei, understands that figural reading is not necessitated by a literal reading of texts, 
but is based on prior theological presuppositions.  Vanhoozer‟s primary concern, like 
Frei‟s, is showing why this kind of reading is authoritative for the Church.  Because 
Vanhoozer places figural reading within the larger context of the economy of redemption, 
he is able to provide resources to advance the discussion.  While Frei‟s nearly exclusive 
focus on the text/reader relationship causes him to struggle to decide whether authority 
resides in the text itself or community practice, Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the divine 
economy allows him to show that authority resides in God‟s sending of Scripture to the 
community of faith.  Here overtly theological concerns ground issues of method, so that 
once the theological presupposition of God‟s authoring work is established behind the 
text, Vanhoozer proposes a fairly intratextual approach to Scriptural reading.   
Vanhoozer‟s second proposal for explaining the movement from text to divine 
reality relies on speech-act theory.  Vanhoozer explains both the unity of Scripture and 
the incorporation of the present reader at the level of the canonical whole, as God‟s 
illocutionary stance supervenes upon the many locutions and illocutions of the human 
writers, making the Scriptures God‟s speaking action.  The authority of Scripture, then, is 
                                               
531 Vanhoozer, DD, 222. 
532 Vanhoozer, DD, 224.   
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based on the unique movement from human communication to divine communication, 
and this is completed with the final form of the Christian canon.  In this sense, the 
movement from text to divine reality takes place more in the theological prerequisites for 
reading Scripture uniquely than in an encounter with the text itself.  Whereas both Frei 
and Tracy emphasized the reader‟s encounter with the text, Vanhoozer focuses on the 
preunderstanding of the reader who encounters the text.  If employed in isolation, this 
proposal for a particular conception of authorship may draw attention away from the 
transforming event of Christ.  If only a theory of divine authorship were emphasized, the 
revelation of Jesus Christ as the transforming event in light of which the Old Testament 
should be read could be neglected.  Stress on Scripture as a covenant document which 
renders a relatively determinate meaning might neglect the unique narrative structure of 
Scripture which testifies to God‟s ongoing action in history.  Only if Vanhoozer‟s two 
proposals of figural reading and divine authorship are held as complementary can the 
uniqueness and authority of Scripture be simultaneously demonstrated.   
3. Conclusion and Remaining Challenges  
 
Vanhoozer‟s later work is devoted to the development of a First Theology which 
understands God‟s Being as Pure, self-communicative Act, therefore understands all 
reality in light of God‟s economic self-communication in Christ and Scripture.  This 
model allows Vanhoozer to establish rules for reading Scripture which grant it authority 
over the reading community and provide a philosophically interesting, theologically 
significant proposal for developing an account of God as communicative act in light of 
Scripture‟s many speech acts.  Yet Vanhoozer‟s later model also brings out a number of 
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significant difficulties which must be resolved if his project is to be completed.  This 
section will identify four persistent difficulties in Vanhoozer‟s later work which will be 
discussed later in the dissertation.   
Theological Presuppositions, or Disclosive Encounter? For Vanhoozer, the ability 
to read Scripture correctly is largely a matter of being able to employ the correct 
theological presuppositions to a literal reading of the Scriptural texts.  Whereas Frei 
focuses on the realistic rendering of the text as disclosive to the reader in a straight-
forward way and Tracy focuses on the encounter between reader and text which pushes 
the reader to a new existential possibility, Vanhoozer focuses on the theological 
presuppositions of the reader, so that only those readers who have the right 
presuppositions concerning Scripture will be able to read.  Reading the Scriptures rightly 
requires several presuppositions:  God can communicate to human beings; God did so 
definitively in Christ; the canon is taken up into God‟s self-communicative action; 
consequently, only these texts should be considered divine discourse.  After this First 
Theology is presupposed, the interpreter may go on to employ general hermeneutical 
rules to Scripture in order to understand the diverse communicative acts that take place 
by means of the different genres.  For Vanhoozer, doctrinal categories replace literary 
theory as the determinate element in Scriptural interpretation.  With this new proposal, 
Vanhoozer‟s earlier tension between reading within the Church and outside the Church 
simply disappears.  If the interpreter reads correctly (i.e. with the right First Theology), 
she is in the Church.  Only believers can read Scripture rightly, because only they are 
able to accept, by faith, the proper stance toward Scripture.   
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This First Theology shifts Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutics of Scripture explicitly from 
the realm of “nature” to the realm of “grace.”533  When Vanhoozer speaks of “theological 
interpretation” in his later work, he always associates it with “divine action.”  While it is 
right, Vanhoozer believes, to explore meaning behind, in, and in front of the text, secular 
hermeneutics “stops short of a properly theological criticism to the extent that it brackets 
out a consideration of divine action.”534  To attend seriously to the subject matter of 
Scripture means establishing a First Theology which necessarily breaks general 
hermeneutical rules.
535
  Theological interpretation, then, begins with a preunderstanding 
of God and God‟s action that causes the interpreter to read the texts along a certain 
trajectory—remythologizing instead of demythologizing and participatory response 
instead of subjecting text to community norms.  As we will see in the next chapter, De 
Lubac will add an additional dimension to this discussion, as he emphasizes that even the 
right theological presuppositions cannot, by themselves, lead to right reading without the 
process of conversion on the part of the reader.  For de Lubac, theological 
presuppositions must lead to participation in the Mystery.  Hence de Lubac will go 
further in grounding Scriptural reading in theology rather than literary theory.   
                                               
533 Vanhoozer is thereby is intrinsically opposed to the Enlightenment quest to read Scripture 
as any other book.  Vanhoozer argues that this is not yet to make a judgment about whether grace “opposes, 
crowns, or outflanks reason;”  it is simply to “establish theological interpretation as dealing with issues 
outside the realm of “nature” (Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the 
Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 20).     
534 Ibid, 20. 
535 This shows the progression in Vanhoozer‟s thought.  In his early work, Scripture largely 
followed the same hermeneutical rules because God grounds all communication.  In his later work, 
Scripture is unique because it is God‟s speaking action.  In fact, Vanhoozer (ibid, 22), claims that reading 
to understand God can be considered the only legitimate primary purpose of Scripture: “the principal 
interests of the Bible‟s authors, of the text itself, and of the original community of readers was theological: 
reading the Scriptures therefore meant coming to hear God‟s word and to know God better.” 
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Does God Still Speak?  While Vanhoozer provides a strong argument for 
understanding God as able to speak and having spoken, Vanhoozer is often unclear about 
how God continues to speak.  A rather strong tension exists throughout Vanhoozer‟s later 
work between a very broad understanding of authorship in which authoring refers to the 
entire economy of redemption, and a very narrow view of authorship in which only 
revelatory events in history and Scripture are considered God‟s speech acts.  Overall, it 
appears that Vanhoozer is pressed to the narrow view of authorship, in which God‟s 
speaking in Scripture is an entire past action, for three reasons.  First, Vanhoozer spends a 
great deal of his work in dialogue with Barth, attempting to expand Barth‟s understanding 
of God‟s speaking action in Christ to include both Christ and Scripture as acts of speech.  
The underlying assumption for Vanhoozer is that God‟s speaking action has taken place 
in the past and is both complete and determinate in meaning (both in Christ and in 
Scripture).  In this sense, speech acts and revelation are virtually synonymous for 
Vanhoozer.  Second, Vanhoozer‟s whole argument about the supervening of divine 
illocutions on human illocutions to create a canon with determinate meaning is only 
intelligible if God‟s speaking action ceased with the closure of the canon.  God‟s ongoing 
communication to human beings today must be distinguished from God‟s speech acts, 
because the latter can be understood determinately in the context of the canon alone.  
Both revelation and speech acts, then, ceased with the closure of the canon.  Third, the 
limitation of speaking to God‟s actions in history and the canonical texts is also necessary 
to safeguard Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scriptural meaning is determinate.  It appears that 
God‟s speech acts count as speech acts precisely because they are determinate in 
meaning, and hence complete as acts.  Vanhoozer is committed to showing that because 
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meaning resides in the text itself, God‟s speaking to human beings has a determinate 
meaning.
536
  The meaning of the text, then, must be closely associated with God‟s speech 
acts, and must be distinguished from God‟s ongoing communication.537  Consequently, 
God does not speak today, as that speaking action was completed with the closure of the 
canon.   
Placing God‟s speaking action entirely in the past, however, does not sit well with 
Vanhoozer‟s later project.  Vanhoozer‟s purpose in developing a metaphysics of God as 
communicative Being is not simply to construct yet another doctrine of inspiration in the 
past, but to show that God continues to communicate to believers through Scripture 
today.  Here a distinction, never really drawn out by Vanhoozer, between „speaking‟ and 
„communicating‟ becomes clearer.  The ongoing action of the Holy Spirit is 
communicative, but cannot be considered speaking.  Vanhoozer insists,  
The Spirit‟s role is not to go beyond Scripture, adding new words, but to enable 
the church to perceive and respond to the words that are already there.  The Spirit 
is the advocate of the word written, the executor of the will of the Father and the 
Son.  The Spirit is the efficacy of divine canonical discourse, the indispensable 
means through which the triune communicative action achieves its goal in the 
lives of believers.
538
 
 
                                               
536 For example, Vanhoozer, (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 315), claims, “If meaning 
resides in the encounter of text and reader, it necessarily follows that meaning does not reside in the text 
itself and, consequently, that meaning will change and develop as it encounters new readers and enters new 
contexts.”  It often appears that Vanhoozer‟s understanding of meaning is built specifically to show that, 
“The way the church reads the Scripture does not affect its meaning, only its significance” (ibid, 279).  
Hence Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 321), claims, “Sola scriptura is a reminder that textual meaning 
is independent of our interpretive schemes and, hence, that our interpretations remain secondary 
commentaries that never acquire the status of the text itself.” 
537 Remember that meaning, for Vanhoozer, is the locutions and illocutions within the context 
of the whole speech act.  This means that perlocutionary effect is excluded from the meaning of a text.   
538 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 199.   
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The Spirit does not add new words, but “enables,” “advocates,” “executes,” 
“effects,” and is the “means through which” God‟s speech is conveyed to human beings.  
Vanhoozer admits that the Spirit communicates through a number of channels, including 
sacraments, the leadership of the Church, lives of the saints, etc., yet God‟s speaking 
action as illocutionary supervening on human speech acts, is unique to Scripture.
539
  
Ongoing communication is the work of the Holy Spirit and is mediated in many ways, yet 
it is not determinate in meaning in the same way that revelation (God‟s acts in history and 
Scripture) are determinate in meaning.  This ongoing communication between God and 
reader must be developed further to account for the whole action of God in using 
Scripture.
540
   
Does sola Scriptura Work?  Vanhoozer continually insists that authority ought to 
be granted to the Scripture over the Church.  Vanhoozer‟s concern with postliberals is 
what he perceives to be a willingness to grant authority to the Church over Scripture.  In 
fact, the very equating of Scripture with revelation is very closely tied to the question of 
authority.  For Vanhoozer, it is God‟s speaking action that establishes Scripture‟s 
authority.  As a result, Vanhoozer does not feel comfortable extending that speaking 
action beyond Scripture, even though his whole project seeks to portray a God who 
communicates with believers on an ongoing basis.  Vanhoozer attempts to expose, 
                                               
539 Ibid, 412.   
540 Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 153.  Spinks (ibid, 151-52), is concerned that 
Vanhoozer‟s “argument about authorial intent that…reduces the discussion about meaning to the same two 
options—either authorial intention or readers‟ interests—does not effectively address the interplay of 
intentions and interests that takes place when people read most texts, especially those texts they deem 
sacred.  When we speak of the „meaning of Scripture‟, it diminishes the fullness and effectiveness of these 
sacred texts in the life of the community to consider the term „meaning‟ as a placeholder for „authorial 
intention‟ or „readers‟ interests‟.” 
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through the use of speech-act theory, a neglect on the part of postliberals to adequately 
show the relationship between Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption.  Yet 
at the same time, Vanhoozer‟s whole discussion of authorship rests on the assumption 
that the Church has acknowledged God as author of Scripture.  Vanhoozer must, then, 
discuss the place of both Scripture and the Church within the context of the divine 
economy.  I will show in the next chapter that the relationship between Scripture and 
revelation can only be addressed within the context of the whole economy of redemption.   
What Unifies Scripture—The Event of Christ or Divine Illocutions? Vanhoozer‟s 
construction of a divine supervening illocution seeks to establish a unity of the canon at 
the level of the text more than at the level of events of salvation history.  Focus is on 
God‟s speaking which unifies the canon into one speech-act, rather than the revelation of 
Jesus Christ which unifies the events of both Old and New Testament.  Vanhoozer does 
at the level of illocutionary stances almost exactly what de Lubac does at the level of 
events.  Vanhoozer claims that God‟s supervening speech-action unifies the meaning of 
all other speech-acts to God‟s own speech at the level of the whole canon (hence the 
canon becomes the principle of meaning by which to understand the individual parts).  
De Lubac will claim that the revelation of Jesus Christ unifies all Scriptural events and 
allows the whole of Scripture to be read in light of this principle of meaning.  The focus 
for Vanhoozer is on text rather than event, and literary theory rather than history.  We 
will see in the next chapter that this decision between text and event has significant 
consequences for the project of both Vanhoozer and de Lubac.  De Lubac‟s focus on 
history leaves his literary treatment of the text underdeveloped, and Vanhoozer‟s focus 
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on the text leaves his understanding of the radical newness of Christ in history 
underdeveloped.   
III.  Ecclesiology: The Church as a Response to Scripture 
 
Vanhoozer‟s whole project of establishing Scripture as God‟s speech act, 
articulating all Scripture as covenant, rehabilitating sola scriptura, distinguishing 
between Scripture‟s mission and tradition‟s commission, and appealing to a fixed 
meaning of the biblical texts, emphasizes his clear priority of Scriptural authority over the 
authority of Church and tradition.  Vanhoozer summarizes that, “As a work of the Spirit, 
tradition plays the role of moon to Scripture‟s sun: what light, and authority, tradition 
bears, it does so by virtue of reflecting the light of the Son that shines forth from the 
canon.”541  Though both Scripture as mission and Church as commissioned response are 
necessary parts in the economy of redemption, Scripture is always given authority over 
the Church.  In Vanhoozer‟s structuring of the economy, the Church derives its authority 
only from its faithful response to Scripture.   
Like Frei, Vanhoozer‟s project is driven by his persistent concern about the 
location of Scriptural authority.  Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the authority of Scripture over 
the Church is really intended to be a manifesto for articulating the authority of God over 
the Church, and thereby for chastening readers to attend submissively to God‟s 
authoritative speech.  Yet Vanhoozer‟s either/or schema comes at a high price, as his 
denial of the authority of the Church prevents him from adequately describing the Church 
                                               
541 Ibid, 210. 
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as a theological reality.  This underdeveloped ecclesiology, in turn, opens a number of 
hermeneutical difficulties as Vanhoozer seeks to describe the relationship between 
Scripture and Church in the economy.  
A.  The Identity of the Church: An Evangelical Ecclesiology 
 
Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scripture is constitutive of the Church has its roots in 
Vanhoozer‟s Evangelical ecclesiology which posits a strong distinction between the 
visible, present Church and the invisible, eschatological Church.  Vanhoozer bases his 
argument that God does not normatively speak in tradition on the present incompleteness 
of the Church.
542
  Scripture is authoritative because it is complete, while the visible 
Church, because it is still being led toward its eschatological fullness, cannot be 
authoritative in the same way.  Vanhoozer claims that, “Ecclesiology cannot be first 
theology because the church enjoys only the first fruits of its salvation.  As an 
eschatological reality, it is indeed already in union with Christ, but not yet completely 
so.”543  Since the canonical Scriptures are already complete in content, Vanhoozer feels 
that they naturally should be given priority over a presently incomplete, sinful Church.  
The only authority the Church can claim for itself is its responsive participation in the 
economy of redemption, and this must continually be checked by some criterion which is 
authoritative over the Church.
544
  This strong distinction between visible and invisible 
                                               
542 Ibid, 121. 
543 Ibid, 163.   
544 Vanhoozer (ibid, 121), argues, “The idea that cultures are closed systems, insular and 
internally consistent wholes that preserve a stable deposit of values and knowledge, is a distinctly modern 
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Church makes it quite difficult to show how the visible Church has a productive role in 
the economy of redemption.   
Following Gerhard Ebeling, Vanhoozer equates tradition with the history of 
biblical interpretation, so that “church tradition” is defined as “the embodied social 
practice of biblical interpretation” and hence always “stands under the canon viewed as a 
dominical and spiritual practice of administering the covenant.”545  The Church, then, is 
constituted by Scripture, and the Church becomes the Church to the extent that it 
participates rightly in response to the mission of Scripture.  The Church, for Vanhoozer, 
is “a „creature of the word‟—brought into being and shaped by the Spirit‟s ministry of the 
word.”546  The Church, then, appears to be a group of individuals who are individually 
and only then corporately called to respond to the Scriptures.  It is the association of 
individuals responding to God who make up the Church.  This focus on the Church as an 
association of individuals makes it difficult for Vanhoozer to describe the visible Church 
as a theological reality. 
Yet Vanhoozer does try to give an account of the Church as a theological reality.  
Vanhoozer rejects the theological formulation of Church as sacrament, instead suggesting 
                                                                                                                                            
fiction… Cultures…are as susceptible to deconstruction as are texts.”  Only Scripture, because of its unique 
role in the divine economy, can avoid deconstruction and stand as a check to corporate pride.   
545 Ibid, 114.  Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 222), is very clear that Ebeling‟s 
definition is needed to show that “text” and “interpretation” must continually be distinguished.  In fact, sola 
scriptura is needed to preserve just this distinction.  Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 235, 418), quotes 
Gerhard Ebeling: “the history of the church is the history of biblical interpretation.”  Vanhoozer (ibid, 418), 
will enhance Ebeling‟s claim, so that, “The history of the church is essentially the story of how the church 
interprets Scripture „bodily,‟ through the shape of its community life.  Church history is thus the history of 
biblical performance.”  
546 Ibid, 230.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 208), claims, “The church in the power of the Spirit is nothing 
less than the efficacy of the canonical word, rightly understood and rightly appropriated.”  
 186 
 
that the Church “imitates” and “signifies” grace.547  In fact, Vanhoozer rejects both a 
description of the Church as “mediation” of grace and a description of the Church as a 
“memorial” of Christ, instead opting for a description of the Church as a “mimesis” of the 
Gospel.
548
  Vanhoozer rejects mediation because it gives the Church too much 
sacramental value.  Vanhoozer specifically rejects any ecclesiology in which the church 
is considered a “sign/presence of the triune God,” where “ecclesial words and actions 
mediate the grace of God.”549  This, he thinks, would give the Church an initiatory 
mission analogous to the mission of Scripture.  Yet Vanhoozer also rejects a description 
of the Church as a memorial because it seems to deny the active role of the Spirit in the 
Church.  Vanhoozer consequently seeks a middle ground in mimesis: “The form of the 
church‟s fitting participation in the drama of redemption is precisely that of mimesis: an 
imitation of Paul, of God, of Christ.”550  Imitating is distinctly a mission of response, and 
consequently has less authority than mediation in the economy of redemption.  For 
Vanhoozer, the Church‟s task is that of “performing the word in the power of the Spirit,” 
and “present[ing] the body of Christ.”551  Once again, Vanhoozer feels more comfortable 
with the terms performing and presenting, as they indicate a responsive role only, 
whereas mediating suggests a mission closer to that granted to Scripture.  Proposing the 
model of imitation (mimesis), Vanhoozer feels, will provide the Church a participatory 
                                               
547 Vanhoozer, (The Drama of Doctrine, 401), claims that the Church is “less a sacrament than 
a means of signifying the divine grace poured out in Christ through the Spirit.”   
548 Ibid, 412.   
549 Ibid, 400. 
550 Ibid, 401. 
551 Ibid, 401, 407, respectively. 
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role in redemption, yet will keep that action from being confused with God‟s prior 
initiatory action.
552
  Drama, then, provides a helpful paradigm for showing that the 
Church is responsive to the divine and Scriptural missions yet actively participatory in 
them.
553
   
B.  The Relationship between Scripture and Church in the Economy 
 
Vanhoozer‟s Evangelical ecclesiology emphasizes a one-directional authority 
from Scripture to Church.  Vanhoozer‟s later work does not place authority in the literary 
construction of the text itself, but in God‟s supervening speech acts which establish the 
biblical texts as Scripture.  As Vanhoozer describes both Scripture and Church as 
extensions of the economic missions of the Triune God, Vanhoozer proposes a 
structuring of the economy in which Scripture is given an active mission and the Church 
is given a responsive mission.   
1.  The Active Mission of Scripture in the Economy  
 
                                               
552 Vanhoozer sees “imitation” as a middle ground between claiming the Church is a simple 
(almost passive) remembrance of Christ, and a channel of mediation of Christ.  In fact, Vanhoozer‟s model 
of drama attempts to incorporate “imitating” as an alternative to the traditional divide between memorial 
and sacrament in sacramental theology.  Hence Vanhoozer (ibid, 409), claims, “As celebration, the church 
is not a literal repetition of the body of Christ, nor a sacrament, nor an empty memorial, but an active 
mimesis.”  Vanhoozer‟s treatment of sacraments covers only three pages, and unfortunately the focus is on 
defining them rather than showing how they are an essential and unique part of God‟s self-communicative 
action.  Sacramental theology would seem to be a very productive area for developing a theology of 
communicative action, and a greater development of this branch of theology would likely enhance 
Vanhoozer‟s project. 
553 Ibid, 412.   
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Whereas Kelsey described First Theology as the theologian‟s prior decision about 
how to use Scripture, Vanhoozer wishes to establish the authority of Scripture based on 
God‟s use of these texts.554  Vanhoozer argues, “What becomes paramount is God‟s use 
of the biblical texts…God, in and through the human authors, has an ongoing speaking 
part.”555  The Church, says Vanhoozer, can take responsibility neither for the 
establishment of the canon nor for establishing the literal sense as authoritative.  This is 
because “it is not the church‟s use but the triune God‟s use of Scripture that makes it 
canon.  That the church recognizes the canon authenticates the church rather than the 
canon, which needs no ecclesial approval to be what it is: the Word of God.”556  
Ultimately, Scripture must be understood as God‟s communication rather than human 
communication about God.  Vanhoozer explains,  
The crucial point is that Scripture is holy (set apart) and authoritative because it is 
ingredient in the economy of communication, that is, in the way in which the 
triune God ministers the Word of God in the power of the Spirit…Scripture is a 
creaturely medium taken up as an „extension of Christ‟s active, communicative 
presence in the Spirit‟s power through the commissioned apostolic testimony.‟  
As such, Scripture is a means of ongoing triune communication by which the 
church follows her master‟s voice…557 
 
While Scripture is a “creaturely medium,” it is ultimately more a species of the 
economic triune communicative action than a product of human discourse.  While the 
focal point of the economy of redemption “consists in what God has done and is doing in 
Christ, the Scriptures, as testimony to this act, are themselves caught up in it and become 
                                               
554 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 11-12.   
555 Ibid, 177. 
556 Ibid, 149-150.   
557 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 264.   
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a means for God for building up his church in Christ through the power of the Spirit.”558  
Realizing that Scripture is finally an act of God in the economy of communication 
requires a re-estimation of the human language of Scripture.  For Vanhoozer, “The 
human statements about God‟s action and passion are not accommodations of a rich 
reality to poor words, but rather an elevation of human words to divine discourse: these 
human texts have been set apart as sanctified servants of divine revelation.”559  As a 
result, “In attending closely to Scripture we not only read about God but confront God in 
one mode of his self-presentation.”560  The unique mode of self-presentation here seems 
to be dependent on Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scripture uniquely contains God‟s complete, 
determinate speech acts.  The Scriptures are unique precisely because God uses them in a 
unique way.  
Vanhoozer develops an argument for the place of Scripture in the economy of 
redemption by comparing the mission of Scripture to the mission of Son and Spirit.  God 
exists as self-communicative Act, eternally communicating among the Persons of the 
immanent Trinity.  Yet, Vanhoozer claims, “When directed ad extra, the communicative 
action of God is perhaps better termed mission.  Hence the economy of communication is 
ultimately missional: divine communicative action involves the „sendings‟ (missio) of 
Son and Spirit.”561  Vanhoozer proposes that Scripture is given a mission for redemption 
analogous to the missions of the triune Persons, and that “Scripture‟s mission is tied up 
                                               
558 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 418.   
559 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 80, noting John Webster, Holy Scripture: A 
Dogmatic Sketch (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 26.) 
560 Ibid, 189. 
561 Ibid,  261. 
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with the Trinitarian missions of the Son and Spirit.”562  Scripture is sent to the Church so 
that the Church may respond, just as Son and Spirit were sent for the purpose of 
redemption.  As a result, “Scripture does not simply recount action; it is part of the 
action…it contributes to the realization of God‟s purposes for the world…Scripture is 
thus a collection of statements—and promises, commands, warnings, and so on—all on 
their respective missions.”563  This claim locates Scripture in the economy of redemption, 
and it establishes the priority of Scripture over the Church as Scripture is ultimately an 
action of God (not of the Church).   
For Vanhoozer, everything included in the economy of redemption has a 
particular mission.
564
  Since both Church and Scripture participate in the economy of 
redemption, each has its own respective mission which is essential to that economy.
565
  
Yet two distinct kinds of mission must be distinguished.  Vanhoozer calls these “mission” 
and “commission.”  Mission is initiative, while commission is responsive.  Since the 
Triune Persons extend themselves in economic mission, and because Scripture is caught 
up in that action and likewise sent, the mission of Scripture is an initiative kind of 
mission.  At the same time, those to whom the missions of the Son, Spirit and Scripture 
                                               
562 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 60.   
563 Ibid, 70.  Vanhoozer (ibid), draws an “analogia missio” between “incarnation” and 
“inscripturation,” based on three analogies: “(1) both are species of triune communicative action—
embodied in the case of Jesus, verbalized in the case of Scripture; (2) both aim to draw communicants into 
the new covenant community; (3) both are accompanied by the Spirit and require the Spirit in order to 
complete their respective missions.” 
564 Vanhoozer (ibid, 69), claims, “The whole theodrama is essentially missional.”   
565 Vanhoozer (ibid, 93), very much appreciates the postliberal understanding of doctrine as “a 
rule for „storied practice‟” because it seeks to overcome the divide between theory and practice.  Vanhoozer 
(ibid), feels the postliberal understanding of doctrine is quite helpful, though it “ultimately fails to preserve 
biblical authority.” 
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are sent are themselves called to participate in mission, but this is a “commissioned” 
mission, a mission of response.
566
  Vanhoozer concludes, “The Bible is thus the locus of 
God‟s ongoing communicative action in the church and in the world…The mission of the 
church, and therefore of theology, is to participate in and continue the joint mission of 
Word and Spirit.”567  Yet, while each of these kinds of mission is essential, each does not 
have equal authority.
568
  Initiating mission (God‟s initial act) always has authority over 
commissioned responsive mission (the effect that God‟s initial act produces).  The 
essential thing to notice here is that the mission of Scripture is located on the side of 
God‟s self-communicative act rather than on the side of participated human response.  
Scripture has priority over the Church because Scripture is mission sent by God to the 
Church, and hence the Church‟s mission is constituted in response to that mission.   
Failure to locate the place Scripture‟s mission among the various missions of the 
divine economy, Vanhoozer feels, is a mistake of most modern theology.  Vanhoozer 
suggests that both “Chicago” and “Yale” go wrong precisely by seeing Scripture more as 
a response to revelation than as God‟s communicative act.  Vanhoozer suggests that 
Ricoeur was correct to propose a “Copernican revolution” in biblical interpretation which 
                                               
566 Vanhoozer (ibid, 71), emphasizes, “The church does not send itself; it is rather appointed, 
commissioned.  Its mission derives from its prior commission.”  Church doctrine, a construction of the 
Church‟s practice, is caught up in the divine drama and has its own mission, but this mission is one of 
response to Scripture.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 60), keeps the direction clear:  “The mission of theology is to 
enable the people of God to participate in the mission and ministry of the gospel… Scripture‟s role in the 
economy of the gospel…is that of the gospel‟s normative specification.”  The Church‟s responsive mission 
depends on the Scriptures‟ initiative mission.   
567 Ibid, 71.  
568 Hence Vanhoozer (ibid, 78), argues, “Doctrine proceeds from an authoritative script and 
gives direction as to how individuals and the church can participate fittingly in the drama of redemption.”  
Thus for Vanhoozer, (ibid, 102), “Doctrine is direction for the fitting participation of individuals and 
communities in the drama of redemption.”   
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would render the reader a submissive learner of the unique subject matter of Scripture.  
However, Vanhoozer feels that Ricoeur was unable to accomplish this project because 
Ricoeur could not precisely articulate how the biblical text is „of God.‟  Vanhoozer 
claims,   
Ricoeur…fails to consider the possibility that the Bible as a unified canonical 
whole may itself ultimately count as a divine communicative work, in which case 
the self-naming of God would not be limited merely to one or two instances, such 
as the burning bush of Exodus 3, but would comprise the entire length and 
breadth of the canon.  God would therefore be not only the subject of the biblical 
mythos, but also in some sense its author.
569
 
   
To complete Ricoeur‟s Copernican revolution and articulate the correct relation 
between Scripture and Church, the theologian must go beyond a claim about the 
uniqueness of the subject matter (i.e. these texts name God, and hence may invert general 
hermeneutical rules) to a claim that God has used this text in a unique way (these texts 
are caught up in God‟s self-communication).570  Scriptural language is not a human 
projection about God, but is rather God‟s true and real self-revelation.   
It is this location of Scripture as active mission in the economy that reestablishes 
the principle of sola scriptura in Vanhoozer‟s later work.  Vanhoozer suggests that only 
by returning to the traditional Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura will resolve the crisis 
of authority in the Church, because only this doctrine will allow God to use Scripture 
                                               
569 Ibid, 12.   
570 Vanhoozer (ibid, 11), uses Ricoeur‟s emphasis on “naming God” as his point of departure, 
but “[G]oing beyond Ricoeur, we can say that God also speaks and acts in and through all these discourses 
differently as well.  Consequently, this work derives a doctrine of God‟s being from an analysis of God‟s 
speaking, something Ricoeur never attempted.”   
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against the Church.
 571
  Sola scriptura, then, operates both as a principle of authority 
which, when recognized by the Church, in conjunction with a First Theology, will 
conform the Church‟s concrete practices toward Scripture.572   
2.  The Passive Mission of the Church in the Economy 
 
In Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the relationship between Scripture and Church, 
then, the Church has an actively responsive role in the economy of redemption.  
Vanhoozer clarifies this relationship between Scripture and Church by claiming,  
The human readers of Scripture are indeed active, but in a peculiarly passive way.  
The Spirit catches readers up into the theo-dramatic action not by inspiring but 
illumining them, enabling them to read the Bible in order to hear and do the 
Word…The church is ultimately not the author but the passive recipient of the 
canonical Scriptures…573   
 
                                               
571 Vanhoozer (ibid, 17), claims, “The supreme norm for church practice is Scripture itself: 
not Scripture as used by the church but Scripture as used by God, even, or perhaps especially, when such 
use is over against the church.”    Notice that this Protestant doctrine is simply used by Vanhoozer, ibid, as 
a theoretical construct to locate authority.  It does not mean Scripture alone, but is “a responsive, 
directional practice of the Church… namely, the practice of corresponding in one‟s speech and action to the 
word of God.”   
572 Vanhoozer (“Scripture and Tradition,” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodern Theology, Cambridge Companions to Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 166), claims that sola scriptura means that “Scripture is a polyphonic testimony to 
what God has done, is doing, and will do in Christ for the salvation of the world.  No other story, no work 
of genius, communicates that.  Sola scriptura means that this testimony is not only irreducible, but that 
Scripture should enjoy epistemic and existential primacy in the life of the Church.”  It is difficult, on this 
account, to distinguish sola scriptura from First Theology.  And, for Vanhoozer, this appears to be 
precisely the function of sola scriptura.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 152), continues, “To the extent that sola 
scriptura is an indispensable tool of ideology critique, its future seems assured.  Indeed, seen in this light, 
sola scriptura sounds positively postmodern to the extent that it questions whether any single human point 
of view captures universal truth.  For the voice of God in Scripture is mediated by a polyphony of human 
voices.”   
573 Ibid, 230.   
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What is important to notice here is that there are only two options; the Church is 
either “passive recipient” or “author.”  Since the Church is not author of Scripture, the 
Church must only have a mission of response to Scripture‟s author.  This structuring of 
the Scripture/Church relationship sets the stage for Vanhoozer‟s discussion of drama and 
performance.  While Scripture alone is authoritative for the Church, Vanhoozer will 
suggest that the Scripture is incomplete without the responsive mission of the Church.  
Since the very mission of Scripture is to “form a new people,” this mission cannot be 
fulfilled without the incorporation of the Church into a commissioned mission.
574
  At this 
point Vanhoozer agrees with Gadamer that “only the performance brings out everything 
that is in the play….To be occasional is essential to it: the occasion of the performance 
makes it speak and brings out what is in it.”575  Yet far from generating meaning in 
conversation with Scripture, Vanhoozer emphasizes that performance is a response to 
Scripture, and cannot be authoritative over Scripture nor affect the meaning of Scripture.   
Vanhoozer suggests that “„performing texts‟ may be the best means for reframing 
traditional discussions concerning the Scripture/tradition relationship,” so that the 
necessity of the Church can be acknowledged in a way that safeguards the authority of 
Scripture.
576
  The Church, then, is called the “theater of the gospel,” the location where 
                                               
574 Ibid, 182.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 165), claims, “The holy script…is both complete and 
incomplete.  On the one hand, the story of God‟s word-acts in the history of Israel and in Jesus Christ is 
finished…On the other hand, without a people to embody it, the script lacks something essential, for the 
canon “delivers its meaning only as it is „played out‟ in patterns of human action in Church and society.”  
See also Vanhoozer (ibid, 235), who claims, in this sense, the “canon as script comes into its own only 
when it is realized in understanding and responsive action.” 
575 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 147, cited in Vanhoozer, The Drama of 
Doctrine, 235.   
576 Ibid, 179.  It is important to emphasize that this one-directional establishment of authority 
is not intended to make the Church‟s response to Scripture a rote, fundamentalist adherence to an ancient 
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the Gospel drama is played out, while those incorporated into the Church are “the 
company of performers” who can “function as a „hermeneutic of the gospel.‟”577  
Vanhoozer further clarifies his distinction between importance and authority, suggesting 
that “script and performance are equally necessary, though not equally authoritative.  
Biblical script without ecclesial performance is empty; ecclesial performance without 
biblical script is blind.”578  While both have essential missions in the fulfillment of the 
economy of redemption, Scripture always has the authoritative role and the Church the 
responsive role.     
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the plurality of literary genres unified as a divine 
speech act provides a further argument for the passive mission of the Church in response 
to the active mission of Scripture.  In dialogue with postliberals, Vanhoozer agrees that 
literary genres are social constructions built in response to community needs.  Genres are 
“communicative practices, rule-governed literary forms that authors employ to engage 
reality and interact intelligibly with others.”579  Genres provide the agreed-upon structure 
for communication to occur in social situations, and new genres must arise in response to 
new social realities.  Vanhoozer writes,  
In short: genres are bound up with the aims and purposes of beings who act and 
react within social situations in certain rule-governed ways to accomplish certain 
                                                                                                                                            
text.  Quite the opposite.  Vanhoozer‟s whole project of theo-drama seeks to overcome the “ugly ditch” 
between theory and practice in order to show how contemporary doctrine can flow from Scripture itself.  
Because Vanhoozer (Ibid, 16), feels “the main purpose of doctrine is to equip Christians to understand and 
participate in the action of the principal players (namely, Father, Son, and Spirit),” the model of drama 
“overcomes the theory/praxis dichotomy…when it insists on audience participation.”  The Church‟s 
responsive role is indeed quite active, even if it lacks authority. 
577 Ibid, 413.   
578 Ibid, 362. 
579 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 283. 
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kinds of communicative objectives.  Literature falls into generic types precisely 
because the situations humans find themselves in often recur…each [literary 
genre] makes a distinct social contribution.
580
   
 
In Scripture, literary genres are the product of a “covenant form of life,” literary 
forms which establish possibilities and boundaries for communication in a new social 
reality.  The best example of this is the production of the literary genre, Gospel, which 
was an attempt to respond to the new event of Christ.
581
  Ultimately, because “Covenant 
is the social situation to which the various language games of Scripture broadly 
correspond…the many canonical practices represent and render the real in Christ, the 
shape, and hope, of glory.”582  God, then, can communicate the many aspects of the 
covenant to the Church by means of the many genres.   
Yet whereas postliberals propose that the Church establishes the “language 
games” by which Scriptural interpretation can take place, Vanhoozer argues that 
canonical Scripture, not Church practice, has already established those rules.  On 
Vanhoozer‟s account, there is simply no need to start from community practice, because 
Christians already have, in the canon, the authoritative means to develop a Christian form 
of life.
583
  Thus “the uses to which Christians should attend to learn the meaning and 
correct grammar of „God‟ are the patterns of usages (practices) in the canon itself.  
                                               
580 Ibid, 214.  
581 Ibid, 216. 
582 Ibid, 220.   
583 Ibid, 216.  Vanhoozer (ibid, 215), notes, “Stated in dramatic terms, genres provide 
direction for one‟s fitting participation, whether by word or by deed, in particular types of social 
situations.”  This particular response “marks the decisive break” with a cultural-linguistic approach 
because,  “It is not that participating in the contemporary community helps clarify the meaning of biblical 
narrative but rather that the literary practices of the canon teach us how to participate in the story-shaped 
ecclesial community.”  
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Christian theology is, or should be, ruled by a properly canonical grammar.”584  The very 
genres of Scripture, as the social forms of Christian identity, are able to form community 
practice.  Scripture takes the active mission in establishing the form of the Church, which 
responds in passive mission.   
In Vanhoozer‟s later work, the Spirit is the one who links both the authoritative 
mission of the Scriptures and the responsive mission of the Church by bringing about the 
perlocutionary effect of the fixed meaning of Scripture.  It is the particular role of the 
Spirit to communicate the determinate, fixed covenant message of Scripture to the 
Church, and to bring about the intended response.
585
  As a result, the Church can only 
claim relative authority to the extent that it can demonstrate interpretive competence.  
Clearly, this argument for associating the Spirit with the perlocutionary effect of the text 
has not changed from Vanhoozer‟s early work.  What has developed, however, is the 
emphasis on God‟s communication to the Church instead of the human author‟s 
communication to individual readers.  Vanhoozer argues that the missions of Word and 
Spirit must be closely connected, because “Word without Spirit is powerless; Spirit 
without Word is directionless…The canon is the Spirit‟s chosen means to mediate the 
covenant and foster the communion that obtains between Christ and the church.”586  By 
locating the places of God, Scripture, and Church in the economy of redemption, then, 
                                               
584 Ibid, 213. 
585 The argument is familiar by now.  For example, Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 208), 
argues, “The Spirit brings about perlocutionary effects: he creates the new people of God.  But—and this is 
the crucial point—the Spirit produces these effects by bringing about an understanding response on the part 
of the interpreting community to the canonical testimony about Christ.” 
586 Ibid, 199.   
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Vanhoozer is able to show the necessity of the Church for completing Scripture, even as 
he shows the necessity of the Scriptures in constituting the Church.   
IV.  Vanhoozer‟s Contributions to the Scripture in the Economy  
 
Vanhoozer‟s later work provides a substantial theological proposal for 
understanding Scripture which moves beyond the impasse between Frei and Tracy.  
Vanhoozer moves beyond the impasse both by articulating an argument for God‟s use of 
the Scriptures in the economy of redemption, and by placing both Scriptures and the 
Church in the broader context of the divine economy.  Discussions about methods for 
reading are set within a structure of the economy of redemption in which theological 
presuppositions form a foundation for reading.  The Scriptural texts are unique as they 
are uniquely used by God and as they relate uniquely to the Church.  Vanhoozer‟s later 
work advances the discussion between Tracy and Frei by easing the persistent difficulties 
of locating authority (Frei) and explaining disclosure in multiplicity of genres (Tracy).  
Authority, Vanhoozer argues, is located in the literal reading of these texts because God 
has used the plain sense to communicate plainly to readers.  At the same time, Vanhoozer 
shows, the various genres of Scripture do have unique disclosive potential precisely 
because God has chosen just these forms of communication for self-mediation to readers.   
Vanhoozer‟s construction of the divine economy as a series of missions is a 
particularly fruitful development in the discussion.  Vanhoozer shows that in the 
economy of redemption, God exists as self-communicative Act, Scripture exists as 
communicative act sent on economic mission through which the Word and Spirit carry 
 199 
 
out their respective missions today, and the Church exists as Christ and Spirit-led 
responder to the mission of Scripture through the work of the Spirit who makes the 
Scriptures effective in the Church.  Whether or not one is convinced by Vanhoozer‟s 
series of arguments to establish the authority of Scripture (that God is Author of 
Scripture, that only sola scriptura will solve the crisis of authority in the Church, that the 
Church‟s mission is always responsive), Vanhoozer‟s analysis of the various elements of 
the divine economy provides valuable resources for discussing the interpretation of 
Scripture.  From beginning to end Vanhoozer‟s project has been more about establishing 
the proper theological presuppositions necessary for reading Scripture than it has been 
about the development of a particular method of reading.  What Scripture is and what 
Scripture does has inevitable consequences for how Scripture is read, and this 
understanding of Scripture can only take place within the context of the divine economy.  
Hence Vanhoozer has shown that the relationship between Scripture and Church is 
essential to hermeneutical method.   
At the same time, it is not at all clear that Vanhoozer has rightly articulated the 
relationship between Scripture and Church.  Vanhoozer‟s strong “either/or” language 
creates significant deficiencies which weaken the strength of the overall argument.  
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the completeness of Scripture and the incompleteness of the 
visible Church causes Vanhoozer to take a stance of continual suspicion toward the 
Church and trust toward Scripture.  While Vanhoozer discusses the relationship between 
various parts of the economy of redemption, an apologetic for sola scriptura often 
overwhelms substantial ecclesiological reflection.  Here I will highlight several such 
tensions.   
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The first difficulty concerns Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the relationship between 
Scripture and Church as each is “sent” on an economic mission.  It remains somewhat 
unclear in Vanhoozer‟s account why the mission of Scripture must be placed on the side 
of God‟s initiation (and hence authoritative) while the Church must be only placed on the 
side of commissioned response (and hence submissive).  From a historical standpoint, 
those who wrote the biblical texts and those who assembled the canon appear to have 
thought themselves to be responding to revelation as they wrote.
587
  God guided the 
process of this human response and then incorporated Scripture into a mission in the 
economy of redemption.  It is difficult to see why the Church should not likewise be 
considered as also being incorporated into the active, mediating mission of God.  
Although one may grant that “[n]either tradition nor practice can be the supreme norm 
for Christian theology, because each is susceptible to error,”588 this also does not 
necessarily prohibit the Church from also being caught up into the divine economy and 
also used to mediate truth.  If God could use human words of human authors (susceptible 
to error), and incorporate them into an active economic mission in Scripture, it appears at 
least possible that the Church could also be so used.
589
  One of the most serious 
                                               
587 Childs (Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation, 381), claims that the early Church 
“understood [the canon‟s] formation as a response to the divine coercion of the living Word of God…It set 
the boundaries within which God‟s voice was heard.”  It also seems worth noting that the early Church 
understood their own community as the locus of God‟s communicative action as well.   
588 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 22.   
589 My suspicion is that there is a good deal of productive ground between the either/or 
Vanhoozer posits.  Some of this ground has already been claimed by Wolterstorff, Lindbeck, and Childs, 
all of whom have said they could accept some claim to divine discourse in Scripture, and yet are also 
willing to grant a greater amount of interpretative authority to the Church than Vanhoozer is willing to do.  
All three agree that some claim to divine discourse is a helpful articulation of Scripture‟s authority, yet 
Vanhoozer thinks all three give too much authority to the Church.  Their granting of interpretive authority 
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oversights here is Vanhoozer‟s lack of attention to the process of canonization.  
Vanhoozer‟s claim for divine authorship has been that the biblical texts become God‟s 
speech acts as God‟s illocutionary stance supervenes over the whole collection of texts.  
Individual genres, illocutionary stances and texts, on this account, cannot be considered 
God‟s authorship, no matter how indispensable to the illumination of God‟s speech act 
they have become.  Yet it was the Church which was used by God to collect just the right 
set of texts so that God‟s supervening illocution could become known.  As a result, the 
Church must have a more active role in the economy; to some extent it has the role of 
constituting the Scriptures.  The difficulty with Vanhoozer‟s construction is not his 
promotion of sola scriptura as a criterion of authority over the Church, but that 
Vanhoozer simply does not sufficiently explore the nature of the Church as a theological 
reality.  Vanhoozer simply follows his Evangelical tradition in emphasizing the 
distinction between the visible Church and the invisible Church, and then concludes that 
the visible Church, being incomplete, can only be a mission of response.   
A second, closely related difficulty regards the scope of Vanhoozer‟s 
ecclesiology.  Nearly all of Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology is worked out in dialogue with 
postliberal theologians, especially Lindbeck.  In this sense, Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology 
may be best appropriated as an apologetic against misbalancing the economy of 
redemption in favor of Church practice.  As such, Vanhoozer‟s project articulates a 
helpful argument for interpretive humility and the continual chastening of readers.
590
  Yet 
                                                                                                                                            
to the Church is expressed variously through a doctrine of providence (Childs), a cultural-linguistic 
understanding of doctrine (Lindbeck), or a second hermeneutic (Wolterstorff).   
590 Interestingly, Vanhoozer (Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, 22), 
claims, “A theological interpretation of the Bible is more likely to be critical of readers than of biblical 
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one theological reduction must not be countered by another.  The reduction of Scripture 
to the Church cannot be corrected by a reduction of ecclesiology to elevate Scripture.  
Thus when Vanhoozer writes, “This emphasis on the community‟s use of the biblical text 
tends to obscure the question of God‟s use of the text,” he may be quite correct in the 
contemporary climate; yet, to dismiss community use in favor of authorial discourse may 
be to accept one aspect of the economy of redemption to the exclusion of another.
591
  
Both Frei and Tracy are also critical of what they believe is Lindbeck‟s wholesale 
appropriation of authority to tradition, and they all pursue ways of establishing Scripture 
as a normative authority for the Church.  If the only two ways to express the relationship 
between Scripture and Church were Lindbeck‟s linguistic postliberal method and 
Vanhoozer‟s theo-dramatic sola scriptura method, there may be compelling reasons to 
side with Vanhoozer.  Indeed, the Scriptures must be allowed some critical authority over 
the Church.  Yet Vanhoozer does not enter into serious dialogue with any Catholic 
theologian on the topic of authoritative interpretation, and his overall arguments seem to 
suggest that the Church simply cannot ever make an authoritative interpretation of 
Scripture.  It is one thing to say that, “Church authorities do not have the mandate either 
to define doctrine that runs counter to Scripture or to invent new truth,” and quite another 
to say that the Church lacks authority to “preserve doctrine…and to pronounce doctrinal 
definitions of the faith” because Scripture stands as an authority over the Church.592  
                                                                                                                                            
authors or biblical texts…A properly theological criticism will therefore seek to do justice to the priority of 
God.  One way to do so is to guard against idols: images of God manufactured by the interpretative 
communities.” 
591 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 175. 
592 See Hans Boersma, "On Baking Pumpkin Pie: Kevin Vanhoozer and Yves Congar on 
Tradition," Calvin Theological Journal 42 (2007), 254.   
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Vanhoozer does not adequately distinguish between these two.  Since Vanhoozer does 
very little to examine the options beyond a standard account of Evangelical and 
postliberal ecclesiology, it will be difficult to find in Vanhoozer the resources to establish 
a far-reaching, constructive proposal for the Church‟s use of Scripture in its responsive 
mission in the economy.   
The next chapter will consider the work of Henri de Lubac, who shares 
Vanhoozer‟s desire to locate Scriptural interpretation in the economy of redempt ion.  
Though their hermeneutical projects vary greatly, the chief difference between 
Vanhoozer and de Lubac will not be found in their method, but in the different way in 
which each understands the Church to relate to Scripture in the economy of redemption.  
As de Lubac provides a more thorough description of the theological nature of the 
Church, it will be possible to identify helpful theological resources by which to advance a 
more complete theological interpretation of Scripture.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
HENRI DE LUBAC:  SCRIPTURE AS MEDIATION OF MYSTERY 
I.  Introduction: Placing de Lubac in Discussion with Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer 
 
In the first chapter I suggested that impasses in the discussion between Tracy and 
Frei are largely a consequence of their nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between 
text and reader.  The chapter concluded that Frei‟s central difficulty of deciding whether 
to locate Scripture‟s authority in the text or in the Church, and Tracy‟s central difficulty 
of showing that the identity of Jesus Christ is the singular subject matter of Scripture, 
cannot be resolved without placing hermeneutical discussions in the broader context of 
the economy of redemption.  The second chapter examined the work of Kevin Vanhoozer 
to show how his explicit articulation of Scripture‟s role in the economy of redemption 
provides theological resources which have potential to advance the discussion on method.  
The chapter concluded that while Vanhoozer has rightly attempted to shift hermeneutical 
discussions beyond the relationship between text and reader, Vanhoozer‟s one-sided 
insistence on the authority of Scripture over the Church has prevented him from 
completing his hermeneutical project.  This chapter will examine the project of Henri de 
Lubac in order to show how a different way of structuring the relationship between 
Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption may advance hermeneutical 
discussions between Frei and Tracy.  This chapter will suggest that de Lubac provides 
two theological insights which can help interpreters move beyond certain impasses.  First, 
de Lubac has explicitly identified the central hermeneutical issue in a Christian reading of 
Scripture as the movement from text to spiritual reality in such a way that the relationship 
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between Christ, Scripture and Church become visible.  This concern, I have shown, is 
central to Tracy and Frei, although the philosophical tools they employ prevent them 
from not explicitly identifying this hermeneutical movement.  Second, de Lubac has 
shown the intrinsic relationship between Scripture and Church in the economy of 
redemption in such a way that eases the tension of locating authority in either Scripture or 
Church.  De Lubac‟s structuring of the relationship of the Church to Scripture provides a 
way to move beyond Vanhoozer‟s investment of authority in sola Scriptura and Frei‟s 
investment of authority in the community consensus of the Church.  These two insights 
will be explored within the context of de Lubac‟s overall project.   
Ressourcement Theology:  De Lubac‟s own theological project is best located in 
the Ressourcement movement of French theology.
593
  Although labeled “La nouvelle 
théologie” by its opponents, the movement intended to return Christian theology to riches 
of Christian tradition which had been lost by a separation of biblical studies, historical 
theology and systematic theology.
594
  D‟Ambrosio describes the movement as a “creative 
hermeneutical exercise in which the „sources‟ of Christian faith were „reinterrogated‟ 
                                               
593 Other theologians commonly classified in this movement are Jean Danielou, Yves Congar, 
and Marie-Cominique Chenu, Gaston Fessard, Henri Bouillard, and Pierre Tielhard de Chardin (see Wood, 
Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 6).  
594 It appears to be Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (“La nouvelle théologie ou va-t-elle?” 
Anglicum 23 (1946), 126-45), who first applied this term to de Lubac, and associated the movement with 
the philosophy of Maurice Blondel (see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 6, and Marcellino G. 
D'Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the Recovery of the Traditional Hermeneutic (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI 
Dissertation Services, 1991), 2-3; 20-21).  De Lubac rejected the term because he saw his project as 
providing answers to contemporary questions precisely through a return to the patristic and medieval 
sources.  De Lubac was viewed as something of a ring-leader for this movement toward a critical retrieval 
of the sources of Christian theology, and his work was viewed with suspicion during his career.  After the 
publication of the encyclical Humani Generis in 1950, several of de Lubac‟s books, Surnaturel, Corpus 
Mysticum, and Connaissance de Dieu, were banned.  Yet in 1960 de Lubac was invited by Pope John 
XXIII to be a consultant for the preparatory Theological Commission at the Vatican II Council, where de 
Lubac consulted in the drafting of Dei Verbum.  In 1983 de Lubac was named by Pope John Paul II as a 
cardinal (see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 3-5).   
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with new questions,” rooted in the needs of the modern Church.595  The very name 
“ressourcement” implies a “going back” to the sources of Christian faith to bring out 
theological insights and resources forgotten or overlooked in the Church at present.  As 
D‟Ambrosio emphasizes, the “sources” mined by these theologians were viewed as much 
more than ancient texts; they were “wellsprings of dynamic spiritual life.”596  
D‟Ambrosio claims, “The events and words of Scripture, the doctrine of the Fathers, the 
Creeds and decrees of the councils, the rites of the liturgy—all of these are, for them, 
vehicles and, in an analogous sense, sacraments of the dynamic and living Mystery of 
Christ.”597  De Lubac‟s early work, Catholicism, became programmatic for the 
Ressourcement movement, as it stressed the “social character of the church as the true 
universal community in embryo, rather than as a mere external machinery for the saving 
of individual souls.”598  The Church, as the social reality established by God which 
participates integrally in the mystery of Christian faith, mediates that singular mystery 
through its sources, and these must continually be re-approached for the revitalization of 
the Church.   
The Ressourcement movement was at once a rejection of contemporary neo-
Scholastic Thomism and the modern Protestant liberal tradition.  The latter, thought de 
Lubac, denied the transcendence of Christian faith, while the former denied the intrinsic 
                                               
595 Marcellino G. D'Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 3.   
596 Ibid, 9. 
597 Ibid.   
598 John Milbank, "Henri De Lubac," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology since 1918, ed. David and Rachel Muers Ford, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005; reprint, 3rd ed.), 77.   
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relationship between history and the Christian mystery.  Neo-Scholasticism, as 
D‟Ambrosio describes it, “has virtually no historical sense.  In an existentialist world, it 
remains resolutely essentialist and objectivist, oblivious to human 
subjectivity….Hardened by its Scholastic categories, neo-Thomism remains basically 
incomprehensible to most people and is thus incapable of offering them spiritual and 
doctrinal nourishment.”599  Rationalist and liberal theology, on the other hand, tended to 
focus on “closed, clear systems” which has “impoverished theology and has almost done 
away with the mystery.”600  The return to the sources of the Christian faith, then, will 
seek to recover both the transcendence of the Christian mystery, and the intrinsic 
relationship of that mystery to the human being.   
The Influence of Maurice Blondel:  De Lubac‟s hermeneutical system is heavily 
influenced by the philosophy of Maurice Blondel, who has provided a description of the 
Christian “Mystery” which will be used by de Lubac in several important ways.601  First, 
for Blondel, Mystery is always granted as revelation, and is consequently a gift.
602
  No 
                                               
599 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 6.   
600 Ibid, 8.   
601 Maurice Blondel was the most influential philosophical influence on de Lubac, as 
Blondel‟s proposal for a distinctly Christian philosophy sets forth many of the distinctive features which de 
Lubac finds central to his own hermeneutical project.  De Lubac also influenced by many other 
philosophers and theologians, although they will not be discussed in this dissertation (D‟Ambrosio, 
Traditional Hermeneutic, 2, mentions J.A. Mohler, John Henry Newman, A. Gardeil, Charles Peguy and 
Paul Claudel).   
602 Blondel (La philosophie et l‟esprit chrétien I , 14, cited in Adam C. English, The 
Possibility of Chrisian Philosophy: Maurice Blondel at the Intersection of Theology and Philosophy, ed. 
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, Routledge Radical Orthodoxy Series (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2007), 65), claims, “We will use this word „mystery‟ in order to signify a revealed 
truth that the human spirit, left to its own resources, would not have been able to discover and identify with 
certainty.  [It is] a secret that, even once revealed, remains impenetrable in its depth.  Yet, it is not without 
useful significance, illuminating and profitable for us.  [It is] a speculative and practical teaching which, in 
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amount of intellectual striving will grasp the Mystery, since Mystery is revealed and not 
intellectually mastered.
603
  Blondel distinguishes between “enigma,” an “impasse, a 
moment of confusion, a stumbling block to thought” which ought to be but has not yet 
been solved, and a “mystery” which “by contrast, is not something that eludes but 
something to be found and entered into; it does not describe the state of knowledge at the 
end of data but rather the state of being confronted by Truth.”604  A mystery, then, is 
intelligible but never comprehensible.
605
  Since scientific disciplines are structured to 
solve enigmas, they do not possess the right tools for approaching Mystery.   
Second, Since Mystery is an opening to a dimension greater than can be comprehended 
or intellectually mastered, Mystery is approached primarily through sacramental signs 
and is always understood through paradox.
606
  According to de Lubac, all Christian 
                                                                                                                                            
this clair-obscur moment where faith and reason have to cooperate, allows us to know and achieve our true 
and entire destiny.” 
603 De Lubac (ibid, 13-14), claims that mystery “is not, therefore, something irrational or 
absurd or merely non-contradictory; but, even so, the intellectual approach will always be 
fruitless…Neither is it a truth which would remain provisionally out of reach but as human reason attained 
„adulthood‟ would become progressively more accessible.”  For Blondel, philosophy could take a person to 
the point of encounter with the very Mystery of existence, yet it could not answer that question.  For 
example, Blondel ends his doctoral thesis, (Action, 1893: Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of 
Practice, trans. Olivia Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 466), by claiming, 
“There is no middle ground or neutrality: not to do as if it were true, is to do as if it were false.  It is for 
philosophy to show the necessity of posing the alternative: „Is it or is it not?‟…But philosophy can go no 
further, nor can it say, in its own name alone, whether it be or not.” 
604 Adam C. English, The Possibility of Chrisian Philosophy: Maurice Blondel at the 
Intersection of Theology and Philosophy, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, 
Routledge Radical Orthodoxy Series (London & New York: Routledge, 2007). 64.   
605 Blondel has claimed, “We will use this word „mystery‟ in order to signify a revealed truth 
that the human spirit, left to its own resources, would not have been able to discover and identify with 
certainty.  [It is] a secret that, even once revealed, remains impenetrable in its depth” (La philosophie et 
l‟esprit chrétien I.  Autonomie essentielle et connexion indéclinable (Alcan : Presses universitaires de 
France, 1944), 229, cited in English, The Possibility of Chrisian Philosophy, 65).   
606 Henri de Lubac, (Medieval Exegesis Vol. 2, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Grand Rapids and 
Edinburgh: Eerdmans and T & T Clark, 1998), 20), emphasizes that the Latin word “sacrament” really 
means “mystery,” and hence visible things can be given a sacramental role in mediating the Mystery.  De 
 209 
 
realities (including Scripture and Church) have a fundamentally sacramental structure, 
where an intrinsic relationship exists between the visible sign and disclosure of the 
Mystery.  This Mystery can only be approached intellectually through a series of 
paradoxical relationships.  Theology (and philosophy) will always be fundamentally 
paradoxical, as they highlight the tension between seen reality and the spiritual realm to 
which it points, but which stands in tension with it.
607
   
Third, for Blondel, appropriation of the Mystery is never passive, but always 
requires participation.
608
  The truth of Christian faith is one which must be lived to be 
understood.  As a result, faith grows as it is practiced, since “perfection is in the act.”609  
Hence Blondel claims, “It is through action that the divine takes hold in man, hides its 
presence there, insinuates into him a new thought and a new life…”610  Blondel argues 
that the “thought that follows the act is richer by an infinite degree than that which 
                                                                                                                                            
Lubac (ibid), claims, “In Latin mysterium serves as the double for sacramentum…The two words are often 
simply synonyms.”  Following Augustine, de Lubac calls the sacramentum the “exterior component, the 
„envelope‟” (21).   
607 For de Lubac (The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 62), paradox refers to the very structure 
of reality, so that “Paradoxes: the word specifies, above all, then, things themselves, not the way of saying 
them.”  D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 63), claims, “The great methodological sin for de Lubac is 
one-sidedness” which would eliminate one side of tensions between nature and the supernatural, and hence 
creation and redemption, etc.  Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. 
Lancelot C. and Elizabeth Englund Sheppard (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). 182), claims, “The 
whole of dogma is thus but a series of paradoxes, disconcerting to natural reason and requiring not an 
impossible proof but reflective justification.  For if the mind must submit to what is incomprehensible, it 
cannot admit what is unintelligible, and it is not enough for it to seek refuge in an „absence of 
contradiction‟ by an absence of thought.” 
608 Blondel‟s L‟Action emphasizes that active participation is a prerequisite for the real 
understanding of lived history, and hence of Christian Mystery.  Blondel (ibid 371), claims, Faith requires 
action because, “Truth does not live in the abstract and universal form of thought… It is a gift, but a gift we 
acquire as if it were an earning.”   
609 Ibid, 377.   
610 Ibid, 380. 
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precedes it.”611  As approaching the Mystery is more than an intellectual assent to a 
particular set of truths, Mystery must be lived in order to be known.   
Fourth, because the Mystery is manifest through the sacramental structure of 
Scripture and Church alike, and because it is manifest in participation, an intrinsic unity 
must exist between Scripture and Church.  Tradition, Blondel shows, is the medium of 
participation in the Mystery, and it provides a “living synthesis” between the historical 
narrative of Scripture and the lived experience of Christian faith today, what Blondel 
calls “real history.”612 
This understanding of Mystery has significant implications for de Lubac‟s 
theological interpretation of Scripture.  First, since the scientific disciplines are structured 
to solve enigmas but are not able to apprehend Mystery, de Lubac insists that the various 
scientific disciplines which inform the interpretation of Scripture can never finally 
determine the meaning of the text, nor will they bring encounter with the Mystery.  A 
„spiritual sense‟ of Scripture, the spiritual reality to which the text points, always 
transcends that which is accessible to any scientific investigation.  Second, since both 
Scripture and Church have the same sacramental structure and mediate the same Mystery, 
de Lubac insists that the Church possesses an implicit and unique understanding of the 
                                               
611 Ibid, 371.   
612 Blondel speaks of “real history” in contrast to the history developed by the historical 
scientist.  “Real history,” says Blondel (History and Action, 237), is “composed of human lives; and human 
life is metaphysics in act.”  Blondel (ibid, 239), is against separating the two in such a way that the 
historian is given the domain of historical research and the theologian is assigned to develop doctrine which 
articulates the lived reality of the community as if they were separate, and he is against reducing “real 
history” to what the secular historian can deduce.  Consequently, Blondel (ibid, 237), claims, “It remains 
true that the historian has to make the determinist explanation as intelligible and complete as possible—but 
it remains equally true that it is his duty to leave the issue open or even to open it as widely as possible to 
the realist explanation which always lies beneath.”   
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meaning of history and has a unique ability to interpret Scripture according to its own 
self-understanding.
613
  A reciprocal causality exists between Scripture and Church so that 
each constitutes and vitalizes the other, while both mediate the singular Mystery.  Third, 
for de Lubac, the basis for all Scriptural interpretation is the “transcendence” of the spirit 
over the letter which “forms the central event of Christianity that remains continuously 
present at every moment.”614  It is Christ who gives meaning to history, unifies the 
Testaments, and establishes both Scripture and the Church to mediate this mystery.  This 
mediation of revelation is essentially sacramental, and Scripture and Church have each 
been given a particular role in the divine economy lead toward the eschatological reality 
of the totus Christus.  Consequently, all de Lubac‟s discussion of the interpretation of 
Scripture in the Church will take place in the larger context of God‟s use of Scripture, 
Church and sacrament to mediate the mystery of the supernatural in the economy of 
redemption.   
Through this understanding of Mystery and tradition, de Lubac develops an 
understanding of the relationship between Scripture and the Church in the divine 
economy which provide further resources for the hermeneutical projects of Tracy, Frei 
and Vanhoozer.  Like Frei, de Lubac stresses the centrality of Christ for all Christian 
reading of Scripture, as well as the importance of the Church‟s self-description as a 
starting-point for hermeneutical reflection.  Like Tracy, de Lubac emphasizes the public 
character of Christian faith and a symbolic understanding of Scriptural reading, in which 
                                               
613 For a detailed discussion of these three descriptions of the Church, see Susan K. Wood, 
Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 71-128. 
614 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri De Lubac: An Overview (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1991), 38.   
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the text discloses encounter with the divine.  Yet de Lubac goes beyond Tracy and Frei 
by grounding his hermeneutical reflections in a theological description of the place of 
Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption.  By situating Scriptural reading in 
this broader context, de Lubac is largely able to bypass both Tracy‟s difficulty with 
Christological reference and Frei‟s difficulty of authority.  De Lubac, like Vanhoozer, 
will alleviate certain hermeneutical difficulties by placing Scripture in the economy of 
redemption.  Yet de Lubac‟s placement of Scripture in the divine economy will produce 
very different rules for reading than Vanhoozer‟s placement of Scripture in the economy, 
since each will understand the relationship of Scripture and Church in very different 
ways.  While Vanhoozer emphasizes the authority of Scripture over the Church, de Lubac 
emphasizes the reciprocal constitution of each by the other, and the direction of both 
toward the singular Christian Mystery.   
II.  Scriptural Interpretation: Emphasizing Spiritual Reality within the Letter  
 
Although de Lubac (1896-1991) writes a generation before Frei, Tracy and 
Vanhoozer, de Lubac shows a similar concern about the tendency of historical critical 
method to reduce the content of Scripture to historical reference.  De Lubac‟s 
hermeneutical focus is always on God‟s use of the Scriptural texts to mediate the singular 
mystery of the Christian faith revealed in Jesus Christ.  For de Lubac, Christianity is 
unique among religions in its historical grounding, as God has entered into human history 
for self-revelation.  This revelation is divided into a covenant of promise (Old Testament) 
and a covenant of fulfillment (New Testament).  This twofold structure of letter and spirit 
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characterizes de Lubac‟s understanding of the relationship between nature and the 
supernatural, and hence his understanding of all reality from a Christian perspective.
615
  
The transcendent mystery of the supernatural, though always beyond the grasp of the 
human intellect, is nonetheless sacramentally disclosed in certain natural realities through 
which God has chosen to make Godself known.  Hence Scripture is unified in Christ, 
who mediates Himself to the Church by means of this witness to Himself.  This section 
will explore de Lubac‟s insistence on the unity of the Scriptures in Christ and the 
sacramental structure of Scripture by which Christ mediates Himself to readers.   
A.  Unity of the Testaments in Christ 
 
The center of de Lubac‟s Scriptural hermeneutics is the premise that Christ is at 
the same time both singular Object and Subject of Scripture.  As Object, “Jesus Christ 
brings about the unity of Scripture, because he is the endpoint and fullness of Scripture.  
Everything in it is related to him.  In the end he is its sole object.”616  As Subject, 
“Inasmuch as he is the exegesis of Scripture, Jesus Christ is also the exegete.  He is truly 
Scripture‟s Logos, in an active as well as a passive sense.”617  The goal of Scriptural 
exegesis, then, is not to search for some thematic relationship between Old Testament 
and New Testament; it is to look to the reality of Christ and read all Scripture in light of 
                                               
615 For a good treatment of the relationship between nature and the supernatural for de Lubac 
and the consequences this has for his whole theological project, see John Milbank, "Henri De Lubac," 76-
91, where he presents a clear description of the issues involved without his more idiosyncratic reading 
reflected inJohn Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the 
Supernatural (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2005).   
616 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 237.   
617 Ibid, 238.   
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Him as Object.  Yet to exegete Christ in Scripture is not to read Scripture in light of some 
new doctrinal principle or teaching; to exegete Christ is to participate in Christ‟s 
presence.  De Lubac claims that “Christ‟s exegesis, insofar as it is essential and decisive, 
does not consist of words first and foremost.  It is actual.  It is Action….The mysteries of 
Scripture are „revealed in action…‟”618  This action is both the action of God and the 
action of the interpreter.  On the side of the interpreter, Christ, as Object, cannot be 
understood without participation in Him.  On the side of the referent, Christ, as Subject, 
continually offers to the reader incorporation into the singular Mystery.   
The unification of all Scripture in Christ is what makes the Christian Scriptures 
unique among religious books.  For de Lubac, the relationship between the Testaments 
can be described neither simply by a doctrine of progressive revelation nor by the 
assumption that there is a spiritual dimension which transcends the letter.  Other religions 
bring both of these presuppositions to their religious books, yet the Christian unity of the 
Testaments goes beyond both.  The Event of Christ goes far beyond progressive 
revelation, as the “history of revelation…offers the spectacle of a discontinuity that has 
no equal, which makes the traditional idea of allegory, understood in its most profound 
essence, irreplaceable.”619  Christ reorients all of Scripture toward Himself.  The Event of 
Christ goes far beyond the assumption that Old Testament letter points to a deeper 
spiritual reality.  All religions of the Book claim that the reality to which their text points 
is greater than the words themselves, and every religion “fancies that there is some 
                                               
618 Ibid.  De Lubac (ibid, 239), claims that Christ “is an exegete, in principle, from the 
moment of his Incarnation,” in the sense that he is the unified Mystery.   
619 De Lubac, ibid, 234-35.   
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hidden meaning” in their religious texts.620  Yet the Christian faith, for de Lubac, is not a 
religion of the book, but a religion of the Word.  The movement from letter to spirit in the 
Christian Scriptures is unique because it is grounded in the “definitive” and “eternal” act 
of Christ which unifies the Testaments.  Hence, “In fulfilling” the Old Testament, the act 
of Christ “gives it new life and renews it.  It transfigures it.  It subsumes it into itself.  In a 
word, it changes its letter into spirit.”621  De Lubac‟s implication here is that one cannot, 
like Tracy and Ricoeur, employ a general strategy of reading which leads the reader to 
discover in the subject matter a content which transcends the letter and hence presses the 
reader to limit experiences.  All religions suggest this dimension in their texts.  The 
Christian Scriptures are unique because Christ, as Object of Scripture, gave meaning to 
both Testaments by entering into history and unifying them within Himself.  They are 
unique because Christ, as Subject of Scripture, continually mediates Himself through 
them in a unique manner.  Thus the Event of Christ which unifies Scripture establishes 
the unique character of Christian reading.   
It is the movement from the literal sense to the spiritual sense (often called 
allegory) in interpretation which insures that all Scripture is read as a unified whole.  De 
Lubac claims,   
Thus, using „allegory‟ as a means of going beyond the literal significance of Old 
Testament texts and finding in them the mysteries then being revealed in the flesh 
by the New was a way of showing the indissoluble unity of the two Testaments.  
Hence, the relationship of history to allegory, of fact to doctrine or of the figure to 
                                               
620 Henri de Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, trans. Luke O'Neill (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1967)., 88.   
621 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 228, and The Sources of Revelation, 90.   
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the truth was the link between the two parts of Scripture and the witness to its 
profound unity.
622
   
 
Christ, the great Allegory, is the ground upon which all subsequent allegorical 
interpretation of a particular passage can be legitimated.  The more resolutely the reader 
approaches the text presupposing the unity of the Testaments in Christ, the more 
Christian will be the disclosure yielded by the interpretation.   
B.  Unity of the Senses of Scripture in Christ 
 
For de Lubac, the spiritual senses are the threefold means of approaching the 
singular Mystery.
623
  De Lubac writes, “Each sense leads to the other as its end…A unity 
of source, and a unity of convergence.”624  The literal sense discloses the Mystery, which 
must be illumined in three intrinsically related ways.  There is an integral movement from 
one sense of Scripture to the other, which de Lubac calls a “living evolution,” so that the 
senses of Scripture, while distinguished from one another, cannot be separated from one 
                                               
622 Henri de Lubac, “On an Old Distch,” Theological Fragments, trans. Rebecca Howell 
Balinski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 123-24. 
623 One way de Lubac highlights the intrinsic unity of the spiritual senses is to relate them to 
the three advents of Christ.  Christ‟s advent in history radically transformed the meaning of the OT history 
and creating the spiritual reality of the Church (allegory); Christ is born daily in the soul of the individual 
believer, causing an interiorization of the Mystery (tropology), and Christ will return in glory at the end of 
time (anagogy). (see, for example, Medieval Exegesis, II, 138-40).  Another way de Lubac often highlights 
their unity is by showing their correspondence to the threefold Pauline theological virtues, faith, hope and 
love.  Allegory is the Christian faith, tropology corresponds to the love which is the interiorization of the 
Christian faith, and anagogy corresponds to the hope of the final consummation of the Christian faith (see 
The Sources of Revelation, 221).   
624 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 203.  See also de Lubac (ibid, 26), who claims, “But in 
Scripture itself, one professes that there is no dissociation of the two senses.  The spirit does not exist 
without the letter, nor is the letter devoid of the spirit.  Each of the two senses is in the other—like the 
„wheel within the wheel.‟  Each needs the other.  With those two they constitute „the perfect science.‟” 
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another.
625
  The whole structure of Christian reality is the movement from sign to the 
unified Christian Mystery viewed in three aspects: as the radical transposition of the OT 
in the advent of Christ (allegory), as the transformative participation of the individual in 
the body of Christ (tropology), and as the eschatological union of the totus Christus, 
Christ and Church (anagogy).  The fourfold nature of Scriptural interpretation is really 
the fourfold understanding of all of Christian reality.  Only the Christian Scriptures can 
be interpreted in a fourfold manner, because they are the privileged witness to the 
revelation of the whole Mystery of Christ who, coming in history, transformed the 
meaning of history, and invites individuals to share in this salvation history and await the 
fulfillment of history.
626
  The purpose of this section is to show the intrinsic relationship 
between each of the senses, as well as the way in which movement occurs from letter to 
spirit. 
1. Literal Sense 
 
Indispensability of the Letter:  The letter of Scripture is the indispensable starting 
point for all Christian reading for two essential reasons.
627
  First, Christian faith is a 
uniquely historical faith, and the literal sense narrates the historical events of salvation 
                                               
625 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 221. This de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 203), 
also described as a “living development” or an “organic unfolding.”   
626 See de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 8. 
627 Besides these two characteristics of the letter which make it indispensable for Christian 
faith, de Lubac notes several other less essential characteristics about the literal sense for premodern 
interpreters.  First, the literal sense is the way for beginners to enter the Scriptures, as it does not require 
conversion to be understood.  Second, the literal sense provides moral lessons for readers (see de Lubac, 
Medieval Exegesis, II, 44-45 and 70, respectively).  The distinction of this understanding of morality from 
tropology will be seen later.     
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history.
628
  De Lubac insists: “is it not essential for Scripture to recount a history, the 
history of redemptive events? Is that not, even for the unbelieving observer, the 
characteristic that most markedly differentiates the Bible from so many other sacred 
scriptures?”629  In his classic work, Catholicism, de Lubac emphasizes the historical, and 
hence social nature of the Christian faith, showing that “if the salvation offered by God is 
in fact the salvation of the human race…any account of this salvation will naturally take a 
historical form—it will be the history of the penetration of humanity by Christ.”630  For 
premodern interpreters, according to de Lubac, the “literal sense” meant essentially a 
narration of God‟s action in human history, so that stress was on the events behind the 
text rather than the text itself.  Due to Christianity‟s uniquely historical character, 
Scripture must first be a record which “delivers us facts,” and to participate in Christian 
faith we are “obliged to believe in a whole series of facts that have really come about.”631  
It is essential to Christian faith to realize that “redemption has not been accomplished in 
the imagination, but in time and in factual reality,” so that “our whole salvation in fact is 
worked out in…history.”632  Hence de Lubac states strongly, “Christianity is not one of 
                                               
628 D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 173), notes that the “letter” and “history” were 
basically “synonyms in the patristic and medieval exegetical tradition,” and de Lubac emphasizes that the 
“letter” refers to “objective facts or events in history.” 
629 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 122-23.   
630 De Lubac, Catholicism, 141.   
631 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 44.  De Lubac (“On an Old Distich,” 114), adds that 
Christian “religion is first of all a historical fact.  God has intervened in human history: the first thing to do 
is to learn the history of his interventions from the Book where they have been recorded by the Holy 
Spirit.” 
632 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 46-47.   
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the great things of history: it is history which is one of the great things of Christianity.”633  
There is an intrinsic relationship between Christianity and history so that one cannot 
explain either without the other. 
Second, the letter is the indispensable means of rendering present the Spirit.  
Summarily, de Lubac claims, “The spirit is not separate from the letter but is contained 
and, at least initially, hidden within it.  The letter is both good and necessary, for it leads 
to the spirit: it is the instrument and the servant of the spirit.”634  This necessary 
movement from history to spirit could be described as a sacramental relationship, in 
which “the letter is „the sacrament of the spirit.‟”635  Without the letter, then, the singular 
Mystery of Christian faith would never be known.  This role of the letter as means to the 
Spirit will be developed further in the section on allegory.   
Uses of the Letter:  These two roles of the letter make the study of Scripture in its 
literal sense the indispensable foundation for spiritual understanding.  Yet a great deal of 
ambiguity exists in de Lubac‟s work about the exact meaning of the “letter” which has 
resulted in difficulty for readers in explaining the relationship between letter and spirit.  
                                               
633 De Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 145, cited in D‟Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the 
Recovery of the Traditional Hermeneutic, 176, n. 123.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 75), realizes that 
many practiced a tendency “to pass rapidly over this „letter,‟ so as to have more time to give to the 
exploration of the „mystery,‟” yet he recognizes this as a problem in practice, and not in principle. 
634 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 87.     
635 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 14.  De Lubac often likens the letter of Scripture to 
wax which holds honey (the spiritual sense) (see, for example, de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 162-5 and 
The Sources of Revelation, 87).  A number of theological and anthropological analogies are also given to 
show the indispensability of the letter in leading to the divine reality.  De Lubac uses the analogy of the 
relationship of the Son to the Father in the Trinity (the Son is the indispensable means to know the Father), 
the soul to the body in a human being, and the human nature to the divine nature in Christ (See The Sources 
of Revelation, 14, Medieval Exegesis, II, 45, and II, 60-61, respectively).  These are, of course, just 
analogies, but they show the intrinsic nature of the relationship of the literal sense of Scripture to the 
spiritual senses of Scripture.   
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While some of this ambiguity can be attributed to the flexibility of the patristic usage of 
the term, part of the ambiguity lies in de Lubac‟s relishing of paradoxes in the 
relationship between letter and spirit.  De Lubac at times suggests quite varied 
understandings of the letter, often leaving the reader to discern from the context exactly 
what he meant by the term.  Overall, de Lubac appears to be more interested in 
emphasizing the relationship of letter to spirit than he is in providing a precise definition 
of the literal sense.  De Lubac describes the letter in a variety of ways that he feels are 
advantageous in illuminating the manner in which the letter hides, contains, and discloses 
the spirit.  Here I will identify four distinct ways in which de Lubac uses the literal sense.   
First, the literal sense often means the Old Testament Scriptures before the advent 
of Christ.  De Lubac claims, for example, that “Scripture has two meanings.  The most 
general name for these two meanings is the literal meaning and the spiritual 
(„pneumatic‟) meaning, and these two meanings have the same kind of relationship to 
each other as do the Old and New Testaments to each other.”636  In this usage, the letter 
corresponds to the Old Testament, while the Spirit corresponds to the New Testament.  
Here the letter was preparation for the Spirit and contains the Spirit, so that the economy 
of Old Testament history was transposed by the economy of New Testament grace.   
Second, the literal sense often means the Old Testament read without Christian 
faith.  This usage, however, provides a significant ambiguity which further complicates 
the understanding of the literal sense.  On the one hand, the “letter” could refer to the 
reading of the Old Testament by a Jewish person who refused to read it in light of the 
New.  De Lubac‟s classic text to illustrate this kind of reading is Paul‟s distinction 
                                               
636 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 225.  
 221 
 
between the veiled letter and the Spirit.
637
  The Jewish exegete, by refusing to read in 
light of Christ, would only read the “mere letter.”638  On the other hand, the “letter” could 
refer to the reading of a secular historian who insisted on reading the Old Testament text 
only as a secular history.  Using only his secular methodology, the secular exegete could 
only access the “mere letter,” since this is all that can be discerned using the tools of 
secular historical research.
639
   
De Lubac often equates these two uses of the “letter,” since the outcome of such 
reading for the unbelieving Jew and secular historian is basically the same.  As the letter 
was not allowed to operate as a sign which points to the spiritual reality, for both Jew and 
secular historian it becomes a “mere letter.”640  Failing to see Christ as its inner reality, 
the “living spirit of prophecy is no longer within it; it is a body…after the soul has been 
taken from it.”641  Equating these two uses creates a serious difficulty, however, since the 
way the Jewish person views Scripture is quite different from the way the secular 
historian views these texts.  As Susan Wood notes, the Old Testament, read in a Jewish 
                                               
637 See 2 Cor. 3:15-17:  “Whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their minds; but when one 
turns to the Lord the veil is removed.  Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there 
is freedom.” 
638 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 51, 53-54, 60.   
639 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 81.  This is the picture of the modern commentators who, 
de Lubac (ibid), says, “consider the Bible „as a book that interests them, but which does not concern 
them.‟” 
640 D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 182), claims that the letter that kills is “that 
attachment to the literal sense that blinds the interpreter to the spirit hidden within it…the obstinate refusal 
to go beyond the littera sola.”  David M. Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith: Historical and 
Theological Exegesis (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 154), notes that the 
central problem by those who create a “mere letter” was that the letter “was restricted in scope.  It failed to 
acknowledge the inner potential that would find its actuality in the Gospel and, explicitly or implicitly, 
denied the affirmation that would be later integrated into the Creed: that these things happened in 
fulfillment of the Scriptures.”   
641 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 174.  
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way, “is itself an interpretation of positivistic phenomena from a perspective of faith,” 
and hence differs greatly from the interpretation of the secular historian who first 
excludes such presuppositions.
642
  As we will see, this ambiguity has a significant impact 
on de Lubac‟s understanding of the relationship between text and event, and his doctrine 
of inspiration.
643
   
Third, the literal sense often designates the historical events of salvation history.  
As de Lubac follows the Medieval formula, the letter “delivers us facts” of history.644  
Things signify things.  Here the focus is on God‟s revelatory action in history as event, to 
which the text bears witness.  In the New Testament, because of Christ, the Great 
Allegory of the Old, the literal sense is also the spiritual sense,
645
 as the New Testament 
bears adequate and authoritative witness to the “fact” of Christ in history.  The letter is 
used to show the indispensability of history to Christian faith.  Here all history could only 
be understood rightly through the very historical event of Christ.  As we will see, 
ambiguity also exists in this third sense between the Old Testament as letter anticipating 
Christ and the New Testament as letter and allegory, showing the realized historical event 
                                               
642 Susan K. Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 34.   
643 One key difference is the issue of inspiration.  The Jewish interpreter would accept the 
inspiration of the author, and hence would understand the events of history as rendered in a particular way 
that is beneficial for salvation.  The secular historian, on the other hand, could not begin with the 
presupposition that the biblical text was inspired.  As such, the secular historian would not appreciate the 
work of God in the preservation of just this text.  This creates an extremely significant difference between a 
Jewish reading of Scripture and a secular reading of Scripture, for the Jew would understand the text as 
rendering the events of salvation history, while the secular historian would see merely a set of conjoined 
historical happenings. 
644 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 44.   
645 Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 33), claims that “the allegorical meaning is also 
historical insofar as history is the interpreted event and the principle of this interpretation is the Christ 
event…” 
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of Christ.  The concluded canon as unified in the historical event of Christ is a very 
different kind of letter than the Old Testament history anticipating the spirit.  This 
ambiguity will cause some confusion about the ongoing nature of allegory today.   
Fourth, the literal sense often means the plain sense of the text.  D‟Ambrosio 
defines the literal sense as “the sense directly conveyed by the words, irrespective of the 
intention of the human author.”646  God, as divine Author had overseen the pattern of 
words in such a way that the meaning that they render is reliable.  It is in regard to this 
usage that de Lubac insists on basing theological arguments on the literal sense only.
647
  
As this understanding of the letter deals with the text itself, the literary genre is essential 
for understanding the meaning of the letter.
648
  Figurative texts such as Song of Songs, 
despite not being a record of history, had a literal sense determined by the plain meaning 
of the words.
649
  Appreciating the importance of the plain sense of the text, de Lubac 
shows that the tradition had made a distinction had been made between the “ad litteram” 
                                               
646 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 174.  D‟Ambrosio may exaggerate de Lubac‟s 
disinterest in human authors (de Lubac and the early Christian tradition were not entirely uninterested in 
the intended meaning of the author).  Notice, for example, that de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 79), claims 
that even the “letter” itself, “as letter, had in fact a sort of „inside,‟ since, before passing to the spiritual 
interpretation, one inquired about the „intention of the letter.‟”  This at least shows some concern for 
authorial intent at this point, as this would have been an object of inquiry for all books, not just the 
Scriptures.  Yet the focus is certainly on most common sense meaning of the words to the contemporary 
listener. 
647 In fact, de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, IV, 382), claims that all “theological 
argumentation…can only proceed from the literal meaning, and theological proofs cannot be based on the 
allegorical sense” (cited in Susan Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 32).   
648 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 32.  Here she cites Genesis 1-3 as a place where 
the literal sense is a figurative sense.  Wood claims that in this particular situation, the allegorical sense is 
different from the figurative, literal sense in that the former is grounded in a Christian interpretation, 
whereas the latter is not.   
649 De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 41-44), claims that non-historical genres such as 
proverbs, parables, etc. on the one hand “have no literal sense” because they do not recount history, but on 
the other hand they are history insofar as they are a historical response to God‟s action in history which 
recounts either actions of God or commands of God.  Because “history” is as broad as “the thing done or 
the thing seen,” it can include both accounts of events and accounts of what the author wrote about. 
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(the “linguistic order”), the “ad sensum” (the “signification of the words”), and the “ad 
sententiam” (the “ideological content of the passage”).650  As we will see, the ambiguity 
between the literal sense as historical event and the literal sense as the plain sense of the 
text will result in difficulty for articulating a truly hermeneutical project of theological 
interpretation.   
 Conclusion:  Overall, de Lubac‟s use of the “letter” is usually the one he believes 
is most appropriate in highlighting the relationship of letter and spirit.  Only the specific 
context will help the reader discern whether the letter refers to the text itself or to the 
historical event behind it, to the Old Testament as anticipation of or in rejection of New 
Testament reality, and if the latter, to the Jewish reading or secular reading of the Old 
Testament texts.  Yet what must be stressed here is that the literal sense is always that 
which grounds Christian faith in history and that which intrinsically contains and 
discloses the spirit.  All four above mentioned uses of the historical sense are structured 
emphasize both of these aspects.  Thus the literal sense really cannot be understood 
without describing the spiritual sense of Scripture which is intrinsically contained within 
it and disclosed by it.   
2. Allegorical Sense 
 
Allegory as the Meaning of History:  If history discloses the Mystery, allegory is 
the Mystery disclosed in its various aspects.  Allegory is thus the intended completion of 
history.  All historical events, if they are to be understood, need a principle of reference, 
                                               
650 Ibid, 79.   
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without which they remain merely random events.  Allegory is the meaning of history, 
for it shows that all history is unified in Christ.  De Lubac claims, “At the summit of 
history, the Fact of Christ supposed history, and its radiance transfigured history.”651  It is 
in this sense that allegory is, as the Old Distich says, first of all “what you must 
believe…doctrine, the very object of faith.”652  This “theological sense of history,” de 
Lubac claims, is the only kind which really has resources to understand the whole of 
history, since it has “recourse to the final causes” which can allow the interpreter to 
understand the individual parts.
653
  As a result, far from undermining the historical 
importance of Scripture, the spiritual sense was actually “providing the foundation for the 
objective sense of history and by that very fact giving history its proper value.”654  Thus, 
de Lubac claims, “If it is…a dive into the „mystery,‟ it in no way follows that it is, as it 
has been accused of, a „flight from history.‟”655   
                                               
651 Ibid, 105.  Hence allegory, de Lubac (ibid, 107), claims, was a very useful and necessary 
tool to “construct…the edifice of the faith” and show “how all of biblical history bears witness to Christ.” 
652 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 114.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 109), explains that 
the “content” of allegory “is exactly „the doctrine of the holy Church.‟  The allegorical sense of Scripture is 
„The Catholic sense.‟” 
653 Ibid, 71.  For de Lubac (ibid), “This is why, if any not merely partial and relative but total, 
comprehensive, and absolutely valid explication of history is truly possible, this explication can only be 
theological.  Only faith anticipates the future with security.  Only an explication founded upon faith can 
invoke a definitive principle and appeal to ultimate causes.”  De Lubac (ibid, 77), calls this “total exegesis” 
and “theology itself” and even “spirituality.” 
654 Medieval Exegesis, II, 72 (emphasis his).  This is a happy alternative to the immanentism 
that de Lubac, (ibid, 71), sees lurking in many secular histories, which he calls “absolutized History.”  
655 Ibid, 100.  To show the great difference between Christian allegory and pagan allegory, de 
Lubac (ibid, 104), asks, “Where would one find, in the facts of history, or only in the thought or 
imagination of the Greek allegorists, the irruption of some „new testament‟ analogous to that of the 
Christians, an irruption which one day would have turned the ancient exegesis of the Homeric poems 
upside-down by overturning the very being of their exegete?  Where would one find…anything even 
remotely resembling the opposition between the oldness of the letter and the newness of the spirit?” 
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De Lubac never tires of stressing the unique historical character of Christian 
allegory as opposed to the allegory used by classical writers, claiming that, “Biblical 
allegory is…essentially allegoria facti,” not allegory based on the words alone, like other 
instances of ancient allegory.
656
  A fundamental difference existed between Christian 
allegory and pagan allegory, as Christian allegory was always a unification of history in 
an actual historical event, as opposed to pagan allegory which sought to reconcile 
fictitious stories and myths with “timeless philosophical truths.”657  The Christian use of 
allegory was developed from the apostle Paul, who saw his own allegory grounded in real 
historical events.
658
  While the allegorical sense is the doctrinal sense, it can never 
operate apart from the foundation of the historical (literal) sense.  Wherever there is 
spirit, there is also history.  For de Lubac, Christian allegory was based in history and 
saw history as essential, while pagan allegory was often an attempt to escape something 
embarrassing in history.  The spiritual reality cannot be disclosed in Scripture without 
attention to the literal sense.   
                                               
656 De Lubac (ibid, 88), is here citing John Scotus Erigena (In Jo., fr. 3 (PL, CXXII, 344-45), 
who argues that “mysteries are things that are handed on according to allegory of deed and word….So 
mysteries are what have both been historically done and literally narrated in both Testaments, whereas 
symbols are what are said, not done…”  See also Henri de Lubac, "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian 
Allegory," in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 165-96 for de Lubac‟s most 
pointed description of the difference between Christian allegory and pagan allegory.   
657 D‟Ambrosio, The Traditional Hermeneutic, 99.  See de Lubac, "Hellenistic Allegory and 
Christian Allegory," 165-96 in Theological Fragments, trans. Rebecca Howell Balinski (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1989). 
658 De Lubac (“On an Old Distich,” 123), claims that “even if allegory has a certain value, it 
alone does not provide the doctrine to be believed.”  For Paul‟s establishment of a distinct Christian 
practice grounded in history and not in words, see especially Henri de Lubac, "Typology and 
Allegorization," 129-64 and "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory," 165-96 in Theological 
Fragments, trans. Rebecca Howell Balinski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989).  
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Allegory as Movement from Nature to Supernatural:  The realm of allegory brings 
the reader into a qualitatively new dimension.  The transition from letter to spirit is the 
movement from nature to the supernatural.  De Lubac insists that in this movement exists 
an “infinite qualitative difference” exists, which, if diminished, would “make out of the 
allegorical sense, which is a spiritual sense, a new literal sense; and this would practically 
negate the interiority of the Christian mystery.”659  The rule of thumb seems to be that if a 
secular historian could notice the historical correspondence based on his or her own 
secular tools, observation could not yield an allegorical reading.  Boersma suggests that 
the movement from letter to spirit can best be described as a sacramental relationship.  
This means that for de Lubac, “The sacramental character of history implied that it 
pointed beyond itself not just in a horizontal, historical, but also in a vertical sense.  The 
natural-supernatural relationship should provide the pattern for the relationship between 
history and spirit.”660  No method, then, can move the exegete from history to spirit.  This 
movement is made by God, as the reader places herself in the place of submission to 
receive the mediation of God‟s revelation by Scripture. 
De Lubac‟s emphasis on the entrance into a new dimension of reality with the 
spiritual sense can be illustrated by showing his dissatisfaction for typology and sensus 
plenior.  Typology could be defined as an instance recorded in Scripture where an earlier 
historical event in salvation history is recognized to prefigure a later historical event of 
salvation history.  Typology, de Lubac feels, falls short of the radical newness of allegory 
                                               
659 Medieval Exegesis, II, 98-99.  Thus de Lubac (ibid, 108), claims, “Faith is the light „that 
makes one see the light of the spirit in the law of the letter‟…we are therefore „to be imbued in the faith 
through allegory.‟” 
660 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183.   
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because typology is grounded only in historical correspondence and not in the definitive 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
661 
  The very uniqueness of Christian allegory is 
grounded in the radical newness of the Event of Christ giving meaning to all historical 
events.  As a result, typology “does not have a foundation of its own, typology by itself 
says nothing about the dialectical opposition of the two Testaments nor about the 
conditions for their union.  It does not explain the unique passage from prophecy to 
Gospel.”662  Typology, then, taken on its own, could only diminish understanding of the 
radical newness of Christ, because typology “lacks the ability to show that the New 
Testament is something other than a second Old Testament which…would leave us 
completely within the thread of history.”663  Typology without allegory, then, would 
leave the reader in the realm of nature and consequently without apprehension of the 
Mystery or personal incorporation into it.
664
   
The movement to a supernatural dimension in the biblical texts forces the reader 
to relinquish control over the meaning of the text.  This insistence is perhaps best seen in 
de Lubac‟s criticism of the sensus plenior.  De Lubac resists any attempt use a conception 
of sensus plenior to “constitute a „scientific demonstration of the harmonies of the two 
                                               
661 Notice that for de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 144), “Scriptural allegory provides a 
justification for typology, provides a foundation for it and contains it within itself.”  Thus de Lubac is not 
arguing against typological reading; he is only showing that typology falls short of allegory in showing 
Christian newness.  See also Henri de Lubac, "Typology and Allegorization," in Theological Fragments 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 129-64.   
662 Ibid.  Typology, claims de Lubac (Sources of Revelation, 16), “has the drawback of 
referring solely to a result, without alluding to the spirit or basic thrust of the process which produces that 
result.”  Hence “it stops the spiritual impulse at the half-way mark” (145).   
663 Ibid, 144.   
664 Typology, claims de Lubac, (ibid, 144-45), “does not express the connection between 
spiritual understanding and the personal conversion and life of the Christian.”   
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Testaments,‟” as this approach will always attempt to capture knowledge at a natural 
level and will never advance to the level of faith.
665
  De Lubac insists that when reading 
Scripture, “In order to receive it, it is not enough…to „press hard,‟ to „seek‟; it is also 
necessary to „pray,‟ to „implore.‟”666  This is because the only adequate movement to the 
spiritual sense is one which takes place “on the level of faith,” which “cannot be 
something purely technical or purely intellectual,” but is “a gift of this Spirit.”667   
Allegory as Conversion to Mystery:  Since the passage to allegory brings passage 
to a qualitatively new dimension, de Lubac insists that spiritual meaning “„stems totally 
from the Spirit‟ inasmuch as it presupposes an entire grasp of the history of salvation as 
directed toward Jesus.”668  Yet this qualitatively new dimension is not simply an 
intellectually apprehended theological presupposition.  The reader must not think that the 
event of Christ in history provided the singular historical clue which would allow the 
secular historian to now decipher all history without personal faith.  De Lubac claims that 
in Scripture, “To stop at the objective datum of the mystery would be to mutilate it, to 
                                               
665 Ibid, 150-51.  Sensus plenior refers to the deeper meaning intended by God to the text 
written by the human author.  This deeper intended meaning comes to light in the reading community only 
through further revelation (e.g. the Old Testament meaning revealed in Christ), or through a deepening 
understanding of revelation in the Church (e.g. the progress of doctrine).  (see here, for example, Raymond 
Brown, “The history and development of the theory of a sensus plenior.” Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 15: 
141-62).  De Lubac‟s concern (Sources of Revelation, 151), is that the sensus plenior “presupposes a 
transposition which is impossible or unseemly without „newness of spirit.‟”  Consequently, while the goal 
of sensus plenior was to show the gradual recognition of God‟s communication in Scripture, it cannot 
incorporate the radical newness of Christ without moving from the realm of observation to the realm of 
faith (ibid, 152).   
666 Ibid, 152-53.   
667 Ibid, 152.   
668 Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 143, citing de Lubac, History and Spirit: The 
Understanding of Scripture According to Origen, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2007), 390. 
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betray it.”669  Since the Christian Mystery cannot be understood without participation, 
allegory is essentially the process of conversion.
670
  De Lubac shows this desire to read 
first for conversion rather than mastery of the text as he claims that for the premoderns, 
“It was an undefined understanding, precisely because it was an approach to the depths of 
God.  It was not a matter merely of a text being explicated, but of mysteries being 
explored.”671  As a result, de Lubac emphasizes that it is not guaranteed that those most 
knowledgeable, even in Christian theology as an academic discipline, will understand 
allegory.  He claims, “But it is not ordained by God that the most learned will inevitably 
be the most believing, nor the most spiritual; nor that the century which sees the greatest 
progress realized in scientific exegesis will, by that fact alone, be the century with the 
best understanding of Holy Scripture.”672  Allegory, then, is more than reading the 
Scriptures as a unified whole:  It is participating personally in the Mystery.   
Allegory as the totus Christus:  The Christian Mystery which is disclosed in 
allegory is not, properly speaking, the Triune God as divine Persons in themselves.  
Neither is the Christian Mystery Jesus Christ considered as an individual Person.  Rather, 
the Christian Mystery is the union of the Triune God with human beings.  In the 
movement from letter to spirit, Scripture “always shows forth the Mystery of Christ, 
indivisible.  The same unique mystery is also the mystery of ourselves and our 
                                               
669 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 134.   
670 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 20-21, cited in William F. Jr. Murphy, "Henri De 
Lubac's Mystical Tropology," Communio 27 (2000). 186.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 117), writes, 
“To pass from history to allegory or from the letter to the mystery or from the shadow to the truth, is 
without a doubt always to pass to spiritual understanding: but it is also, thereby, „to be converted to the 
faith…‟”  
671 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 34.   
672 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 157.   
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eternity.”673  Thus the Mystery encompasses Christ, Church, and all salvation history.  
The one Mystery was anticipated in salvation history and revealed in Jesus Christ (past), 
mediated to the Church by Scripture and sacrament alike (present), and anticipated as the 
totus Christus (future).   
As the meaning of history, then, allegory is the disclosure of the Mystery of Christ 
and the Church.  De Lubac emphasizes that Christ‟s Incarnation has as its goal the union 
with Church as body.  Consequently, the “whole content of the Bible” is the mystery of 
Christ and the Church.
674
  In the scope of salvation history, then, “This ecclesial 
body…must thus be said…to be „truer‟ than the [incarnate body], because it constitutes a 
more perfect, fuller realization of the divine design.”675  Emphasizing the totus Christus 
does not in any way depreciate the value of the Incarnation, but instead shows this unique 
and transformative event in light of its completion.  De Lubac shows that at times 
premodern exegetes understood the object of allegory to be Christ, yet at other times they 
speak of the object as the Church, and at times they do not distinguish between them.  De 
Lubac likens this difference in approach to the distinction drawn in contemporary 
                                               
673 Ibid, 222.  Because the Mystery is precisely that union between God and human beings, de 
Lubac also, in a secondary way, describes the human person as mystery as well.  The human being is the 
one created for, enabled, and called into this relationship as partaker of the Mystery.  In this way, de Lubac 
can, at times, speak of the human being as mystery.   
674 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 90.  One of de Lubac‟s most frequent uses of Mystery is 
the usage taken from Paul about the relationship of Christ and the Church in Ephesians 5.  De Lubac (ibid, 
92), claims, “[A]s Saint Paul said, Christ and the Church are just one great mystery: this is the mystery of 
their union.  Now the whole mystery of Scripture, the whole object of allegoria, resides in this.  This 
enables one to discover everywhere the „deeper mysteries about Christ and his body.‟” 
675 De Lubac (History and Spirit, 412), claims, “The assumption of individual flesh has a 
unique importance, of course, because it constitutes the point where God inserts himself into our humanity.  
But it is not an end in itself.  Its goal is to allow the assumption of the Church.”   
 232 
 
Christology between “Christology from above” and “Christology from below.”676  For 
the premoderns, one could consider the totus Christus from the perspective of Christ as 
head, or from the perspective of Church as body, but both must be considered in relation 
to each other.  De Lubac explains that, “The matter of holy Scripture is the whole Christ, 
head and members,”677 and because “Christ and the Church are just one great mystery,” 
one cannot really consider one reality without the other, without risking abstraction.
678
  
As head of the body, one cannot look to Christ abstractly without also including the 
Church.   
Since the Mystery revealed is the totus Christus, the Church is included in the 
allegorical meaning of Scripture.  De Lubac explains that, “For a long time, allegory was 
taken by theology to mean, and often in the broadest sense, the mysteries of Christ and of 
the Church as they appeared in Scripture.”679  As D‟Ambrosio claims, “The fact that 
biblical allegory has the mystery of the Church as part of its very object means that the 
Church and its tradition must necessarily be a principle of interpretation.”680  God has 
both ordained the events recorded in Scripture to disclose the Church as Mystery and has 
ordained that the Church, by participating in the Mystery, is the only institution that can 
understand the disclosed Mystery.   
                                               
676 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 92. 
677 De Lubac, ibid, 93.   
678 Ibid, 92.   
679 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 12.   
680 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 189.  
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Allegory Regulated by the Church:  Since the allegorical sense includes the 
Church and can only be understood by the Church, it follows that allegory can only be 
regulated within the Church.  All allegorical interpretations must be in accord with the 
understanding of the Church, since the Spirit operates both in the text and in the Church.  
Hence, “The „true‟ meaning of the Scriptures, their complete and definitive meaning, can 
really be nothing other than the meaning „which the Spirit gives to the Church.‟”681  The 
Church, as that institution which participates in the Mystery, is the only one which has an 
intuition of the Mystery, and this intuition toward which the Church yearns allows the 
Church to sense which interpretations are legitimately part of its Faith.   
For de Lubac, the Church ought to focus more on the illumination of the Mystery 
through allegory than on the regulation of careless allegorical interpretation.
682
  While de 
Lubac admits that many allegorical interpretations have been inadequate and should be 
quickly dismissed,
683
 he also insists that interpreters “not confuse them with what they 
                                               
681 D‟Ambrosio, 190, citing de Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 114.   
682 De Lubac believes that the Spirit always resides in the Scriptures to disclose the Mystery to 
the Church.  De Lubac‟s whole project of recovering the wealth of traditional insights illustrates his 
emphasis on doctrinal maximalism (D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 59, for example, claims that de 
Lubac‟s ultimate goal is “to help Christians enter into sanctifying communion with the divine principle of 
tradition which is the Holy Spirit.”)   
683 De Lubac agrees that there was need for some control on allegory.  Wood (Spiritual 
Exegesis and the Church, 49-50), notes several of de Lubac‟s criteria for limiting allegory, although none 
of these appears to have been unanimously followed either by the tradition nor by de Lubac‟s own 
judgment.  First, “divine revelation” both in the sense that the New Testament explicitly authorizes a 
particular allegory and in the sense that there is “unanimous agreement” among the Fathers about such an 
interpretation (49). Second, the analogy of faith is helpful, because it points to the one, unified meaning of 
Scripture (50).  Third, allegory should, properly speaking, flow only from allegoria facti (allegory of the 
events of history) and not allegoria verbi (allegory based on a correlation of terminology).  This kept the 
allegory always based in and dependent upon history, rather than being based in the imagination of the 
commentator (50). 
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are intended to signify”—the great Allegory of Christ.684  So long as the interpretation fit 
within the analogy of faith, it should be appreciated as being a “Christian” reading.  The 
most important thing to remember was that, as D‟Ambrosio says, “All successive 
allegorical interpretations performed by Christian commentators through the centuries are 
no more than incomplete attempts to trace the lines of this great Allegory of the Scripture 
performed once and for all by Christ.”685  No individual allegorical interpretation adds to 
the Mystery revealed in Christ, but simply seeks to illumine this Event by all of 
history.
686
   
This fundamental stress on illumination over regulation is seen in de Lubac‟s tacit 
acceptance of allegoria dicti.  De Lubac has argued that allegoria facti is distinctly 
Christian while allegoria dicti is not, as the Christian understanding of allegory is 
established on real historical events rather than from relationships drawn between figures 
in the text.
687
  However, in practice de Lubac does not see allegoria dicti as 
inappropriate, provided that it is grounded on allegoria facti, the Great Transposition of 
Christ.
688
  As D‟Ambrosio claims, “So long as allegoria facti is given first place, and the 
theological principles that establish its validity granted, [de Lubac] regards the use of 
                                               
684 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 143.   
685 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 184.   
686 De Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 99-100), emphasizes that the early interpreters “no 
longer sought to „actualize‟ ancient Scripture; they realized that it had been actualized in Jesus, once for all.  
Thus they were able to devote their attention to particularizing, in the joyful daring of their faith, the 
magnificent allegory which Scripture spread before them.  They were fully aware that, through this endless 
activity, they neither prolonged nor completed in any way the total allegorization which had definitely 
made of Scripture by Christ.” 
687 Henri de Lubac, "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory," 165-96. 
688 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic 186.  As D‟Ambrosio (ibid, 193), claims, “Thus, in 
the ancient exegetical tradition, the various allegoriae dicti are ordinarily pressed into the service of the one 
great Allegoria facti by means of the analogy of faith.” 
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verbal allegory as a matter of indifference.”689  Allegoria dicti may be fanciful, 
imaginative, and in fact mistaken interpretation, but it is not harmful to Christian faith so 
long as it directs the imagination toward the great Act of Christ.  As long as the Mystery 
is being contemplated, the maximum range of interpretations should be allowed.   
Allegory Continued in Preaching:  De Lubac sees the role of the apostles and their 
successors as that of expositing the Scriptures, the Old Testament in light of the New.
690
  
The chief duty of preaching does not concern “some „oratorical genre‟ or some sort of 
„moral teaching,‟” but to “proclaim the whole Christian faith as revealed in Scripture.691  
This means that all “Christian preaching is an exegesis, and indeed an „allegorical‟ 
exegesis.”692  What is important to note is that all successive Christian expositors, even 
up to the present time, are called to this task.
693
  De Lubac emphasizes that, “This was 
true of the first Christian preaching, that of the apostles; this is equally true of the 
preaching of those who succeed them in the Church: the Fathers, the Doctors, and our 
                                               
689 Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 171. 
690 It is somewhat unclear why de Lubac locates the discussion of “apostolic preaching” under 
the sense of anagogy (See Medieval Exegesis, II, 216-26), as it would seem that this topic should have been 
placed under the section on allegory.  The emphasis here seems to be that the apostles and their successors 
were entrusted with the task of proclaiming, for each age and context, the whole mystery of the faith, and 
this included the fourfold meaning of Scripture.   
691 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 217-18.   
692 Ibid, 222.   
693 Hence de Lubac (ibid, 219), claims that the apostles and their successors “draw the fire, 
that is to say, the light of the faith, from the pits where the patriarchs and the prophets had hidden it, that is, 
from the deep obscurity of the Scriptures,” which, “thanks to the „inspiration of the Holy Spirit,‟ [makes 
known] its content in their „expositions.‟”  The emphasis here is on the succession of the task of exposition 
as the apostles initiated it.  De Lubac claims that the “great miracle of Pentecost” in which “the disciples 
there were filled with the Spirit; they themselves became like a book written within and decorated without,” 
and hence “the miracle is being perpetuated from generation to generation” as those entrusted with 
preaching continues “always in unfolding the Scripture, as Jesus did, by relating it all to Jesus” (ibid). 
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present-day pastors.”694  Successors to the Apostles, though they have not witnessed the 
historical event of Christ (and hence could not write Scripture), are still entrusted with the 
same task of allegory.  De Lubac feels that the first successors of the Apostles must have 
understood themselves to have been entrusted with the role of carrying on the allegory of 
the apostles because,  
Up until the end of the second century, the writings later referred to as the New 
Testament were considered not as „Scripture,‟ but as the spiritual or allegorical 
interpretation of Scripture.  The apostles and evangelists were then considered 
exegetes.  Hence, the apostolic writings, in their literal sense, are already 
allegoria.
695
   
 
Thus de Lubac suggests a fundamental continuity in interpretive method between 
the apostles and their successors, for interpretation is the reading of the whole Scriptures 
as a unity in light of Christ.  Significantly, for de Lubac, the closure of the canon does not 
mean that the allegorical method of the New Testament authors was unique to their age.  
Rather, the New Testament provides the foundation for continuing allegorical 
interpretation of Scripture.  It is the role of successors to go beyond the Apostles in 
tracing lines of allegory between Old and New, as successors reproduce the same 
spiritual movement of the first Apostles.  Since de Lubac‟s focus is not on the text itself 
but on the event behind the text, de Lubac argues that all generations of successors have 
qualitatively the same access to Christ as the first apostles.  Yet it must be asked whether 
the access of the first Apostles to the historical Christ and the access of their immediate 
                                               
694 Ibid, 218.   
695 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 194.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, 216-23), 
shows this awareness on the part of the successors to the apostles, who typically write literal expositions on 
the works of the apostles, not allegorical commentaries on the apostolic writings.   
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successors to the oral tradition witnessing to that Christ is the same as the access of later 
successors to canonical, textual witness to Christ.  If the mediation of Christ is 
significantly different between these three modes, we will have reason to ask whether 
allegory can really be performed today exactly like it did for the first Apostles.  Here the 
relationship of text and event will be quite significant.   
Conclusion:  Allegory is the Mystery of Christ contained in the letter of history.  
While allegory is the meaning of history and the completion of the letter, it belongs to the 
realm of faith and therefore cannot be discerned through history alone.  The only reality 
able to discern this Mystery is the Church, which is constituted by the Mystery and 
participates in the Mystery.  The fourfold structure of apprehending the Christian 
Mystery stresses that because the unified Mystery can never be fully comprehended, 
there will always be “an incurable character of non-fulfillment which marks all spiritual 
understanding…there will always be new aspects of doctrine to bring to light and new 
applications of it to be adduced” as the Scriptures are studied.696  It is the role of the 
successors of the Apostles to continue allegory in the Church by continually tracing the 
lines of Old Testament history to the Event of Christ.   
De Lubac‟s understanding of allegory yields several significant insights for this 
study.  First, de Lubac‟s understanding of the infinite qualitative difference between letter 
and spirit goes beyond the relationship between text and spiritual reality portrayed by 
Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer.  While all see allegory as the meaning of history, and all 
have some sense of the movement from letter to spirit, only de Lubac stresses the 
qualitative difference from the realm of nature to that of the supernatural.  De Lubac‟s 
                                               
696 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 29.   
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articulation of allegory will go beyond Frei‟s emphasis on figural readings which extend 
the literal sense to the whole Scriptures.  It will go beyond Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on a 
canonical sense in which the right theological presuppositions will allow God to be heard 
in the literal sense.  And it will go beyond Tracy‟s emphasis that the subject matter of the 
text presses the reader to a limit-experience.  None of these articulations of the 
relationship between text and spiritual reality, de Lubac feels, really gets at the radical 
newness of Christian allegory.   
Second, de Lubac‟s position that the successors of the apostles ought to carry out 
the same interpretive strategy as did the original apostles will place him in a unique 
position among these four theologians, for it causes him to de-emphasize the significance 
of the completed canon for ongoing interpretation.  It must be asked whether subsequent 
allegorists really have the same role in extending allegory in the same way after the New 
Testament canon is formed as those who practiced allegory before it.  The key question 
will be, „What difference, if any, does the existence of a closed New Testament canon 
impose on subsequent allegorical interpretation?‟  It would seem that while the first 
apostles interpreted in light of their experience, subsequent apostles interpret in light of 
the closed canon.  Here the closure of the New Testament writings may have a more 
significant impact than de Lubac has stressed.   
Third, while Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer understand the literal sense more in 
terms of the plain meaning of the text, de Lubac‟s treatment of the literal sense is almost 
functional, as it focuses mainly on the way events render spiritual realities.  As a result, 
de Lubac spends very little time explaining how the New Testament text, as literal sense, 
renders the event of Christ.  Here de Lubac largely ignores the question that concerned 
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Frei so greatly:  „How is it that just this text provides disclosure and regulation of 
individual interpretation of the Event of Christ?‟  This relationship between text and 
event which is given so much attention by Frei, Tracy, and Vanhoozer receives very little 
focus by de Lubac.   
3.  Tropological Sense 
 
Relationship between Church and Individual:  As has been shown above, 
tropology is not so much an additional sense of Scripture as it is one intrinsic aspect of 
the unified spiritual sense.  Hence tropology does not move beyond allegory, but gives 
allegory specification in the individual.  Tropology refers to the “daily” advent of Christ 
into the soul of the individual believer as the Mystery is continually being interiorized, 
and hence illumines the intrinsic relationship between the Church and the individual 
believer.
697
  Just as believers could not come to faith without the Church, so the Church 
could not exist without individuals.
698
  On the one hand, “if the soul can effectively be 
united to the Word of God, this is because the Church is united to Christ.”  Yet on the 
other hand, the individual soul is the “microcosm of the perfect Church.”699  The meaning 
of Scripture, then, must be accomplished in both the Church and in the individual soul.  
                                               
697 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 138.  De Lubac (ibid), insists that “in this Christian soul, it 
is each day, it is today, that the mystery, by being interiorized, is accomplished…Moraliter, intrinsecus and 
quotidie are three adverbs that go together.” 
698 De Lubac (ibid, citing Ambrose, De myst., c. vii, n. 39 (SC, 25, 120)), claims, “The 
tropological sense presupposes, or rather, expresses the mystery: for if the souls are Christian only within 
the Church, the reverse holds: „it is within the souls that the Church is beautiful.‟”   
699 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 136, noting Cassidodorus, In Ex., h. 9, n. 3-4 and Origen, 
In Gen., h. 10, nt. 5, respectively.     
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Hence, says de Lubac, “everything in Scripture that is susceptible of being allegorized 
also can and ought to be moralized.”700   
Just as history intrinsically points to the Mystery in the Church, so history 
intrinsically points to the Mystery interiorized in the individual.  De Lubac explains the 
same relationship between tropology and history as he has shown to exist between 
allegory and history.  Hence he writes, “All that Scripture recounts has indeed happened 
in history, but the account that is given does not contain the whole purpose of Scripture in 
itself.  This purpose still needs to be accomplished and is actually accomplished in us 
each day, by the mystery of this spiritual understanding.  Only then…will Scripture bear 
us its fruit in its fullness.”701  The very plan of God in salvation history which is seen in 
the unity of the Testaments takes place for the purpose of the transformation of the 
individual soul.
702
 
Tropology and Morality:  While tropology is often referred to as the moral sense 
of Scripture, this does not mean that it refers to Scripture‟s moral instructions.  In fact, 
passages of moral instruction do not have a privileged place in tropology at all.  As we 
                                               
700 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 134.  As specification of allegory, tropology produces 
charity.  De Lubac (ibid, 141), shows this intrinsic relationship as he claims, “It is in charity that tropology 
shows itself to allegory in interior perfection: for the perfection of the Law is charity and it is at the same 
time the Christ.”  Christ‟s fulfillment of the old economy (the Law) produces a new economy externally 
(the Church) and transforms the individual internally (charity).  Because the interiorization of Christ is the 
life of charity, believers participate in this new economy in the Church. 
701 Ibid, I, 227.  See also de Lubac‟s claim (ibid, II, 138),  “Now everything that came about 
for the first time in history had no other end than that.  All that is accomplished in the Church herself had 
no other end.  Everything is consummated in the inner man.  This ought to be said of all the external facts 
related in the books of the two Testaments; it ought equally to be said of the Mystery of the Christ.  
History, allegory, tropology, draw an unbroken line from the unique redemptive action…” 
702 Lewis Ayres ("The Soul and the Reading of Scripture: A Note on Henri De Lubac," 
Scottish Journal of Theology 61, no. 2 (2008), 176), claims, “The unity of the testaments is grasped not 
merely by seeing Christ present through both, but by seeing how both point to and describe the mystery of 
the soul‟s restoration effected in Christ.” 
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have seen, de Lubac has already classified these under the literal sense and has shown 
that the Holy Spirit has ordered history in such a way that the responsive reader can 
understand and incorporate moral lessons from the text.
703
  Tropology is qualitatively 
different from moral instruction, as it refers to the interiorization of the Christian 
Mystery.
704
  It is this essential distinction between moral instruction as part of the literal 
sense and the interiorization of the Mystery as the tropological sense which occasions de 
Lubac‟s preference of the fourfold sense of Scripture over the often used threefold sense 
in the history of interpretation.  Really, it is not the number of senses which are important 
to de Lubac, but the order in which they are developed.  In the threefold schema, the 
order of the senses is history, tropology, allegory, while in the “classic” fourfold schema, 
the order of the senses is history, allegory, tropology, anagogy.  It is the place of 
tropology in the order which determines how the whole schema is to be understood. As 
de Lubac puts it, “Depending on its position, it yields either a natural anatomy and 
physiology of the soul and its virtues (the first formula) or a Christological spirituality 
                                               
703 De Lubac has claimed that the letter, as history, was a source of moral edification.  This 
kind of moral edification must be distinguished from tropology (as we will see), because it does not require 
conversion to understand.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 70), claims that all “[h]istory was...a moral 
science, which was studied with a view to improving morals…Indeed, whether it were a question of good 
acts or bad, the history that reports them always draws a salutary lesson from them, teaching people to 
imitate the good acts and to avoid the rest…What is true of every history is still more true of sacred 
history.”  Scripture, having been shaped by the Holy Spirit, was useful in teaching moral lessons because it 
provided such lessons, not just from the perspective of a human historian, but from the perspective of the 
God who grounded all morality.  While de Lubac (ibid), claims that “the very report that [the Bible] makes 
concerning the worst crimes there results for our use a „warning to turn to a better life,‟” it does so in a 
qualitatively and quantitatively greater way than other texts, because the Holy Spirit stands uniquely behind 
those examples which have become part of Scripture. 
704 Ibid, 141.  As interiorization, de Lubac (ibid), can claim that “whatever page I meditate 
upon, I find in it a means that God offers me, right now, to restore the divine image within me.”  It is the 
Mystery interiorized which transforms the reader, not the moral instruction of the text. 
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and asceticism (the „classic‟ formula).”705  If tropology is placed before allegory, the 
result is that the text in its literal (and hence natural) sense supplies the moral sense as 
general natural lessons for morality.  If tropology is placed after allegory, tropology is 
understood as an interiorization of the Mystery which allegory discloses.  Since Christ is 
the real basis for Christian morality, not nature, de Lubac claims that “only the second of 
the two orders, the one that puts allegory right after history, expresses authentic doctrine 
in both its fullness and its purity.  It alone gives an adequate rendition of the Christian 
mystery.”706  Ultimately, in de Lubac‟s understanding, tropology would simply be natural 
moral instruction without allegory, and allegory has not been grasped without the 
interiorization of the Mystery in tropology.  Christian moral action, then, is not developed 
by simply following the example of Christ, but rather is an interiorization of the Mystery 
of Christ.
707
     
De Lubac believes it has always been a temptation for both preachers and 
theologians to lose the intrinsic relationship between allegory and tropology, since the 
                                               
705 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 112.   
706 Lubac recognizes that both threefold and fourfold schemas are represented in Christian 
tradition, yet he finds the fourfold schema to be a far superior articulation of the relationship of the senses.  
Both orders, claims de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 142-43), go back to Origen, who applied his 
understanding of the threefold constitution of the human being (body, soul and spirit) to Scripture as well 
(“corporeal sense for history, psychical sense for morality, and spiritual sense for allegory (or anagogy)”).  
The threefold articulation was accepted (and even preferred) by many early exegetes because it emphasized 
the progress of moral development toward the depth of the Christian Mystery.  D‟Ambrosio (Traditional 
Hermeneutic, 113), notes that this threefold articulation “was also generally more attractive to 
contemplatives in that it expresses the degrees of the ascent of the soul and corresponds to the dynamism of 
the spiritual life.”  However, de Lubac emphasizes the superiority of the fourfold sense, because it rightly 
places tropology as an inevitable interiorization of allegory.  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 105), feels 
that this significant difference has been overlooked by many historians, resulting in a significant 
depreciation of the uniqueness of the nature of Christian of tropology. 
707 Murphy (Henri de Lubac‟s Mystical Tropology, 184), claims that it is the interiorization of 
revelation which reformulates the Christian imagination and desire toward moral action which participates 
in grace.  
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tasks of both preaching and dogmatic theology are simplified when one is not required to 
trace the intrinsic connection between Mystery and action.
708
  De Lubac chronicles the 
reduction of tropology in the Middle Ages, a reduction which he feels was inevitable as 
soon as allegory and tropology were split.  The split began when the disciplines of 
dogmatic theology and preaching became separated, with allegory becoming more 
associated with the academy and tropology becoming more associated with preaching.  
Consequently, allegory “became more theoretical, more impersonal, in a certain way 
drier,” and ultimately became the “object of theological speculation,” while tropology 
became “more practical, looking more to regulate external activity than to nourish the 
interior life,” and ultimately became the primary subject matter for preaching.709  Yet 
however natural such a separation was, de Lubac insists it had a tragic effect on 
Scriptural interpretation for several reasons.  First, as moral instruction lost its intrinsic 
relationship to allegory, it became a product of nature rather than the supernatural.  Hence 
to emphasize morals to a congregation of believers without showing its intrinsic 
relationship to doctrine inevitably depreciates the reality of the Christian life.  Second, 
the intrinsic connection of individual to Church was likewise lost, with the result that 
moral action lost contact with the anagogical hope of the union of individuals in the 
Church with Christ as head.  Third, preaching lost touch with its fundamental task, the 
                                               
708 In Medieval preaching, de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 12), notes that tropology was 
naturally given misbalanced attention over allegory, since, “It may, indeed, be possible for an overly 
profound „allegoria‟ to engender error or confusion in unsubtle minds that are incapable of following the 
preacher, whereas solid moral instruction is accessible to all and useful to all.”  Likewise, the dogmatic 
intricacies of allegory in an academic setting often did not press on to interiorization.  De Lubac (ibid, II, 
209), realizes that the genre of preaching lends itself to tropology, while the genre of commentary lends 
itself to allegory.   
709 Ibid, II, 176.   
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explanation of the whole Mystery of Christ in the unified Scriptures.  Hence the 
disassociation between allegory and tropology was devastating for both senses.   
The Process of Interiorization:  It is specifically through the tropological sense of 
Scripture that Christ reveals the reader to him/herself.  Lewis Ayres has shown that 
tropology depends on a doctrine of the soul as a spiritual meeting place between God and 
human beings, where the Mystery may take effect and elicit the return response.
710
  The 
human being, for de Lubac, has already been created with the imprint of the Logos 
within, a place that could theologically be called the soul.  Thus when the Mystery is 
interiorized in the soul, the Logos reveals the human being to him/herself.  Consequently, 
de Lubac claims that, “By taking possession of man, by seizing hold of him and by 
penetrating to the very depths of his being Christ makes man go down deep within 
himself, there to discover in a flash regions hitherto unsuspected.  It is through Christ that 
the person…becomes conscious of his own being.”711   
This anthropology which affirms the inscription of the Logos on the soul has 
immediate implications for the tropological reading of Scripture.  De Lubac sees, 
following Origen, a reciprocal effect between Logos inscribed in the soul and Logos 
inscribed in Scripture.  De Lubac writes,   
What I draw from myself with respect to the Bible, provided that it is really, in 
fact, from the depths of myself, I draw from the Bible also; since Scripture and 
                                               
710 Ayres (“The Soul and the Reading of Scripture,” 176), claims, “For De Lubac it is the 
existence of an inner spiritual core to the human person that is both the source of moral action and the 
location of Christ‟s restoring grace which draws together the various senses of Scripture.”  Although the 
soul is never defined by de Lubac, his discussion of the soul “enables De Lubac‟s account of Christ‟s 
restorative action and it provides a site for exploring the mystery of human action and the presence of 
Christ and Spirit” (ibid).   
711 De Lubac, Catholicism, 338-39.   
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the soul have the same structure, or rather the same „inspiration‟; since one and 
the same divine breath gives birth to them and never ceases to animate them…it is 
thus the sign that normally reveals my soul to me; but the converse also has its 
truth.
712
   
 
This insight shows the importance, for de Lubac, of reading the Bible‟s salvation 
history as one‟s own interior history.  The narrative construction of the individual is one 
which yearns toward the Logos.  Consequently, when Scripture is read, there is a certain 
awareness of identity between the narrative of salvation history and the individual‟s own 
narrative identity.  The narrative structure of the Bible reflects the narrative structure of 
the individual.  Consequently, de Lubac speaks of Scripture as a mirror, in which the 
individual reader reads his/her own history in the narration of history in Scripture.  De 
Lubac claims,   
In this mirror we learn to know our nature and our destiny; in it we also see the 
different stages through which we have passed since creation, the beautiful and 
the ugly features of our internal face.  It shows us the truth of our being by 
pointing it out in its relation to the Creator.  It is a living mirror, a living and 
efficacious Word, a sword penetrating at the juncture of soul and spirit, which 
makes our secret thoughts appear and reveals to us our heart.  It teaches us to read 
in the book of experience, and makes us, so to speak, our own exegesis.
713
   
 
Scripture can be described as a mirror because the Logos is already inscribed in 
the interior realm of the human being.  The claim that the Logos is written on the soul of 
every person legitimates the interiorization of the Logos in Scripture.  De Lubac suggests 
that interiorization takes effect through a double movement of, on the one hand, sustained 
contemplative reflection on the relationship between history and allegory, and on the 
                                               
712 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 398.   
713 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 142.   
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other hand, repentance and conversion.
714
  As this takes place, “Interior experience and 
meditation on Scripture accordingly tend to merge in a unique „experience of the Word,‟” 
in which each deepens and furthers the other.
715
 
Conclusion:  Tropology is an inevitable aspect of the spiritual meaning of 
Scripture as it is the personal interiorization of the Mystery.  What is useful about de 
Lubac‟s model is his recovery of an integrated life of discipleship through which the 
Scriptures (history and meaning) are interiorized or assimilated to the reader as the reader 
is converted to the Mystery they reveal.  The Christian moral life, for de Lubac, is not 
based primarily in a set of biblical or traditional rules, or in a following of the moral 
example of Christ.  Instead, spiritual reorientation takes place as Christ is present to the 
reader as the reader reads his/her own history in light of God‟s action in history 
culminating in Christ.
716
  It would be interesting to speculate about de Lubac‟s response 
to the debate between the narrative theologies of Tracy and Frei.  De Lubac would likely 
agree with the narrative construction of the individual, yet would add an important 
addendum: the human being is so structured as the Logos is inscribed on the individual 
soul.  This would provide a theological description which is much more akin to Tracy‟s 
understanding of human beings than Frei‟s and would provide a valuable ontology to 
supplement the postliberal descriptions of the role of narrative.  Yet, on the other hand, de 
                                               
714 De Lubac (History and Spirit, 421), claims that “the essential work of the Christian will be 
meditation on Scripture, in order to achieve an understanding of it.  But, on the other hand, since this 
understanding of Scripture is identically the act of listening to what the Word makes heard interiorly, it 
necessarily presupposes purification of the soul.”   
715 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 142.  De Lubac (ibid, 174), claims, “When the Word 
comes to the soul, it is to instruct her in wisdom, and this understanding of the soul with the Word” is not 
“imaginary;” rather, “the mystery interiorizes itself within the heart, where it becomes experience.” 
716 Ibid, 140-41.   
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Lubac would almost certainly side with Frei in his insistence to read one‟s own 
experience in light of Scripture rather than to read Scripture with correlation to one‟s own 
experience.  The incorporation of the Logos in Scripture stands logically and 
ontologically prior to the inscription of the Logos on the individual soul, and it is the soul 
which is incorporated into the Mystery through Scripture.  Furthermore, the means by 
which the Logos incorporated in Scripture meets with the Logos-inscripted soul is the 
ongoing inspiration of the Holy Spirit.  Here it will be de Lubac‟s account of God‟s use 
of Scripture which gives his understanding of tropology theological density.   
4. Anagogical Sense 
 
The Union of the Senses:  The sense of anagogy anticipates the union of the four 
senses of Scripture in the eschatological return of Christ.  De Lubac claims, “The doctrine 
of the four meanings of Scripture (history, allegory, tropology, anagoge) is fulfilled and 
finds its unity in traditional eschatology.  For Christianity it is a fulfillment, yet it is, in 
this very fulfillment, also an expectation…real anagogy is, therefore, always 
eschatological.  It stirs up in us the desire for eternity.”717  The movement from allegory 
to anagogy is not a further passage to a greater reality, since the Church and individual 
                                               
717 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 217.  As the unity of the threefold spiritual sense of 
Scripture can thus best be seen in the anagogical sense, it is only fitting that de Lubac devotes over half of 
his chapter on anagogy in Medieval Exegesis II to the unity of the senses (See “Anagogy and Eschatology” 
in Medieval Exegesis, II, 179-226, where de Lubac devotes 17 pages to anagogy and 29 pages to the unity 
of the spiritual senses). 
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already participate in the Mystery.
718
  Yet the fourfold Christian apprehension of reality 
can only be seen as unified as it is directed toward anagogy.   
Anagogy unifies the spiritual senses of Scripture by “achieving a synthesis” 
between allegory and tropology which “is neither „objective‟ like the first nor „subjective‟ 
like the second.”719  Consequently, both allegory and tropology are “contained within 
anagogy, as the first and the second coming of Christ are included within the last.”720  
Anagogy contains the eschatological hope of the “objective” content of allegory, the 
union of the totus Christus.  Although “the whole mystery of salvation had undoubtedly 
been revealed,” it will “not fully be grasped” until the end of time.721  God‟s revelation is 
presently accessible only to faith, whereas at the end of time it will be accessible to 
“another sort of knowledge” (the “face to face” of 1 Cor. 13 rather than the “mirror”).  
Thus allegory, although it is the full revelation of the Mystery, can only be described as 
an “image” and a “promise” of what is to come.722  Further, anagogy contains the more 
specified hope of the “subjective” sense of tropology as the individual is fully 
incorporated into the totus Christus.  Tropology is inherently ordered toward anagogy, 
                                               
718 De Lubac (Ibid, 183), emphasizes that with the understanding of allegory, the believer now 
has “the very reality of salvation which henceforth is inserted in history and immediately offered to us…he 
has already, albeit still secretly, penetrated into the kingdom.” 
719 Ibid, 187 
720 Ibid, 186.  Because anagogy is the final union of the allegorical and tropological senses, it 
is natural that two strands of anagogy are discerned within the Christian tradition: Doctrinal anagogy as the 
theological study of eschatology which focuses on the fulfillment of allegory as all things are summed up in 
Christ, and interior anagogy as the hope for full interiorization of the Mystery which focuses on the 
fulfillment of tropology as the individual soul is united both to Christ as Head and Church as Body (see 
ibid, 181-82).  Since anagogy remains eschatological hope at the present time, doctrinal and interior 
anagogy can be distinguished.   
721 Ibid, 182.   
722 Ibid, 182.   
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since “it is in each of the members of his mystical body that Christ, at the end of time, 
completes the work of the Father.”723  Furthermore, anagogy unifies the literal sense with 
the spiritual senses, as Christ returns in glory within history to unify all history within 
Himself.   
The Scriptural sense of anagogy must be distinguished from what de Lubac calls 
total anagogy.  Scriptural anagogy is the hope for the final union in Christ, while total 
anagogy is its actual arrival in history.  Total anagogy will occur when faith becomes 
sight, the moment of union of doctrinal and interior anagogy when the totus Christus is 
complete.  This “fully concrete anagogy,” or “total anagogy” is “reserved for the 
„fatherland,‟” because “Mystical contemplation is not yet vision.”724  Thus while anagogy 
as an exegetical practice is the sense which yearns for completed anagogy, the time when 
Scripture is “merged with the great Book of Life,” and hence will reveal “its final 
secrets,” total anagogy is the moment this takes place.725  At this final realization of 
anagogy, sacramental signs from the current divine economy will no longer be needed for 
mediation of the Mystery, and hence at the final union of the senses the whole of 
Scripture will give way to the unmediated presence of the Mystery.
726
   
Immanentism and the Breakdown of Anagogy:  Throughout his career, de Lubac 
was continually concerned about the encroachment of immanentism, the loss of the 
                                               
723 Ibid, 186-187.  As de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 218), says, “this spiritual life must 
then open out into the sun of the kingdom, at the end of time, which is the object of anagoge—for what we 
now realize in Christ through deliberate acts of will is exactly what will one day, after it has been freed of 
all obstacles and all obscurity, be the essence of eternal life.” 
724 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 192.   
725 Ibid, I, 85-86.   
726 Following Augustine, de Lubac (ibid, II, 189) emphasizes that “The just and the 
saints…would enjoy the Word of God „without reading, without letters.‟” 
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dimension of eschatological hope as Christian faith is reduced to historical progress.  De 
Lubac suggests that this tendency arose during the Middle Ages, as theology became a 
product of the monastery.  De Lubac highlights a correspondence between the rise of 
monasticism and the decrease in eschatology, as a misbalance emerged which tilted 
attention toward the “interior life” and away from “the end of history.”727  Hence, “As 
spiritual individualism gained ground, the great dogmatic vision became blurred,” as 
“morality and spirituality, though still referred to as tropology and anagogy, split in two, 
and this was at the expense of eschatology.”728  De Lubac agrees with Congar that “lack 
of the eschatological sense…represents the most crucial defect arising from 
scholasticism.”729  Without a firm sense of Christ‟s eschatological Advent in history, 
anagogy “tends to become, on the one hand, a process of natural mysticism, and, on the 
other, a chapter of natural theology.”730  This reduction of Christian faith, de Lubac 
argues, is the chief danger of the Church today, as it tends to eliminate the Mystery in the 
Christian vision of reality and reduce Christian faith to an expression of human progress.  
In the section on ecclesiology I will show how de Lubac‟s insistence on the anagogical 
sense of Scripture matched his insistence on the Church‟s eschatological dimension.  The 
integral unity of the Christian vision of reality constitutes the fourfold understanding of 
both Scripture and Church.   
                                               
727 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 52-53.   
728 Ibid, 53-54.   
729 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 195, citing Yves Congar, “Le Purgatorie,” in Le myst. de 
la mort et sa célébration (1951), 312.   
730 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 195.   
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Conclusion:  Since anagogy is, for de Lubac, the dimension in which all the 
senses of Scripture are united, analysis of anagogy shows the relationship of all the 
spiritual senses.  This examination of the different senses of Scripture highlights certain 
key points for de Lubac‟s understanding of Scripture and all of Christian reality.  First, 
there is an intrinsic relationship between letter and spirit, so that Christian faith cannot be 
adequately expressed without both.  The believer cannot access the Mystery without the 
letter, and the letter is incomplete without the spiritual senses.  Second, the three spiritual 
senses of Scripture are not so much different ways to read the text as they are mutually 
complementary aspects of being brought into contact with the one unified Mystery of 
Scripture: the union between God and human beings in Christ.  None of these senses of 
Scripture could be removed from the Christian understanding of reality without the 
collapse of the integral Christian vision.  It is impossible to practice one of the spiritual 
senses in isolation from the others, just as it is impossible to practice faith, hope or love 
in isolation from the others or to understand the Mystery of Christ without one of His 
three advents.  There will, then, be a reciprocal deepening in all the spiritual senses when 
any one of them is rightly engaged.  Third, the senses of Scripture are dimensions of an 
integral understanding of Christian reality, which cannot be understood in isolation from 
the divine economy.  It is only as readers understand the place of Scripture in the 
economy that they will understand the way in which the spiritual senses are related to one 
another.   
C.  Scripture‟s Role in the Economy 
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Since the letter of Scripture discloses the spiritual sense, and since the spiritual 
sense is inaccessible without the work of the Spirit, the very distinction between letter 
and spirit shows that God must use the Scriptures in a unique way for communication.  
While Tracy and Frei use literary theory and philosophical reflection to articulate the 
causal relationship between text and content rendered, de Lubac wishes to place the 
discussion of how the letter discloses the spirit within the broader discussion of God‟s 
ongoing use of Scripture in the divine economy.  In this section, I will show how de 
Lubac understands the spiritual sense of Scripture to be, in many ways, equivalent to 
God‟s communicative action.  I will suggest that while de Lubac‟s articulation of the 
relationship helpfully shows the way in which Scriptural reading discloses spiritual 
reality, his project also presents a fundamental ambiguity about the way in which the 
literal sense of Scripture participates in God‟s communicative action.  The ambiguity will 
be illumined in this section so that in the final chapter I will be able to suggest that the 
projects of Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer provide just the resources to advance de Lubac‟s 
project.   
1.  God‟s Use of Scripture  
 
For de Lubac, the text possesses a quasi-sacramental character and a 
communicative character as it is used by God to mediate the Mystery.  Theological 
categories of presence, inspiration, authorship, and speaking all take priority over literary 
theory in describing God‟s use of the Scriptural text.  This section will describe the 
communicative character of the texts of Scripture under the central category of 
inspiration.  De Lubac continually emphasizes God‟s presence in and communication 
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through the texts as being the spiritual sense of Scripture.  Since the spiritual sense of 
Scripture is God‟s communication through the texts, the category of ongoing inspiration 
dominates de Lubac‟s work.  At the same time, de Lubac is somewhat ambiguous about 
the way in which the literal sense of the text participates in God‟s communicative action.  
This section will explore the way in which de Lubac articulates God‟s communication to 
readers through both the spiritual sense and the literal sense.   
Inspiration in the Spiritual Sense:  To speak of inspiration in the spiritual senses, 
of course, is to speak tautologically, since de Lubac insists that the spiritual sense is 
inaccessible without the action of the Spirit in the reader.  The whole recovery of spiritual 
exegesis has as one of its goals the explanation of the Spirit‟s role in the entire process of 
Scriptural mediation, from the inspiration of original authors to the inspiration of texts to 
the inspiration of readers.  Yet when de Lubac speaks of inspiration, his focus is usually 
on the ongoing aspect of inspiration, in which the Spirit continues to mediate the Mystery 
to the believer by means of the spiritual sense of Scripture.  This spiritual mediation is 
perhaps the defining characteristic of de Lubac‟s whole hermeneutical project, as the very 
distinction of “letter” and “spirit” emphasizes the Spirit‟s involvement in the text beyond 
the letter.  In a summary statement, de Lubac emphasizes,   
It is not only the sacred writers who were inspired one fine day.  The sacred books 
themselves are and remain inspired.  It can and must be said of them, with 
especially good reason, what Saint Augustine said of all the beings of creation: 
„God did not create them and then depart from the scene.  They come from him 
and exist in him.‟731 
                                               
731 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 81.  Significant also is de Lubac‟s discussion of Origen‟s 
understanding of inspiration.  De Lubac (History and Spirit, 300-301, translated and cited in D‟Ambrosio, 
Traditional Hermeneutic, 146), claims that Origen “focused upon the objective inspiration of the Book 
itself,” yet de Lubac‟s emphasis is that “That does not only mean that its origin is supernatural….It 
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While not denying inspiration of the original texts, de Lubac‟s emphasis here is 
clearly on the Spirit‟s continual action within the texts rather than the providential 
ordering of the original documents.  De Lubac is concerned that theories of inspiration 
are often developed for apologetic reasons to safeguard God‟s past action in the text.732  
Furthermore, de Lubac continually worries that believers will see the inspired Scriptures 
simply as a warehouse of dogmatic propositions which need only to be mined and applied 
in the Church.
733
  Both tendencies, De Lubac thinks, ignore the intrinsic unity between 
letter and spirit and tend toward extrinsicism.  To avoid this error, de Lubac emphasizes 
the passage to the spiritual sense as the moment when the communicative action of God 
takes place.  This communication is best described as spiritual communion, and hence is 
grounded in, but does not take place in, the literal sense.  
This kind of ongoing inspiration is better described as presence than as 
providential action.  De Lubac does not really distinguish between the continued 
inspiration of the Holy Spirit and Scripture as an incorporation of the Logos.  In fact, 
there is such a close connection between the two that ongoing inspiration can only be 
understood in light of de Lubac‟s understanding of the incorporation of the Logos in 
                                                                                                                                            
signifies moreover and above all, as we have seen, that this Spirit dwells in it.”  De Lubac, then, shifts 
emphasis away from Origin‟s focus on inspiration of the text and onto the ongoing aspect of inspiration.  
732 See, for example, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 62-63), is dissatisified that in 
contemporary “treatises on hermeneutics…there is much more discussion about the inspiration of the 
sacred writers than about the inspiration of Scripture.”   
733 Ibid, 225-26.  De Lubac sees this problem in Protestant theology, in which only the literal 
sense is accepted and the ongoing speaking action is the application of certain dogmatic truths in the text to 
the contemporary Church.  He also sees this problem in Catholic neo-Thomism, as many theologians 
suggested that the Church could continually find hidden dogmatic truths in Scripture which the Spirit 
originally placed in the text to be found by the Church at the proper time.    
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Scripture.
734
  In History and Spirit, de Lubac claims, “In his Scripture as in his earthly 
life, Origen thought, the Logos needs a body; the historical meaning and the spiritual 
meaning are, between them, like the flesh and the divinity of the Logos.”735  Just as the 
Spirit prepared a physical body for the Logos so that God‟s revelation could take place, 
so the Spirit prepares a literary body for the Logos so that God‟s revelation could become 
effective in the Church.  The Spirit is the active agent in both, and the Spirit uses the 
physical and literary bodies to manifest the Mystery which transcends them both.  
Scripture, then, is characterized by the continual presence of God, just as was the 
humanity of Christ.  De Lubac emphatically claims,  
Within the Scripture, God resides; by the Scripture, God makes himself known; 
the mystery of the Scripture is the very mystery of the Kingdom of God…Thus 
Scripture is not merely divinely guaranteed.  It is divinely true.  The Spirit did not 
merely dictate it.  The Spirit immured himself in it, as it were.  He lives in it.  His 
breath has always animated it.  Scripture is „fertilized by a miracle of the Holy 
Spirit.‟736   
 
Since Christ and the Spirit of Christ are continually present in Scripture, communication 
to the believer is always available through the movement from letter to the spirit of 
Scripture.   
                                               
734 It is significant that for de Lubac, the Spirit is always the Spirit of Christ.  Wherever Christ 
is incorporated, the Spirit is always present mediating the Mystery.  Distinguishing between aspects of the 
Spirit‟s work as, on the one hand, the incorporation of the Logos, and on the other hand, continual 
inspiration of the text to the reader was not much of a priority for de Lubac, as his program sought to see 
these as the same mediation of the Mystery. 
735 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 104.  Boersma (Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental 
Ontology, 161-62), suggests a close link between “Incarnation and the inspiration of Scripture” and claims 
that “the medieval mindset had realized that at the divine level much more was at stake than just a 
comparison [between text and human flesh],” since ultimately Christ is the Object of both, and both are 
used by the Spirit to reveal Christ.   
736 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 82, citing Anselm, De Concord, q. 3, c. 6 (PL 157: 528 
B).   
 256 
 
It is within this discussion of the ongoing inspiration of the Spirit that de Lubac‟s 
comments about God‟s speaking action in the text ought to be located.  De Lubac insists 
that “the Word of God…speaks to us still” in Scripture, “reaching the depth of our souls 
as the limits of the universe.”737  A primary purpose of Scripture is to mediate God‟s 
communication to human beings, yet de Lubac does not emphasize the role of God‟s 
speaking in the literal sense.  On the contrary, De Lubac claims that Scripture “is not a 
document handed over to the historian or thinker, even to the believing historian or 
thinker.  It is a word, which is to say, the start of a dialogue.  It is addressed to someone 
from whom it awaits a response…a return movement.”738  Speaking here is attributed to 
the spiritual sense of Scripture, as de Lubac emphasizes that while the historian may see a 
document, the purpose of Scripture is only fulfilled as the believer hears God‟s voice.739  
This speaking is inaccessible at the level of the letter.  Primarily in de Lubac‟s work, the 
literal sense points to events, which, when contemplated in light of Christ, open the 
reader to the speaking action of God.   
Normally, then, God‟s speaking action in the text is identified with the Spirit‟s 
ongoing inspiration of the text and reader.  The speaking that takes place in Scripture is a 
twofold action:  It is a disclosure of the Mystery to the reader and a transformation of the 
reader which enables understanding.  Notice the twofold action by God in this extended 
quote: 
                                               
737 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 81.   
738 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 346-47.   
739 Due to the action of the Spirit in the text, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 223), 
claims, “An old text can, by means of allegory, always make further aspects of the newness apparent; the 
new mystery can always be further interiorized and can always introduce eternity still more deeply into the 
heart.”  
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It is the same God who gives us scripture and makes it understood; what appear to 
be two successive acts on his part are in reality but one.  The Spirit communicates 
to the sacred text a limitless potentiality, which therefore entails degrees of 
profundity which can go on and on.  No more than this world was Scripture, that 
other world, created once for all: the Spirit „creates‟ it still, as if every day, to the 
extent that he „opens‟ it.  Through a wondrous and precise correlationship, he 
„expands‟ it to the extent that he expands the understanding of him who receives 
it…The volatus of the contemplative soul, no matter how far into the heavens of 
Scripture it might carry the soul, will never cause it to collide at any frontier, for 
both space and flight are provided, proportionately.  This is a bold view indeed, 
but, properly understood, the boldness is precisely the boldness of faith.
740
 
 
God gives Scripture, opens it for understanding, and uses it to move the individual 
soul toward union with God.  On the one hand, Scripture “expands” to the reader, and on 
the other hand, the reader is “expanded” to Scripture.741  Speaking, then, is the drawing of 
the individual into the unified Mystery, and takes place as one enters into the spiritual 
sense.   
Inspiration in the Letter:  While de Lubac‟s emphasis is on the ongoing aspect of 
inspiration in the spiritual sense, his insistence on the uniqueness of God‟s action in 
history leads him to articulate God‟s providential preservation of those events in the letter 
of Scripture as well.  On account of the intrinsic unity of the literal and spiritual senses in 
Scripture, inspiration must be attributed to both.
742
  De Lubac insists that because “God 
                                               
740 Ibid, 225-26.  De Lubac (ibid, 223), further claims, “The Word of God never stops creating 
and burrowing within a man who makes use of his capacity to receive it, so that the understanding which 
also believes can grow indefinitely” (emphasis mine).      
741 De Lubac (ibid, 224), claims, “Scripture…„moves forward with those who read it.‟… 
Scripture, which contains God‟s revelation about himself, is, we might say, expandable—or penetrable—to 
an infinite degree.”  Yet at the same time, de Lubac (ibid, 157), suggests, “As a result of the revealing 
unction of the Spirit, our mind is expanded for the understanding of the Scriptures.”     
742 De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 26), claims, “To tell the truth, from the start they even 
constitute really only one.  The spiritual sense is also necessary for the completion of the literal sense, 
which latter is indispensable for founding it; it is therefore the natural term of divine inspiration, 
and…‟pertains to the original, principle plan of the Holy Spirit‟…The spirit is not outside the history.” 
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has intervened in human history…the first thing to do is to learn the history of his 
interventions from the Book where they have been recorded by the Holy Spirit.”743  De 
Lubac makes it clear that the Holy Spirit is involved in the letter and has providentially 
ordained that just these events are preserved.  Here the primary role of the Spirit in the 
inspiration of the letter seems to be the providential action of insuring that the account 
inscribed by the human authors was adequate for salvation history.  The focus, as usual, 
is on the events rather than the text itself, and what is required of the text is that it is a 
reliable mediator of events.   
Yet at times de Lubac goes further and describes the Spirit as having an integral 
role in the authorship of the text in such a way that the texts themselves have a certain 
role in salvation history beyond merely leading readers to events.  This is seen in several 
ways:  First, the Spirit seems to have been responsible for the recording of events which 
were not pertinent to salvation history but which would provide moral lessons for readers.  
Here we are referring to those moral lessons contained in the literal sense, not tropology.  
For example, de Lubac claims that the Spirit saw fit to record certain ignoble instances in 
history, events not part of God‟s intervention in history, in order to provide moral lessons 
for readers.  Noting that God‟s providence moves ahead of the biblical authors, de Lubac 
speaks of “the whole Old Testament” as having “value as prophecy,” so that even “a 
disgraceful act,” when providentially recorded in Scripture, “becomes a prophecy.”744  
Even the “less worthy” parts of Scripture, “made of rather gross material,” are part of 
God‟s prophetic plan, because “the Holy Spirit has turned a precious content within them 
                                               
743 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 114.   
744 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 64.   
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to our intention.”745  Whatever the intent of the human authors, the Spirit orchestrated the 
content in such a way that it is useful today.  De Lubac suggests that “if the Holy Spirit 
had perceived no shame in mentioning such histories, we have still less reason to disguise 
them.”746  Hence the Spirit actively inscribed moral lessons in the texts during their 
composition.   
Second, because the early Church assumed that the Spirit authored the whole 
Scriptures, they consequently assumed that even the difficult passages of Scripture must 
have meaning, even if an interpreter could not immediately discern them.  In fact, it was 
assumed that the Holy Spirit placed difficulties into the literal sense so that readers would 
be humbled and would be required to think more deeply into the truths of Scripture.
747
  
The early readers “took the opportunity to admire the „magnificent and salutary‟ art of the 
Holy Spirit, who knows how to pacify our hunger with the clear passages and to prevent 
satiety by means of the obscure ones…The clarity of the first illuminates us; the difficulty 
of the second keeps us breathless.  Thus, made for all, helpful to all, Scripture is always 
adapted to all.”748  Hence one primary purpose of unclear passages was develop the 
character of the reader.  Since the Church believed that the Spirit authored the text, one of 
the goals of premodern exegesis was to show that the Spirit was in agreement with 
Himself throughout the text.  Since all of Scripture “has the same God as author,” the 
                                               
745 Ibid. 
746 Ibid, 69.   
747 Ibid, 74-76.  See William M. IV Wright, "The Literal Sense of Scripture According to 
Henri De Lubac: Insights from Patristic Exegesis of the Transfiguration," Modern Theology 28, no. 2 
(2012)., 257.   
748 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 75.   
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exegete “works on it until one can finally say: „All the divine writings stand together at 
peace with each other.‟”749  Exegesis of the literal sense necessarily included the 
reconciliation of difficult passages, since interpreters must assume that the divine Author 
inscribed them purposefully.   
Although de Lubac stresses ongoing inspiration in the spiritual senses, he also 
accepts the providential and even authoring action of the Spirit in the composition of the 
literal sense of the Scriptures, which insures in just these texts their unity, their reliability, 
and their intrinsic connection between the literal and spiritual senses.  The distinction 
between providence and authoring is important here, because it highlights the distinction 
between the literal sense as history and the literal sense as the plain reading of the words.  
The Spirit providentially insured the literal sense to be a reliable rendering of God‟s 
action in history, and the Spirit authored the literal sense to communicate just those 
moral lessons and plain meaning of the words which will draw the reader into the 
Mystery.  I will show in the next section that this distinction between text and event is 
quite significant for our discussion, as Vanhoozer, Tracy and Frei are all focused on the 
literal sense of the text, while this aspect remains the least developed for de Lubac.   
2.  The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality  
 
De Lubac has argued for the necessity of spiritual understanding in reading 
Scripture, seeking to demonstrate that fourfold Christian exegesis flows inevitably from a 
holistic Christian vision of reality.  Both letter and spirit form an indissoluble unity in 
                                               
749 Ibid, 78. 
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Scripture.  Yet to move from theological vision to hermeneutical explanation, it will be 
necessary to explore exactly how the letter discloses the Mystery.  It is in this movement 
from letter to spirit that the importance of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical program will begin 
to emerge.  In this section I will evaluate the relationship between the text of Scripture 
and the event it signifies in order to show a significant tension in the relationship between 
letter and spirit.
750
  I will suggest that de Lubac‟s work does not adequately articulate the 
movement from text and signified historical event, and consequently that it does not enter 
into adequate hermeneutical discussion about the relationship between letter and spirit.  
Yet I will suggest that these difficulties are significantly eased by de Lubac‟s insistence 
that the understanding the way Scripture as text mediates the spiritual reality is only be 
possible in light of how God uses the biblical text in the divine economy.  So long as the 
place of Scripture in the economy is clearly articulated, hermeneutical method will not be 
the decisive factor in gleaning theological meaning in Scripture.   
A fundamental ambiguity exists throughout de Lubac‟s writings about the 
relationship of the Scriptural texts to the historical events they signify.  As we have seen, 
when de Lubac speaks of the letter, he sometimes means the plain sense of the text, and 
at other times he means the historical events to which Scripture points.  For de Lubac, 
historical reference (objective history—the events themselves) is typically given priority 
                                               
750 Articulating de Lubac‟s understanding of the transition from letter to spirit is complicated 
by several factors.  First, de Lubac relishes a number of paradoxes to describe the relationship which are 
difficult to systematize.  Spirit is at times in the same discussion opposed to the letter and the fulfillment of 
the letter.  Second, de Lubac desires to represent the breadth of the whole Christian tradition, and therefore 
provides a wealth of quotes which are difficult to reconcile systematically.  Third, a genuine ambiguity 
exists in de Lubac‟s own thought between the relationship of the letter of the text to the events of history 
which make it unclear which letter de Lubac is referring to.  Fourth, the relationship between letter and 
spirit must be seen in light of de Lubac‟s whole understanding of Christian reality in all its various forms: 
the relationship of nature/supernatural, Church as divine and human, sacramental presence, etc.   
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over textual sense (subjective history—Scriptural witness to those events).751  De Lubac 
makes a key distinction between “history in the objective sense as a past event and 
history in the subjective sense as a report of that past event by witnesses”752  When de 
Lubac claims that “the letter is „the sacrament of the spirit,‟” he insists that this refers to 
the letter “not Scripture as text, but sacred history as contained in Scripture…since 
spiritual meaning is not the meaning of words but the meaning of things.”753  
Furthermore, de Lubac insists that “to discover…allegory, one will not find it properly 
speaking in the text, but in the realities of which the text speaks; not in history as 
recitation, but in history as event…allegory is indeed in the recitation, but one that relates 
a real event.”754  It is the emphasis on things signifying things that forms the basis of all 
allegorical interpretation.  The text leads the reader into the events, and the events 
prefigure and signify other events.  Theologically, it seems clear that the historical events 
themselves are more important than Scripture‟s witness to them, for events are the 
foundation of Christian faith.   
Yet, granting the Christian priority of events over texts, the way in which the 
Scriptures mediate historical events must still be articulated.  It is here that ambiguity can 
be seen.  On the one hand, de Lubac speaks of the text as merely pointing to historical 
events, which, in turn point to spiritual realities.  De Lubac claims, for example, that “the 
                                               
751 De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 44), distinguishes between “on the one hand, the deeds 
recounted and, on the other, the report of these deeds.” 
752 Wright.,” 262, noting de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 44.   
753 The Sources of Revelation, 14-15, n. 10.   
754 Medieval Exegesis, II, 86. Quoting St. Victor, de Lubac (ibid, 88), suggests, “Therefore 
holy Scripture is superabundant in the other senses….In the divine page not only do the understanding and 
words signify things, but the things themselves signify other things.” 
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text acts only as spokesman to lead to the historical realities; the latter are themselves the 
figures, they themselves contain the mysteries that the exercise of allegory is supposed to 
extract from them.”755  This would suggest a providential relationship between text and 
event only, as God has preserved an adequate and reliable witness about historical events 
so that the events may render spiritual realities.  The literal sense, then, as text, would 
simply be a providentially ordered witness to history.   
Yet on the other hand, de Lubac at times has a quite robust understanding of the 
spiritual reality intrinsically contained in the text of Scripture itself.  De Lubac calls 
Scripture an “incorporation” of the Logos, claiming, “The Logos is already truly 
incorporated there; he himself dwells there, not just some idea of him, and this is what 
authorizes us to speak already of his coming, of his hidden presence,” a “presence that 
[is] actualized anew each time this Scripture illumines us…”756  While defending 
Origen‟s understanding of Eucharistic presence, De Lubac claims that while the Eucharist 
“truly contains the Body and Blood of Christ…in a subsequent, more elevated and 
profound and, therefore, „truer‟ sense, Scripture is the Body and Blood of the Logos.”757  
The Logos dwells in Scripture as mystery, analogous to the way the Logos dwells in the 
flesh of Christ.
758
  At times, de Lubac speaks of two Incarnations of the Word.  Just as the 
Word was clothed flesh, so also the Word descends to the Scriptures.  Significantly, de 
                                               
755 Ibid, 86.  Thus de Lubac (ibid, 87), follows Augustine in claiming that, “The facts of the 
Bible…in their very reality, „were words, destined to signify something to us…‟”   
756 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 389 (citing John Scotus, In Jo., fr. 1).  De Lubac (ibid), notes 
the difference with the Logos‟s presence in the Incarnation, as he shows that “the Logos is…not, properly 
speaking, incarnated as he is in the humanity of Jesus.” 
757 Ibid, 415.   
758 Ibid, 393.  De Lubac (ibid), is comfortable with a double meaning for Hebrews 4:11, 
allowing the “living and active” referent to be both Jesus Christ and Scripture, for the Logos dwells in both.   
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Lubac records Origen‟s claim that this dual “incarnation” (using Origen‟s term) “is here 
something more than a comparison; „letter‟ and „flesh‟ are not only alike in that they are 
both likened to a „veil‟; for, according to Scripture itself, one can say that „the Word of 
God has been incarnated in two ways,‟ since at bottom it is one and the same unique 
Word of God who descends into the letter of Scripture and into the flesh of our 
humanity.”759  Here Scripture as text seems to have something of a sacramental value.  
De Lubac strengthens this sacramental allusion by claiming, “Already in its literal sense, 
or in its „body,‟ Scripture expresses something of the Logos, just as something of him is 
glimpsed through the flesh of Christ.”760  Furthermore, de Lubac records Origen‟s claim 
that even before the Incarnation, the Word was present in Scripture and “the function of 
Scripture is to reveal this Logos.”761  Here the text of Scripture itself, as the dwelling 
place of the Logos, intrinsically discloses the Mystery.  While de Lubac never himself 
claims that the Word was present in Scripture before the Incarnation, de Lubac does seem 
to agree that texts, unified by Christ, provide access to the Logos as Mystery because 
they are words which render the Word.  Thus Scripture has the same role in disclosing 
the second Person of the Trinity as does the humanity of Christ.  When the Mystery is 
viewed in terms of its historical revelation, the great Act of Christ, the event has priority 
                                               
759 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 60-61.  Quoting Augustine, de Lubac (ibid 61), speaks of 
both the humility of the letter and the humility of the Son of Man, emphasizing that the divine is present in 
both the letter and the humanity. 
760 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 416.     
761 Ibid.   
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over the text.  Yet when the Mystery is viewed in terms of the reality revealed, the Logos, 
both text and incarnation are seen as efficacious signs.
762
   
Furthermore, yet another position can be discerned, which is Distinct from both of 
these two contrasting understandings of the literal sense of the text as mere witness to 
historical event, and as sacramental embodiment of the Logos.  Often it seems that 
something of a double movement takes place from words to events to spiritual reality.  
Words really signify and make present the events of history, and the events, in turn, really 
signify and make present the Mystery.  For example, De Lubac suggests that for Origen, 
history takes a “new mode” when written down in Scripture, so that the past events 
“survive today…as signs and mysteries….for the purpose of our „edification‟.”763  This 
“new mode” is not simply the record of events, but the providentially ordained record of 
salvation history.  The letter preserves the event, and hence participates in the flow of 
history from past to present.  The purpose of this recorded history is to “pass on,” and 
hence, “„In following the trail of truth in the letter of Scripture‟, we „will thus be served 
by history as by a ladder‟.”764  The “ladder” which de Lubac refers to allows the reader to 
climb from text to event to spirit.  De Lubac‟s understanding seems to be of the human 
authors themselves being caught up into the events of salvation history as they recorded 
sacred history, so that the Mystery is disclosed through “both” the events themselves and 
the written record of the events.  Hence de Lubac claims that although “the human 
                                               
762 It is important here to again note that for de Lubac, the Mystery is singular.  There is no 
incompatibility between disclosure of the Logos and disclosure of Christ, as both ultimately are aspects of 
the same Mystery.  Christ is the definitive revelation of God in history, yet the Logos is always working in 
history to incorporate believers into the Mystery.   
763 Ibid, 322, noted by Wright, “The Literal Sense of Scripture,” 264.   
764 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 323.     
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authors of the holy Books have died,” and “the events that they have reported have 
passed away,” yet still “the Word of God was expressed through both.”765  In some way, 
texts, authors and events are all drawn as integral and indispensable parts into salvation 
history, so that the texts themselves are used as mediation of the Logos, and not just the 
events to which they point.   
It would be tempting to describe this as a double sacramental movement, where 
text sacramentally discloses event and event sacramentally discloses spirit.  Yet the text 
cannot be said to have a sacramental relationship to the event, because in this movement 
the text only renders history, not spiritual reality.  Those who wish to grant a sacramental 
status to the text itself must clarify that the text is not sacramental insofar as it leads to 
events.
766
  On the other hand, as we have seen, some sacramental value must be accorded 
to the letter of the text as text, as it, and not the event to which it points, is said to be an 
incorporation of the Logos.  This seems to be an unresolvable lacuna in de Lubac‟s work, 
and it has consequences on the appropriation of de Lubac‟s work today.  While Frei 
focuses on meaning in the text situates his project in the movement from text to event, 
Tracy‟s focus on meaning in front of the text situates his project completely on the ability 
of the literal sense of the text to disclose new human possibilities.  To both, de Lubac‟s 
inattention to this relationship would make it nearly impossible to appropriate de Lubac‟s 
work.   
                                               
765 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 81.  See also Wright, “The Literal Sense of Scripture,” 
264.   
766 Boersma (Nouvelle Theologie, pp. 154-60), consistently emphasizes that the letter as 
history which is sacramental.  Yet in discussing Origen‟s understanding of Scripture as the “incorporation” 
of the Logos, Boersma changes his focus from history to text as sacramental (see esp. 163-64).  The fault 
here is perhaps not Boersma‟s, but Origen‟s lack of distinction between text and event as sacramentally 
making present the spirit.   
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Overall, it seems that de Lubac would like to shift the discussion from the way 
texts render events to the way in which God uses both text and history to mediate the 
Mystery.  In discussing the way the text renders its spiritual content, de Lubac is less 
concerned with hermeneutical theory and more interested in articulating the place of 
Scripture in the divine economy.  Thus the manner in which the text of Scripture 
discloses the Mystery can only be discerned in relation to the way Sacrament and Church 
disclose the Mystery.  In this shift of emphasis, explanation of the relationship between 
text and event is left unfinished.   
3.  Conclusion and Remaining Challenges 
 
De Lubac insists that allegory is grounded in events of history, not texts.
767
  
Current exegetical and hermeneutical discussions center almost completely on the textual 
rendering of the event, leaving historians to investigate the events themselves.  Hence 
many contemporary exegetes write off allegory as fanciful interpretation before even 
investigating it, since they do not feel that it technically falls under their domain.  Texts 
are judged by literary criteria, and historical events are judged by the criteria of secular 
history.  This is exactly the division that de Lubac desired to overcome.  Yet De Lubac‟s 
explanation of the relationship between letter and spirit reveal several ambiguities in the 
relationship of text and event which have significant consequences for exegesis.  Some of 
                                               
767 The Christian Scriptures are different from other ancient texts which were subjected to 
allegory, in that Christian allegorists clearly distinguished between allegoria facti and allegoria verbi (see 
especially Henri de Lubac, "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory," in Theological Fragments, 165-
96). 
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these difficulties can be traced to de Lubac‟s ambiguity about the literal sense, while 
others can be traced to inattention to the relationship between text and letter.   
One of de Lubac‟s difficulties in describing the relationship between text and 
event arises from not adequately distinguishing between secular history and biblical 
history.  De Lubac locates history in the realm of nature, not the supernatural, claiming 
that “by themselves, historical events bring us no increase in supernatural revelation.  
They remain always „ambiguous‟ and in a kind of state of „expectation,‟ and it is they 
that must be enlightened for us by the light that comes from the Gospel.”768  De Lubac‟s 
focus is, as always, on the infinite qualitative difference in the movement from letter to 
spirit.  Yet in describing the “letter” itself, a further distinction still needs to be made 
between a secular understanding of history and an understanding of history as guided by 
the Holy Spirit.
769
  While both are described as the “letter,” the text of Scripture is not the 
mere letter.  Not just any interpretation of the events of salvation history will do, for 
interpretations without the providential ordering of God fail to configure the events in 
such a way that the Mystery can be intrinsically disclosed.  When the Great Act of Christ 
transformed history, it transformed a certain history—that which was recorded through 
                                               
768 See Voderholzer, “Dogma and History,” 664, citing De Lubac, La révélation divine,  
Troisième édition.  Revue et augmentée. (Paris, 1983), 101.   
769 The latter here is often described as the “relgious sense” in which the Bible is read to 
understand the religious experience of Israel (see D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 232-33).  In the 
“religious sense,” de Lubac (Sources of Revelation, 26), claims, the Christian historian attempts to 
understand the history of Israel and, “Since we are dealing with a unique history, it is important that the 
historian who recounts that history do so as a believer.”  Still, de Lubac insists on a qualitative difference 
between the “religious sense” and the “spiritual sense” to such an extent that the religious sense is simply a 
species of the literal sense.  While de Lubac is correct that Christian interpretation must insist that the 
reader approach Scripture as “his own history, from which he cannot remove himself” (Sources of 
Revelation, 27), the sharp distinction that de Lubac draws between these two seems unnecessary if the 
literal sense of Scripture can be shown to itself participate in salvation history.  Frei‟s project of figural 
reading will be shown to have potential to expand de Lubac‟s proposal here.   
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the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in Scripture and discloses the presence of the Logos.  
Scripture as a text is both the providentially ordained theological interpretation of 
revelation and an incorporation of the Logos.   
As soon as it is emphasized that what is “in the text” is the only adequate God-
ordained guide to understanding what is “behind the text,” some theory of dual 
authorship must be articulated.  Consequently, the inspiration of the human author must 
also be considered.  As we have seen, de Lubac‟s emphasis is on the ongoing aspect of 
inspiration rather than on the inspiration of the original authors, leaving the inspiration of 
the letter quite underdeveloped.  Yet the relationship between human authors and divine 
Author must be addressed.  De Lubac has already suggested God has a meaning in the 
spiritual senses that may not only expand, but may be viewed in opposition from the 
intention of the human author.  He also suggests a certain divine authorship of Scripture 
that seems to go beyond the providential recording of events.  Hence divine authorship 
applies even to the literal sense.  Yet no real discussion of the role of the human authors 
is discussed.  David Williams highlights this problem as he critiques de Lubac‟s 
understanding of the original authors:  
As one magnifies the importance of the overall biblical gestalt as the object of 
God‟s intention and a primary medium of the Spirit, so the significance of what 
the human authors of individual books intended to convey diminishes.  Their 
intention, as with any human effort, is part of the particular historical context that 
is now gone; it must pale to some degree when contrasted with an opportunity to 
discern the movement of the divine plan borne by the Spirit…770 
 
                                               
770 Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 171.   
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Williams is suggesting that de Lubac‟s emphasis on ongoing inspiration of the 
Spirit in the spiritual sense forces him to neglect God‟s guiding action on the part of the 
original writers.  Indeed, if the literal sense simply tells us facts, and if the text is the 
incorporation of the Logos, we would expect the ongoing inspiration of the Spirit to 
dominate.  But the text does more than tell us facts: it tells us what human authors 
reliably recorded about the facts, how they thought their audiences ought to respond to 
the facts, etc.  The problem becomes quite practical in exegesis.  For example, in a 
difficult passage, should the exegete assume both that the Spirit has placed this difficulty 
in the text to humble the exegete and that the text must be able to be harmonized with 
other texts because it is authored by the Spirit, or should the exegete assume a human 
mistake?  The assumption of divine authorship requires a mutual discussion of human 
authorship.  In order to attend to this, more attention needs to be given to the role of 
human authors in encoding meaning in the text.   
A second difficulty in describing the relationship between text and event arises 
from an ambiguity in the definition of the literal sense.  As we have seen, the letter is 
sometimes described as “history” and sometimes as the “plain sense” of the text.  When 
de Lubac describes the letter as the plain sense, however, the text‟s relationship to both 
history and spiritual reality becomes unclear.  At times, de Lubac emphasizes that the text 
is only a “spokesman” to lead the reader to history, while at other times he claims that the 
plain sense of the text is the “incorporation of the Logos.”  Often a double movement 
from text to event to spiritual reality seems to emerge throughout de Lubac‟s work, in 
which both text and event are caught up in salvation history and lead to the spiritual 
sense.  I would suggest, here, that in this double movement from text to event to spiritual 
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reality, there is a great deal of room for literary theory and philosophical reflection to 
explain the first movement from text to event.  De Lubac should feel uncomfortable 
describing the text as a sacrament, since the text points to a historical event, and in a 
sacramental relationship one natural thing cannot disclose another natural thing.
771
  
Hence explanation of the rendering of event by text belongs to the realm of literary 
theory rather than sacramentality.  As most of the discussion between Frei, Tracy and 
Vanhoozer focuses on the relationship between text and referent, their work could be 
quite instructive to this part of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical project.  Frei‟s entire project, for 
example, may be classified as an attempt to describe this first movement from text to 
event.  De Lubac is so focused on showing the necessity of historical events as the 
foundation of Christian faith that he does not give enough attention to the relationship 
between God‟s action in history and God‟s assurance that just this rendition of history 
will be preserved in Scripture.
772
  In keeping with de Lubac‟s project, to appreciate the 
historical character of Christian faith without allowing the secular historian to have the 
final word and thereby reduce the Mystery to historicism and immanentism will require 
more than simply an insistence upon an anagogical reading.  It will require a thorough 
explanation of just how these texts mediate the events of salvation history to the reader.  
                                               
771 Given his sacramental understanding of the whole economy of redemption (Incarnation, 
Scripture, Church, Eucharist, Nature/Supernatural), it seems significant that de Lubac never speaks of a 
double sacramental movement from text to event to reality.  He does call the “letter” a sacrament, but in 
that context is clear that the letter refers to history (See de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 34, 60-61, 162-5 
and The Sources of Revelation, 14). 
772 The problem is heightened when the exegete attempts to assess the importance of those 
parts of Scripture which are not historical, but are themselves responses to revelation.  It is not enough to 
say that the letter leads us to historical events, when certain non-narrative responses to events are preserved 
and others are not.  It seems clear that written responses to revelation themselves have a privileged place in 
mediating spiritual realities that have not been sufficiently described.   
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Hence de Lubac‟s project would not be compromised by placing greater attention on the 
relationship between text and event.  Rather, de Lubac‟s project would be furthered by 
this attention, as discussion of the relationship between text and event would provide the 
theologian with resources to describe how just this text can render just these events in just 
the way that will be effective for salvation.   
A third difficulty in describing the movement from letter to spirit arises 
specifically from a lack of clarity about the nature of the New Testament as a text.  While 
at times de Lubac speaks of the literal sense as the reading of God‟s action in the Old 
Testament which anticipate the New, at other times de Lubac speaks of the literal sense 
as the whole witness to God‟s action in history.773  In the New Testament, the literal 
sense is the allegorical sense.  This explanation needs further clarification, since, while it 
is true that the Act of Christ transfigures history, the record of Christ‟s transformation of 
history became the literal sense after it was recorded as Scripture.  Hence even the secular 
historian can read the whole of Scripture in its plain sense and understand with relative 
clarity what the apostles, the first allegorists, believed about the event of Christ.  The 
relationship between a literal reading of the New Testament and a spiritual reading of the 
New Testament must be more carefully developed. 
Here the relationship between text and events once again becomes important.  
When the emphasis remains on events, we see that no matter how energetically the 
secular historian studies the New Testament texts, he or she could not grasp the Event of 
                                               
773 It is in this sense that a secular New Testament historian might read only the “mere letter” 
of Scripture.  For example, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 154), is clear that spiritual understanding 
is a meaning that the secular historian can never grasp, for human effort by itself “can never furnish 
anything other than a better historical knowledge.”  The historical knowledge, here, is knowledge of the 
event of Christ, yet it does not move to the spiritual sense.   
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the New Testament (the Incarnate Christ unifying history and anticipating the totus 
Christus), and hence could never see the intrinsic relationship between Old Testament 
history and New Testament meaning.  However, if the emphasis is on the whole text of 
Scripture as a canonical unity, it seems that the secular historian could intellectually 
recognize the Christian Faith without subsequently participating in it.  In this sense, the 
New Testament is the adequate and authoritative witness to the meaning of history in 
Christ, and this testimony is located in the plain sense of the text, accessible to all 
readers.  The plain sense of the Old Testament is very different from the plain sense of 
the unified canon, for the unified canon does provide the rules and theological 
presuppositions necessary to discern, intellectually, the distinctly Christian faith.  The 
upshot of this distinction is that the presence of a New Testament canon really may 
change the subsequent use of allegory.  While the first Christians were first required to 
access the meaning of history by interpreting the Old Testament in light of the Event of 
Christ which they had experienced, Christians today are required to access the meaning 
of history by first reading the plain sense of the text and accepting it in faith.
774
  Here the 
concern by Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer about the continued use of allegory may have 
some merit.  While de Lubac suggests that the continuation of allegory is a primary task 
of apostolic succession as it continues the work of the New Testament writers, Frei and 
Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the priority of interpretation should be on Scripture as a 
canonical whole may restrict allegory in a way that would be consistent even to de 
Lubac‟s project.   
                                               
774 Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith, 208-10), makes suggestions in this direction.  We 
will return to his assessment in the next chapter.   
 274 
 
These three ambiguities must be addressed if de Lubac‟s work is to provide a 
consistent hermeneutical reflection which will advance the theological interpretation of 
Scripture.  In the final chapter I will suggest that Vanhoozer‟s emphasis that the literal 
sense is the canonical sense, as well as Frei‟s method of figural reading, provide 
resources which could develop de Lubac clarify the way in which the very literal sense is 
used by God to mediate Christ to readers.  The strength of de Lubac‟s project lies not in 
his development of literary theory or philosophical description about the process of 
reading, but in his insistence that when the interpretation of Scripture is understood 
within the wider context of the divine economy, a movement to the threefold spiritual 
sense is inevitable.  The fourfold interpretation, for de Lubac, is a part of a fourfold 
understanding of all Christian reality in which God uses Scripture, Church and Sacrament 
to mediate the unified Mystery.  As Scripture is understood in this broader context, 
hermeneutical issues relating to literary theory and the rendering of meaning by texts are 
subjected to theological descriptions of the economy.  Thus de Lubac‟s project, more 
clearly than the others, shifts discussions of textual interpretation from literary theory to 
the mediation of the unified Mystery through these texts. 
III.  Ecclesiology: The Church as a Sacramental Reality 
 
De Lubac‟s ecclesiology can only be understood in light of the way he 
understands Scripture, Eucharist, and the Church to play essential roles in mediating the 
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Mystery in the divine economy.
775
  All three, for de Lubac, have a sacramental structure, 
in which the visible discloses the Mystery.  Furthermore, all three operate with the same 
fourfold understanding of Christian reality.  As the Church points toward and makes 
present Christ, it does so with an understanding of the fourfold reality of the economy, 
which is also the fourfold sense of Scripture.  The visible Church discloses the Church as 
divine reality, which in turn effects transformation in individuals and yearns toward its 
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus.  Of the four theologians, only de Lubac 
provides a description of the Church which seeks to show the integral identity between 
Church and Scripture in the economy of redemption.  This section will first describe the 
identity of the Church, then will show the relationship of the Church to Scripture and 
Eucharist in the economy. 
A.  Identity of the Church: Mystery and Sacrament 
 
De Lubac‟s development of an ecclesiology in which the Church is both Mystery 
and Sacrament sets his work apart from that of Frei, Tracy and Vanhoozer.  These 
descriptions of the Church flow naturally from de Lubac‟s understanding of God‟s use of 
the Church to mediate Christ.  The Church already is the Mystery of the totus Christus, 
yet it always acts as sacramental sign which leads to Christ.  Here the Church exhibits the 
fourfold structure of Christian reality in its own self-identity as the visible Church is the 
                                               
775 Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 62), concludes that for de Lubac “the spiritual 
interpretation of Scripture is in fact a sacramental theology, but one which situates sacraments within the 
entire historical economy of salvation.”  Wood‟s argument is that de Lubac is able to draw his parallel 
between Eucharistic theology, ecclesiology, and spiritual interpretation by correlating the Eucharist with 
the allegorical sense of Scripture.  In his Eucharistic ecclesiology, the Eucharist makes the Church as it 
unites Christ as head with the Church as body.  This action, though, presses toward the anagogical sense for 
its final conclusion, where the totus Christus will be complete.   
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indispensable means to the fullness of the totus Christus as it incorporates individuals and 
yearns for its eschatological fullness.   
The Church as Mystery:  As we have seen in the section on allegory, de Lubac 
insists that the Church, in an incomplete way, is the Mystery.  De Lubac claims, “The 
Church is a mysterious extension in time of the Trinity, not only preparing us for the life 
of unity but bringing about even now our participation in it.  She comes from and is full 
of the Trinity…She is „the Incarnation continued,‟” the “presence of Christ on earth.”776  
The Church really is Mystery because it is the reality of the totus Christus.  De Lubac 
insists, “The Church on earth is not merely the vestibule of the Church in heaven…for 
she stands to our heavenly home in a relation of mystical analogy in which we should 
perceive the reflection of a profound identity.  It is indeed the same city which is built on 
earth and yet has its foundations in heaven…”777  Anagogy thus unites the Church as it 
exists today with the fulfillment of the totus Christus.  The Church is not the cause of the 
Mystery, nor can it claim any role in mediating the Mystery other than what it has 
received as a gift.  Rather, “The Church is a mystery because, coming from God and 
entirely at the service of his plan, she is an organism of salvation, precisely because she 
relates wholly to Christ and apart from him has no existence, value or efficacity.”778  The 
                                               
776 Henri de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, trans. James R. Dunne (Staten Island, 
NY: Alba House, 1969), 24.     
777 De Lubac, Catholicism, 72.  De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 119), suggests that the 
difficulty in seeing the eternal nature of the Church is “because we don‟t yet see her from a viewpoint 
wide-embracing enough.  We are thinking of the Church only as the Church Militant, not as the perfect and 
glorious Bride…”  A theological understanding of the Church must include the Church Militant, purgatory, 
and the Church Triumphant. 
778 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 15.  De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 
106) notes that the Church is both “holy” and “the Church of the holy,” not because there are no sinners in 
the Church, but because it is the Church which sanctifies and the Church that is purified by the Holy Spirit. 
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Church is Mystery because the Church is the organization ordained by God and united 
with Christ in which salvation history receives its meaning and yearns for its ultimate 
completion.   
De Lubac insists on accepting the implications of the Church as Mystery.  While 
the Church is sinful and its visible structures are not eternal, these present features of the 
Church are not its primary identity.  De Lubac claims that the Church should not 
understand “herself…so much from her structures or her history as from her 
predestination in Jesus Christ and her orientation towards the parousia.‟”779  Even in the 
present state of the Church, “there is between her and Him a certain relation of mystical 
identity,” so that, “Practically speaking, for each one of us Christ is thus His Church.”780  
So intrinsic is this relationship between the Church in its “transitory, imperfect state” and 
its “complete, spiritual, definitive state” that a certain “exchange of idioms” should be 
allowed between Christ and the Church, because “between the means and the end there is 
not merely an extrinsic relationship.”781  Refocusing attention on the divine reality of the 
Church and its anagogical completion as Mystery is, of course, an act of faith.  Hence de 
Lubac claims that “no one can believe in the Church, except in the Holy Spirit.”782  To 
grasp the intrinsic relationship between visible Church and divine reality is to enter the 
very Mystery which is intelligible but not comprehensible. 
                                               
779 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 16. 
780 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 210-11.   
781 De Lubac, Catholicism, 68.  De Lubac (ibid, 72-73), claims that because “The Church, 
without being exactly co-extensive with the Mystical Body, is not adequately distinct from it…there should 
arise a kind of exchange of idioms: Corpus Christi quod est ecclesia.”   
782 Ibid, 74.   
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Though de Lubac insists on understanding the Church in terms of its divine 
reality, he nonetheless demonstrates a very realistic picture of the sinfulness of the 
Church, admitting that the visible Church will often hide rather than disclose this divine 
reality.  De Lubac claims that “this very same Church, is often unfaithful and 
unsubmissive.  In her members she is a sinner…the Church is also a symbol of perpetual 
decline and mortality.”783  On account of the communication of idioms between the 
Church and Christ, the visible Church is often the same kind of stumbling block that the 
humanity of Christ posed to understanding his divinity.  Yet the ability of the body of 
Christ to hide Christ is much greater in the Church than in Christ‟s human body, because 
the behavior of the Church is often sinful.
784
  De Lubac realizes that the Church has a 
responsibility to continually be a fitting sign.  The actions of the Church serve to either 
hide or disclose the divine reality of the Church.  The behavior of those within the 
Church has a real effect on whether the sign hides or discloses the reality.
785
  Yet de 
Lubac claims that the ability to see the divine reality of the Church is part of the gift of 
                                               
783 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 24.   
784 De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 48-49), claims, “[T]here is something yet more 
„scandalous‟ and „foolish‟ about belief in a Church where the divine is not only united with the human, but 
presents itself to us by way of the all-too-human, and that without any alternative…Truth to tell, the Church 
is even more compact of contrast and paradox than Christ.  We can say of the Church, as of Christ, „a great 
mystery and wonderful sacrament,‟ but we are driven to say of her even more than of Christ…„A stone of 
stumbling and a rock of offence‟…If a purification and transformation of vision is necessary to look on 
Christ without being scandalized, how much more is it necessary when we are looking at the Church!” 
785 In The Splendor of the Church, after his chapter on the Church as sacrament (pp. 203-35), 
de Lubac spends the rest of the chapter exhorting the Church to realize its sacramental position and not 
mute the sacramental value of the sign (see esp. 228-35).  The behavior of the Church has a real effect on 
its value as sacramental sign. 
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faith itself and stands despite the witness of its members.
786
  In fact, faith that the Church 
will truly be eschatologically transformed is one of the tests of Christian faith.
787
 
The Church as Sacrament:  De Lubac has been a leading figure in emphasizing 
the sacramental nature of the Church, resulting in the incorporation of this theological 
description in the Second Vatican council.
788
  In The Splendor of the Church, de Lubac 
describes the Church as “the great sacrament which contains and vitalizes all the 
others.”789  The Church is the great sacrament precisely as it operates in a sacramental 
chain from Eucharist to Church to Christ to Triune God.  De Lubac writes in Catholicism,   
If Christ is the sacrament of God, the Church is for us the sacrament of Christ; she 
represents him…she really makes him present…she is his very 
continuation…the… exterior organization…is but an expression…of the interior 
unity of a living entity, so that the Catholic is not only subject to a power but is a 
member of a body as well, and his legal dependence on this power is to the end 
that he might have part in the life of that body.
790
   
 
This description of the Church as sacrament will form the background for all de 
Lubac‟s discussion of the Church. On account of its sacramental nature, de Lubac feels 
                                               
786 De Lubac (ibid, 46), claims, “But the dark side of the mystery is there too, and just as 
surely…For the unbeliever whom the Father has not begun to draw to Him, the Church remains a 
stumbling-block.  And she can be a testing-round for the believer too, which is a good thing; perhaps the 
test is all the more strenuous in proportion as his faith is purer and more vital.” 
787 De Lubac (ibid, 49), claims, “Let us within the Church, who speak of ourselves as being 
„of the Church‟, manage to grasp the fact as sharply as it is sensed by those who are afraid of her and those 
who run away from her.”  However, this sense of faith will result in an optimism for the Church rooted in 
faith.  De Lubac (ibid, 78), claims, “We should…be on our guard against cramping within concepts that are 
inadequate to it God‟s power to transfigure His Bride.  Far from struggling against belief in something 
which our imagination cannot picture, we ought to let the daring of faith sweep us off our feet.” 
788 The Vatican II Council‟s Lumen gentium (I, 1; II, 9; VII, 48) is the first time the Church is 
called a sacrament in an ecumenical council.   
789 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 203. De Lubac‟s chapter, “The Sacrament of 
Christ” (pp. 203-35), forms the climax of his first concentrated work on ecclesiology. 
790 De Lubac, Catholicism, 76.   
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that the Church can only be understood in terms of a series of paradoxes.  The visible is 
the indispensable means to the invisible, as is the human to the divine and the temporal to 
the eternal.
791
  Since de Lubac‟s ecclesiology has the same fundamental fourfold structure 
as his understanding of Scripture, it can be assumed that the sacramental relationships 
which exist in the Church can illumine de Lubac‟s understanding of the movement from 
letter to spirit in his theology of Scripture.   
Intrinsic Relationship Between Visible and Invisible:  De Lubac‟s understanding 
of the Church as sacrament suggests that at the fulfillment of the totus Christus, the sign 
will pass away into reality.  Given the pairs of paradoxes used to describe the Church, it 
would be easy to associate the visible with the temporal and the human, and the invisible 
with the eternal and the divine.  Yet this would destroy the Christian Mystery.  Much of 
what is visible and human is also eternal, since the totus Christus will be the union of the 
Church in history with Christ as head.  Thus it does not follow that the sign will pass 
away in all these relationships.  Rather, just as in the sacramental nature of the 
Incarnation, the sign is an integral and continual part of the Mystery.   
Due to the intrinsic relationship between the human and divine aspects of the 
Church, De Lubac emphatically rejects any division between the invisible Church and the 
visible Church which would reduce the visible to merely a human institution.
792
  On the 
one hand, because the visible Church is “the sign of something else, it must be passed 
through, and this not in part but wholly…it is not something intermediate, but something 
                                               
791 See especially de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 23-29.   
792 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 85-87. 
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mediatory.”793  On the other hand, however, a sacramental sign cannot simply “be 
changed at will” because it is “essentially related to our present condition.”  Hence, de 
Lubac claims, “We never come to the end of passing through this translucent medium, 
which we must, nevertheless, always pass through and that completely.  It is always 
through it that we reach what it signifies; it can never be superceded, and its bounds 
cannot be broken.”794  If viewed from the perspective of the sacramental structure of the 
Church, the visible Church is inferior to the spiritual reality it signifies.  And yet it is 
impossible to discover that spiritual reality without the historical, institutional, visible 
Church.
795
  The individual believer will never be able to discover Christianity without the 
Church nor go beyond the Church to a purely spiritual faith.
796
 
Since much of the function of the visible Church is to mediate sacramentally the 
Mystery, however, those aspects which exist for this purpose (e.g. hierarchical 
organization, sacramental system, etc.) will disappear with the return of Christ.  De 
Lubac claims, “The sacramental element in the Church, being adapted to our temporal 
condition, is destined to disappear in the face of the definitive reality which it effectively 
                                               
793 Ibid, 203.   
794 Ibid, 204.   
795 De Lubac (ibid, 147), claims, “Recognition of authority in the Church is the first and 
indispensable condition without which we cannot have any part in her vitalizing work...”  De Lubac (The 
Motherhood of the Church: Followed by Particular Churches in the Universal Church and an Interview 
Conducted by Gwendoline Jarczyk, trans. Sergia Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 68, 
emphasizes that the three functions of “Word, worship, and government” cannot be “dissociated,” and thus 
the visible structure could never be considered optional.   
796 De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 205-09), recounts the many enthusiastic proposals 
by Enlightenment philosophers and theologians to move to a purely spiritual faith, a “Church of the Holy 
Spirit” (the new era prophesied by Joachim of Fiore).  De Lubac emphasizes that the age of the Spirit has 
already occurred simultaneously with the age of Christ, and that the Spirit is the Spirit of Christ.  As a 
result, it is impossible to move beyond the Church which Christ formed to a less institutional faith.   
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signifies; but this should not be thought of as one thing‟s effacing of another.  It will be 
the manifestation of sacramentality‟s own proper truth; a glorious epiphany and a 
consummation.”797  Thus de Lubac emphasizes, “We ought, indeed, to love that very 
element in the Church which is transitory—but we ought to love it as the one and only 
means, the indispensable organ, the providential instrument, and at the same time as „the 
pledge, the passing image, the promise of the communion to come.‟”798  Certain 
sacramental aspects of the Church are destined to pass away when anagogy becomes 
reality, yet this does not mean that the visible Church will give way to the invisible 
Church.   
De Lubac is careful not to say that the true Church is identical to the Roman 
Catholic Church, but he does insist that the visible dimension of the Roman Catholic 
Church is the true structure of the Church.  De Lubac claims, “We shall not reduce the 
mystical body of Christ to equivalence with the forms of the Roman Church, nor will we 
water down the Church until it becomes a „body‟ conceived in an entirely „mystical‟ 
fashion.  What we shall affirm is that the Church mysteriously transcends the limits of her 
visibility, that by her very essence she carries herself, as it were, above herself.”799  The 
visible aspect is intrinsically related to the divine reality, yet the visible dimension is not 
identical to the whole reality. 
                                               
797 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 68.     
798 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 83.  Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 
107), summarizes the relationship in this way: “the human element in the Church makes the divine element 
present by making Christ present.” 
799 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 27.   
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Protestant theology, de Lubac feels, has lost the intrinsic relationship between 
visible and invisible by focusing only on the invisible Church.
800
  De Lubac feels that this 
disregard for the visible Church causes Protestantism to implicitly deny the structure of 
the Christian Mystery.
801
  By denying the sacramental necessity of the visible, they also 
disregard the radical newness of the invisible.  De Lubac argues that such Protestant 
theologies could not possibly call the Church a sacrament, because their understanding of 
the Church is “more inspired by the Old than the New Testament or, in other words, does 
not fully enter into the logic of the Mystery of the Incarnation.”802  In their stress on the 
invisible Church, they have lost the uniqueness of the entry of God into human history 
and the formation of the Church as a visible reality.   
The Immediate Danger of Immanentism:  De Lubac‟s ecclesiology, just as his 
scriptural interpretation, seeks to avoid what he perceives to be the current errors of the 
extrinsicism of the Neo-Thomists and the immanentism of contemporary secularism and 
theological liberalism.  Throughout his career, de Lubac resists the extrinsicist a tendency 
on the one hand to see the Church primarily in terms of its divinely ordained 
ecclesiastical structure (thus giving priority to the temporary aspect of the Church), and 
                                               
800 De Lubac (Catholicism, 75-76), claims that “the experience of Protestantism should serve 
us as sufficient warning.  Having stripped it of all its mystical attributes, it acknowledged in the visible 
Church a mere secular institution; as a matter of course it abandoned it to the patronage of the state and 
sought a refuge for the spiritual life in an invisible Church, its concept of which had evaporated into an 
abstract ideal.”  One could suspect that de Lubac is primarily lamenting the current state of German 
Lutheranism.   
801 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 25.   
802 Ibid.  De Lubac (ibid), dislikes the Protestant argument to liken the visible Church to 
rebellious Israel, in which a remnant (the invisible Church) will be saved.  To appreciate the Christian 
Mystery, one must realize that the Church really consists of something that the OT people of God did not.  
Christ really is joined to this body in a way that the OT people of God did not have access to.  The Church 
is really the reality that the OT people of God pointed toward as a sign. 
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the historicist tendency on the other hand of viewing the Church simply as a social 
institution of this world (thus forgetting the eschatological reality of the Church).  Both 
errors, de Lubac feels, are resisted by stressing the intrinsic sacramental structure of the 
Church.  Boersma claims, “For de Lubac, the neo-scholastic overemphasis on 
hierarchical authority and the liberal critique of authority stemmed from one and the 
same source: a sharp disjunction between nature and the supernatural resulting in a 
„separated theology‟ that failed to see how authoritative, supernatural means of grace 
played a divinely ordained role within the Eucharistic life of the Church.”803  An intrinsic 
relationship between sign and reality must be maintained so that the believer may be 
incorporated into the Mystery through the movement from sign to reality.   
During his later career, especially after the Second Vatican Council, de Lubac 
sees immanentism as the primary danger confronting the Church, as he perceives a 
tendency to dismiss the eschatological dimension in order to focus on the world at 
present.
804
  The very structure of Christian reality presses de Lubac to emphasize the 
divine, eschatological character of the Church as a counterbalance to what he perceives as 
one-sided emphasis on the visible, this-worldly Church.  Much of de Lubac‟s later 
writing centers on the danger of immanentism in the Church.   
                                               
803 Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie, 258.   
804 The extent to which a need to stand against the immanentism of the Church is seen in The 
Church: Paradox and Mystery, 122-23, where de Lubac provides a list of qualities which will characterize 
the person of holiness will possess in the future.  Most of these center on a resistance to immanentism:  
“They will not…be ideologists…If they bring something truly new to the world….it will not be by means 
of worldly generalities on the necessity to create and invent…tradition will be a source of strength, not a 
millstone round their necks…They will not confuse the openness of life with the dissolution and 
disintegration of death, nor the idolatry of man with brotherly charity…”  This list indicates de Lubac‟s 
continual concern about the encroachment of immanentism. 
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De Lubac‟s concern about immanentism is seen in his rejection of 
Schillebeeckx‟s claim that the Church is “the sacrament of the world.”805  De Lubac, 
having emphasized that the Church is the sacrament of Christ, worries that Schillebeeckx 
will “confuse the „progress of the world‟ with the „new creation.‟”806  De Lubac claims, 
“Does the „eschatological kingdom‟ not appear, in all this, as the culmination of our 
„earthly expectations‟, as their supreme fulfillment and consummation?”807  
Consequently, de Lubac believes, making the Church the sacrament of the world would 
eliminate the “difference between the Old and the New Testament.”808  The Church 
would no longer be the sacramental embodiment of the Mystery, but would fall victim to 
immanentism.
809
   
De Lubac‟s concern about immanentism is also seen in de Lubac‟s 
disappointment that Lumen Gentium chose the description “people of God” for the 
Church over other New Testament images such as bride or body of Christ.
810
  De Lubac 
                                               
805 See Edward Schillebeeckx, Approches théologiques.  Vol. 3, 4.  Bruxelles: Editions du 
CEP, 1969, vol. 3, 145-47, cited in Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 109.  Lumen Gentium only 
says that “Since the Church is in Christ like a sacrament or as a sign and instrument both of a very closely 
knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race…”  (see Lumen Gentium, I, 1 from 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-
gentium_en.html.  Accessed July 12, 2011).   
806 Schillebeeckx, Church and World, 129-30 (cited in Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the 
Church, 119).   
807 Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Arnandez (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 225.   
808 Ibid, 226.   
809 Boersma (Nouvelle Theologie, 265), claims that de Lubac “believed that Schillebeeckx had 
fallen into the trap of accepting nature as an isolated entity, which was exactly the problem Blondel had 
described as „historicism.‟” 
810 While de Lubac (The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 55), appreciates the council‟s desire 
“to emphasize the human traits of the Church,” he laments that the image of Church as bride of Christ is 
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disapproves of the phrase for two reasons.  First, this phrase stresses “continuity” over 
“transformation,” thus straining the sacramental nature of the Church.811  Instead, de 
Lubac emphasizes, as always, the radical transformation brought about by the event of 
Christ, in which “the infusion of the Holy Spirit placed the people of God in an 
essentially new position…the Spirit of Christ has renewed, transfigured, and 
„spiritualized‟ everything.”812  Second, de Lubac feels that the phrase „people of God,‟ 
undervalues the eschatological reality which the Church already participates.
813
  For de 
Lubac, the eschaton has already broken in to the natural order, and because of its union 
with Christ, the Church is the eschatological reality, the kingdom, already, even if it still 
awaits its full union.
814
  The radical newness to which the spiritual senses of Scripture 
point is a present, if uncompleted reality in the Church.  
For de Lubac, the key to retaining the sacramental nature of both Church and 
Scripture is the preservation of anagogy.
815
  For de Lubac, where the eschatological focus 
is abandoned, the relationship between the historical sense and the allegorical sense will 
                                                                                                                                            
“subordinated to that of the people of God,” since it is well-represented in both Scripture and in the Fathers.  
Thus, says de Lubac, “readers must be careful not to take this expression in isolation” (23).   
811 De Lubac, ibid, 39-44. 
812 Ibid, 43.   
813 Ibid, 49-50. See Lumen Gentium II, 9-17.  De Lubac (The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 
50), sees the problem mostly as a matter of emphasis, claiming that the council did not “suppress the 
consideration of collective eschatology, showing the people of God being guided, generation after 
generation, towards, and already mystically united to, the heavenly Jerusalem” (50).  The problem of 
immanentism, then, is largely a problem of the subsequent application of the council.     
814 De Lubac (ibid, 51), criticizes the council for “a certain narrowing of the patristic 
horizons,” which neglects the „already‟ aspect of the eschatological understanding of the Church.  De 
Lubac (ibid, 52), claims, “In one way, for the people of God envisaged as still on pilgrimage through the 
obscurity of this world, it is altogether a matter of the „not-yet‟.  But in another way—and one that cannot 
be disassociated from the first—for which the Church considered as a gift from above and the habitation of 
Christ and his Spirit, we are faced with the „already-present.‟”   
815 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 68.   
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no longer be understood in a sacramental manner.  The abandonment of the anagogical 
sense will almost inevitably result in a focus on nature without the supernatural.
816
  If 
allegory is not finally realized in the totus Christus, the “different order” made present by 
allegory becomes simply a higher dimension of the natural order.
817
   
B.  Relationship between Scripture and Church in the Economy 
 
As we have seen, the strength of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical proposal is found in 
his attempt to shift the discussion away from simply the relationship between text and 
reader and onto the place of Scripture in mediating the Mystery in the divine economy.  
In this section I will examine how Scripture, Eucharist and Church relate to one another 
as fellow mediators of the totus Christus.  As the singular Mystery is approached in 
various ways, de Lubac insists that an intrinsic unity must exist between these different 
realities in the economy.   
In his emphasis on the singular Mystery of Christian faith and the various ways in 
which God mediates this Mystery, de Lubac once again develops his thought from the 
philosophy of Maurice Blondel.  In his important essay, History and Dogma, published in 
1903, Blondel sought to avoid what he saw as the dual errors of “extrinsicism” and 
                                               
816 Dismissal of anagogy would be dismissal of “the presence of the eternal.”  De Lubac 
(Catholicism, 357-58), emphasizes that “it is the role of the Christian…to raise his voice and remind those 
who forget it of their own nobility; man is only himself, he only exists for himself here and now if he can 
discover within himself” the “presence of the eternal.” De Lubac (ibid, 354-55), emphasizes that, 
“„Becoming‟, by itself, has no meaning; it is another word for absurdity” without an eschatological 
dimension, a “fulfillment” to the human being.   
817 De Lubac, Brief Catechesis, 119.   
 288 
 
“historicism” through “tradition.”818  Extrinsicism is defined by Blondel as the use of the 
historical evidence of Scripture primarily as an instrument of apologetics to prove a 
spiritual reality, rather than seeking to understand the revelation brought about by, or 
contained in, the historical event.  In extrinsicism, historical events are regarded as 
merely extrinsic signs which point toward, but are not intrinsically related to, the spiritual 
reality that is assumed.
819
  The opposite error, historicism, is defined by Blondel as the 
reduction of the content of the Christian faith to only what is in principle observable to 
the secular historian.  In historicism, Christian faith is viewed as merely a historical or 
social reality, without any intrinsic relationship to a transcendent reality.   
Blondel suggests that both extrinsicism and immanentism, though completely 
opposed to each other, are really two sides of the same coin.  Both reduce the revelatory 
action of God in history; extrinsicism by limiting God‟s action to the „proof‟ that can be 
adduced from it, and historicism by limiting God‟s action to what the secular historian 
can ascertain.  Neither approach is useful for apprehending the reality of Christian Faith, 
                                               
818 Blondel (Blondel, History and Dogma, 224-41), seeks a middle way between two 
“incomplete and incompatible solutions,” on the one hand the extrinsicism of the neo-thomists who use 
history as apologetic data to support the legitimacy of the Christian faith, and on the other hand the 
historicism of theological liberals who reduced the spiritual realm to what can be explained by means of 
some universal human spirit or demonstrable historical data.  Blondel‟s solution is to re-identify the role of 
tradition as the “living synthesis” which unifies God‟s past action in history with the present Christian faith.   
819 Blondel (ibid, 227), claims that in extrinsicism “historical facts are merely a vehicle, the 
interest of which is limited to the apologetic use which can be made of them; for, whether this or that 
miracle is involved, provided that it is a miracle, the argument remains the same” (emphasis his).  The 
result, Blondel, (ibid, 228), claims, is that “the relation of the sign to the thing signified is extrinsic, the 
relation of the facts to the theology superimposed upon them is extrinsic, and extrinsic too is the link 
between our thought and our life and the truths proposed to us from outside.”   
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as both have disconnected spiritual reality from historical event.
820
  To confront these 
errors, Blondel makes a key distinction between secular history, the historian‟s 
construction of the past by whatever tools are available, and “real history” which is the 
whole reality of life and hence always transcends what could be reconstructed by the 
secular historian.
821
  Blondel realizes that philosophical description must be given to the 
element which maintains the intrinsic relationship between both historical event and lived 
reality, history and dogma.
822
   
For Blondel, tradition is that living link which connects history as a lived reality 
with events as they are observed by the secular historian.  Blondel suggests that because 
“the Church does not rest entirely on the Scriptures, and that the History in which 
Catholicism obliges us to believe is not only the history which the historian can 
establish,”823 it is necessary to say that “only a principle distinct from texts and formulae 
can relate, harmonize and organize them.”824  This principle, for Blondel, is tradition, 
which provides a “living synthesis” as it links history and spiritual reality through 
                                               
820 Ibid, 244-64.  Blondel‟s distinction between the “historic Christ” and the “real Christ” is 
aimed at showing that when historical event and spiritual reality are separated, the result is always a 
truncating of Christian faith. 
821 Ibid, 237-38.  Blondel (ibid, 240), claims further that when secular history replaces real 
history, “The historical facts will be given the role of reality itself; and an ontology, purely 
phenomenological in character, will be extracted from a methodology and a phenomenology.” 
822 Ibid, 264.  Hence Blondel (ibid), claims that there is “need for an intermediary between 
history and dogma, the necessity for a link between them which would bring about the synthesis and 
maintain solidarity without compromising their relative independence” and which for Christianity would 
answer the “initial question: „How is it that the Bible legitimately supports and guarantees the Church, and 
the Church legitimately supports and interprets the Bible?‟” 
823 Ibid.   
824 Ibid.   
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experience and reason in submission to Christ, its Head.
825
  Since the singular Mystery 
cannot be comprehensively manifested in a particular historical event, the Church is 
required to continually manifest its reality.
826
   On Blondel‟s account, tradition “extends 
further than Scripture.  Even in regard to what Scripture tells us, it possesses a special 
virtue and a distinct competence; and it does not rely only on oral transmission to lead us 
deeper and deeper into the reality revealed, and to the Revealer himself who constitutes it 
in its entirety.”827  As a result, a reciprocal relationship can be said to exist between 
Scripture and Tradition, so that each deepens the understanding of the other.   
De Lubac furthers the work of Blondel by providing a more complete theological 
description of the intrinsic relationship between tradition and Scripture.  In the case of the 
Christian faith, the „spirit‟ which transcends what is observable to the sciences is 
precisely the Holy Spirit, and consequently must be understood to be qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from the „spirit‟ of any lived reality which transcends what is 
observable in that reality.
828
  Just as the secular historian cannot expect to understand the 
fuller dimension of lived history, so much the more the historian cannot expect to 
understand the full spiritual reality of the Christian faith through the discipline of history 
                                               
825 Blondel (ibid 269), claims that “the active principle of the synthesis lies neither in the facts 
alone, nor in the ideas alone, but in the Tradition which embraces within it the facts of history, the effort of 
reason and the accumulated experiences of the faithful.” 
826 Ibid, 268.  Hence Blondel (ibid, 276), claims, “Only a progressive and synthetic movement 
can lead us from the effects produced to their cause, can trace all the rays of light in the Christian 
consciousness over the centuries to their source, and through its unending progress imitate the infinite 
riches of God, revealed and always hidden, hidden and always revealed.  In that profound sense, when it is 
a question of finding the supernatural in Sacred History and in dogma, the Gospel is nothing without the 
Church, the teaching of Scripture is nothing without the Christian life, exegesis is nothing without 
Tradition…” 
827 Ibid, 270.   
828 D'Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 57.   
 291 
 
alone.  Both Scripture and Church are fellow mediators of the Mystery of Christ, and the 
intrinsic relationship between them is grounded in the Incarnate Christ.  In History and 
Spirit, de Lubac follows Origen in calling Eucharist, Scripture and Church three 
“incorporations” of the Logos and seeks to distinguish the sacramental role of each in 
mediating the one Mystery in the divine economy.
829
  All three incorporations are distinct 
from revelation, yet are employed by God in mediating revelation.  While each 
incorporation has a unique role in the economy, all three mediate the same Mystery.   
1.  Incarnation of the Logos: The Singular Revelation of Christ 
 
For de Lubac, revelation is God‟s action in history, culminating in the event of 
Christ.  De Lubac emphasizes the priority of the Event of Christ over Scriptural witness 
to that event when he claims, “Christianity is not at all, properly speaking, a „religion of 
the Book‟: it is the „religion of the Word‟—but not merely nor principally of the Word in 
its written (or oral) form.”830  Since the Word is incarnated in the humanity of Christ but 
only incorporated in Scripture, only the former is to be considered revelation.
831
  De 
                                               
829 In a section of History and Spirit entitled “The Incorporations of the Logos” (pp. 385-426), 
de Lubac speaks directly to the relationship between four sacramental realities in the divine economy in 
which dwells the eternal Logos: the hypostatically united Christ, Scripture, Eucharist, and Church.  Each is 
an aspect of the same Mystery, yet each operates causally on the others in this mediation.  The first of these 
is an “Incarnation” of the Logos, while the last three are “Incorporations” of the Logos.  The distinctions 
between these two words are decisive, since it was the historical event of the Incarnation which grounds the 
Christian faith.  Incorporations are ways of making the Mystery made present in the historical event present 
today.   
830 De Lubac, La révélation divine (3rd ed) in OEuvrew completes IV, Eric de Moulins-
Beaufort and Georges Chantraine (eds) (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2006), 161, cited by Eric Moulins-
Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum," Communio 28 (2001)., 679.   
831 Voderholzer, “Dogma and History,” 658, claims, “Revelation is achieved in the incarnate 
Word, which unifies and fulfills the many words of the Old Covenant, and which is then unfolded in the 
New Testament‟s witness to revelation as the word of God in the word of men.”  Voderholzer, (ibid, 664), 
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Lubac claims that Scripture “contains all of revelation” although revelation and Scripture 
are not identical.
832
   
De Lubac maintains the priority of event over text in the literal sense of Scripture 
because revelation was, strictly speaking, event.  It is this priority of Christ over textual 
witness which necessitates the fourfold exegesis of Scripture.  De Lubac emphasizes,  
To say that the Scriptures are the Word of God is not, therefore, simply to 
designate a succession of books.  It is to aim at its internal organization, its 
structuring around the center that is Christ.  The reading of the holy Scriptures 
grants us communion with the faith of these concrete men who were seized by 
God and opened to the mystery of Christ by the Holy Spirit; Christ unites us with 
them.
833
   
 
For de Lubac, to interpret Scripture in light of Christ is to give the event of Christ, as 
revelation, logical priority over the mediation of that event by Scripture.  This, in turn, 
necessarily imposes a fourfold hermeneutic to keep all of Scripture unified on this event.   
It is also the priority of Christ over Scripture which necessitates reading in the 
Church.  The distinction between Scripture and revelation allows de Lubac, in continuity 
with Vatican II, to subject both Scripture and Church to the event of Christ and 
emphasize that both Scripture and tradition are used by God to mediate the Mystery.
 834
  
                                                                                                                                            
notes that Dei Verbum emphasizes that by naming Christ Himself as Revelation, the council “defuse[d] a 
long-standing dispute about the sources of revelation; neither Scripture nor Tradition may be regarded as 
sources of revelation in the strict, properly dogmatic sense of the word.  Rather, Christ himself is the one 
source of revelation.” 
832 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 25.   
833 Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum," 680.   
834 De Lubac, La révélation divine, 164-65, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: 
Reader of Dei Verbum," 680.  Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and entire by 
Scripture, and whole and entire by Tradition, both of which are intimately connected.‟”  As Moulins-
Beaufort (ibid, 681), says, “Scripture and Tradition are two sources in the sense in which the theologian has 
recourse to two instruments in order to know the Christian faith.”  (See here Dei Verbum, II, 7-10,-
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The Church, currently participating in the Mystery and existing as Mystery, is the only 
organization which has a sense of this Mystery.
835
  De Lubac claims, “Now it is in the 
Spirit that the Church…receives her heritage and understands this heritage in truth.  The 
„true‟ meaning of Scripture, its full and definitive meaning, cannot be other than the one 
„that the Spirit gives to the Church.‟”836  It is only in the Church that the unity of the 
Testaments can be maintained, since only the Church has the “instinct” to read Scripture 
in this way.
837
   
The Catholic insistence on interpreting Scripture within the Church has long been 
viewed suspiciously by Protestants, who are concerned that human beings will place 
themselves above of the word of God.  This fear has caused them to summarily dismiss 
serious investigation of other senses of Scripture beyond the literal sense.  Yet de Lubac 
argues that the role of the Church is to ensure that Scripture is always used for the 
illumination of the Mystery.  Hence, de Lubac claims,  
The Magisterium merely guarantees that the development of the mysteries of the 
faith in the minds of believers remains within the complete and definitive „figure‟ 
of this mystery.  It guarantees that the communion of these believers remains open 
to an Object that is „incomprehensible‟ in the etymological sense of the word, 
because it is he who „embraces me beyond my capacity to embrace him‟—and 
this embrace is that of a living Person.‟838   
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-
verbum_en.html.  Accessed July 12, 2011).   
835 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 27.   
836 De Lubac, ibid, I, 242, and The Sources of Revelation, 114.   
837 De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 114, claims that the Church always knows by 
instinct the relationship between the two Testaments: “In subtle balance, ordered by an extremely sure 
instinct, the Church affirms from the time of her birth and will maintain during the whole course of her 
history „the precise and indissoluble interdependence of the Old and New Testaments.‟” 
838 De Lubac, La révélation divine, 158-59, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: 
Reader of Dei Verbum," 692.  Henri de Lubac ("Preface," in La Parole Vivante Au Concile: Texte Et 
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The role of the Magisterium is to keep the interpretation of the text oriented 
toward the singular Mystery, and to proscribe those interpretations which prohibit such 
Christian readings.  Here de Lubac‟s focus, much like Frei‟s work, is on the chastening of 
readers rather than the muting of the text.  The reading of Scripture within the Church is 
meant to eliminate those readings of Scripture that are incompatible with the identity of 
the Church and to illumine the Mystery to which only the Church can sense.  This 
understanding of the Magisterium is possible only when it is assumed that the event of 
Christ grounds both Scripture and Church as mediators of that Event.  As I will now 
show, a certain reciprocal causality exists between Eucharist, Scripture and Church as 
unique but intrinsically and ultimately unified mediators of the Mystery.   
2.  Incorporations of the Logos: Scripture and Church 
 
De Lubac refers to Scripture, Church and Eucharist as mutual incorporations of 
the Logos.
839
  This terminology qualitatively distinguishes Christ as the Incarnation of the 
Logos from these theological realities which mediate Christ as Incorporations of the 
Logos.  Incorporations are the various ways by which God mediates the Mystery in the 
economy of redemption.  De Lubac, then, subjects both Scripture and Church to the event 
                                                                                                                                            
Commentaire De La Constitution Sur La Revelation, ed. R. and M. Thurian Schultz (Taize: Presses de 
Taize, 1966), 4, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, 691), claims, using a citation from Saint Francis de Sales, 
“According to us, it is not Scripture that needs rule or light, but our glosses; we do not place a judgment 
between God and ourselves, but rather between „a man like Calvin and another man like Morus.‟” 
839 See de Lubac, History and Spirit, “The Incorporations of the Logos” (pp. 385-426).  
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of Christ and shows that their authority and their intrinsic relationship are grounded in 
Christ.
840
   
Eucharist Makes the Church:  De Lubac‟s, Corpus Mysticum, written in 1944, 
focused on the causal relationship between the Eucharist and the Church.  There de 
Lubac claims that “the Eucharist corresponds to the Church as cause to effect, as means 
to end, as sign to reality.”841  De Lubac argues in the book that throughout the early 
Church and up to the 12
th
 century, the Church had been able to hold together Eucharist, 
Church, and Christ by understanding that the Eucharist was the corpus mysticum which 
had as its goal the unity of the Church with Christ its head.  During the Middle Ages, de 
Lubac feels, an “inversion” took place in the terminology between “corpus mysticum” 
which had been applied to the Eucharist and now was applied to the Church, and “verum 
corpus” which had been applied to the Church but was now applied to the Eucharist to 
emphasize Real Presence.
842
  This inversion resulted in the loss of focus on the causal 
relationship between Eucharist and Church, placing apologetic emphasis only on the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist.  De Lubac argues that the “final result was that the 
first two of the „three‟ bodies, that is, the historical and sacramental bodies, were 
                                               
840 De Lubac (La révélation divine, 164-65, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: 
Reader of Dei Verbum," 680), claims that Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and 
entire by Scripture, and whole and entire by Tradition, both of which are intimately connected.‟”   
841 De Lubac, Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle 
Ages: A Historical Survey, trans. Gemma Simmonds, Richard Price and Christopher Stephens; ed. 
Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).   
842 De Lubac (Catholicism, 100, n. 68), claims, “At first and for quite a long time, „Corpus 
mysticum‟ meant the Eucharistic body, as opposed to the „corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia‟, which was the 
„verum corpus‟ par excellence.  Was it not in fact quite natural to designate as „mystical‟ that body whose 
hidden presence was due to „mystical prayer‟ and which was received in a „mystical banquet‟? that body 
offered in forms which „mystically‟ signified the Church? It is possible to trace the slow inversion of the 
two expressions.” 
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identified with each other while the third, the ecclesial body, was detached from the 
historical and the sacramental.”843  The importance here is that when the Church 
understood her existence in terms of the fourfold Christian understanding, it understood 
that the visible sacrament of the Eucharist constitutes the Church and moves it toward its 
eschatological reality as the totus Christus.  Hence an intrinsic relationship exists 
between sacrament and Church, wherein the sacrament has a causal effect on the Corpus 
Mysticum, the body of Christ, anticipating its anagogical union as totus Christus.  
Scripture Makes the Church:  In History and Spirit, the efficacy of the Eucharist 
is equated with the efficacy of Scripture.
844
  Like the Eucharist, Scripture constitutes the 
Church as Scripture makes present the Mystery of Christ.
845
  De Lubac claims, “Scripture 
is…already like the coming of the Son of Man, for it has within itself the radiance of 
truth.  Now the Church, in accepting it, takes in this radiance…Scripture is thus like the 
voice of Christ speaking to the Church and in the Church; it is his efficacious sign; it thus 
assures the luminous presence of Christ to the Church.”846  Thus Scripture, by being 
incorporated by the Logos, has a causal role in the divine economy in forming the 
Church‟s members into the one body of Christ.  Boersma claims that de Lubac 
                                               
843 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 65, noting de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 184.   
844 Boersma, (Nouvelle Theologie, 163), claims, “In de Lubac‟s portrayal, Origen had 
regarded Scripture as one element in a „triology‟ of „incorporations‟ of the Word.  Scripture and Eucharist 
had both functioned as „body of Christ‟ sacramentally pointing to the Church and, through the Church, to 
the completed body of Christ, the eternal Logos.”     
845 De Lubac (History and Spirit, 418), claims, “The life of the Church has its source in 
Scripture.  It has it no less in the Eucharist.”  De Lubac (ibid), notes that Origen gives Scripture a certain 
causal priority over the Eucharist because “the „Word‟ is, in its pure essence, that very reality: for the Son 
of God, God himself, is „Word‟.”  This does not mean that Scripture is above the Eucharist, but that while 
both “express and reveal the Logos… Scripture does so, in the final analysis, with a superiority that allows 
one to consider it…as the „truth‟ of which the Eucharist would be the symbol” (419).   
846 Ibid, 418.   
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“emphasized the „efficacious sign‟ character of Scripture and Eucharist, both of them 
transforming the recipients into Christ himself: „Scripture and Eucharist are thereby 
joined once again.  Both never ceased to “build up” the Church.‟”847  Both Scripture and 
Eucharist render Christ present to the Church, and thus both constitute the Church and 
impel the Church toward its eschatological reality.
848
   
The Church Makes the Scripture and Eucharist:  Though both Scripture and 
Eucharist make the Church, mediation of the Mystery is not one-directional, since both 
Scripture and Eucharist depend on the Church for their existence and efficacy.  With 
regard to Scripture, de Lubac emphasizes that “it is only in the Church, through the effect 
of the Church‟s preaching, that this Scripture ceases to be a simple mass of letters in 
order to become a living language.”849  The Church has produced the Scriptures and has 
the ability to interpret Scripture, and without such interpretation, the individual could 
never understand the Logos within it.
850
  With regard to the Eucharist, de Lubac 
emphasizes that the hierarchy makes the Eucharist as part of its sacramental structure.  
Balthasar notes this reciprocal relationship claiming, “There lies at the heart of the 
Church an ineradicable complementarity: the Church (through her hierarchical office) 
                                               
847 Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie,163, citing de Lubac, History and Spirit, 418.   
848 De Lubac (History and Spirit, 422-23), emphasizes the anagogical sense of Scripture as he 
focuses on the causal effect of Eucharist and Scripture on the Church, as both Scripture and sacrament will 
be “only still symbolic in relation to what it will become in the other life, or rather, what the other life will 
be…”  Susan Wood notes the necessity of anagogy for both the Eucharist/Church relationship with the 
literal/spiritual senses of Scripture.  Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 55-56), notes that in both 
Eucharistic ecclesiology and spiritual exegesis, sign and reality can only be held together by looking 
forward to a full future union between the two (an anagogical sense) in the totus Christus.   
849 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 422.   
850 De Lubac (ibid, 420), claims that the Church “dispenses” the Word, because the “Church is 
for each of us the place of the Logos.  In the Church…we hear the Word, and it is the hearing of the Word 
that builds up the Church for all eternity.” 
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„makes the Eucharist‟, and the „Eucharist makes the Church‟ as incorporation into 
Christ‟s body.”851  De Lubac concludes that “we must be careful not to make the smallest 
break between the Mystical Body and the Eucharist…The two mysteries must be 
understood by one another and their point of unity grasped at depth.”852  Hence there 
exists a reciprocal causality between Eucharist, Scripture and Church, so that all become 
constitutive signs which lead to the others yet which are ultimately unified in the divine 
economy.   
IV.  De Lubac‟s Contributions to Scripture in the Economy 
 
In this chapter I have suggested that de Lubac‟s project seeks to explain two 
essential hermeneutical issues which have potential to advance the discussion between 
Tracy and Frei.  First, de Lubac has explicitly shown that a Christian reading of Scripture 
will inevitably make a move from text to spiritual reality.  This movement is essential to 
Christian reading, de Lubac suggests, because the Triune God uses just these texts for 
self-communication to the Church in the economy of redemption.  Readers are drawn into 
the singular Christian Mystery as they interpret Scripture according to the fourfold 
structure of the economy of redemption.  All Christian reality can be approached in this 
fourfold manner, seen most clearly in the traditional fourfold interpretation of 
Scripture.
853
  Here Scripture is understood as both letter and spirit, with the spiritual 
                                               
851 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri De Lubac, 108.   
852 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 156-57. 
853 In fact, Blondel‟s discussion of tradition anticipates the fourfold dimensions of 
apprehension of the Mystery that de Lubac‟s fourfold sense of Scripture will develop in detail.  While the 
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reality emphasizing both the „already‟ and the „not yet‟ aspects of the Mystery (allegory 
and anagogy), as well as the intrinsic relationship between the individual and the Church 
(tropology and allegory).  In order to read Scripture in the economy of redemption, some 
movement from text to spiritual reality must be clearly articulated.   
Second, De Lubac has shown that an intrinsic relationship exists between 
Scripture and Church, since both are ordained by God to mediate the singular Mystery 
revealed in Christ, both are structured toward the fourfold understanding of Christian 
reality, and each exercises a causal relationship on the other.  De Lubac emphasizes that 
the premodern Church interpreted Scripture in accord with its own nature.  Moulins-
Beaufort summarizes the relationship between scriptural interpretation and ecclesiology 
for de Lubac by claiming that “the ultimate criterion of the interpretation of Scripture is 
not some hermeneutical principle, but the unity of persons for whom the Church 
exercises her maternity.”854  As the Church realized that it is the new reality formed in 
relationship to Christ the head (allegory), which was anticipated by the sign (history), it 
realized also its movement toward eschatological fulfillment (anagogy) in the totus 
Christus through the transformation of individuals incorporated into the whole 
(tropology).  De Lubac‟s insistence that the Church be understood primarily as it will be 
in its eschatological form allows him to show that the fourfold interpretation of Scripture 
                                                                                                                                            
distinction between letter and spirit is central to Blondel‟s project, Blondel (ibid, 277), also suggests the 
necessity of the anagogical nature of tradition (“Tradition is less concerned to conserve than to discover: it 
will only attain the ά at the ω”), as well as the presence of both allegory and tropology in the relation of the 
corporate to the individual (“Without the Church, the faithful would not detect the true hand of God in the 
Bible and in souls; but, unless each believer brought his little contribution to the common life, the organism 
would not be fully alive and spiritual”).  Thus in articulating the philosophical relationship between history, 
dogma and tradition, Blondel articulates the same fourfold relationship to the Christian reality that de 
Lubac argues is essential to premodern exegesis. 
854 Moulins-Beaufort, “Henri de Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum,” 692, summarizing de Lubac, 
The Motherhood of the Church, 39-168. 
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flows naturally from the fourfold structure of the Church, and hence the fourfold structure 
of all Christian understanding. 
These two conclusions the role of Scripture in the economy and the intrinsic 
relationship between Scripture and Church provide several insights by which to advance 
the discussion between Frei, Tracy and Vanhoozer.  First, de Lubac‟s description of the 
Church as a theological reality moves beyond Frei‟s description of the Church as a socio-
linguistic community, and will better show how the Church participates in the Mystery of 
Christ.  De Lubac would likely be quite suspicious that Frei‟s description of the Church 
comes close to lapsing into immanentism, and would insist that only as the Church is 
described as a theological reality can the Church work out a consistent hermeneutic of 
Scripture.  Second, de Lubac‟s ecclesiology provides a possible solution to the 
disagreement about authority between Frei and Vanhoozer.  Where Vanhoozer places 
authority in Scripture as God‟s communication, and Frei places authority in the self-
description of the community as constitutive of the normative role of the literal sense, de 
Lubac advances the discussion by grounding both Scripture and Church in the reality of 
Christ and giving Church and Scripture essential mediating roles in communicating that 
reality.  De Lubac would agree with Vanhoozer that Scripture is a species of God‟s 
communication to guide and direct the Church, and de Lubac would agree with Frei that 
the self-description of the Church is fundamental for establishing rules of Scriptural 
reading.  Yet in both Vanhoozer and Frei, de Lubac would find a deficient theological 
description of the Church at the root of inadequate interpretive strategy.  Where 
Vanhoozer describes the Church as only a response to Scripture, de Lubac would 
seemingly say that the Church is also constitutive of Scripture, and that both mediate and 
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are impelled toward the same Mystery.  Where Frei describes the Church as establishing 
the literal sense as normative by a community consensus, de Lubac would argue that the 
Church is compelled to read the Gospels literally as a recognition of God‟s action in 
history is the indispensable means to the disclosure of the Christian Mystery in which the 
Church participates.   
Yet while de Lubac‟s project provides theological resources for moving beyond 
certain impasses in the debate between Frei and Tracy, several hermeneutical difficulties 
remain in his own project which could be helped by the projects of Frei, Tracy and 
Vanhoozer.  First, de Lubac‟s equation of the “letter” with history simply bypasses much 
of the contemporary hermeneutical debate, which centers on the way in which the text 
renders its referent.  De Lubac‟s work remains underdeveloped in treating the literal 
sense of Scripture, and this confuses the movement from text to historical referent.  Lack 
of specification between the literal sense as history or as plain sense, as Old Covenant 
anticipation of the New Covenant or as the whole canon viewed by the secular historian 
limits de Lubac‟s exegetical influence.  Much is at stake in this movement from text to 
history, for what the text uniquely renders will help to show the place of Scripture in the 
economy.  It is here that Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer will be instructive to de Lubac, as 
their projects will insist on the importance of the literal sense.  
Second, de Lubac‟s project depends on a particular “sacramental ontology” of the 
movement between nature and the supernatural.
855
  Yet while it may be true that 
                                               
855 This presses for a return to a symbolic method of theology.  See here Boersma (Nouvelle 
Theologie, 252), who claims, “In short, de Lubac did not just present a plea for a return to a more 
Eucharistic understanding of the Church; his concern was also for the restoration of a symbolic approach to 
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Christian self-description depends on a fourfold understanding of Christian reality, both 
Vanhoozer and Frei suggest that it is possible to preserve the dimensions of 
transcendence and anagogy indispensable to Christian faith while interpreting only the 
literal sense of the text.  While de Lubac has thoroughly shown the foundation of the 
fourfold interpretation of Scripture in the Christian tradition, his goal of re-establishing 
spiritual exegesis as a practice of the Church has remained largely unrealized.  Frei and 
Vanhoozer especially would remain critical that such a hermeneutical practice would 
reduce to eisegesis, as it would allow the Church to avoid the plain sense of the text.  In 
the next chapter, I will suggest some possible convergence between these four 
theologians which gives adequate attention to the role of Scripture in the broader context 
of the divine economy.  
                                                                                                                                            
theology, one that he felt had suffered greatly through the twelfth-century introduction of dialectical 
theology.” 
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CHAPTER 4: 
LOCATING SCRIPTURE‟S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION 
I.  Introduction:  Advancing the Discussion 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I suggested that many of the impasses 
between Hans Frei and David Tracy have been caused by a narrowing of hermeneutical 
discussions to the relationship between text and readers.  I suggested that by locating the 
place of Scripture in the broader context of the economy of redemption, it would be 
possible to ease many of the difficulties between them, as the hermeneutical discussion 
would be expanded to include God‟s use of Scripture to communicate to the Church.  
Kevin Vanhoozer provided one attempt to locate Scripture in the economy of redemption, 
as he builds an ontology of God as author who communicates to the Church through the 
literal, canonical sense of the Scriptural texts.  Henri de Lubac provided a very different 
approach to locating Scripture in the economy of redemption, as de Lubac explains the 
economy as the singular Mystery revealed in Jesus Christ and mediated sacramentally in 
Scripture and Church alike.  In this chapter, I will place all four authors in dialogue to 
show how each of these very different hermeneutical projects, when examined in the 
context of the economy of redemption, are able to contribute to a more complete 
theological interpretation of Scripture.  Here I will examine how God uniquely uses 
Scripture for Triune self-mediation to readers so that they may be uniquely incorporated 
into the Church as the eschatological totus Christus.  This structure is based on the classic 
understanding of the divine economy as exitus and reditus, God‟s action toward creation, 
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the transformation of creation by God, and the return of creation to God.
856
  Thus 
situating Scripture in the divine economy will place the text/reader relationship between 
two other essential relationships: The relationship between Christ and Scripture and the 
relationship between Scripture and the Church.   
In this introduction I first suggest that different categories are needed to describe 
the differences between Tracy and Frei than those which have typically been used.  I will 
suggest that locating Scripture in the economy will provide just those categories which 
will advance the discussion.  Then, I will show that the projects of both Tracy and Frei 
require them to articulate this broader theological context in which reading takes place.  I 
will suggest that because both Frei and Tracy see Scriptural reading as a unique activity 
in which the Triune God is disclosed to the reader, they must explain both the way in 
which God uses Scripture and the capacity of the Church to encounter God in Scriptural 
reading.  After showing that articulation of the relationship between Christ and Church is 
a requirement of their own hermeneutical aims, I will show how articulating this broader 
context will advance the debate.   
A.  The Inadequacy of the Usual Categorizations 
 
A number of theological and philosophical distinctions have been suggested in an 
attempt to categorize the divergent trajectories of revisionists and postliberals.  While 
                                               
856 This typical way of structuring the economy of redemption is seen, for example, in 
Aquinas‟s structure of the Summa (See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His 
Work, trans. Robert Royal, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 
150-52).  Telford Work (Living and Active, vii-xi) similarly structures the divine economy as, “The 
beginning of Scripture: the Word of God,” “the mission of Scripture: a school for all the world,” and “the 
end of Scripture: God‟s word in faithful practice.”   
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some are quite helpful in illuminating certain key similarities and differences between the 
two schools, I will argue here that the discussion has led to impasse because no proposal 
has thus far been successful in getting to the heart of the difficulty.  The real issue has not 
proven to be the choice between a system of “proclamation” or “manifestation” as Tracy 
typically describes it, nor has the real issue been captured in the relationship between 
philosophical description and the Church‟s self-description, as Frei‟s Types of Christian 
Theology so helpfully categorizes it, nor has the real issue fully surfaced the distinction 
between “foundationalists” and “nonfoundationalists,” as many postliberals have 
suggested.
857
  While each of these categorizations has illumined significant options for 
theological method, none of them has really probed to the center of the disagreement 
between Tracy and Frei.  The real difference between Tracy and Frei, I will suggest in 
this chapter, is that each uses a different hermeneutical method to show the movement 
from the plain sense of the text to the spiritual reality which it discloses to readers.  These 
methods appear to be incompatible when they are compared only in the context of the 
text/reader relationship.  Yet, when examined in the broader context of the economy of 
redemption, they may be seen as compatible and even mutually complementary.  Here I 
provide a short description of the most common categorizations of the disagreement and 
show why each falls short of really getting to the heart of the issue. 
Proclamation and Manifestation:  Tracy has suggested that the primary difference 
is the distinction between “manifestation” and “proclamation” theologians.858  Tracy 
                                               
857 See here John E. Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994). 
858 See especially Tracy, The Analogical Imagination 371-89, as well as the previous 
discussion about proclamation and manifestation in this dissertation in chapter 2, “Relationship to David 
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wants to show that theologies of proclamation can ultimately be located as critical 
moments within the larger schema of manifestation, and therefore that the trajectory of 
manifestation better captures the essence of the Christian tradition.  Tracy‟s attempt to 
incorporate “proclamation” theology as a necessary moment in his own system of 
“manifestation” was intended to show that encounters of radical transcendence and 
confrontation are a common and necessary prerequisite for encounters of 
“manifestation,” in which readers recognize “some pervasive yes at the heart of the 
universe, some radical mystery sensed as power, as an abiding love that undoes all our 
more usual senses of the futility and absurdity of existence.”859  Vanhoozer, in his early 
writings, agreed that Tracy‟s distinction adequately captured the nature of the debate.  In 
those writings Vanhoozer strongly resisted the entire trajectory of manifestation because 
he felt it necessarily compromised the Gospel message.  Vanhoozer argued that both 
Ricoeur and Tracy were manifestation theologians who were consequently unable to 
articulate the nature of revelation in an adequate way.
860
  As a result, Vanhoozer 
vigorously defended a system of meaning which would safeguard Christian proclamation 
                                                                                                                                            
Tracy” above.  Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 379), characterizes “manifestation” as that 
“power…now disclosed…reflecting upon the original experience of wonder in existence…to  a mediated 
sense of a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality of God as well as an attendant trust in all reality as 
graced.  Reflection upon that uncanny sense of wonder discloses the uncanny giftedness of all creation.  It 
transforms the stuttering self into a creature alive to and with a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality 
manifesting itself/himself/herself as none other than the incomprehensible, a pure, unbounded, powerful 
love decisively re-presented as my God in the event of Jesus Christ.”  Tracy (ibid, 386-87), characterizes 
“proclamation” as emphasizing “the radical transcendence of God and the eschatological coming of God‟s 
word into this world in the triumph of grace in Jesus Christ” so that “only if God comes to disclose our true 
godforsakenness and our possible liberation can we be healed.” 
859 Ibid, 386. 
860 Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 180), claims, “By 
attributing to the poetic word the sacramental function of manifesting transcendence, Ricoeur erases the 
very distinction between nature and grace that was so important to Barth.…For Ricoeur…revelation is not 
so much an „impossible possibility‟ as a natural possibility shared by sacred and secular narratives alike.” 
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from what he considered to be the destructive advances of the manifestation 
theologians.
861
  Even in his later work, Vanhoozer remains a decidedly “proclamation” 
theologian, although his recent ontology of communication would force him to somewhat 
temper his early harshness.   
Yet when Vanhoozer is compared to de Lubac, it appears that Tracy‟s dichotomy 
between proclamation and manifestation is not so helpful after all.  Vanhoozer and de 
Lubac share many theological commitments, and both emphasize the uniqueness of 
encounter in Scripture, God‟s supervening use of Scripture to communicate to the 
Church, and the need to develop a participatory hermeneutics which incorporates the 
reader into the meaning of the text.  Yet while Vanhoozer develops his career on the 
proclamation trajectory, de Lubac would be better located in Tracy‟s manifestation 
model.  De Lubac proclaims with vigor the disruptive, transformative Word of God 
mediated through Scripture, yet de Lubac‟s sacramental ontology is much more at home 
with a system of manifestation than proclamation.  In de Lubac, Vanhoozer would find a 
manifestation theologian whose theological convictions are very close to his own.  When 
Vanhoozer and de Lubac are compared, we see that the real disagreement is the location 
of the Church in relation to Scripture in the economy of redemption, a disagreement that 
has little to do with manifestation and proclamation.
862
  Hence proclamation and 
                                               
861 See Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 150-180 and 
Vanhoozer "The Spirit of Understanding,” 220.   
862 To be sure, the trajectories of proclamation and manifestation do lead to different 
emphases by each theologian.  While Vanhoozer, in terms typical of proclamation theologians, emphasizes 
the authoring character of God in relation to Scripture, de Lubac, more akin to manifestation theologians, 
emphasizes the ongoing communication of the Spirit of Christ through the text in terms of sacramental 
mediation.  Yet for neither theologian would these differences create a deep conflict in the resulting 
program.  The real remaining difference between them is the understanding of the place of the Church in 
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manifestation appear to be only a small part of a larger disagreement about the structure 
of the economy of redemption.   
Critical Correlation:  Frei and Tracy have both suggested that a central 
disagreement between them is the relationship between Christian self-description and 
secular philosophical systems of meaning.  The debate, as Frei articulates it, is whether 
the interpreter ought to employ an “ad hoc” or “systematic” correlation in order to render 
the content of Christian faith intelligible.
863
  Frei affirms the need to make the Christian 
faith intelligible using general philosophical concepts.  But he does not look for any 
particular criteria to ground this correlation, as he feels that the criteria itself would have 
priority over Christian self-description.  Tracy, on the other hand, is committed to finding 
both criteria of “appropriateness” to the Christian tradition and criteria of “intelligibility,” 
a systematic correlation between the Christian tradition and common human experience 
based on secular criteria.
864
   
Yet while Frei‟s posthumous book, Types of Christian Theology, is a remarkable 
achievement in presenting options for articulating the relationship between theological 
discourse and secular reason, Frei‟s Types does not really get to the heart of the impasse 
between revisionists and postliberals.  Three examples will show that Frei‟s Types leave 
certain key issues unresolved.  First, in his later career, Tracy appears to have moved 
from type 2 (a system in which “external description and self-description [of the Church] 
                                                                                                                                            
relation to Scripture, not manifestation and proclamation (see the comparison of de Lubac and Vanhoozer 
below, ppg. 74ff).   
863 See Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically” 55, and Frei, Types, 86.   
864 Tracy ("On Reading the Scriptures Theologically," 26), claims, “In any theological method 
which remains distinctively Christian, there logically must be criteria to assess the appropriateness of any 
particular theological proposal as Christian.  For some theologians (including myself) there must also be 
criteria of intelligibility or credibility for a full theological method.” 
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merge into one, and the joint product is justified by a foundational philosophical 
scheme”) to type 3 (a system in which philosophy and “Christian self-description” are 
“correlated as two autonomous yet reciprocally related factors,” and Christian self-
description is not subjected to philosophical description) on Frei‟s continuum.865  If this is 
so, all four theologians represented in this dissertation would be located in type 3 or 4 (a 
system in which “theology is not philosophically founded” and “Christian self-
description is quite independent of every external endeavor to describe Christianity as a 
specific religion”).866  Yet, just as divergence remains between Schleiermacher and Barth, 
so these four theologians continue to disagree greatly on important points of interpretive 
method.  Second, Vanhoozer himself could be described as moving from type 2 to type 4 
between his early work and his later work, yet his theological commitments remain 
largely unchanged.
867
  Third, while Vanhoozer, Frei and de Lubac would all probably fit 
in type 4, each would remain quite wary of the others‟ employment of hermeneutical 
method.  Vanhoozer, for example, rejects Frei‟s “turn to the Church” and, against Frei, 
constructs his own proposal to grant authority to God rather than to the Church.  Frei is 
                                               
865 For Frei‟s definitions of Types 2 and 3, see Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 30 and 34-
35, respectively.  This move from type 2 to type 3 is most explicit for David Tracy in "Writing," 383, where 
he admits that his articulation of the classic, while perhaps helpful for fundamental theology, is not 
adequate for Christian self-description.  Furthermore, Tracy ("On Reading the Scriptures Theologically," 
36-43), has admitted the importance of Frei‟s work in emphasizing the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus 
Christ, and hence admits that Christ is the proper referent of the text.  Hunsinger and Placher suggest that 
Tracy‟s later work might be better appropriated in type 3 (Frei, Types of Christian Theology, x).   
866 For Frei‟s definition of type 4, see Types of Christian Theology, 39.   
867 Vanhoozer‟s early work could best fit in type 2 of Frei‟s typology (see Frei, Types of 
Christian Theology, 30-34), insofar as Vanhoozer does attempt to ground Scripture in a particular theory of 
meaning that comes from literary theory grounded in theological presuppositions.  Vanhoozer‟s early work 
attempts to move to type 3, yet it appears to remain grounded in type 2, since the general hermeneutical 
project proved inflexible enough to not be able to incorporate Vanhoozer‟s suggested theological 
underpinnings.  Vanhoozer‟s later work could be classified almost certainly in type 4, as it begins with 
Scripture‟s place the economy of redemption, and then moves to methods for reading.   
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wary of de Lubac‟s turn to the spiritual sense as he feels this will draw attention away 
from the unsubstitutable identity of Christ rendered realistically in the literal sense.  De 
Lubac would see the projects of both Frei and Vanhoozer as failing to capture the 
distinctiveness of the Christian hermeneutic as they restrict meaning to the literal sense 
alone.  Thus while Frei‟s typology may be useful for articulating the relationship between 
Christian self-description and secular reason, it says little about options for Christian 
hermeneutics.  Together, these three observations indicate that some hermeneutical 
element exists which Frei‟s typology does not identify.  This element can be analyzed 
explicitly only when Scripture is located within the economy of redemption, as the 
relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church are specifically articulated.    
Narrative Theology and Foundationalism: Nor is the issue really the problem of 
“narrative theology” vs. “foundationalism,” as has occasionally been the charge of 
postliberals.  Often postliberals have accused revisionists of being “foundationalists,” or 
those who claim some common human experience which forms a philosophical 
foundation for truth claims.
868
  Postliberals, in turn, have claimed to form their identity on 
“nonfoundationalist” narrative readings of reality.869  Yet while the postliberal allergy to 
foundationalism has helped to bring some precision to the relationship between the 
Church‟s self-description and philosophical categories (for example, it has helped to 
                                               
868 See, for example, Nancy Murphy (Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark Nation, 
Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of Theological Truth (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1994, 9-16) who calls foundationalism a claim that all knowledge can be traced back to a 
bedrock of knowledge which cannot be questioned, an idea which she believes began in Descartes.  The 
implicit claim is that an epistemological foundation which cannot exist apart from the philosophical 
tradition of Descartes lacks usefulness in the contemporary situation.   
869 See here Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark Nation, Theology Without 
Foundations, Hauerwas, Murphy and Nation and John Thiel, Nonfoundationalism. 
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clarify why Frei‟s Types 1 and 2 are unhelpful for Christian reading), it has yielded few 
insights which will help advance the debate between Frei and Tracy.
870
  With perhaps the 
exception of the early work of Tracy and Vanhoozer (which both authors admit to have 
failed), all theologians in this dissertation desire to give priority to the self-description of 
the Church through a literal reading of the Gospel narratives, yet all insist that the 
unsubstitutable identity of Christ must be articulated for a secular sensibility.  Vanhoozer, 
de Lubac, and Frei, all make extensive use of various philosophical tools to illumine 
Christian truth while still reading intratextually.  For each, philosophical models must be 
put in the service of articulating the claims of revelation.
871
  Frei is particularly wary of 
“type 5” theology in which Christian self-description (language games) has no 
relationship to criteria for truth outside the Church.
872
  Tracy likewise insists on creating 
space for Christian self-description and admits that where he has been unsuccessful at 
giving revelation priority over philosophy, his project needs to be corrected.
873
  
Furthermore, Tracy thinks that his incorporation of recent insights from hermeneutical 
                                               
870 For Frei‟s definition of type 1, see Types of Christian Theology, 28, where Frei claims that 
in this system, theology as a “philosophical discipline…takes complete priority over Christian self-
description within the…Church.” 
871 Each in his own way attempts something of a reversal from “onto-theology” to “theo-
ontology” (The phrase is Vanhoozer‟s (See Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 8, 222, etc.). 
872 For Frei‟s definition of type 5, see, Types of Christian Theology, 46, where Frei claims that 
in this system “Christian self-description” leaves no place for philosophy, “neither in adducing criteria for 
coherence, adequacy, or appropriateness, nor…of any metaphysical scheme by the theologian.”  
Significantly, Frei‟s critique of type 5 representative D.Z. Phillips is much like Tracy‟s critique of 
Lindbeck: “To ask a question about the reality of God is to ask a question about a kind of reality…asking 
that kind of question is asking for criteria.  How do you judge whether or not you‟ve got the right 
grammar?” (Types, 47).  See Tracy (“Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 468), who similarly claims that Lindbeck 
“has [not] resolved the issues he has set for himself (viz. relativism and fideism)” with his insistence on a 
“linguistic-cultural” theology.   
873 See Tracy, “Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 468, and Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures 
Theologically,” 39-40. 
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philosophers has fully cleared him of the charge of foundationalism.
874
  Both theologians, 
then, are committed to assigning a relative priority to the Church‟s self-description, as 
well as to insisting that correlation be made between Scripture and secular reason.  It 
seems, then, that the fundamental disagreement between Tracy and Frei is theological, 
not philosophical, as it does not so much concern discussions about modernist and 
postmodern philosophical method, but about the way in which Christ is mediated to the 
Church through occasioned by a theological reading of Scripture.   
Conclusion:  All of the above distinctions help to illumine important interpretive 
issues in the debate, yet none of them really moves the discussion beyond its present 
impasse.  Instead, quite different issues will begin to emerge as Tracy and Frei are 
brought into discussion with Vanhoozer and de Lubac.  I will show that what is 
ultimately important to Tracy and Frei alike is the development of a hermeneutical 
project in which Scriptural reading is ultimately about encounter between Triune God and 
responsive reader.  Through Vanhoozer and de Lubac we can see that all methods for 
Scriptural reading should be ordered to that end.  As we will see, this changes the 
parameters of the discussion, as a description of this movement requires an understanding 
of Scripture‟s role in God‟s ordering of the economy of redemption.   
B.  Scripture‟s Spiritual Sense and the Economy of Redemption  
 
The very hermeneutical method of Tracy and Frei requires that each locate 
Scripture in the economy of redemption.  Central to the method of each is the 
                                               
874 Tracy, “Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 463-65.   
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presupposition that, uniquely in the reading of Scripture, a movement takes place from 
simply understanding the content of the text to encountering God.  As much as Tracy and 
Frei try to focus only on the relationship between text and reader, their very goal of 
showing that Scriptural reading is about encounter with the Triune God requires that they 
provide deeper description of theological realities which attend Scriptural reading.  In this 
section I propose that the very methods of Tracy and Frei require them to adopt what de 
Lubac calls a spiritual sense of Scripture, and that this will, in turn, obligate them to 
locate the text/reader relationship in the broader context of the economy of redemption.  
Through the lens of de Lubac‟s project of spiritual interpretation, it can be shown that 
Tracy and Frei must attend more specifically to theological realities in the context of the 
divine economy in order to complete their hermeneutical projects.   
1.  The Enduring Value of the Spiritual Sense of Scripture 
 
De Lubac has argued that in traditional Christian readings of Scripture, an 
essential movement takes place from the text itself to the spiritual reality to which the 
text points.  De Lubac describes this as the movement from the literal sense to the 
spiritual sense, and his whole work on Christian hermeneutics of Scripture could be 
described as an attempt to recover this essential movement which he calls spiritual 
interpretation.  Yet despite de Lubac‟s insistence on the importance of such a move from 
text to spiritual reality, contemporary theologians have found it notoriously difficult to 
articulate exactly what the spiritual sense of Scripture is, and consequently how it ought 
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to be pursued in reading Scripture today.
 875
  Among the authors represented in this 
dissertation, there is little appreciation for de Lubac‟s insight.  Tracy is willing to accept 
the usefulness of spiritual interpretation, provided that some other criteria be employed to 
judge it.
876
  Vanhoozer and Frei, who see the text as rendering spiritual reality to readers 
in some way, nonetheless deny that spiritual interpretation is a discipline in its own 
right.
877
  Even de Lubac refuses to develop a method for what he calls “spiritual 
interpretation.”878  At first glance, de Lubac‟s project seems antiquated and unuseful. 
                                               
875 This seems to be the complaint of Joseph Fitzmeyer (The Interpretation of Scripture, 91), 
who claims, “The problems that the spiritual sense of Scripture raises today are different and multiple, but 
they are almost all derived from the fact that the term „spiritual,‟ when used of the meaning of a biblical 
passage, has become a weasel word.  Its connotation always depends on who is using it, and one has to try 
to sort out its intended nuances.”  Fitzmeyer (ibid, 92), himself finds “the christological sense of OT 
passages,” to be the only legitimate and unproblematic use of the spiritual sense today.  Even many 
theologians who hold a deep appreciation for de Lubac‟s work finally conclude that what de Lubac‟s 
“spiritual interpretation,” is no longer necessary for the Church.  Notice this extended quote by Susan 
Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac, 141):  “One can 
conclude…that even though spiritual exegesis is now foreign to scientific biblical study, its categories 
continue to shape the Christian worldview.  De Lubac does not call for a return to this method of exegesis: 
its time is truly past as a method of biblical study, the emphasis now being on a scientific and historical 
study of the literal sense of Scripture, a literary analysis of the biblical narrative, or various other exegetical 
methodologies.  However, the fruits of this exegesis endure and serve as the foundation of a Christian 
vision of reality.”  Wood herself does not fully appreciate the intrinsic unity between the spiritual sense and 
“scientific biblical study,” and a better articulation of the inevitable movement from text to spiritual reality 
may show greater ongoing legitimacy in de Lubac‟s ongoing work. 
876 See On Naming the Present, 120.  The chastening of spiritual interpretation by an outside 
criteria, of course, is exactly what de Lubac argues cannot be done, and consequently it shows how little 
Tracy understands what de Lubac was arguing for.  This makes it all the more interesting to see Tracy 
embrace something of a spiritual sense that has a distinct resemblance to de Lubac‟s spiritual sense.   
877 It seems fair to conclude that Vanhoozer‟s canonical sense and Frei‟s literal sense (which 
includes figural reading) do, in fact, constitute a spiritual sense of Scripture.  While both Vanhoozer and 
Frei would insist that they are not advancing a spiritual sense, both assume the same set of presuppositions 
that de Lubac‟s spiritual sense requires: the unity of the testaments in Christ, an understanding of Christ as 
the meaning of history, and the unique spiritual meeting between God and reader that Scripture occasions.  
See here Denis Farkasfalvy, "A Heritage in Search of Heirs: The Future of Ancient Christian Exegesis," 
Communio 25 (1998), 505-19, who suggests a movement to the spiritual sense depends on three 
presuppositions:  First, reading with a focus on the “context of salvation history” (this includes the unity of 
the Testaments in Christ as well as the ongoing action of Christ through the Spirit)(344).  Second, reading 
with a “parallelism between the community and the individual” (This means that each individual finds 
his/her own salvation history mirrored in God‟s relationship with Israel and the Church)(346).  Third, 
reading in light of the principle of “interiorization” (This means that the Bible “ultimately addressed to 
man‟s spiritual faculties in order to elicit from them the response of faith and love”)(347).  It seems that 
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Ironically, however, Tracy, Frei, and de Lubac all provide different strategies for 
appropriating just the kind of move from text to spiritual reality that de Lubac saw as 
essential to Christian reading.
879
  While showing little appreciation for e Lubac‟s 
hermeneutical project, each performs the same hermeneutical move.  Here an analogy 
between de Lubac‟s “spiritual interpretation” and Frei‟s The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative 
illustrates the issue.  In The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, Frei claimed that there is a 
quality in the Gospels called realistic reading, that all interpreters saw it, and yet they 
“eclipsed” it because they had no method to deal with it.880  I suspect that something very 
similar is taking place among these authors in the move from text to spiritual reality.  
                                                                                                                                            
Vanhoozer would emphatically agree with all three presuppositions, and would see the „canonical sense‟ as 
the way in which the interpreter aligns him/herself with them.   
878 De Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 228-29), claims, for example, “The more religiously 
beautiful and powerful a text is, the more it is stripped of its beauty and power by too ready or rigid an 
attempt to find a „spiritual meaning‟ in it….We must, therefore, reject too all-embracing or too automatic 
practice of spiritual interpretation, so as to preserve the religious value of the Old Testament, considered 
both literally and in its historical situations.” 
879 Following on the research of the earlier chapters, the implicit move in each could be shown 
as including at least the following:  Frei sees the move from text to spiritual reality in terms somewhat 
analogous to Anselm‟s ontological argument:  when the plain sense of the Gospel narratives are read, the 
reader cannot but understand the referent of those stories to be the living and present Christ today.  Frei 
then furthers his argument by showing that the formative Christian practice was to read the whole of 
Scripture with Christ at its center.  Tracy claims that when it is understood that the very subject matter of 
Scripture is God, the reader is placed in a position where he or she risks a claim to the whole and thereby 
moves from text to encounter with God.  Tracy sees the greatest intensification of this revelatory potential 
in Jesus Christ, the Christian classic, but also in other genres of Scripture and, by extension, in other 
religious texts.  Vanhoozer believes the move from literal sense to spiritual sense occurs in the 
presupposition that God is the author of Scripture, supervening divine illocutions on the human speech acts 
so that the whole canon ultimately comes to be understood as the communication of God.  Vanhoozer‟s key 
phrase, “the literal sense is the canonical sense,” shows a distinct move from text to spiritual reality as it 
highlights God‟s authorship over the authorship of the human writers.  De Lubac understands the move as 
occurring in the shift from understanding the events of history to understanding the meaning of history as it 
was transformed in the event of Christ.   
880 Frei (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 10), describes his thesis about the „eclipsing‟ of 
realistic reading with his central thesis:  Realistic reading is “a feature, as obvious as it is important, of 
many of the biblical narratives that went into the making of Christian belief…It can be highlighted by the 
appropriate analytical procedure…[it] was actually acknowledged and agreed upon by…commentators.  
But since the…procedure for isolating it had irretrievably broken down…[it] came to be ignored, 
or…denied for lack of a „method‟ to isolate it.”  This, I suggest, is a very close description to what has also 
happened to the spiritual sense of Scripture.   
 316 
 
Each sees such a move as essential to Christian reading, yet after recognizing its 
necessity, each fails to describe it since he has no method for it.  As a result, the 
movement from text to spiritual reality, central to Christian interpretation of Scripture, 
remains unexplored, and is sometimes denied even while it is being used.  I suggest that 
each of these contemporary theologians is quite interested in demonstrating some 
movement from text to spiritual reality, yet that movement will not be identified as such 
until the broader theological reality of Christ‟s relationship to the Church is shown to 
determine interpretive method.  Below, I suggest why this confusion has taken place and 
how it can be fixed.   
2.  Clarifying the Spiritual Sense of Scripture 
 
While it seems that de Lubac‟s central problematic is perhaps the central one for 
developing a contemporary theological interpretation of Scripture, de Lubac‟s own lack 
of lack of clarity has left his insight underappreciated.  To clarify the movement from text 
to spiritual reality, it will be necessary to differentiated four distinct aspects of spiritual 
interpretation in de Lubac‟s work which de Lubac himself does not often distinguish.  
First, spiritual interpretation provides the theological presuppositions necessary for 
Church and individual reader to participate in the meaning of Scripture.  These include 
the presuppositions which make Scripture unique, such as Scripture‟s participation in the 
Logos, God‟s use of Scripture for self-disclosure to readers, the unique location of the 
Church as a theological reality, although the two most important seem to be the necessity 
to reading all Scriptures in light of Christ and to recognize the fourfold structure of 
Christian reality.  Second, spiritual exegesis describes the unique capacity of the Church 
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to encounter Christ in the Scriptures.  For de Lubac, spiritual interpretation always 
includes a theological description of the Church as reading community which allows 
disclosure to take place in a unique way.  De Lubac shows that believers have a unique 
capacity to encounter the Triune God in Scripture, based on an imprint of the Logos on 
the soul of every human being.  This capacity can be identified at the level of the 
individual (the tropological sense) or at the level of the Church (the allegorical sense), yet 
the two are united in anagogy.
881
  Third, spiritual interpretation describes the 
transformative result of reading the Scriptures in light of Christ.  This result remains 
mysterious as it is an encounter with God which draws the reader into Mystery.  
Ultimately, the result is the building of the eschatological totus Christus consequently the 
believer in this way is incorporated more deeply into the Church, the body of Christ 
which participates in its eschatological reality already even if such eschatological 
(although not yet fully realized) reality.   
Finally, spiritual interpretation may or may not involve a particular method of 
reading.  De Lubac shows that the whole process of spiritual reading is the process of 
conversion and thus cannot be contained in a particular method, although certain 
hermeneutical methods may be more useful than others at leading readers to this 
                                               
881 For the experience of the tropological capacity, see William F. Murphy (“Henri de Lubac‟s 
Mystical Tropology”, 187-90), who identifies three experiences of the believer who participates in spiritual 
interpretation.  First, the reader experiences “consolations” which provide “nourishment” for the spirit in 
which “mystery and morality are united in a single vision full of sweetness” (see de Lubac, Medieval 
Exegesis, II, 174, where de Lubac explains this experience of sweetness:  “the mystery interiorizes itself 
within the heart, where it becomes experience—though always passing over in itself „the limits of 
experience‟ as well as those of reason.”).  Second, the reader experiences the “Divine Fire” which makes 
him “„burn with love‟: it produces in him „an extraordinary expansion of the mind” so that “his 
understanding is flooded with the clarity that comes forth from „the eye of the Bridegroom,‟” and 
“scrutinizes the mysteries of the Scriptures” (Medieval Exegesis, II, 161; see Murphy, 188).  Third, the 
reader becomes “aware of…daily participation in the Mystery of Christ” through Scripture (Murphy, 188).  
The experience of the whole Church, on the other hand, appears to be best located in the sensus fidelium, in 
the guiding role of tradition, and in the teaching Magisterium.  
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encounter with God.  The Christian hermeneutic may include a wide variety of reading 
methods, provided that it respects the plain sense of the text and employs unique 
theological presuppositions about God‟s use of the text and the spiritual nature of the 
community responding to God‟s communication.  In other words, the method in spiritual 
interpretation is unique precisely because of the uniqueness of the theological 
presuppositions employed, the capacity of those who read, and the transformative result 
of Scriptural reading.  Consequently, to discuss hermeneutical method in Scripture 
interpretation, one must describe theological realities beyond the text/reader 
relationship.
882
  One cannot arrive at a sufficient method simply by describing the 
interaction of the text and reader.   
                                               
882 Much of the confusion about de Lubac‟s account of spiritual interpretation can be 
attributed to a lack of consistent distinction between the various parts of the movement from text to 
spiritual reality.  De Lubac is notoriously unsystematic about the various aspects of spiritual interpretation.  
Even in describing the project, de Lubac at times uses the phrases “spiritual sense,” “spiritual 
understanding,” “spiritual interpretation,” and “spiritual exegesis” interchangeably, as if there were some 
hidden Christian method, unavailable to scientific exegesis, which would lead to disclosure of spiritual 
reality.  This conflation often makes it unclear whether de Lubac is speaking of approaching the text with 
Christian theological presuppositions, or whether he is speaking of the disclosive gift of God received as 
gracious result of Christian reading.  If spiritual interpretation is to be recovered, theologians must be clear 
about their interpretive aims.  For example, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 114), claims, “The „true‟ 
meaning of the Scriptures, their complete and definitive meaning, can really be nothing other than the 
meaning „which the Spirit gives to the Church,‟” he supposes a theological description of the Church which 
strongly distinguishes between insiders and outsiders.  Frei and Vanhoozer naturally bristle at this claim, 
feeling that the relative clarity of the plain sense is being quickly dismissed in favor of some method 
accessible only to “insiders.”  Yet the disagreement exists primarily because Frei and Vanhoozer are 
focusing on a different aspect of spiritual interpretation than that which de Lubac emphasizes.  De Lubac‟s 
claim acknowledges that the meaning of Scripture is accessible only to the Church because the Church 
brings a unique set of theological presuppositions to Scripture, that the Church has a unique capacity to 
understand the spiritual meaning as it uniquely participates in Scripture‟s Logos, and that those in the 
Church can participate in a transformative result not open to all readers.  When Frei and Vanhoozer 
emphasize the external clarity of Scripture, they are referring to the method by which the Scriptures can be 
read.  De Lubac has persistently demonstrated his commitment to scientific exegesis of the literal sense 
grounded in Christian theological commitments.  In this sense, de Lubac is in full agreement with Frei and 
Vanhoozer, and there is no reason to fear that de Lubac has lapsed into an arbitrary hermeneutic.  When de 
Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 29), warns that, “We must…reject too all-embracing or too automatic a 
practice of spiritual interpretation,” so as not to circumscribe God‟s transformative communication to the 
reader, he is here speaking of the result of spiritual reading, encounter with the Triune God and 
incorporation into the world of the text.  This movement from text to spiritual reality is, for de Lubac, a 
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The very methodological goals of Tracy and Frei require that they attend to 
theological realities beyond the text/reader relationship.  Essential to the method of each 
theologian is the assumption that a movement takes place from text to spiritual reality 
which, we have now seen, can only be explained when certain theological categories are 
developed.  Consequently, it can be shown that only when these theologians begin to deal 
explicitly with the broader theological issues attending this movement such as the 
theological presuppositions about God‟s use of Scripture, the capacity of the Church to 
receive the disclosure of God, and the result that occurs when the movement takes place, 
can they develop insights about the text/reader relationship which are appropriate to the 
Scriptural texts.  In order to advance the discussion between Tracy and Frei, then, it is 
necessary to locate Scripture‟s role in the economy of redemption.  This will mean 
articulating the relationship between Christ and Scripture, and the relationship between 
Scripture and the Church.   
3.  Advancing the Discussion in the Divine Economy 
 
Having shown that Frei and Tracy are obligated, by their own hermeneutical aims, 
to locate Scripture‟s role in the broader context of the economy of redemption, the rest of 
this chapter will seek to show the specific hermeneutical implications of articulating the 
relationship between Christ and Scripture and Scripture and the Church.  As I examine 
the relationship between Christ and Scripture in the next section, I will suggest that the 
most helpful model by which to show how Christ is related to Scripture is de Lubac‟s 
                                                                                                                                            
result of reading rather than a specific method for reading.  Keeping these aspects separate will help clarify 
both how this move from text to spiritual reality occurs. 
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claim that Christ stands as both Subject and Object of Scripture.  This lens will show the 
intrinsic unity between the literal sense of Scripture and the inevitable movement from 
text to spiritual reality in Christian reading.  This will advance the debate between Frei 
and Tracy by showing that Frei‟s insistence on the plain sense reading of Scripture is 
quite compatible with Tracy‟s insistence on disclosure in reading, so long as Christ is 
understood as the one who is both sole subject matter of Scripture and the one who is 
mediated to the Church through Scripture.   
As I examine the relationship between Scripture and Church in the following 
section, I will suggest that the most helpful lens by which to show how Scripture is 
related to the Church is de Lubac‟s distinction between the “Imprint,” “Incorporations,” 
and “Incarnation” of the Logos.  This lens will show the intrinsic unity between Scripture 
and Church and will show how the Church possesses a unique capacity for understanding 
Scripture which is grounded in the authority of Christ.  This will advance the debate by 
showing that Frei‟s insistence on the identity of Christ rendered in the realistic reading of 
the Gospels is intrinsically connected with Tracy‟s insistence on the self-description of 
the identity of the Church which reads its Scriptures for the disclosure of Christ, and that 
both proposals mutually deepen one another.  Yet although I will suggest that de Lubac 
provides the best articulation of the relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church in 
the economy of redemption, my goal is not to defend de Lubac, but to develop a more 
adequate Christian hermeneutic of Scripture which incorporates the insights of all four 
authors and ultimately advances the discussion between Frei and Tracy.  Consequently, in 
each section, after providing a summary of each author‟s thought I will state a theological 
proposal to advance the discussion and show its impact on hermeneutical method.   
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II.  The Relationship between Christ and Scripture  
 
Articulating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption requires reflection on 
the Church‟s traditional confessions: 1) the Scriptures participate in the Logos, 2) Christ 
is the Incarnate Logos and the climax of revelation, and 3) Christ mediates Himself to 
readers by means of the Scriptural texts.  Here a thicket of issues must be discussed, 
including the way in which Scripture and revelation are distinguished but not separated, 
the way in which a plain sense reading of Scripture renders spiritual disclosure of Christ, 
and the way in which the Scriptures are regarded as God‟s past and present 
communication.   
Henri de Lubac provides a hermeneutical lens which has potential to clarify these 
relationships.  The center of de Lubac‟s Scriptural hermeneutics is the claim that Christ is 
at the same time both singular Object and Subject of Scripture.
883
  The Person of Christ is 
both the unifying hermeneutical principle of the texts and the active Subject who 
addresses readers by means of those texts.  This hermeneutical principle affirms the 
consistent testimony of the Church that the Scriptures harmoniously witness to Christ and 
that the texts themselves participate in Christ as the Incarnate Logos mediates Himself to 
readers by means of them.
884
  Consequently, this lens illumines the way in which 
                                               
883 De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 237-38), claims that as Object, “Jesus Christ brings about 
the unity of Scripture, because he is the endpoint and fullness of Scripture.  Everything in it is related to 
him.  In the end he is its sole object.”  As Subject, “Inasmuch as he is the exegesis of Scripture, Jesus Christ 
is also the exegete.  He is truly Scripture‟s Logos, in an active as well as a passive sense.”   
884 Dei Verbum I, #2 reflects this emphasis of de Lubac: “Christ, who is himself both the 
mediator and the fullness of Revelation,” and shows that the presupposition that Christ is both Subject and 
Object of Scripture is an integral part of the faith of the Church.  See 
(http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-
verbum_en.html.  Accessed July 12, 2011) 
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Christian reading must both participate in Christ and to preserve the identity of Christ.  
Use of this hermeneutical lens will clarify the way in which each author conceives of the 
relationship between Christ, Scripture, and the Logos, and will provide a way in which to 
incorporate the insights of all four authors into a fuller Christian hermeneutic.  In this 
section I will first survey the work of each author by means of this lens to see the specific 
emphasis of each about the relationship between Christ, Scripture, and Logos.  Then, I 
will provide a theological proposal about the way in which understanding Christ as 
Subject and Object of Scripture can advance the discussion between these authors.  
Finally, I will provide specific insights for the relationship between text and reader which 
will lead to a more adequate theological interpretation of Scripture.   
A.  Surveying the Positions of the Four Authors  
 
As each author seeks to show that Scriptural reading renders spiritual reality to 
readers, it is necessary for each put forth some argument about the way in which Christ 
relates to Scripture, both as its subject matter and as the one who actively uses Scripture 
to transform readers.  This section, then, will summarize the way in which each author 
relates Christ to Scripture as its Subject and Object. I will argue that while no author is 
completely successful in showing the relationship, insights from each can be used in 
developing a useful hermeneutical framework.   
David Tracy:  Tracy‟s emphasis lies almost completely on the present disclosure 
of risen Christ to the contemporary reader, helpfully reminding Christians that Scriptural 
reading is essentially a disclosive, transformative encounter with the living God revealed 
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in Jesus Christ.  Yet Tracy‟s constant focus on the text/reader relationship keeps his 
attention on the way in which readers access and experience this encounter rather than the 
way in which Christ mediates this encounter, and hence keeps his project from 
adequately describing the way in which Christ stands as Subject of Scripture.  Tracy‟s 
early model seems to describe Scripture as an intensification of some general revelatory 
potential.
885
  Tracy‟s argument for the potentially disclosive nature of all religious texts 
prevents him from showing how Scripture participates in the Logos in a qualitatively 
unique way, and hence how the Incarnate Logos mediates Himself to readers as Subject 
of Scripture.  In his later work, Tracy admits that his conception of Scripture as a 
religious classic is difficult to reconcile with the Church‟s affirmation that Scripture 
participates in the Logos.
886
  Tracy attempts to reformulate his discussion of Scripture in 
light of contemporary philosophical discussions of presence and absence in writing.
 887
  
This new focus on the dialectic between presence and absence allows Tracy to articulate 
                                               
885 I refer here to Tracy‟s Blessed Rage for Order account specifically.  Tracy (“On Reading 
the Scriptures Theologically,” 64, nt. 51) has admitted the failure of this account.  This account seems to 
suggest that Scripture contains a greater intensification of disclosive potential than other religious texts 
because Scripture bears testimony to Christ, the greatest Christian classic.  Hence Scripture is revelatory 
only as a greater intensification of what can be disclosed in lesser ways in other religious texts.  In his later 
work, Tracy (Analogical Imagination, 231-338), does place a firm priority on Christ as the primary 
Christian classic, thus distinguishing Scripture as a secondary Christian classic which holds its status as a 
classic by its relation to Christ.  Yet Tracy does not quite complete his argument and must still show how 
the texts render precisely this Christ to readers. 
886 Tracy (“Writing,” 383), claims that Judaism, Christianity and Islam do not see their sacred 
texts as “classics, nor even as sacred texts, but as Scripture and thereby as somehow participatory in what is 
construed as the revelation of God.”   
887 Tracy (“Writing,” 390), claims, “There are good theoretical reasons to hold that the 
interplay of presence (in spoken, proclaimed word and sacrament) and Scripture-as-writing in Christian 
self-understanding needs more attention for clarifying Christian hermeneutics of Word and Scripture.” 
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more clearly the way in which Scripture participates in the Logos and mediates Christ.
888
  
Hence it is precisely by abandoning his model of the classic that Tracy is able to more 
successfully show how Christ stands as Subject of Scripture.   
Tracy‟s focus on the classic which discloses truth to readers in front of the text 
also makes it difficult to specify exactly how Tracy understands Christ as Object of 
Scripture in his early work.  Frei‟s persistent complaint is that Tracy does not show how 
the whole narrative of Scripture testifies to the unique identity of Christ.  Frei argues that 
Tracy tends to make the narrative of Christ into a disclosive story about the existential 
situation of the contemporary reader, causing the story to be about the existential 
possibility of the reader rather than on the identity of Jesus Christ.
889
  In Tracy‟s later 
work, he recognizes this difficulty and attempts to overcome by showing that Christian 
experience is defined in terms of Christ‟s particular identity.890  Tracy‟s attempt to 
                                               
888 Tracy (Ibid), claims, “In Christian self-understanding, except for the unique status of 
Christ-as-Logos, there is no claim to full or simple self-presence in either manifesting Word-as-Logos or 
proclaimed word as rendering present the Word in distance (Bultmann) or sacrament.  There is some 
presencing, to be sure, but mediated in and through writing/scripture.  Presence is never full, simple, or 
whole.”  Unfortunately, this new option is suggested only in summary form, and Tracy never really draws 
out the implications of this new model.  
889 Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 82), explicitly targets Tracy‟s phenomenological 
schema of ostensive and non-ostensive referents, complaining that Tracy‟s “interpretation ends up having 
two meanings or referents at the same time, Jesus and some general experience,” which Frei feels 
necessarily mutes the plain sense of the text and leads to “hermeneutical incoherence.”  Frei feels that 
Tracy‟s model quickly shifts emphasis to the non-ostensive reference, leaving the ostensive reference as 
one instance of general experience.   
890 In his later work Tracy, ("Approaching the Christian Understanding of God," in Systematic 
Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991), 138), insists on the particularity of Christ.  Tracy (ibid), claims, “God, for the 
Christian, is the one who revealed decisively who God is in and through the message and ministry, the 
incarnation, cross, and resurrection of none other than Jesus the Christ.  The most profound New Testament 
metaphor for who God is remains the metaphor of 1 John: „God is love.‟…However, if this classic 
Johannine metaphor…is not grounded in and thereby interpreted by means of the stark reality of the 
message and ministry, the cross and resurrection of this unsubstitutable Jesus, who, as Christ, is God‟s 
decisive self-disclosure as love, then Christians may be tempted to think that the metaphor is reversible into 
„Love is God.‟”   
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integrate Frei‟s insistence on plain reading into his own emphasis on plurality and 
diversity may yield something of a plan for figural reading, which would show how the 
identity of the reader must be grounded in the unsubstitutable identity of Christ.
891
  
Tracy‟s later work suggests that readers may read the literal sense with a great deal of 
diversity and plurality, provided that those readings are always ordered to the plain sense 
of the Gospel narratives.
892
  If these later insights were organized into a system of figural 
reading, Tracy‟s project could contribute much in showing how Christ as Object of 
Scripture.
893
   
Hans Frei:  Whereas Tracy is most concerned to illumine the potential for 
disclosure rendered in Scripture, Frei is most concerned to demonstrate that the particular 
identity of Jesus Christ is the singular Object of Scripture.  For Frei, Christ is not an 
                                               
891 Frei and Tracy are very close in their mutual emphasis on a plurality of readings 
subordinated to the plain sense of the passion narratives at this point.  In his later work, Frei (Letter to Gary 
Comstock, 5 (unpublished manuscript, 1984), cited in Higton, Christ, Providence, and History, 84), 
emphasizes the legitimacy of a plurality of readings in the Church, provided that they do not undermine the 
plain sense.  Frei (ibid), claims plainly, “For me „meaning‟ in the gospel narratives is more and more a 
combination of 1) the communal-religious interpretive tradition and what it has seen as their primary 
meaning; 2) the fact that the tradition has given primacy to their realistic, ascriptive sense; 3) that outside of 
that tradition there is no reason to think of any single interpretive move or scheme as the meaning of these 
stories; 4) and even within it there is room for others, provided they do not conflict with the primary, 
realistic or literal sense; 5) that subordination of understanding to the text…is in no way the same as the 
elimination of interpretive understanding and of a possible multiplicity of interpretations.”  Tracy (On 
Reading the Scriptures Theologically, 43-44), makes almost exactly the same point:  “[T] he church has 
made clear through the centuries how it fundamentally reads all the canonical books: through their harmony 
with the common Christian confession as that confession is more fully articulated in the plain sense of the 
passion narratives.  Nevertheless, the entire canon already bespeaks so remarkable a diversity of readings of 
the common confession and narrative that the diversity should also be theologically affirmed as long as the 
plain sense of the common passion narrative is not disowned.”  I believe that much advancement of the 
dialogue with Frei could be made if Tracy developed this insight into a full program of figural reading.   
892 Tracy, ibid, 43-57.   
893 This emphasis on plurality would open space for lively Christian discussions about the way 
in which Christ, as Subject, addresses the Church, while allowing such discussions to be judged by their 
ability to be related to the plain sense of the Gospel narratives.  See Tracy (On Reading Scripture 
Theologically, 41 and 59, nt. 17), where he emphasizes that he wishes to add Frei‟s work to his own 
without substantially changing his project.   
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“Object” of Scripture in the sense that the historical Jesus Christ is the ostensive referent 
of Scripture. Rather, the particular identity of Jesus Christ is the singular subject matter of 
the whole canon.  Frei emphasizes the clarity of realistic narrative to render the Christ, to 
whom the whole Scriptures witness, to the reader.  Frei then uses figural reading to 
extend the narrative of Christ to the whole of Scripture, so that the entire biblical text can 
be normatively read as an extension of the story of Christ.   
Frei is careful not to equate Scripture with revelation, as Christ is the unique 
revelation of God to which the Scriptures bear witness.  Yet Frei‟s project of realistic 
narrative seeks to remove the gap between text and referent to such an extent that it is 
practically difficult to distinguish between Scripture and revelation.  For Frei, while 
Scripture formally is the responsive texts of the community to the event of Christ, there is 
really no practical distinction between Christ and Scripture for readers today.  This is the 
case because Scripture renders Christ present to the reader.  For Frei, as Dawson claims, 
“The text does not deliver God to its reader, as though it were a mere channel through 
which God might be conveyed.  On the contrary, the text that renders the identity of 
Jesus, like (although not identical to) the logos incarnate in Jesus, just is, says Frei, the 
linguistic presence of God.”894  In realistic narrative, text and event can be logically 
distinguished but not practically separated.  By eliminating the gap between meaning 
and referent, realistic reading causes Scripture to participate in revelation so closely that 
Scripture is practically equated with revelation.   
While Frei‟s project has yielded tremendous insights in showing that Christ is the 
singular Object of Scripture, Frei does little to show that Christ is Subject of Scripture.  
                                               
894 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, 165-66.   
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For Frei, realistic reading renders Christ‟s identity to the reader, and when the reader 
recognizes this identity, the reader encounters Christ as present.  Yet Frei remains 
hesitant to say that Christ speaks to the reader or encounters the reader in a 
transformative way.  Instead, the reader is simply required to recognize the identity of 
Christ to which the whole Scriptures attest and then follow Him.  For Frei, the 
participation of Scripture in the Logos is limited to the narrative rendering of the Christ.  
By so focusing on Christ as Object of Scripture, Frei does not make sufficient room for 
Christ‟s transformative presence as Subject of Scripture whom readers encounter readers 
through the text.  Frei simply claims that Scripture makes the identity of Christ present to 
the reader, but he leaves undeveloped both the doctrinal grounding and implications of 
this claim.  The consequence is that Frei does not really develop the way in which the 
Church is transformed by Christ through encounter with Christ in Scripture.   
Kevin Vanhoozer:  Like Frei, Vanhoozer argues strongly for the primacy of the 
literal sense and the centrality of figural reading to render Christ as the singular Object of 
Scripture.
895
  Furthermore, Vanhoozer‟s unique articulation of the whole canon as 
actively used by God to incorporate readers into the economy of Triune missions, as well 
as his insistence that the canon is the complete and relatively determinate speech action 
of God, provide theological presuppositions which allow for the movement from text to 
spiritual reality when believers read Scripture.  Vanhoozer‟s proposal that Scripture is an 
                                               
895 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 222), claims the Bible must be read figurally because 
figural reading “represents the inner logic or telos of the canon by interpreting the story of Israel and the 
story of Jesus as one story,” and because figural reading is “the rule for present-day Christians to make 
sense of their stories as Jesus did of his, precisely by reading their own lives in light of the life of Jesus.” 
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extension of the Triune missions has great potential for showing how Christ stands as 
Subject of Scripture, using it for the purpose of self-revelation to the Church.  
Still, Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory may actually prevent Vanhoozer from 
showing that Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture.  Despite Vanhoozer‟s 
insistence that Scripture is a species of God‟s speaking action, Vanhoozer‟s apologetic 
for the closed, determinate meaning of Scripture through his use of speech-act theory 
prevents him from showing Christ‟s role as active Subject of Scripture.896  Vanhoozer‟s 
argument that God‟s speaking action is found in the in the supervening illocutionary 
stance encoded in the literal sense of Scripture seems to force Vanhoozer to argue that 
God‟s speaking action ceased with the closure of the canon.897  At the same time, 
Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory at times shifts the emphasis away from Christ as 
sole Object which unifies Scripture and onto the philosophical articulation of God‟s 
illocutionary speaking action as the causes of the canon‟s unity, thus practically 
detracting from the centrality of Christ as Object of Scripture.   
                                               
896 “Perlocutionary effect” remains a decidedly general literary category rather than a 
theological concept in Vanhoozer‟s project.  Vanhoozer‟s apologetic for determinate meaning keeps his 
focus on the way in which perlocutionary effect does not influence the meaning of the text, rather than on 
the way in which encounter does take place between the reader and the Triune God.  Overall the Spirit is 
restricted to simply applying to readers a determinate meaning which all readers should be able to grasp, 
provided that they apply the correct theological presuppositions to the text.  Certainly Vanhoozer wants to 
describe conversion and incorporation into Christ, but the philosophical resources of speech-act theory, as 
Vanhoozer employs them, really do not prove sufficient to articulate the gracious encounter between God 
and reader occasioned by the text. 
897 God, it turns out, does not really “speak” today, but rather “makes effective” in readers 
what God spoke long ago.  Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 428), claims, “The Spirit‟s 
present-day leading of the community into all truth is best viewed, I believe, under the rubric of 
perlocutionary effects….The Spirit thus opens readers‟ minds and hearts so that the words can produce all 
their intended effects…the Spirit‟s role is not to add a new sense to the Word, but to energize and empower 
the sense—the speech act—that is already there.”   
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Henri de Lubac:  De Lubac, more than any of the other theologians, emphasizes 
that reading Scripture occasions an address by the living, present Christ who stands as 
Subject of Scripture.  For de Lubac, the Christ who is Object of Scripture is always the 
Christ in act, and the reader cannot move from the plain sense of the text to the spiritual 
reality without being addressed by Christ as Subject.  A Christian reading of Scripture is 
always more than reading the plain sense of the text in light of the correct theological 
presuppositions.  This means, for de Lubac, that the “letter” is always the “mere letter” if 
it does occasion transformative result.  It is the incorporation of the individual into the 
eschatological body of Jesus Christ which only occurs when Christ actively addresses the 
reader.   
De Lubac is clear that the whole Scriptures must be read in such a way that they 
testify to Christ.  As Object, de Lubac writes, “Jesus Christ…is the endpoint and fullness 
of Scripture.  Everything in it is related to him.  In the end he is its sole object.”898  Yet de 
Lubac‟s emphasis lies decidedly on the side of Christ as active Subject who addresses 
readers in the interpretation of Scripture, and seems to argue that Christ is Object of 
Scripture precisely because He stands as Subject of Scripture.
899
  De Lubac shows that, 
“It is [Christ] and he alone who explains [Scripture] to us, and in explaining it to us he is 
himself explained.”900  Consequently, “Jesus, thus, is Exegete of Scripture in himself, in 
                                               
898 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 237.   
899  For example, when de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 105), speaks of Christ as the 
“unique Object” of Scripture and the “totality of its exegesis,” this is so because “Jesus Christ effects the 
unity of Scripture because he is its end and its fullness.”  In fact, de Lubac seems to believe that figural 
reading is incomplete precisely because it would allow the exegete to see Christ as Object without seeing 
Him as Subject. 
900 Ibid, 106.   
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all his mystery.  In principle, he is this Exegete from the first instant of his 
incarnation.”901   
  De Lubac‟s persistent difficulty is his tendency to downplay the role of the 
literal sense in mediating Christ as he emphasizes the spiritual sense.  Consequently, de 
Lubac locates Christ‟s role as both Subject and Object of Scripture in the spiritual sense, 
not in the literal sense.  We have already seen that de Lubac likewise tends to locate 
God‟s communicative action in Scripture in the spiritual sense rather than in the literal 
sense.  A particular challenge arises for de Lubac to show the connection between the 
particular Christ rendered in the plain sense and the living, present Christ who addresses 
the Church.  Likewise, de Lubac must more clearly show the connection between the 
plain sense and God‟s communication in the spiritual sense.  Where Frei insists that the 
literal sense of Scripture achieves just this unity of the Scriptures in Christ as singular 
Object, de Lubac so emphasizes the need for the spiritual sense that he does not 
adequately show how the literal sense mediates the Christian Mystery.   
B.  Proposal #1: Christ as Subject and Object of Scripture 
 
As we have seen, locating Scripture in the economy of redemption requires a clear 
articulation of the relationship between Scripture, Christ and the Logos.  Christian 
confession affirms that Christ stands as the full presence of the Logos in human flesh, and 
that Scripture participates in the Logos as it bears unified witness to the Incarnate Christ.  
Thus while both Scripture and Christ mediate the Logos, they do so in qualitatively 
                                               
901 Ibid, 108.  Yet de Lubac (ibid, 109), suggests that Christ is Object most specifically in the 
event of the Cross.   
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different ways, Scripture is called revelatory as it participates in and bears witness to the 
Christ who is revelation.  In the economy of redemption, the glorified and present Christ 
uses the Scriptures as unique, unified witness to Himself.  Through the Scriptures, Christ 
mediates Himself to readers in order to incorporate them into His Mystical body, the 
Church.  Christian reading, then, always moves from text to spiritual reality, as the 
recognition of Christ in Scripture occasions encounter with Him which incorporates the 
reader into His body.  Below, I provide a theological proposal which, using the insights 
of all four authors, seeks to provide categories for developing a more complete Christian 
hermeneutic of Scripture.   
Premise 1:  To affirm that Christ is the Subject of Scripture is to necessitate 
the recovery of a movement from text to spiritual reality as a normative 
hermeneutical principle for Christian reading.  This movement from text to spiritual 
reality, recovered by de Lubac, has a central and lasting significance for the Christian 
interpretation of Scripture, and the explicit acknowledgement of such a movement will 
lead to a better articulation of Christian hermeneutical method.  All four authors, I have 
argued, implicitly see this as the central issue in their hermeneutical projects, although 
only de Lubac is able to describe it and thus sufficiently explain its relevance.  As de 
Lubac has shown, it is impossible to explain the place of Scripture in the economy of 
redemption without somehow showing that Christ actively uses Scripture to mediate 
Himself to the Church.  Reciprocally, it is impossible to read Scripture as Christ‟s 
mediation to the Church without likewise recognizing a spiritual dimension into which 
the texts draw the receptive reader.   
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Premise 2:  The affirmation that Christ is Object of Scripture gives priority 
to the plain sense reading of Scripture as the means by which Christ is rendered to 
readers.  This insistence on the plain reading of the literal sense to render the particular 
identity of Jesus Christ, recovered by Frei, likewise has enduring value for the Christian 
reading of Scripture.  The claim that Christ is Object of Scripture shows that the whole 
Scriptural witness testifies to Christ as subject matter of the Christian story.  This gives 
the Gospels‟ narrative witness to Christ a privileged place in the Christian canon, and it 
shows that all Scripture is somehow ordered to the realistic narrative which renders the 
identity of Christ.  Affirming that Christ is Object of Scripture requires some method 
such as figural reading to show how the whole Scriptures are a unified narrative which 
testifies to the revelation of Jesus Christ.  Figural reading not only reads Christ as the 
singular subject matter of the closed canon, but it also draws the reader into that story in 
such a way that the reader finds her own reality in the narrative of Christ (what Frei calls 
“intratextual” reading).  Frei‟s emphasis on realistic reading, as well as his extension of 
the story of Christ to the whole Scripture and to present readers through figural reading, 
provides the best resources for examining Christ as Subject of Scripture.   
Premise 3:  All properly Christian readings of Scripture must be able to 
show the intrinsic connection between Christ as unified Object of Scripture and 
Christ as active Subject of Scripture.  Articulating Christ as Subject and Object of 
Scripture provides a useful hermeneutical lens because it holds together the two 
traditional Christian claims about the nature of Scripture which have been recovered by 
Frei and de Lubac.  First, through Frei, we see more clearly that the plain sense reading of 
Scripture, which is ordered to the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ, forms the 
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normative hermeneutical framework for Christian faith and practice.  Second, through de 
Lubac, we see that Christ actively encounters readers by means of Scripture to 
incorporate them into His eschatological body, the Church.  These two traditional claims, 
however, cannot simply be held loosely together.  Rather, they must be shown to be 
connected intrinsically to one another in the economy of redemption.  Here, an 
integration of Frei‟s emphasis on the plain sense with de Lubac‟s emphasis on the 
spiritual sense is essential for showing how Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture 
in a way connects the plain sense reading with the active address of Christ.  
Furthermore, reading Christ as both Object and Subject of Scripture allows 
readers of Scripture to participate in the realm of grace, not just nature, as they read.  
While it would be tempting to simply associate Christ‟s role as Object of Scripture with 
the literal sense and Christ‟s role as Subject of Scripture with the spiritual sense, this 
would create a false dichotomy.  The biblical texts are Scripture precisely because they 
are understood by the community to participate in the Logos through their relation to 
Christ.  Although the Scriptures participate in the Logos, they are not themselves the 
revelation.  They are revelatory in that they point to and mediate Christ, who is the 
Incarnate Logos.  De Lubac is correct when he gives priority to Christ‟s role as Subject 
over the rendering of Christ as Object, since the biblical texts are Scripture to the extent 
that they are drawn into the divine economy by Christ.  Consequently, for the Christian 
even the plain reading of Scripture, though equally accessible to all readers, occurs in the 
realm of grace, since the very plain reading of the Scriptures is a mediation of Christ, 
who stands behind them, unifies them in Himself, and guides the community in reading 
them.  While the Old Testament texts refer to events which occurred before the covenant 
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of grace, the very act of Scriptural reading occurs in the realm of grace as a result of the 
completed Scriptural canon unified in Christ.  As a result, it would be incorrect to say that 
literal reading is a matter of nature and spiritual reading is a matter of grace.  Once the 
entire corpus of Scriptural texts is unified as canonical Scripture, the literal reading of 
Scripture, which renders Christ as Object, is elevated to the realm of grace by Christ 
Himself to whom the plain reading always points as a unified witness.
902
   
C.  Advancing Hermeneutical Method in the Text/Reader Relationship  
 
Articulating the relationship between Scripture, Christ and the Logos by locating 
Scripture in the economy of redemption yields significant implications for the 
relationship between text and reader.  This section will return to the discussion of 
hermeneutical method and suggest some ways in which each of these authors contributes 
to the advancement of a Christian hermeneutic.  While most of the discussion will focus 
on relating Frei‟s insistence on the literal sense of Scripture with de Lubac‟s insistence on 
the spiritual sense of Scripture, all four authors contribute insights which will provide 
resources useful for advancing the debate between Tracy and Frei, as Scripture is located 
in the broader context of the economy of redemption.   
1.  The Centrality of Figural Reading: Frei and de Lubac Advancing Vanhoozer 
and Tracy 
 
                                               
902 Vanhoozer‟s insight that the literal sense is the canonical sense provides a helpful way of 
articulating this (see Is There a Meaning in this Text, 313).  
 335 
 
The first methodological consequence of the Christian hermeneutic is the 
foundational role figural reading plays in understanding Christ as Subject and Object of 
Scripture.  Traditionally figural reading has been the central way to both extend the 
whole narrative of Scripture to be about Christ and to incorporate the reader into the 
world of the text.  As Mike Higton notes, “Figural reading had fulfilled two related 
functions in pre-critical exegesis: it had exhibited the unity of the canon, particularly the 
unity of the Old and New Testament, and it had provided a link between the biblical story 
and the readers‟ own time.”903  Going further, David Dawson summarizes the 
participatory goal of figural reading in this way:   
“Figural reading in the Christian tradition seeks to express the dynamic process of 
spiritual transformation in ways that respect the practitioners‟ commitment to both 
past and future, both old identity and newly refashioned identity.  Imbedded in 
figural practice is all the drama of discerning the point of existence and 
identifying one‟s place in it, figured as a journey from a former mode of existence 
through various states of transformation toward some ultimate end.”904   
 
The purpose of figural reading is to illumine Christ as the meaning of the Scriptures and 
to incorporate the reader into the story Christ as He establishes the Church and leads it to 
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus.   
Conversely, when the practice of figural reading is abandoned, Christ quickly 
becomes an existential paradigm of possibility for our present situation rather than our 
situation finding meaning in Christ.  Dawson summarizes, “what is meaningful is no 
longer, as the practitioners of figural reading would have insisted, the mysterious 
                                               
903 Mike A. Higton, Christ, Providence and History, 145.   
904 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, 216.   
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transformative interactions of God in history, but rather the deeply subterranean humanity 
that all persons share.”905  Without figural reading, it becomes very easy for some 
abstract quality to replace Christ as the ground of meaning and reference point from 
which all other narratives must be judged.  It is precisely this abandoning of figural 
reading that Frei calls the “great reversal” from narrative to external meaning systems.  
Frei concludes,   
[W]hen the pattern of meaning is no longer firmly ingredient in the story and the 
occurrence character of the text but becomes a function of a quasi-independent 
interpretive stance, literal and figural reading draw apart, the latter gradually 
looking like a forced, arbitrary imposition of unity on a group of very diverse 
texts.  No longer an extension of literal reading, figural interpretation instead 
becomes a bad historical argument or an arbitrary allegorizing of texts in the 
service of preconceived dogma.
906
 
 
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an intratextual reading of 
Scripture if figural reading were abandoned.  Vanhoozer, Frei and de Lubac all think that 
figural reading is the sine qua non practice of intratextual Scriptural readings.
907
  The test 
for any project of figural reading is its ability to hold together both the centrality of Christ 
(Christ as Object) and the incorporation of the reader into the narrative of Scripture 
through incorporation into the totus Christus (an implication of the premise that Christ is 
Subject of Scripture).  Here I argue that Frei and de Lubac both develop proposals which 
can be mutually beneficial to each other and corrective of Vanhoozer and Tracy.   
                                               
905 Ibid, 212.   
906 Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37.   
907 See Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 223; Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-20, 
and de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 23.  
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Uniting Frei and de Lubac:  Even in the description of figural reading it is 
impossible to escape a discussion of Christ‟s role as both Subject and Object of Scripture.  
Frei and de Lubac illustrate both sides of the dialectic which must govern Christian 
interpretation, as Frei stresses Christ‟s place as Object of Scripture while de Lubac 
stresses Christ‟s active role as Subject of Scripture.  Frei and de Lubac both insist that 
Christ is the Subject Matter of Scripture and the entire canon must be read in light of 
Him.  Yet a fundamental difference exists between Frei‟s insistence on figural reading 
and de Lubac‟s insistence on allegory as the foundational principle for unifying the 
Testaments in Christ.  This disagreement runs deeper than a difference of definition and 
highlights a key hermeneutical emphasis which must be clarified.
908
  De Lubac insists 
that only Christian allegory can adequately explain the transformation of the Old 
Testament by the New in Christ, arguing that typological or figural readings cannot make 
the sacramental movement from text to spiritual reality.  Frei, for his part, worries that 
allegory would diminish the efficacy of the literal sense in rendering the particular 
identity of Christ and would replace Christ‟s particular identity with some vague 
dogmatic proposition.
909
  Here it is possible to see most clearly the impact of Frei‟s 
                                               
908 Certainly some of the disagreement between Frei and de Lubac about allegory is simply 
based on different definitions of the term.  For Frei, allegory is the imposition of an external system of 
meaning on the text, while figural reading allows the whole narrative to render its own meaning (see 
Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 212).  For de Lubac, allegory is reading Scripture in light of the 
radical transposition of Christ, its hermeneutical principle, while figural reading, if taken alone, would 
reduce Scripture to a mere system of historical correspondence.  I find no evidence that Frei ever read de 
Lubac‟s work.  If he had done so, he almost surely would have been more careful in his distinguishing of 
allegory from figural reading.  Furthermore,   
909 Significantly, Frei still sees a valid place for allegory in the history of Christian 
interpretation, and claims that allegorical reading is legitimate, so long as it works to unify the whole 
Scriptures to Christ.  Frei, then, is in a peculiar position, in which he must defend allegory‟s unifying role 
in the Church, and yet reject it as a legitimate reading.  While Frei disagrees with allegorical interpretation, 
he sees allegory as an important part of reading the whole Scriptures as a unified whole throughout the 
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emphasis on Christ as Object and de Lubac‟s emphasis on Christ as Subject of Scripture.  
Frei is so focused on Christ as Object that he never fully considers the full implications of 
Christ as Subject confronting the reader in the text, while de Lubac is so focused on 
Christ as active Subject that he never fully appreciates the way the external clarity of the 
whole text renders Christ as Object.  This difference is motivated to some extent by 
different apologetic aims.  Frei‟s project seeks to reverse the eclipsing of Christ‟s 
particular identity while de Lubac‟s project seeks to show that Scripture is the locus of 
the active presence of Christ.  Consequently, Frei is most concerned about preserving the 
unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ (Christ as Object), while de Lubac is most 
concerned about showing how believers are incorporated into Christ (Christ as Subject).  
Nonetheless, the disagreement leads to very different understandings between the two 
about the way in which believers participate in the economy of redemption.   
Frei‟s emphasis on the unsubstitutable identity of Christ leads him to emphasize 
that believers only follow that identity from a distance.  Dawson claims, “Frei wants to 
show how Jesus‟ identity is a consequence of his unique relation to God, a relation that 
                                                                                                                                            
history of the Church.  Frei (“Literal Reading,” 39), claims, “it was largely by reason of this centrality of 
the story of Jesus that the Christian interpretive tradition in the West gradually assigned clear primacy to 
the literal sense in the reading of Scripture, not to be contradicted by other legitimate senses—tropological, 
allegorical, and anagogical.  In the ancient church, some of the parables of Jesus…were interpreted 
allegorically as referring latently or spiritually to all sorts of types, and more especially to Jesus himself, 
but this could only be done because the story of Jesus itself was taken to have a literal or plain meaning.”  
In other words, the literal sense (that plain reading which renders ascriptive identity) is the foundational 
reading for the Christian faith.  Figural reading is an extension of the literal sense (though not the only 
possible reading of realistic narrative), as it extends the plain sense from the Gospels to the whole of 
Scripture.  Allegorical reading is a subordinate and nonessential (although sometimes useful) tool which, 
by employing a different criterion of meaning on the text, reinterprets the plain sense of the text (often to 
refer to Christ as its meaning).   
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human beings cannot share (and therefore cannot usurp).”910  Dawson helpfully 
summarizes Frei position in this way: 
“Frei‟s notion of figural extension also emphasizes the unidirectionality of figural 
reading: figural reading is not a triumphalist retrospective observation of the 
extent to which one has superseded a past that has been rightly repudiated; rather, 
it is a patient „working through‟ the spiritual dynamics of the disciple‟s movement 
from his or her state of figure to one of fulfillment, a working forward in light of 
the assurances of Christ‟s first coming but also of the uncertainties of his not-yet-
realized second coming.  Frei‟s characteristic way of stating this progression is 
not, however, to speak about the disciple‟s journey, but about the singularity of 
Christ‟s identity (as the expression of God‟s identity), and to describe how figural 
readings seek out the complex ways in which that identity is rendered by both Old 
and New Testaments….he…continues to describe the figural process more as a 
matter of textual interpretation than of historical transformation.”911   
 
For Frei, the Scriptures establish the condition for the possibility of the Church—
readers can only understand their own identity-in-relation when they have first 
recognized the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.  Yet while Frei‟s emphasis on 
Christ‟s particular identity is essential his articulation of it is one-sided, for it does not 
sufficiently examine the implications of that unsubstitutable identity on the life of the 
reader.
912
  For de Lubac, the Scriptures bring about the transformation of the reader 
precisely because they mediate the Christ who stands as Subject of Scripture.  De Lubac 
always emphasizes that the partial yet deepening incorporation of the believer into the 
identity of Christ is the result of being encountered by the Christ about whom the believer 
                                               
910 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 186.   
911 Ibid, 212-13. 
912 Dawson (Ibid, 213), criticizes that “when Frei textualizes body and history in this way [i.e. 
that of identity description], the reader—with his or her own body and the bodily effects of his or her 
reading—begins to drop out of sight, as all attention is directed to the way the gospel text renders the 
identity of Jesus.”  Dawson (ibid), suggests further, “The literal reader of the text‟s realistic, narrative sense 
gets to encounter Jesus as only Jesus alone is, but the action of Jesus or God impinging upon the embodied, 
historical life of the reader is a matter left to take care of itself without much comment.” 
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reads.  Hence the three aspects of the spiritual sense (allegory, tropology and anagogy) all 
show the intrinsic relationship between reader and Mystery that occurs when one moves 
from the literal sense to the spiritual sense.
913
   
Both projects appear indispensable for a Christian reading of Scripture, because 
both recapture foundational theological presuppositions about the way in which Christ 
stands as Subject and Object of Scripture.  Furthermore, it seems that both projects can be 
harmonized, provided that different elements of spiritual interpretation are 
distinguished.
914
  In Frei‟s insistence on the literal sense, he remains focused on 
safeguarding a method which will preserve the identity of Jesus Christ but he says little 
about the capacity of the Church to receive this disclosure or the result of this encounter 
with Christ on readers.  De Lubac‟s suggestion that a sacramental move occurs as Christ 
uses Scripture to mediate Himself to the reader moves beyond Frei‟s focus on method to 
address the capacity of the Church to receive disclosure and the result which takes place 
when God encounters the reader.  Since each describes different aspects of the 
interpretive process, there appears to be no real tension between the method Frei proposes 
for figural reading and the method de Lubac proposes for allegory.  Frei‟s method of 
reading the plain literal sense to render the particular identity of Jesus Christ present to 
the reader seems to only strengthen de Lubac‟s affirmation that the Christian Mystery is 
                                               
913 As Bryan C. Hollon puts it, “it is through spiritual exegesis that the church moves from an 
encounter with the historical Jesus to a union with the cosmic Christ” (Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual 
Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri De Lubac, Theopolitical Visions 3 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2009), 165). 
914 Here I speak again of the distinction between theological presuppositions (e.g. that Christ 
is Subject and Object of Scripture), capacity (i.e. the unique location of the Church to receive the mediation 
of Christ), method (i.e. the rules by which one must read the text) and result (i.e. the encounter that takes 
place when believers read the text) developed at the beginning of the chapter.   
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accessible only through the literal sense.  Both projects appear to be mutually compatible 
and necessary, as the reading of the plain sense does intrinsically lead to the spiritual 
interpretation of Scripture as the result of reading the plain sense.  The encounter with the 
Present Christ who causes incorporation into His eschatological body, is a properly 
sacramental movement which is rendered by, but not contained in, the literal sense.
915
   
Frei and de Lubac Correcting Tracy and Vanhoozer: In light of Frei and de 
Lubac‟s insistence on some form of figural reading to relate all reality to Christ, Tracy‟s 
lack of interest in figural reading appears significant.  In his early work figural reading 
does not appear useful to Tracy‟s project, as Tracy was more interested in showing how 
Scripture participates in the contemporary situation than in showing how the reader is 
incorporated into the narrative of Scripture.  Tracy‟s later work expresses appreciation for 
Frei‟s insistence on the centrality of Christ as narratively rendered in the Gospels, and 
Tracy claims that he can incorporate Frei‟s insistence on the centrality of Christ into his 
own project.  Yet Tracy never develops a system of figural reading.  This lack of interest 
in figural reading is a significant indication that Tracy has not completed a hermeneutical 
project focused on Christ as both Subject and Object of Scripture who fulfills the 
Scriptures in Himself.  Tracy still may, in practice, tend to see Christ as the greatest 
instantiation of an existential possibility for the contemporary reader.  Tracy‟s later work 
is clearly committed, in principle, to ordering all Scriptural readings to the plain sense of 
the Gospels.  Were Tracy to incorporate a system of figural reading into his project, he 
                                               
915 Practically, it appears that it will be a persistent challenge for those who start from allegory 
to show the clarity of the literal sense, while it will be a persistent challenge for those who start from figural 
reading to account for the transition from text to spiritual reality. 
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would do much to clarify the way in which he envisions the unsubstitutable identity of 
Christ to establish the hermeneutical rules for Scriptural interpretation.
916
   
The emphasis on figural reading by Frei and de Lubac may also correct 
Vanhoozer‟s project.  While Vanhoozer develops a coherent philosophical system for 
articulating God‟s authorship of Scripture, Vanhoozer‟s suggestions may actually distract 
from the centrality of Christ.  Vanhoozer claims with Frei and de Lubac that the practice 
of figural reading is indispensable for Christian reading.  He argues that figural reading 
“is the mainspring of theo-dramatic unity, the principle that accounts for the continuity in 
God‟s words and acts, the connecting link between the history of Israel and the history of 
the church, the glue that unifies the Old and New Testaments.”917  Yet while Vanhoozer 
insists that figural reading is the hermeneutical key to Christian interpretation of 
Scripture, Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory (in which God has supervened divine 
illocutions on human speech acts so that readers encounter the very Word of God in 
Scripture), tends to shift attention from the presence of Christ as both Subject and Object 
of Scripture to a more abstract theory of God‟s speech acts.  Those who accept 
Vanhoozer‟s model must be careful that a philosophical conception of authorship does 
not replace Christ as the unifying principle of Scripture.  In fact, it would seem that all 
                                               
916 Tracy (On Reading the Scriptures Theologically, 42), claims, “As long as the plain sense 
reading of the passion narratives is understood as the fullest rendering of the common Christian confession, 
then a diversity of readings of both confession and narrative will inevitably occur.”  Here Tracy could 
better show how the Scriptures both regulate and this plurality.  For example, Telford Work (Living and 
Active, 299), suggests, “It is…both significant and discouraging how rarely the status of a particular text is 
defended with respect to its roles in the history of salvation that begins in Israel, and climaxes in the earthly 
life of Jesus, and continues in the Spirit-indwelt Church.  Usually the appeal is to an abstract primitivism or 
developmentalism.”  It is precisely here that Tracy could complete his project by grounding the diversity of 
Scriptural readings in this overarching system of figural reading. 
917 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 223.   
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“authorial discourse” readings may share this same danger of shifting focus away from 
Scripture‟s witness to Christ and onto a philosophical description of God‟s speaking 
action.
918
  Vanhoozer‟s early work appears to have been guilty of just this reduction, as 
Vanhoozer there emphasized the authoritative content of Scripture without 
simultaneously showing how readers are incorporated into Christ as they read the text.
919
  
This does not mean that Vanhoozer is wrong to emphasize the primacy of God‟s 
authorship or to use speech-act theory to describe it.  It only means that there is a constant 
danger in allowing a philosophical description of authorship to replace the centrality of 
Christ when such a philosophical description seems better fitted for securing the authority 
of Scripture.  Frei and de Lubac provide a helpful corrective as they emphasize that the 
Christ who speaks in Scripture is its singular Object and that all claims to the authority of 
Scripture as God‟s Word must be ordered to Christ.   
The heart of the problem is Vanhoozer‟s insistence that because both Christ and 
Scripture are unique communicative actions of God, both Christ and Scripture must be 
                                               
918 As an example, see here Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical 
Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  Many 
Evangelical attempts which follow Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer and emphasize authorial discourse are 
primarily proposals for authority in which Christological and figural readings become minor points, if they 
are mentioned at all.  For example Jeannine K. Brown, in her Scripture as Communication: Introducing 
Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), centers her whole book around the 
implications of speech-act theory for hearing God‟s voice, without any centering of the whole Scriptures on 
the Person of Christ.  My criticism is not of what such books say, but rather what is left unsaid.  Practically, 
covenant instruction begins to take over the narrative function of the text and obscure the centrality of 
Christ.   
919 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 223), corrects this problem in his later work, 
claiming, “While universal history may be the locus of divine action, however, the focus of divine action is 
the history of Jesus Christ….Jesus Christ is the hermeneutical key not only to the history of Israel but to the 
history of the whole world, and hence to the meaning of life, for he is the Logos through whom all things 
were created.”  Here it is Jesus Christ including His history, which is only rendered in the Scriptures, which 
is the hermeneutical key to all understanding of history. 
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considered revelation.
920
  By not adequately distinguishing between Christ as revelation 
and Scripture as revelatory, Vanhoozer‟s project continually runs the risk of shifting 
emphasis from Christ to texts as he emphasizes the ability to recognize God‟s 
determinate speaking action in Scripture.  This difficulty appears more clearly when 
comparing Vanhoozer with Frei with respect to the distinctions between Scripture and 
revelation. Whereas Frei locates the revelatory nature of the text in the elimination of the 
gap between sense and reference (thereby allowing the text to participate closely in the 
event of revelation), Vanhoozer locates the revelatory nature of the text in the 
supervening of God‟s speech acts over human speech acts.  For Frei, Scripture is 
revelatory because it is realistic narrative of Christ, while for Vanhoozer Scripture is 
revelatory because God‟s illocutionary action supervenes upon the intended speech acts 
of the human authors.  This difference means that the encounter occasioned by the text 
between God and reader occurs in fundamentally different ways.  According to 
Vanhoozer‟s model, disclosure takes place as the reader engages the text with the proper 
theological presuppositions.  The reader must understand that the words of Scripture are 
the communicative action of God, and that these texts are uniquely authoritative and 
demand obedient response.  According to Frei‟s model, narrative fitly renders the event 
of Christ to the reader so that the reader encounters the present, risen Christ.  This 
difference in emphasis places Frei and Vanhoozer on somewhat different trajectories.  
Frei will direct his focus in the text to the event of Christ extended through figural 
                                               
920 Vanhoozer continually emphasizes the close association between words and deeds found in 
William Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).  
Expanding on Barth, Vanhoozer (Vanhoozer, “A Person of the Book,” 56), claims that speech-act theory 
helps to reconcile Barth with Evangelicals by showing that because “God‟s Word is His act,” the revelation 
of the Logos in Christ and the revelation of the Logos in Scripture are both forms of revelation.    
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reading, and Vanhoozer will direct his focus behind the text for a philosophical 
conception of authorship which illumines God‟s past and present action.  Distinguishing 
between Scripture‟s participation in the Logos and Christ‟s hypostatic union with the 
Logos would allow Vanhoozer to articulate a clearer distinction between Scripture and 
revelation, which would allow him to better explain how Christ mediates Himself to the 
Church by means of Scripture.
921
   
2.  The Regulation of the Canonical Sense: Vanhoozer Advancing de Lubac 
 
Despite de Lubac‟s achievement in retrieving the spiritual impulse of precritical 
Christian interpretation, many contemporary exegetes have found his project unusable.  
This is because they fear that a move from text to spiritual reality may quickly degenerate 
into arbitrary and fanciful eisegesis.
922
  As one critic has noted, “The exegete can never 
feel confidence in an approach to the Bible which is so free of method and control.”923  
Understandably, many interpreters worry that to accept uncritically De Lubac‟s 
suggestion that Scripture contains an “infinite forest of meanings” may discount the 
importance of genres and grammar, leaving God‟s communication in Scripture 
                                               
921 Telford Work (Living and Active, 95), helpfully distinguishes between “inlibration” (the 
Word‟s union with the human words of Scripture), and “incarnation” (the Word‟s union with the human 
nature of Christ), showing that God‟s Word in Scripture as “real presence” is different from God‟s Word in 
Christ as “full personal presence.”  We will see that de Lubac‟s distinction between “incorporation” of the 
Logos in Scripture and “Incarnation” of the Logos in Christ would help Vanhoozer clarify the relationship 
between Christ and Scripture in a way that would retain the centrality of Christ even as the revelatory 
nature of Scripture is explored (see History and Spirit, 422). 
922 See Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 314-15. 
923 John L. McKenzie, “Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis.”  Journal of 
Biblical Literature 77 (1958): 201, cited in D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 240.   
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ambiguous.
924
  As Boersma writes, “De Lubac appeared to give the imagination relatively 
free reign, as long as the interpreter remained within the edifying teaching of the 
Scriptures.  To specify exactly the cases in which allegory might be acceptable would 
probably have struck him as an attempt to limit the „infinite forest of meanings.‟”925  De 
Lubac‟s hesitance to locate Christ‟s mediating action in the literal sense tends, at times, to 
suggest that careful exegesis of the literal sense is optional for hearing God‟s speaking 
action.  Boersma continues, for de Lubac “the most important question was whether the 
spiritual meaning was based on the overall teaching of the Scriptures and so „fruitful‟ to 
the believer.”926  Williams summarizes the difficulty by claiming that for de Lubac, as for 
the early Church, “However subjective a given interpretation may be, so long as there is 
linkage with that major allegoria…the interpretation is not without basis.”927  De Lubac‟s 
chief difficulty seems to be that he has not adequately shown the way in which the literal 
sense is itself taken up into God‟s communicative action and how it is uniquely fitted to 
serve as a locus of God‟s communicative activity.   
                                               
924 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 1, 75.   
925 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188. 
926 Ibid, 167, noting de Lubac, History and Spirit, 358.   
927 Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 158-59.  De Lubac (History and Spirit, 374-5), 
excuses many of the arbitrary employments of the spiritual sense in the early Church by claiming, “If in 
fact the detail of their explanations…seems so fanciful, it is because that was not for them the essential 
thing.  They spread out comfortably „in the vast field of divine Scriptures‟.  They had no scruples about 
exercising their fertile imaginations there by freely using the „analogy of faith‟…This is because, they 
thought, „where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is the freedom to understand.‟”   De Lubac (“Old Distich,” 
122) defends his position by emphasizing that the singular Allegory to which all others relate is nonetheless 
objective: “Allegoriae are never more than the small change of the main allegoria that the believer has 
presented initially with all the vigor of his faith, and he is well aware that the work he is doing with the 
allegoriae is less assured.  Taken one by one, the allegoriae that he discovers can be rather 
subjective….But the principle that they should highlight, the major allegoria of Scripture, is always 
objective.” 
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For Vanhoozer and Frei, the very essence of Christian revelation is the claim that 
God‟s communication to human beings is clear enough to be sufficiently understood.  
The Christian reader must be able to approach the Bible with some confidence that she 
will, in fact, hear what God intended to say therein.  While de Lubac‟s emphasis on 
encounter with Christ as Subject of Scripture is certainly essential to Christian reading, it 
should not devalue Frei‟s insistence that the opposite is also true: the reader will never 
encounter the Christ who is Subject of Scripture in a way that is disconnected from 
encountering Christ rendered in the literal sense.  If de Lubac‟s description of the 
movement from text to spiritual reality is to be adequately appreciated, it must also show 
how the plain sense of the text intrinsically mediates the Christian Mystery in a way that 
is open to public investigation and dialogue.   
In light of Frei and Vanhoozer, one can see that de Lubac does not always 
sufficiently appreciate the way in which the closed canon of Scripture regulates 
subsequent allegorical interpretation.  This issue gets to the heart of much contemporary 
concern about de Lubac‟s method, and de Lubac Himself seems to suggest that Christian 
interpreters today ought to perform the same task as did the New Testament authors in 
exploring allegory in the rich fields of the Old Testament in search of connections to 
Christ.
928
  The key question for de Lubac‟s work must be, „What difference, if any, does 
the existence of a closed New Testament canon impose on subsequent allegorical 
interpretation?‟   
                                               
928 Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith, 210), claims, “For de Lubac, the special concern of 
allegory within the larger framework is „the work of redemption which is continued in the Church and its 
sacraments,‟ and its task is to trace the significance of prior figures and events in relation to the 
accomplishment of that initial Advent.”   
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David Williams has suggested that a very great distinction exists between allegory 
as it was practiced by the New Testament authors and spiritual interpretation as it is 
central to Scriptural interpretation today.  Williams argues that the early Church‟s use of 
allegory was “not strictly speaking… interpretation …inasmuch as it stems from lived 
experience and oral communication rather than encounter with the written texts.”929  
Williams suggests that the apostles did not interpret the Old Testament in light of the 
New, as much as they applied the Old Testament to their new experience of the reality of 
the risen Christ.  With the closure of the New Testament canon, Williams claims, this 
situation changed.  After the closure of the canon, Christian spiritual interpretation 
became primarily an investigation of God‟s communicative action at the level of the 
canonical whole.  Consequently, allegory (a correlation of individual OT historical events 
to Christ), can now be relegated to a non-essential role in biblical interpretation today 
without destroying the spiritual sense.
930
  Such correlations, Williams claims, may still 
have great value, but they must be classified as “applications” rather than interpretation, 
since the “[i]nclusion of the NT in the body of authoritative Scripture provides a stable if 
many-sided narrative and explanatory center to God‟s action.  Drawing what had gone 
before into more explicit connection with that center then becomes a matter of discerning 
purpose and meaning operative at the level of the canonical whole.”931  For Williams, 
discerning the spiritual sense now is the process of discerning God‟s communicative 
                                               
929 Ibid, 208-09.   
930 Thus Williams (ibid, 210-12), suggests separating allegory (what he calls the responsibility 
to make connections between biblical events) from the spiritual sense (what he calls the “meaning” of the 
Bible).   
931 Ibid. 
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purpose in the whole canon, rather than exploring continual correlation of Old Testament 
types with New Testament antitype.   
Williams‟s proposal rightly shows that the interpretive situation is different for 
contemporary Christians than it was for the Church prior to the closure of the canon.  
Moreover, he helpfully illustrates the regulatory function that the closed canon places on 
subsequent readings of Scripture.  Frei and Vanhoozer emphasize that the distinctive 
change brought about in the Church after the closure of the canon is of chief importance 
for intratextual reading.  Vanhoozer insists that the literal sense is now the canonical 
sense, and consequently certain constraints are imposed on meaning only after the closing 
of the canon.  For Vanhoozer, the meaning of the text is now relatively stable and clear in 
light of its completion.  Frei claims further that figural reading ought to follow a linear 
motion throughout the canon, thereby respecting the literal sense yet extending the 
singular narrative to the whole of Scripture.  For Frei, the reader is incorporated into the 
world of the text when she reads the text in continuity with its linear development, and 
not as interpreting from her own experience, as did the early Church.  Frei‟s clear plain 
sense and Vanhoozer‟s canonical sense, then, could only be implemented after the 
closure of the canon.  These programs differ significantly from the practice of allegory in 
the early Church in which the apostles interpreted the Old Testament in light of their 
experience of the contemporary event of Christ.  Together, Frei and Vanhoozer‟s 
proposals do not discourage the further correlation of Old Testament types to New 
Testament antitype, but they do provide an additional regulatory principle for reading the 
whole of recorded salvation history as the plain sense.  The completed canon, read as a 
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literary whole, does provide a foundation for evaluating the legitimacy of all subsequent 
Scriptural correlations.   
De Lubac‟s focus on the continuity between the New Testament apostles as 
allegorists and successors of the apostles as allegorists tends to discount this decisive 
shift.
932
  A decisive difference does exist between the pre-canonical practice interpreting 
the Old Testament in light of the experience of Jesus Christ and the post-canonical 
practice of reading all things in light of Christ.  Vanhoozer and Frei show that the method 
has changed from the experience of the pre-canonical Church to the interpretation of the 
post-canonical Church.  Christians today are regulated by the closure of the canon in a 
way that the early Church could not have been.  Vanhoozer‟s “canonical sense” helpfully 
brings this decisive shift of method into focus, as it insists that God‟s speaking action can 
be discerned after the closure of the canon in a way previously unavailable to the Church.  
Frei‟s figural reading shows that the reader is obligated to read plainly in a way that is 
now regulated by the contours of the text which testifies authoritatively to Christ rather 
than to interpret in light of the Church‟s contemporary experience of the risen Lord.   
Consequently, readers can approach Scripture with confident expectation that they 
can understand what is plainly written and that their Scriptures plainly bear harmonious 
witness to Christ.  Plain canonical reading is the indispensable means to understand the 
living Christ who mediates Himself to readers through His present communicative 
Action.  This claim is not meant to contradict de Lubac‟s understanding of allegory, but 
only to chasten it in light of the plain literal sense.  Readers can indeed access the 
                                               
932 See especially de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 216-26), who emphasizes that all 
successors of the apostles are entrusted with this fundamental task of allegorical interpretation of Scripture.   
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meaning of Scripture through its plain sense and read for understanding just as they can 
read any book (with perhaps the necessary theological presuppositions imposed by the 
canon).  It is through this medium of plain communication that Christ mediates Himself.  
It is possible to read Scripture plainly while employing the theological presupposition 
that the whole of the story is about Christ, and to extend the story of Christ to all of 
Scripture without being thereby obligated to develop connections between the Old 
Testament and the New.   
3.  The Integral Relationship of Text and Event: Frei Advancing de Lubac  
 
All four theologians agree that the result of reading Scripture is encounter with a 
Mystery fitly rendered by, but too great to be contained in, the biblical text itself.  De 
Lubac wants to call the movement from text to spiritual reality a sacramental movement, 
yet his suggestion is beset with a certain methodological difficulty which must be 
overcome to make this insight work.  As we saw in the last chapter, de Lubac often 
relegates the text itself to the role of „spokesperson‟ which renders the events of history, 
and it is those events which, in turn, sacramentally disclose the spiritual reality.  It 
remains unclear, on de Lubac‟s account, exactly what role the text plays in the rendering 
of spiritual reality.  As long as the text only leads to history, the text itself cannot 
participate in this sacramental movement, since one natural thing (the “letter”) cannot 
sacramentally render another natural thing (history).  Here it will be suggested that while 
de Lubac‟s sacramental ontology provides a helpful description of the movement from 
text to spiritual reality, his framework needs Frei‟s explanation of realistic narrative to 
work consistently.   
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On Frei‟s account of realistic narrative, de Lubac‟s undetermined gap between 
text and event is a false problem, since realistic narrative assumes that there is no gap 
between text and referent.  The text itself is a fitting vehicle for the movement to divine 
reality, as it makes the event present to the reader.  Through his use of realistic narrative, 
Frei “insists that the flesh or letter is not opposed to, but is rather the fit expression of, 
spirit or meaning.”933  Because the text “means what it says,” the text is not a vehicle 
which guides the reader to the ostensive referent, but is the God-ordained means of 
presenting history to the reader.  That history presented to the reader must be 
distinguished from, yet can never be separated from the narrative which renders it 
present.   
Through realistic narrative, Frei illumines the importance of de Lubac‟s claim 
that, in the New Testament, the literal sense is the spiritual sense.
934
  Frei claims, “But 
since it is the story of Jesus taken literally that unveils this higher truth, the „literal‟ sense 
is the key to spiritual interpretation of the New Testament.  In this as in some other 
respects, „letter‟ and „spirit‟ turn out to be mutually fit or reinforcing in much orthodox 
Christianity, despite the superficially contrary Pauline declaration (2 Cor. 3:6).”935  Based 
on a realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, the literal sense fitly renders the spiritual 
sense, inasmuch as the text renders an event that shapes the meaning of the entire 
                                               
933 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 175.   
934 Murphy ("Henri De Lubac's Mystical Tropology," 181), claims, concerning de Lubac‟s 
thought, “Strictly speaking, the New Testament does not have an allegorical sense because the literal sense 
itself reveals the various dimensions of the Mystery of Christ.  Practically speaking, however, the 
allegorical sense can be applied to the New Testament to refer to a deeper and broader understanding of the 
reality mediated by the letter of the text.”   
935 Frei, “Literal Reading,” 41.   
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Christian canon.  Thus Frei implies something of a sacramental relationship which takes 
place at the level of the text.  The literal reading of the text, by realistically rendering 
history, is a fit vehicle to move the reader to divine reality,
936
 as it renders the Christ who 
is present now, who subsequently provides the understanding of the whole picture of 
Christian reality.  As this literal, realistic story is extended through the whole Scriptures, 
all Scripture fitly renders the events of history in such a way that the text itself leads the 
reader to the spiritual reality.  Frei‟s achievement of method thus clarifies de Lubac‟s 
desired move from text to spiritual reality, as it shows how the text fitly render the 
spiritual reality.  Where de Lubac emphasizes that the Scriptural texts are an 
incorporation of the Logos, de Lubac can only carry this claim through consistently as he 
shows how the texts present to the reader the very salvation history that the Logos has 
effected.   
II.  The Relationship between Scripture and Church 
 
At this point it is necessary to turn from the theological presuppositions about the 
way in which Christ mediates Himself to readers by means of Scripture to an explanation 
of the capacity which the Church has uniquely been given to receive the disclosure of 
Christ in Scripture.  Just as the move from text to spiritual reality is the central movement 
in a Christian reading of Scripture which must be explained in the broader context of the 
                                               
936 For Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 147), “For the believer to know who Jesus Christ is, 
to affirm his presence, and to adore him are aone and the same thing…concerning Jesus Christ and him 
alone, factual affirmation is completely one with faith and trust of the heart, with love of him, and love of 
the neighbors for whom he gave himself completely.”  While it seems that these different aspects indeed 
need to be distinguished (hence a move from the literal sense to the spiritual sense), Frei‟s emphasis that all 
these elements is what the Bible means by Jesus Christ is helpful for understanding the way the text brings 
the spiritual reality to the reader.   
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economy of redemption, so the spiritual capacity to receive such disclosure must be 
articulated within this broader context as well.  The Church, as a theological reality, 
stands in a unique position where it is uniquely constituted by and drawn into encounter 
with Christ by means of Scripture.  Some ecclesiological reflection, then, which explains 
this unique capacity, must instruct hermeneutical discussions.  
Despite its importance, the relationship between Scripture and Church has proven 
quite difficult for these four theologians to articulate for a number of reasons.  First, as 
we have seen in the previous chapters, a tension exists between emphasizing the external 
clarity of the Scriptural texts and acknowledging the unique capacity of certain readers to 
participate in a qualitatively greater way in Scriptural disclosure.  All four theologians 
struggle with articulating the movement from text to spiritual reality because they feel the 
pressure to emphasize both the clarity of the plain sense and the capacity of Scripture to 
disclose spiritual reality to receptive readers.
937
  When emphasis lies on the external 
clarity of Scriptural reading, it becomes quite difficult to show how some readers are 
capable of receiving the disclosure of spiritual reality in a qualitatively greater way than 
others.  Second, it is in the discussion of receptive capacity that theological 
presuppositions about the relationship of nature and grace arise with greatest force.  The 
way in which each theologian conceives the nature/grace relationship necessarily 
                                               
937 For Tracy, the authority of Scripture is built, in part, upon its ability to engage intellectual 
discussions in the public square with clarity.  For Frei, the authority of Scripture is built on its ability to 
communicate Christ to the reader with clarity.  For Vanhoozer, the authority of Scripture depends on its 
ability to be understood by all persons who employ the right theological presuppositions.  Consequently, 
Tracy‟s focus is on the disclosive capacity of Scripture, yet he wants to make theology public, and therefore 
needs to show that Scripture is potentially disclosive to all persons who employ useful hermeneutical 
strategies.  Frei argues that the Christian community ultimately determines the rules for reading, yet 
emphasizes that anyone who reads Scripture according to those rules will encounter the living Christ rather 
than simply a story about Christ.  Vanhoozer claims that the Scriptures is disclosive to all those who read 
plainly with the right theological presuppositions.   
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structures the way in which he will describe the disclosure rendered to readers in 
Scripture and how readers will receive that disclosure.
938
  Third, since the Reformation, 
both Protestant and Catholic theologians have framed discussions of the relationship 
between Scripture and Church in terms of authority.
939
  The disagreement between 
Vanhoozer and Frei about the location of authority in either Scripture or tradition is 
illustrative of this ongoing debate.  This debate tends to draw focus away from discussion 
of the Church‟s theological nature and role in the economy of redemption.940   
The way in which each author articulates the relationships between external 
clarity and unique capacity, nature and grace, and Scripture or Church as locus of 
authority leads to very different articulations about the unique capacity of the Church to 
receive disclosure.  When these three issues are discussed with only the text/reader 
                                               
938 The proposal set forth in this dissertation does not require the theologian to take a specific 
position on the nature of grace.  The real ongoing issue which sets Tracy‟s work apart from Frei, 
Vanhoozer and de Lubac is that Tracy locates the work of the Spirit more with creation than with 
redemption.  (In that issue, there appear to be many similarities between the disagreement between de 
Lubac and Schillebeeckx about the sacramental nature of the Church and the disagreement between Frei 
and Tracy about the particular identity of Jesus Christ.  The particular identity of Christ and the historical 
character of grace as event are closely related, and have significant implications for one another.  (For a 
good discussion on the debate between de Lubac and Schillebeeckx, see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the 
Church, 109-28).)   
939 We have seen that this is a central problematic for Frei and Vanhoozer.  Frei‟s central 
problematic is the location of authority for Scriptural reading, and his arguments against Tracy centers on 
either returning to the authority of the plain sense in his early work, or giving priority to the Church‟s self-
description in constructing hermeneutical method.  Vanhoozer also centers his project on the problematic of 
authority, emphasizing sola Scriptura and articulating the economy in such a way that the Church is always 
responsive to the Scriptures.  Consequently, discussions of the unique capacity of the Church in reading 
Scripture tend to become mired in questions about the relationship between Scripture and Church as 
primary authority for Christian life. 
940 Boersma (“On Baking Pumpkin Pie,” 248), notes Congar‟s argument that the tendency to 
choose either Scripture or the Magisterium as the final authority over the Church reflects a divide which 
took place in the middle ages so that, “Slowly but surely, the „rule of faith‟ came to be identified with the 
active tradition of the magisterium rather than with the uncreated truth of divine revelation itself.”  
Consequently, Boersma (ibid, 253, nt. 48), claims “[O]ver time Scripure and Church (magisterium) have 
become separated, with Protestants focusing on the canon as the rule of faith, and with Catholics assigning 
this role to the magisterium.”   
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relationship in view, they necessarily reach impasses.  Yet when the relationship between 
Scripture and Church is placed in the broader context of the economy of redemption, it is 
possible to ease tensions between these issues and provide a helpful description of the 
unique receptive capacity of the Church which allows it to participate uniquely in the 
disclosure of spiritual reality in Scripture.  This section, then, will examine the way in 
which each theologian articulates the unique capacity of the Church, as the reading 
community, to receive the disclosure of Christ in Scripture.  It will then make a 
theological proposal, based on the insights of all four authors, which will establish a 
helpful framework for advancing the discussion.  Finally, it will provide specific 
observations which will advance hermeneutical method for the relationship between text 
and reader.    
A.  Surveying the Positions of the Four Authors 
 
This section will show how each theologian attempts to explain the unique 
relationship between Scripture and Church in a way which uniquely positions the Church 
for reception of Christ in Scripture.  I will argue that Frei and Vanhoozer do not provide 
adequate theological reflection on the nature of the Church to be able to articulate the 
Church‟s unique capacity for disclosure.  Only de Lubac provides sufficient theological 
reflection to show why the Church possesses a unique capacity to receive disclosure in 
the Scriptures, as he describes both Scripture and Church as incorporations of the Logos.   
David Tracy “Capacity as Openness to Disclosure”:  Tracy‟s early model of the 
classic illumines a powerful transcendental insight that all persons possess the condition 
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for the possibility of the disclosure of the divine.  Tracy‟s project is driven by a theory of 
“manifestation” in which all readers engage truth in an already-graced world.941  All 
readers are “fitted” to receive disclosure of the divine because, as created in the image of 
God, they are able to recognize the universal gracious work of the Spirit.  Yet while 
Tracy focuses on the capacity of all persons in receiving disclosure, he says very little 
about the way in which participation in the Church affects the believer‟s reading of 
Scripture.  Two practical factors prevent Tracy from adequately describing the Church‟s 
unique capacity for encounter.  First, Tracy‟s effort to keep theology a public discipline 
practically discourages reflection on the unique capacity of Christians in reading.  Tracy 
must emphasize the general conditions for the possibility of religious experience to 
promote continual public dialogue about religious experience.  Second, Tracy wants to 
show that a number of religious texts such as Bible, the Koran, etc. are able to disclose a 
claim to the whole which is (at least in principle), accessible to all readers.  All readers 
are constituted in such a way that they could, in principle, be brought to a limit-
experience through the text, even if the subject matter disclosed is unique to each 
religious classic.
942
  While Tracy is comfortable talking about a greater and lesser 
potential for revelatory experience, and a greater and lesser intensification of disclosure, 
he does not feel comfortable discussing a unique capacity for disclosure.   
                                               
941 Philosophy is the most common mode of reflection limit-experiences in this situation of 
manifestation.  Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 379), writes that “...the power is now disclosed through 
the critical mediations of reason reflecting upon the original experience of wonder in existence only to 
yield through the philosophical reflection to a mediated sense of a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality 
of God as well as an attendant trust in all reality as graced.  Reflection upon that uncanny sense of wonder 
discloses the uncanny giftedness of all creation.” 
942 This is not foundationalism, but is a low-level observation that texts can and do render 
subject-matter.  The actual moment of encounter is, for Tracy, as for all three other theologians, a judgment 
for theological anthropology and ecclesiology, not philosophy.  
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In his later work, Tracy admits that his transcendental model is insufficient to 
articulate a truly Christian capacity for disclosure, and he acknowledges that Christians 
read for disclosure precisely because they believe that the Scriptures participate uniquely 
in the Logos.
943
  Tracy does describe the theological presuppositions that he feels must 
attend a properly Christian reading of Scripture (namely, Jesus Christ is the greatest 
instance of God‟s revelation; Scriptural readings must not be in discontinuity with the 
apostles; Scripture participates in the eternal Logos).  Yet he never really shows how the 
Church possesses a unique capacity to receive such disclosure.  Both Tracy‟s claim that 
the Church understands Scripture as uniquely participating in the Logos and his claim 
that the Church is a sacrament require some articulation of this capacity than is possible 
through the general model of the classic.  As long as Tracy grounds capacity for 
disclosure only in general human capacity and the universal work of the Spirit, and not 
specifically in Christ as Incarnate Logos, Tracy can only articulate a quantitative 
difference between disclosure within the Church and disclosure outside the Church, and 
not a qualitative difference.
944
   
Hans Frei “Capacity as Employment of Method”:  Frei‟s early work is based on 
the assumption that the texts plainly render a particular identity accessible to all readers.  
Frei‟s argument against any external meaning system imposed upon the text requires him 
to show that all Scriptural “meaning” is contained in the text and accessible to all readers.  
Since there can be no hidden meaning in the text accessible to insiders only, the only 
                                               
943 Tracy, “Writing,” 383-85.   
944 In the last section, I argue that Tracy has indeed implicitly articulated something of a 
qualitative distinction, although he does not develop the implications of his insight.   
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distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” that can exist is that “insiders” are part of a 
particular community which is bound by particular theological presuppositions and hone 
particular interpretive skills.   
In Frei‟s later work, he tends to ground authority in community consensus over 
the inherent nature of the texts.  But Frei never provides a convincing theological 
argument for why the Church decided to read their texts literally.  Frei is reticent to 
provide a substantive theological description of the Church, and instead focuses on 
describing it as a socio-linguistic community.  As a result, even where Frei has 
opportunity to focus on the theological nature of the community, all discussion about the 
capacity of the Church reduces to the way in which the Church as a social (not 
theological) community forms rules for method.  Although Frei claims that reading the 
plain sense should lead to the recognition of the Christ who is living and present, Frei 
never sufficiently shows how the reader‟s incorporation into Christ affects subsequent 
interpretation.
945
  Consequently, Scriptural reading for Frei becomes more of a honing a 
set of skills based on observation of the text than a transformative encounter with the 
Triune God through the text.
946
  Conversion, practically speaking, becomes more a matter 
of perfecting interpretive method than participating in spiritual transformation.  Only 
                                               
945 See Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 141-93, and Bryan Hollon, Everything is Sacred, 
106-47.   
946 Dawson (Christian Figural Reading, 212-14), provides a very insightful summary of the 
differences between Frei and Origen regarding spiritual interpretation.  For Frei, Dawson concludes, literal 
reading and employment of interpretive skill is necessary to “make sure disciples do not confuse Jesus‟ 
identity with their own…” (213).  See also Cyril O'Regan, "De Doctrina Christiana and Modern 
Hermeneutics," in De Doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture, ed. Duane W.H. and Pamela 
Bright Arnold, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
who claims, “Understanding the biblical text…is according to Frei more like a skill, a species of know-
how,” so that the focus is on “competence or incompetence in the practice of interpretation.” 
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when further doctrinal reflection is given to the way in which conversion affects 
subsequent interpretation of Scripture will it be possible for Frei to place Scripture in the 
economy of redemption and thus ease the thorny issue of authority.   
Kevin Vanhoozer “Capacity as Acceptance of Theological Presuppositions”:  
Vanhoozer‟s project is motivated by a desire to show that God is the primary author of 
Scripture and that God‟s speaking action is intelligible to all readers in the literal sense.  
Vanhoozer suggests that all readers can understand the human speech acts which 
compose the literal sense of Scripture.  But because believers recognize that God‟s 
speech acts supervene on the human speech acts at the level of the canon, they are able to 
hear the very speaking action of God as they read.  Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory 
leads him to argue that the unique capacity of the Church to hear God in Scripture is 
almost entirely a matter of applying the right theological presuppositions to the literal 
sense.  Disclosive reading, for Vanhoozer, is a process of lining up the correct doctrinal 
presuppositions and then reading the plain, canonical sense of the text.   
At first glance, Vanhoozer appears to have altogether avoided the tricky issue of 
capacity by means of a confessional paradigm: those who confess that God is the primary 
author of Scripture are, by definition, in the Church and are able thus to hear the voice of 
God when Scripture is read.  On this account, those who read the literal sense with the 
presupposition that Scripture is a covenant document of God do actually hear the voice of 
God.  Subsequently, when those believers read the plain sense of the canonical 
Scriptures, a rule of faith emerges which then determines the confessional boundaries for 
being within the Church.  Christians, then, enter the hermeneutical circle by 
 361 
 
acknowledging that God is the primary author of Scripture.  Subsequently they find 
Scripture to establish the clear and authoritative boundaries for their reading community. 
Yet it is unclear that Vanhoozer‟s proposal really solves the problem he sets out to 
overcome.  First, Vanhoozer places a great deal of weight on a particular philosophical 
model of authorship as the doctrinal foundation for a Christian hermeneutic.  Vanhoozer 
is correct in saying that the Church‟s claim that the Scriptures are the Word of God (what 
he calls the “Scripture Principle”) and the Church‟s claim that the Scriptures manifest 
dual authorship are grounded in the unified witness of tradition.  Yet Vanhoozer‟s own 
articulation of the Scripture principle and dual authorship is distinctly not a traditional 
claim, but is based on speech-act theory, and should not be so hastily argued to be the 
faith of the Church.
947
  Consequently, this understanding of authorship may not have the 
strength to ground Vanhoozer‟s whole proposal.  Second, Vanhoozer‟s proposal is 
supported by a very dense theological scaffolding which only finds credibility within the 
Church.  Hence the same authority problem which led Frei to locate the authority of 
Scripture in the consensus of the Church returns to plague Vanhoozer‟s model.  Placing 
authority in God‟s communicative action necessitates granting authority to the Church to 
recognize and receive that communication.  Vanhoozer‟s “Scripture Principle” and his 
case for the primacy of the literal sense must both be grounded in some unique capacity 
                                               
947 For example, Brevard Childs ("Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation," 80), 
criticizes “authorial discourse theories” using speech-act theory for attempting to bypass the fundamental 
Judeo-Christian claim that “the movement by which scripture becomes the vehicle of divine revelation was 
by means of the Holy Spirit.  Human words in all their time-conditioned form were received thereby as the 
divine voice addressing an expectant recipient.  It is to be noted that the human words were not altered into 
another form of speech, but as the Written Word became the Word of God for them.  The human words 
were not transformed into a new form of illocutionary divine discourse, but were now understood and made 
alive through a divine activity.”  Childs (ibid), concludes, “In my judgment, the most fundamental flaw in 
the new hermeneutical theory arises from the failure to understand the role of the church in collecting, 
shaping and interpreting the Bible, which is the issue of canon.”   
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of the Church to establish fruitful methods for reading.  While Vanhoozer‟s typical 
approach is to promote a theological argument for God‟s use of the text over the authority 
of tradition, until Vanhoozer explores the nature of the Church as a theological reality, his 
work will likely only convince those Protestants who already agree with sola Scriptura.   
Henri de Lubac “Capacity as Incorporation of the Logos”:  Of the four 
theologians, only de Lubac explicitly articulates the unique capacity of the Church to 
receive the mediation of Christ in the reading of Scripture.  De Lubac makes three 
important moves which serve to describe the unique capacity of the Church to receive the 
disclosure of Christ in Scripture.  First, de Lubac clearly distinguishes between Scripture 
and revelation, allowing him to subject both Scripture and Church to the event of Christ 
and to emphasize that both are used by God to mediate the Mystery of Christ.
948
  De 
Lubac clarifies this claim by showing that the Church possesses a unique capacity for 
reading because the Church, like Scripture and the Eucharist, is an “incorporation of the 
Logos” which is grounded in the Incarnate Logos.  Hence the distinction between 
Scripture and revelation allows De Lubac to provide a theologically rich description of 
both Scripture and the Church as fellow incorporations of the Logos and as fellow 
mediators of the singular revelation of Christ.  This model provides resources to speak of 
the Church as having both the unique capacity to receive the disclosure of Christ in 
Scripture and the unique capacity to mediate Christ along with Scripture.
949
   
                                               
948 De Lubac (La révélation divine, 164-65, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: 
Reader of Dei Verbum," 680), claims that Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and 
entire by Scripture, and whole and entire by Tradition, both of which are intimately connected.‟”   
949 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 27.   
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Second, de Lubac‟s understanding of tropology suggests that readers possess a 
unique capacity for disclosure because they bear the imprint of the Logos.  De Lubac 
builds an argument that all persons are “fitted” to recognize and receive the Logos 
incorporated in Scripture because they have the imprint of the Logos on their souls.  
When Scripture is read, the individual understands her own history to participate in the 
story of the Bible because she participates in the Logos.  As the reader fits himself into 
the narrative of the Scriptures, de Lubac claims, “Interior experience and meditation on 
Scripture accordingly tend to merge in a unique „experience of the Word,‟” in which each 
deepens and furthers the other.
950
  This theological explanation for the efficacy of 
Scripture provides a much stronger reason for expecting encounter with the Incarnate 
Logos in Scripture than either Tracy or Frei provide.  De Lubac moves beyond Tracy‟s 
argument for a general capacity for disclosure in all human beings by providing more 
adequate theological terminology to describe this capacity as a function of the Logos who 
is Incarnate in the particular Jesus Christ.  De Lubac moves beyond Frei by showing that 
disclosure in Scriptural narrative is not simply a result of narrative being a more fitting 
genre to render identity, but is a consequence of the Logos causing a recognition of 
identity between the narrative of Scripture and the reader.
951
   
Third, de Lubac grounds the capacity of the Church in a rich understanding of the 
totus Christus, in which the Church interprets in light of the “already” of allegory and the 
“not yet” of anagogy.  As the Church realizes that it is the new reality formed in 
                                               
950 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 142.  De Lubac (ibid, 174), claims, “When the Word 
comes to the soul, it is to instruct her in wisdom, and this understanding of the soul with the Word” is not 
“imaginary;” rather, “the mystery interiorizes itself within the heart, where it becomes experience.” 
951 See De Lubac, History and Spirit, 398.   
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relationship to Christ the head (allegory), it realizes also its movement toward 
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus (anagogy), it interprets Scripture 
according to its nature.  Here de Lubac establishes a theologically rich description of the 
Church which cannot be gleaned through a discussion of phenomenological method 
(Tracy), authority (Vanhoozer), or ascriptive identity (Frei).  The fourfold structure of 
Christian reality is inscribed on the Church by its participation in Christ.  The Church, in 
return, not only uniquely holds the correct theological presuppositions for reading this 
unique text, but is itself “fitted” by Christ for receiving disclosure of Christ.  The Church, 
as that institution which participates in the Mystery, is the only one which has an intuition 
of the Mystery.  This intuition toward which the Church yearns allows the Church to 
sense which interpretations are legitimately part of its faith. 
These three steps allow de Lubac to develop an ecclesiology sufficient to 
articulate the way in which the Church participates in Christ as it reads the Scriptures.  
De Lubac would insist that the Church is not, as Frei suggests, simply that institution 
which follows the identity of Christ and understands its own identity in relation to the 
identity of Christ.  Consequently, Scriptural reading is not simply a recognition of the 
identity of Christ plainly rendered in the literal sense.  Furthermore, de Lubac would 
insist that the Church is not, as Vanhoozer suggests, simply that community which 
responds in obedience to Scripture.
952
  Consequently, Scriptural reading is not simply the 
recognition of and response to divine speaking action.  For de Lubac, the Church is 
primarily an eschatological reality, the body of Christ which participates already in the 
                                               
952 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 235, 418, etc.), typically uses Gerhard Ebeling 
description of the Church that “the history of the church is the history of biblical interpretation.”   
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kingdom, even as it awaits full union with its head.  De Lubac‟s emphasis that the 
“infusion of the Holy Spirit placed the people of God in an essentially new position” as 
“the Spirit of Christ has renewed, transfigured, and „spiritualized‟ everything,” would 
allow de Lubac to stress the “already-present” dimension of the Church, and would cause 
him to worry that both Frei and Vanhoozer have overlooked the very Mystery of the 
Church as a theological reality.
953
   
B.  Proposal #2: Distinguishing the “Imprint,” “Incorporations,” and “Incarnation” of the 
Logos  
 
I have suggested that de Lubac‟s ecclesiology has the most developed resources to 
describe the unique capacity of the Church to receive the disclosure of Christ in 
Scripture.  At this point, I will use insights from all four authors to sketch a theological 
proposal about the unique capacity of readers within the Church which will provide 
helpful insights for the relationship between text and reader.  This proposal should 
advance Tracy‟s project by showing how disclosure is intensified in certain readers and 
provides resources to help Frei and Vanhoozer avoid the problem of locating authority in 
either Scripture or the Church. 
I will base my proposal on de Lubac‟s distinction between “imprint,” 
“incorporation” and “Incarnation” of the Logos as qualitatively deepening modes of 
divine presentation.  The distinctions between “imprint,” “incorporations” and 
“Incarnation” of the Logos are qualitative distinctions and cannot be seen as simply 
differences of intensity of the mediation of the Logos.  The “Incarnation” of the Logos is 
                                               
953 De Lubac, The Church, Paradox and Mystery, 51 and 43 respectively. 
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the unique and climactic event of human history to which the whole of Scripture testifies.  
This testimony of the whole Scriptures to the singular Event of Christ grounds the 
importance of the literal sense.  The term “incorporation” of the Logos refers to the way 
in which the Triune God has drawn certain human realities into God‟s own economic 
missions.  Scripture, Church, and Eucharist are all called “incorporations” as they 
uniquely bear and mediate the presence of the Logos who has been singularly revealed in 
Jesus Christ.  These human realities all have a sacramental nature, as they present the 
Mystery of the Logos to believers as they point to Christ, the Incarnate Logos.  Finally, 
de Lubac claims that all readers bear the “imprint” of the Logos upon their souls.  This, 
again, is a qualitative distinction, as it does not suggest a sacramental relationship to the 
Logos, but rather allows readers to recognize their own identity in light of the Incarnate 
Logos.  Together, these distinct mediations of the Logos provide conceptual resources 
which show the structure of the economy of redemption and the way in which readers 
participate in it.   
Premise 1:  Every human being is fitted with an “imprint” of the eternal 
Logos who is incorporated in the Scriptures and Incarnate in Jesus Christ.  This 
imprint is a gift of creation and is not entirely eliminated by the Fall.
954
  This 
principle grounds Tracy‟s transcendental reflection theologically, showing that all 
persons do have a capacity for disclosure because they bear an imprint of the Logos 
written within them.  Mike Higton, providing a charitable (and I believe correct) reading 
                                               
954 At the lowest level, I am agreeing with the legitimacy of de Lubac‟s use of Origen to show 
that the image of God contains some trace of the eternal Logos.  I am only taking seriously the Imago Dei 
imprinted on every human being and am suggesting that response to grace does place the individual into a 
qualitatively different situation.   
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of Tracy, claims, “Tracy is wanting to say that there is something about human being (the 
proximity of „absolute mystery‟ to us) that makes the truth disclosed in Jesus of Nazareth 
potentially recognizable as a truth by any human being, even though that truth is 
inherently linked to the particularity of Jesus.”955  Tracy‟s early work focused so greatly 
on the „fit‟ nature of human beings to experience the divine that Tracy did not adequately 
emphasize the way in which the unsubstitutable identity of Christ rendered plainly in the 
Gospels enabled this capacity for disclosure until Frei‟s critique.  Yet Tracy has always 
worked to tie that capacity of human beings to receive religious disclosure to the 
mediation of Christ.  As early as The Analogical Imagination, Tracy wrote, “We are 
always already in the presence of an absolute mystery….We are…hearers of a possible 
revelation or self-manifestation from the freedom of the absolute mystery….But for the 
Christian, that revelation (as self-manifestation of God) has in fact occurred in the free 
and decisive event called Jesus Christ—a position explicated in systematic theology.”956  
Throughout Tracy‟s work, he tries to argue for both the capacity of all readers to receive 
disclosure of the divine and the particularity of Jesus Christ in mediating that disclosure.  
De Lubac‟s model brings both general capacity and the unsubstitutable identity of Christ 
together by showing that the eternal Logos is imprinted on every person by virtue of the 
                                               
955 Higton, “Hans Frei and David Tracy on the Ordinary and the Extraordinary in 
Christianity,” 586.   
956 Citing Rahner, Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 162), claims “that revelation, as 
„transcendental,‟ is always already present in this concretely graced world; that revelation as „categorial‟ is 
present in the gratuity of God‟s self-manifestation in the events of „salvation history,‟” specifically in Jesus 
Christ (Karl Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, (New 
York: Crossroad, 1978), pp. 163-62; 206-28).  Tracy‟s own comment on Rahner is even more specific:  
“We are always already in the presence of absolute mystery—a position defended in „philosophy of 
religion.‟  We are, therefore, in fact hearers of a possible revelation or self-manifestation from the freedom 
of the absolute mystery…(ibid)” 
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work of the Logos in all creation, yet that the Logos is revelation only in the Incarnation 
of the Logos.   
Furthermore, because the Christian Scriptures participate in the Logos as they 
testify to the Incarnate Logos, readers of Scripture are able to recognize an identity 
between themselves and the Logos in Scripture in a way that is always grounded in the 
Incarnate Logos.
957
  De Lubac‟s model provides the theological language to describe the 
reader‟s capacity for disclosure grounded both in creation and in the unsubstitutable 
identity of Jesus Christ as the Incarnation of the Logos.  Here every reader has a capacity 
to find, in the narrative of Scripture, a “mirror” in which the reader reads his or her 
identity.  This means that all readers are “fitted” to read more than the plain sense of 
Scripture.  They are “fitted” to participate in the spiritual reality to which it points by a 
certain imprint of identity with the texts which both point to Christ.   
Premise 2:  Since the Scriptures are an “incorporation” of the Logos which 
testifies to the Incarnate Logos in Jesus Christ, the reader is led to the Logos by 
reading the plain sense of the text which directs the reader to Christ as the Object of 
Scripture.  Here Frei and Vanhoozer‟s projects are useful alongside de Lubac‟s 
theological description of Scripture as an incorporation of the Logos.  Through Frei, we 
                                               
957 My suggestion does not simply propose an alternative form of foundationalism, as the 
imprint of the Logos upon the soul is a theological, rather than a philosophical, description of the 
commonality of all persons, and is not identifiable through a particular philosophical analysis (see Lewish 
Ayres, “The Soul and the Reading of Scripture,” 173-90, who proposes that de Lubac‟s understanding of 
the soul as a meeting place between God and human beings can only be described theologically).  This 
reality of imprint may not be experienced without a particular act of grace and a particular rendering of the 
Incarnate Logos mediated by Scripture.  Nonetheless, it is a commonality of all human persons and does 
describe a common capacity to recognize and respond to the revelation of Christ mediated in Scripture.  
Consequently, Tracy may be correct that all persons stand with a capacity to receive the disclosure of 
Absolute Mystery, yet it may be equally valid to accept Lindbeck‟s argument that human beings cannot 
experience the presence of the Logos without being able to name it (see Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 
38, for his charge against Tracy).  
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see most clearly that the literal sense is the indispensable means to the spiritual reality 
and thus plain reading is the normative means to encounter with Christ.  Through 
Vanhoozer, we understand more clearly the importance of the canonical sense, in which 
as Christ emerges as Object of Scripture readers are drawn to the Christ who addresses 
the Church as Subject of Scripture.  These projects are corrective to de Lubac as they 
close the gap between the literal and spiritual senses, showing how the literal sense is 
taken up into God‟s communicative action and how the unsubstitutable identity of the 
Incarnate Logos is indispensable for the movement to the spiritual sense.  Christ‟s 
address to readers as Subject of Scripture is intrinsically linked to recognition of Christ as 
Object of Scripture.  Thus readers are bound to the plain sense of the text so that they 
may recognize the identity of the Incarnate Christ as Object and thereby encounter Him 
as Subject.  
It is important here to emphasize that for the believer, reading both the literal 
sense and the movement to spiritual reality occur in the realm of grace.  Clarifying this 
issue may help to ease a particular tension in Frei‟s writing.  For Frei, Scriptural reading 
always tended to be an activity for the realm of nature, not grace.  Frei argued that 
anyone could read the plain sense of the text realistically and recognize that the identity 
of Jesus Christ is as the one who is present.
958
  Still, Frei could never explain why one 
person believes and the other does not, even as both read the same plainly rendered 
                                               
958 Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 4), claims, “In our knowledge of Jesus Christ, his 
presence and his identity are completely one.  We cannot properly think of him as not present, as we can 
think of others without their real presence.”   
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identity of Jesus Christ.
959
  The present account proposes that the movement from nature 
to grace in the reading of the plain sense may be the difference between recognizing the 
unsubstitutable identity of a Person rendered plainly (nature), and recognizing the 
intrinsic correspondence between the imprint of the Logos on the human soul and the 
Incarnate Logos mediated in the Scriptures (grace).  In other words, while any reader may 
read the Gospels plainly while remaining in the realm of nature, the believer moves to the 
realm of grace when recognition of the particular identity of Jesus Christ reveals to the 
reader the correspondence between this particularly rendered Incarnate Logos and the 
imprint of the Logos on the individual‟s soul.  If this is so, it seems that realistic reading 
may render the identity of Jesus Christ as the identity of God.  Yet this realistic reading 
does not affect the reader‟s own life until the reader recognizes the correspondence 
between his own identity and the identity of Jesus Christ when Christ enables the imprint 
of the Logos to recognize the Incarnation of the Logos through the Incorporation of the 
Logos in Scripture.  Consequently, it could be said that for the believer even the plain 
reading of Scripture occurs in the realm of grace, insofar as the reader can recognize the 
correspondence between his own story and the narrative of Christ rendered in the plain 
sense precisely because the Incarnate Logos stands as Subject of the Scriptures, 
mediating Himself to the reader through the texts.  Hence there is no real dichotomy, as if 
recognizing Christ as Object of Scripture were a matter of nature and recognizing Christ 
                                               
959 Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 151-52), claims that although “there is a kind of logic in 
a Christian‟s faith that forces him to say that disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally 
impossible…whether one actually believes the resurrection is, of course, a wholly different matter…no 
matter what the logic of the Christian faith, actual belief in the resurrection is a matter of faith and not of 
arguments from possibility or evidence.”  This difficulty is articulated in Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 
12-25, although Frei simply concludes that he cannot explain how the believer comes to believe and is not 
obligated to try to explain this.   
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as Subject of Scripture were a matter of grace.  Though any reader can recognize the 
plain identity of Christ by reading the literal sense in the realm of nature, the believer 
recognizes correspondence and is drawn into participation by reading that same literal 
sense.   
Premise 3:  As the reader recognizes and responds to the Incarnate Logos 
rendered in the plain sense of Scripture, the reader is changed from simply bearing 
the imprint of the Logos to being an incorporation of the Logos as a member of the 
Church.  This change of capacity is both qualitative and quantitative.
960
  On the one 
hand, Tracy is correct that the change is one of intensification of receptive capacity for 
disclosure, since it is the same Logos which has left an imprint on the individual into 
which the reader is now incorporated.  Yet on the other hand, the change goes beyond 
intensification to a qualitative difference, as the believing reader really is incorporated 
into the Logos by incorporation into the Church.  Hence the believing reader participates 
in Christ in a way that is qualitatively different from someone outside the Church.  The 
very entry of the believer into the Church makes the believer a fellow incorporation of 
the Logos.   
Here de Lubac‟s proposed relationship between allegory and tropology is 
important for identifying the relationship between the individual and the Church.  As the 
individual soul is the “microcosm of the perfect Church,” the individual reader becomes 
                                               
960 See here Dei Verbum‟s claim (I, 5), to a qualitative change: “To make this act of faith, the 
grace of God and the interior help of the Holy Spirit must precede and assist, moving the heart and turning 
it to God, opening the eyes of the mind…”  This must a qualitative change as it is the effected conversion 
of the individual.  
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an incorporation of the Logos as she is incorporated into the Church.
961
  Tropology, as we 
have seen, is not a spiritual dimension beyond allegory, but is the specification of 
allegory in the individual, thereby relating the individual to the Church and making the 
individual an incorporation of the Logos.  This means that the believer, by being 
incorporated into the Church, bears a qualitatively greater capacity for reception of the 
Logos to the extent that the believer participates in the Church.   
Premise 4:  The only sufficient way to express the relationship between 
Scripture and Church is in terms of their intrinsic identity, as the same 
unsubstitutable Jesus Christ rendered through the plain sense of the text is the 
Christ who constitutes the Church and draws it toward its eschatological end.  Just 
as the task of showing the intrinsic relationship between Christ as Subject and Christ as 
Object of Scripture is essential to the development of a Christian hermeneutic, so the task 
of showing the intrinsic relationship between the Christ rendered in Scripture and the 
Christ experienced as present in the Church is crucial to the advancement of a Christian 
hermeneutic.  This means that just as the formative Christian community was compelled 
to establish rules for reading based on their experience that the present, risen Christ was 
the same Christ rendered realistically in Scripture, so the Church today exists to mediate 
this present Christ as the One rendered in a plain reading of Scripture.  Consequently, the 
Church has authority to safeguard a Christian hermeneutic which will allow Christ to be 
mediated as both Subject and Object of Scripture and to renew itself continually by 
returning to the Christ who is so mediated in Scripture.  Practically, this means that any 
attempt to locate authority in either Scripture or the Church will fail to advance a 
                                               
961 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 136.     
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Christian hermeneutic because it will fail to show the intrinsic relationship between the 
two incorporations of the Logos. 
C.  Advancing Hermeneutical Method for the Text/Reader Relationship  
 
The theological description given to the reading community has significant 
implications for the relationship between text and readers.  When method is emphasized 
without adequately describing the relationship of the Church to Scripture in the economy 
of redemption, the task of interpretation becomes largely a skillful employment of literary 
or theological rules, in which readers are either required to respect a meaning which is 
said to be determinate or are encouraged to conform a meaning to their own self-
understanding which is said to be indeterminate.
962
  This section will examine 
Vanhoozer‟s central problematic of authority and Frei‟s central problematic of identity 
and will show that both emphases are one-sided because they both attempt to chasten 
readers through the plain reading of the text without giving adequate attention to the 
intrinsic relationship between Scripture and Church in the divine economy.  First, I will 
place Vanhoozer and de Lubac in dialogue to show that although they locate Scripture 
very similarly in the economy of redemption, Vanhoozer‟s location of the Church forces 
readers to posit authority in either the Church or Scripture.  Second, I will show that the 
very same ecclesiological deficiency that plagues Vanhoozer‟s work is also evident in 
Frei‟s project.  As a result, Frei also is forced to locate authority either in Scripture or in 
the Church.  Finally, I will show that the best way to resolve the tension about the 
                                               
962 The former is most clearly seen in Vanhoozer‟s early work, while the latter is a persistent 
difficulty in Tracy‟s early work.   
 374 
 
location of authority is by showing the intrinsic connection between Scripture and 
Church.  Here I will suggest that de Lubac‟s description of the Church and Tracy‟s later 
insights on the theological interpretation of Scripture provide the best resources for 
showing the intrinsic similarity between Scripture and Church, and thus advance the 
dialogue.   
1.  Authority in Scripture and Church: Comparing De Lubac and Vanhoozer  
 
For Vanhoozer and Frei, it is necessary to safeguard the plain sense of the text in 
order to uphold Scripture‟s authority to confront the Church.  Unfortunately, both 
authors, the authority issue tends to be posed in terms of an either/or dilemma, in which 
the theologian must choose one reality or the other as the ground for Scripture‟s 
authority.
963
  It is quite informative that the strong disagreement between Vanhoozer and 
Frei about whether to place Scriptural authority in the texts or in the Church has tended to 
make their two very similar hermeneutical projects appear nearly incompatible with one 
another.
964
   
The path to overcoming this impasse, it appears, is through a more explicit 
theological description of the Church as a reading community which will appreciate both 
                                               
963 Historically, the issue of authority has had a significant impact on what de Lubac calls the 
“traditional hermeneutic,” since it has been precisely the debate about locating authority in either the plain 
sense of Scripture or the Magisterium that has contributed what I am calling the „eclipse of spiritual 
interpretation.‟  See Boersma, “Pumpkin Pie,” 253, nt. 48, who claims that much of Vanhoozer‟s focus on 
authority illustrates “Congar‟s point that over time Scripture and Church (magisterium) have become 
separated, with Protestants focusing on the canon as the rule of faith, and with Catholics assigning this role 
to the Magisterium.” De Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 55-71), chronicles the decline of spiritual 
interpretation leading up to the Reformation.   
964 Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 219), complains sharply that with Frei, “It is 
the community, ultimately, that enjoys interpretive authority” so that “[i]nterpretive might makes right.”  
While I have argued that this is a particularly uncharitable reading of Frei, it illustrates a disagreement 
about authority which must be relieved for Christian interpretation to advance beyond the impasse. 
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de Lubac‟s insistence that the Church possesses a unique capacity for interpreting 
Scripture and Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the Scriptures possess the authority to correct 
the Church.  When Vanhoozer‟s attempt to locate Scripture in the economy of 
redemption is compared with de Lubac‟s, it is possible to see the impact of a better 
developed ecclesiology on Christian interpretation.  Since both Vanhoozer and de Lubac 
address the question of authority within the context of Scripture‟s place in the economy, 
the two authors will be placed in dialogue to show how similarly they articulate the role 
of Scripture in relationship to the Church.  This will specify that the real issue is the role 
of the Church in the divine economy.     
The Relationship of Scripture to the Church: A close examination of the work of 
Vanhoozer and de Lubac reveals a striking similarity in the way each understands the 
purpose of Scripture to the Church and the manner in which the Scriptures exercise 
authority over the Church.  The following seven points illustrate the fundamental 
similarity between the two projects.  First, both Vanhoozer and de Lubac specifically 
speak of Scripture and the Church as human realities which have been drawn into the 
economy of redemption to share in the missions of the Triune God.
965
  Second, both 
agree that the Scriptures conduct an active, initiatory mission of confronting and 
renewing the Church.
966
  Third, both see Scripture playing a causal role over the Church 
                                               
965 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 177) claims, “To be sure, the biblical texts have a 
„natural history‟; they have human authors.  Yet these human testimonies are caught up in the triune 
economy of word-acts and so ultimately become divine testimonies.”  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 81), 
claims, “The sacred books themselves are and remain inspired….„God did not create them and then depart 
from the scene.  They come from him and exist in him.‟” 
966 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 210), claims, “Word, Spirit, tradition, and church 
belong together; all have a vital role to play.  Only the Word serves as magisterial norm, however, for only 
the written word is the commissioned testimony of the church‟s Lord and Master.”  De Lubac (History and 
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in the divine economy by mediating the present, risen Christ to the Church.
967
  Fourth, 
both ultimately locate the authority of Scripture in the action of the Triune God who uses 
it to address the Church.
968
  Fifth, both agree that Scripture, since it is authoritative as it is 
used by God to incorporate readers into the Church, is incomplete until it accomplishes 
its eschatological mission.
969
  Sixth, both suggest that the literal sense of Scripture always 
has an authoritative role over the Church to establish parameters for its interpretation 
because the Church is incomplete and still sinful.
970
  Seventh, both suggest that the 
                                                                                                                                            
Spirit, 418), claims, „Scripture and Eucharist are thereby joined once again.  Both never cease to “build up” 
the Church.‟” 
967 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 124), claims his development of his “canonical” 
hermeneutic “has everything to do with the church meeting its risen Lord through the testimony of his 
commissioned witnesses.”  Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 71), argues further, “In the final analysis, 
the mission of Scripture is to minister Christ and to build up the body of Christ.  This is what God is doing 
with his written words: in diverse ways and at diverse times speaking his Son into the world, giving thick 
(canonical) descriptions of what he is saying and doing in Jesus Christ…”  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 
82), agrees that “Within the Scripture, God resides; by the Scripture, God makes himself known…Scripture 
is „fertilized by a miracle of the Holy Spirit.‟” 
968 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 176-77), argues that, “Scripture…is…a mode of 
divine communicative action whereby the triune God furthers his mission and creates a new covenant 
people....God, in and through the human authors, has an ongoing speaking part.”  Vanhoozer 
(Remythologizing Theology, 264), claims that “Scripture is a means of ongoing triune communication by 
which the church follows her master‟s voice.”  De Lubac (History and Spirit, 418), claims, “Scripture is 
thus like the voice of Christ speaking to the Church and in the Church; it is his efficacious sign; it thus 
assures the luminous presence of Christ to the Church.”  De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 81), insists that 
“the Word of God…speaks to us still” in Scripture, “reaching the depth of our souls as the limits of the 
universe.” 
969 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 165), claims, “The holy script…is both complete and 
incomplete.  On the one hand, the story of God‟s word-acts in the history of Israel and in Jesus Christ is 
finished: the climax of the drama of redemption (cross and resurrection) has been accomplished, its 
conclusion (eternal life with God) is sure.  On the other hand, without a people to embody it, the script 
lacks something essential, for the canon „delivers its meaning only as it is “played out” in patterns of 
human action in Church and society.‟” De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 227), similarly writes, “All that 
Scripture recounts has indeed happened in history, but the account that is given does not contain the whole 
purpose of Scripture in itself.  This purpose still needs to be accomplished and is actually accomplished in 
us each day, by the mystery of this spiritual understanding.  Only then…will Scripture bear us its fruit in its 
fullness.” 
970 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 163), claims that, “Ecclesiology cannot be first 
theology because the church enjoys only the first fruits of its salvation.  As an eschatological reality, it is 
indeed already in union with Christ, but not yet completely so.”  De Lubac (The Church: Paradox and 
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Church possesses the authority to safeguard Scripture‟s authority so as to enable fruitful 
readings.
971
  With these similarities, it seems clear that both de Lubac and Vanhoozer 
locate the authority of Scripture in God‟s use of the texts and that all subsequent readings 
must recognize and submit to that authority.   
The Relationship of the Church to Scripture:  In light of the close agreement 
between Vanhoozer and de Lubac about the active, initiating, authoritative mission of 
Scripture and the responsibility of the Church to respond to Christ‟s speaking action in 
Scripture, it is all the more significant that Vanhoozer insists on posing an either/or 
structure of authority, while de Lubac sees the relationship between Scripture and Church 
as one of reciprocity and continuity.  It becomes apparent that the real impasse between 
the two is not caused by the way each theologian structures the role of Scripture in the 
economy of redemption, but rather by the role and reality each gives to the Church in that 
economy.   
While Vanhoozer is continually focused on showing God‟s missional presence in 
Scripture, he does not define the Church as the community which either bears or mediates 
the presence of Christ on earth.  In fact, Vanhoozer specifically rejects the articulation of 
the Church as a sacrament, arguing that “the church is less a sacrament than a means of 
                                                                                                                                            
Mystery, 24), would likely agree, saying that “this very same Church, is often unfaithful and unsubmissive.  
In her members she is a sinner…the Church is also a symbol of perpetual decline and mortality.”   
971 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 123), laments that in the Protestant practice of sola 
scriptura authority tends to reside in “individual readers” and claims that his intent “is not to denigrate 
church tradition but to locate it properly within the economy of salvation and the pattern of divine 
authority.  From this perspective, conforming to church tradition is not what is primary: what is primary is 
attending to the Spirit who speaks in the Scripture of Jesus Christ….we cannot take for granted that the 
content of the apostolic tradition is found in the teaching of the church.”  De Lubac (La révélation divine, 
158-59, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum," 692), claims, “The 
Magisterium merely guarantees that the development of the mysteries of the faith in the minds of believers 
remains within the complete and definitive „figure‟ of this mystery.  It guarantees that the communion of 
these believers remains open to an Object that is „incomprehensible‟…a living Person.‟”     
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signifying the divine grace poured out in Christ through the Spirit.”972  Vanhoozer instead 
argues, “The form of the church‟s fitting participation in the drama of redemption is 
precisely that of mimesis: an imitation of Paul, of God, of Christ.”973  Vanhoozer then 
defines the Church as “the company of the gospel, whose nature and task alike pertain to 
performing the word in the power of the Spirit.”974  Since Vanhoozer provides this 
definition in direct response to a sacramental view of the Church, it is clear that 
Vanhoozer intends the phrase “company of the gospel” to replace the phrase “presence of 
the triune God,” and the phrase “performing the word” to replace “mediating grace 
sacramentally.”975  Any similarities between Vanhoozer and de Lubac about the 
responsive role of the Church to Scripture or the authority of Scripture over the Church 
should be read in light of this hesitance by Vanhoozer to locate the presence of Christ in 
the Church.
976
   
                                               
972 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 401), emphasis his.  Vanhoozer does understand his 
own position to locate the role of the Church in the economy of redemption in a very different place.  
Vanhoozer (ibid, 400-01), claims, “In sacramental theater, ecclesial words and actions mediate the grace of 
God.  This is one possible construal of how the church participates in the drama of redemption: by 
mediating grace sacramentally.”  Vanhoozer‟s rejection of the Church as sacrament, then, is not an 
oversight, but is significant to his own position.   
973 Vanhoozer (ibid, 401), clarifies that this is a “creative imitation, a nonidentical 
participation.”  
974 Ibid, emphasis his.   
975 See ibid, 400-01.  This argument is particularly interesting, since Vanhoozer (The Drama 
of Doctrine, 400), has just claimed that, “Any sufficiently thick description of the church must include 
something about the church being not only the people of God but the presence of God in the world.”  
Vanhoozer, then, seems to have in mind a model which will allow for Christ‟s presence in the Church but 
will grant the Church no authority to mediate that presence other than by extending the Scriptures to others.   
976 While Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 153) recognizes the “necessity, even the 
inevitability, of tradition,” and yet argues that “Everything depends…on giving an adequate dogmatic 
account of their proper ordering [i.e. of relationship between Scripture and Church].”  Vanhoozer (ibid, 
230), then, emphasizes that “The church is ultimately…the passive recipient of the canonical Scriptures…,” 
thus relegating it to a lesser authority. 
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De Lubac‟s ecclesiology, in bold contrast to Vanhoozer‟s, emphasizes Scripture‟s 
authority within the context of the radical newness of the Church in the economy of 
redemption.  For de Lubac, “The Church is a mysterious extension in time of the Trinity, 
not only preparing us for the life of unity but bringing about even now our participation 
in it.  She comes from and is full of the Trinity…She is „the Incarnation continued,‟” the 
“presence of Christ on earth.”977  De Lubac would claim that Vanhoozer‟s hesitance to 
show the Church as bearing or mediating the presence of Christ “does not fully enter into 
the logic of the Mystery of the Incarnation,” is “more inspired by the Old than the New 
Testament,” and consequently cannot really show what the Church is that is new in the 
economy.
978
  De Lubac would likely feel that Vanhoozer has implicitly denied the 
structure of the Christian Mystery by failing to show the presence of Christ in the visible
 
Church.
979
   
From Authority to Capacity: Vanhoozer‟s hesitance to locate Christ‟s presence in 
the Church creates some very pressing difficulties for his hermeneutical method which 
threaten to topple his whole project.  First, for all of Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the 
authority of the closed canon based on God‟s determinate speaking action within it, 
Vanhoozer never produces a convincing argument about how the Christian community 
recognized just this canon in the first place.  Vanhoozer cannot really explain why the 
                                               
977 Henri de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 24.     
978 De Lubac (ibid, 25), dislikes the Protestant argument to liken the visible Church to 
rebellious Israel, in which a remnant (the invisible Church) will be saved.  To appreciate the Christian 
Mystery, one must realize that the Church really consists of something that the OT people of God did not.  
Christ really is joined to this body in a way that the OT people of God did not have access to.  The Church 
is really the reality that the OT people of God pointed toward as a sign. 
979 Ibid.   
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Church had the authority to select certain books rather than others and why it accepted 
the literal sense as its normative hermeneutical approach to reading.
980
  This problem is 
intensified when Vanhoozer claims that the recognition of God‟s speaking action in 
Scripture (and hence its authority) takes place at the level of the whole, completed 
canon.
981
  It is, on Vanhoozer‟s account, unclear how the authority of these texts could 
ever have come to light, and hence how the Church could accept them, if the divine 
speaking action were not discernable until the canon was closed by the Church.  Some 
authority must be granted to the reading community in order for the Church to even be 
able to select the books which would be the canon or establish normative rules for 
reading them.  Vanhoozer is so wary of granting authority to the community that he 
suggests the Rule of Faith ought to be considered authoritative only as it rightly 
summarizes the Scriptures.
982
  Yet once again Vanhoozer must show how the Church, led 
by its experience of the risen Christ, developed a Rule of Faith and established a 
canonical Scriptures in fundamental continuity with their experience which then 
established the norms for canonical acceptance.  While Vanhoozer is right to argue that 
                                               
980.  For example, Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 149-150), claims that “it is not the 
church‟s use but the triune God‟s use of Scripture that makes it canon.  That the church recognizes the 
canon authenticates the church rather than the canon, which needs no ecclesial approval to be what it is: the 
Word of God.”  While it is true that God‟s speaking action requires no subsequent validation, it is very 
difficult to find this to be a helpful description of how the canon came to be regarded as authoritative.   
981 See, for example, Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 179), proposes the phrase 
“canonical illocution” to show “what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at 
the level of the canon” and Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 342), where the resulting 
supervening divine illocution is described as: „confessing faith‟ (349), „proclaiming God‟s salvation‟ (342), 
„testifying to Christ‟ (342), “bearing witness” (349), or “providing guidance for future generations” (380). 
982 Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 206) even claims that “the authority of the Rule [of 
faith] depends on its conforming to the Scriptures.”  (See his whole discussion on the Rule of Faith, 
claiming that it is based on the authority of the canon in The Drama of Doctrine, 203-10).  While it is 
certainly true that the Rule of Faith is in agreement with the Scriptures, it does not account for the way in 
which the Rule served as a causal norm for the formation of the canon and the hermeneutical method 
applied to reading the canon as a unified whole. 
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the Church must now recognize the authority of the canon, he must explain what gave the 
Church the authority to receive its canon, if the closed canon which established the rule 
of faith and allowed God‟s speaking action to be heard in the Church. 
Second, for all Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on God‟s speaking action in Scripture, 
Vanhoozer‟s articulation of God‟s present speaking action to readers remains 
unpersuasive, as his account seems to require that God‟s speaking ceased with the 
completion of the canon.
983
  While the Spirit mediates God‟s past speech to present 
readers, Vanhoozer‟s model requires that the Spirit only guide the perlocutionary effect 
of Scripture.
984
  Yet the transition between God‟s past, closed, determinate speaking 
action and present speaking to the Church simply cannot be accomplished without some 
articulation of Christ‟s ongoing presence in the Church.  Boersma explains this difficulty 
by saying, “If I am not mistaken, [Vanhoozer] means to say that the Spirit confronts 
believers with the Scriptures each time anew.  As a result, it is difficult to avoid the 
impression that believers need to jump the chronological gap between the horizon of their 
own context and that of the Scriptures.”985  The movement from past speech to present 
speech without some continuity of presence in the community would, on de Lubac‟s 
account, amount to little more than a form of extrinsicism.  At the very least, it is difficult 
                                               
983 Vanhoozer (ibid, 152), suggests, “It is precisely as a past performance (i.e., as a discourse 
fixed by writing) that the canon serves as normative specification of what God was saying and doing in 
Christ.”  This claim is, of course, consistent with Vanhoozer‟s claim that God‟s speaking action is equated 
with revelation:  Revelation ceased with the final apostolic writing, and became discernable with the 
closure of the canon.   
984 This articulation appears much more driven by a safeguarding of the authority of the past, 
closed canon than by a desire to show how the risen Christ addresses His Church.  See Vanhoozer (Is There 
a Meaning in This Text?, 410), who claims that “the Trinitarian language of „procession‟ is apt: as the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so the literary act proceeds from the author, and so too does 
the perlocution (persuading, convincing) proceed from the illocution (claiming, asserting).”  
985 Boersma, “On Baking Pumpkin Pie,” 253.   
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to appreciate Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the development of doctrine through “creativity,” 
“imagination” and “improvisation” without showing how tradition has some authority to 
help form the imagination as it bridges the gap between the past texts of Scripture and the 
present Christian community.
986
  Here de Lubac‟s emphasis on Tradition as a “living 
link” between past events and present reality would provide resources for Vanhoozer to 
extend God‟s past speaking action in Scripture to the present reception in believers in a 
way that does not change the meaning of Scripture, but deepens that meaning in the 
Church.
987
  Only if Vanhoozer can show how the Church also participates in the mission 
of Christ, and hence a locus of Christ‟s presence and an active agent in mediating it, can 
he show how God‟s present speaking action occurs. 
Vanhoozer‟s argument that both Scripture and Church are “caught up in” and 
“sent” as missions in the Triune economy is remarkably close to de Lubac‟s argument 
that Scripture and Church are fellow incorporations of the Logos.  Were Vanhoozer to 
accept some form of de Lubac‟s distinction between “imprint,” “incorporations” and 
“Incarnation” of the Logos, it would seem that his project could show a more intrinsic 
relationship between Scripture and Church without undermining the authority of 
Scripture.  Precisely this theological grounding would strengthen Vanhoozer‟s arguments 
against those postliberals who, according to Vanhoozer, have turned the balance of 
                                               
986 These three words form the basis for Vanhoozer‟s “theo-dramatic” model.  See especially, 
The Drama of Doctrine, 335-44.   
987 De Lubac would agree with Blondel (“History and Dogma,” 276), that,  “In that profound 
sense, when it is a question of finding the supernatural in Sacred History and in dogma, the Gospel is 
nothing without the Church, the teaching of Scripture is nothing without the Christian life, exegesis is 
nothing without Tradition…”  The converse, Vanhoozer would insist, is also true!   
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authority from Scripture to the Church.
988
  Vanhoozer would strengthen his argument for 
the authority of Scripture by providing a theologically rich description of the Church 
which shows the intrinsic connection between the literal reading of Scripture and the 
community to which God speaks by means of the text.  Acceptance of some form of de 
Lubac‟s claim that the Church “dispenses” the Word because the “Church is for each of 
us the place of the Logos,” would ease Vanhoozer‟s project by allowing the Church, as 
one “mission” or “incorporation” of the Triune economy to mediate Christ intrinsically 
rather than extrinsically.
989
  It would also allow Vanhoozer to respond to his specific 
hermeneutical difficulties, as he would be able to better articulate how the Triune God 
enabled the Church to recognize just those books upon which He would supervene His 
speaking action, and why the Church has felt compelled to read their Scriptures literally. 
2.  Identity in Scripture and Church: Returning to Tracy and Frei 
 
The above comparison between Vanhoozer and de Lubac is particularly helpful, it 
turns out, in providing resources to advance the debate between Tracy and Frei.  By 
                                               
988 It may seem ironic to suggest that Vanhoozer‟s greatest allies in combating what he feels is 
the transfer of authority from Scripture to tradition may be those who hold a high theological view of the 
authority of the Church.  See The Drama of Doctrine, 1-12, where the chief problematic of the whole book 
is the relationship between Scripture and tradition.  Vanhoozer writes the book because he fears that “The 
prevailing postmodern cultural winds currently blow away from sola scriptura toward tradition” (10).  Yet 
Vanhoozer may need some argument for the authority of tradition to support his project.  Really, I see no 
Catholic theologian who would disagree with Vanhoozer‟s particular understanding of sola Scriptura. In 
fact, one Catholic theologian, Thomas Guarino, has suggested that many Catholic theologians can “accept 
the phrase sola Scriptura” (“Catholic Reflections on Discerning the Truth of Sacred Scripture,” in Your 
Word is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and Catholics Together, ed. Charles Colson and Richard John 
Neuhaus [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 96), cited in Boersma “Pumpkin Pie,” 250).  Thus the issue is 
not the authority of Scripture, as the normative Christian argument is that the Scriptures play a corrective 
role in relationship to the Church.  The real issue is the argument over Christian interpretation, and this is 
issue is best worked through by locating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption. 
989 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 420.  
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comparing Vanhoozer and de Lubac, I have sought to show that the (largely unnecessary) 
dilemma of locating authority in either Scripture or the Church is caused by Vanhoozer‟s 
inability to show the intrinsic connection between the Logos incorporated in Scripture 
and the Logos incorporated in the Church both of which are grounded in Christ, the 
Incarnate Logos.  At this point, I wish argue that the way Frei structures his project to 
safeguard the identity of Christ leads him into the same either/or dilemma that has 
plagued Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology, and that Frei‟s project would also benefit from 
showing the intrinsic unity between the identity of Christ rendered and the experience of 
Christ in the Church.   
Frei and the Identity of Christ:  Vanhoozer‟s description of the Church as 
imitation of Scripture is very similar to Frei‟s description of the Church as identity-in-
relation to Christ.  For both, the Church grows toward its eschatological union with Christ 
as it recognizes the plain sense of Scripture and follows the Christ rendered in it.  Just as 
Vanhoozer‟s chief concern is to emphasize God‟s speaking action in Scripture so as to 
safeguard the authority of Scripture to address the Church, so Frei‟s chief concern is to 
emphasize the plain sense of Scripture so as to safeguard the particular identity of Jesus 
Christ for the Church.  Yet for both, unfortunately, this stress on identity and imitation 
leads to a practical depreciation on incorporation and participation.  Just as Vanhoozer‟s 
emphasis on the authority of Scripture prevents him from showing the unique capacity of 
the Church to bear and mediate the presence of Christ, so also Frei‟s emphasis on the 
identity of Jesus Christ prevents him from showing how the Christian community bears 
and mediates the presence of Christ as it follows that identity.  For both, the intrinsic 
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connection between recognition of Christ and participation in Christ is left 
underdeveloped.   
A genuine ambiguity exists in Frei‟s description of the Church.  On the one hand, 
the Church is “simply a witness” to the identity of Jesus Christ depicted in the Gospels.  
The Church, Frei emphasizes, “is called upon to be a collective disciple, to follow at a 
distance the pattern of exchange…”990  Yet on the other hand, the Church is “the indirect, 
localized presence of Jesus Christ in and for the world.”991  The Church, for Frei, also is 
“the public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes.”992  The first 
account emphasizes separation and distance in an attempt to safeguard the particular 
identity of Jesus Christ, while the second account speaks of incorporation and divine 
constitution in an attempt to connect the unsubstitutable identity of Christ with His 
community of disciples.  The upshot is that Frei‟s focus on the particular identity of 
Christ has prevented him from adequately describing the identity of the Church and the 
fundamental connection between those identities.  Frei‟s attempt to safeguard Christ‟s 
particular identity causes him to undervalue a description of the believer‟s participation in 
that particular identity.  Dawson claims that for Frei, “Jesus‟ identity is a consequence of 
his unique relation to God, a relation that human beings cannot share (and therefore 
                                               
990 Frei,  The Identity of Jesus Christ, 160.  
991 Frei (Identity, 159), claims, “The church is simply the witness to the fact that it is Jesus 
Christ and none other who is the ultimate presence in and to the world.”  Yet Frei (ibid, 157), speaks of the 
Person of the Spirit as being the indirect presence of Christ in the Church.  
992 Ibid, 157.  Frei (ibid, 159), claims, “The given and instituted, spatial and temporal bases for 
the indirect presence of Christ allow the church that relatively permanent institutional structure without 
which no community can exist or be self-identical…”   
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cannot usurp).”993  Thus although Frei rightly shows that readers can only understand 
their own identity-in-relation when they have first recognized the unsubstitutable identity 
of Jesus Christ, Frei never spells out the difference between recognition of Christ‟s 
particular identity accessible to all and incorporation into that identity by those who 
participate in it.  Dawson suggests that in Frei‟s work, “The literal reader of the text‟s 
realistic, narrative sense gets to encounter Jesus as only Jesus alone is, but the action of 
Jesus or God impinging upon the embodied, historical life of the reader is a matter left to 
take care of itself without much comment.”994 
Frei‟s inability to sufficiently draw Scripture‟s rendering of Christ‟s identity 
together with Christ‟s presence in the Church causes the same practical difficulties for 
Frei‟s hermeneutics that the authority dilemma has caused for Vanhoozer.  Central to 
Frei‟s project is his belief that literal reading was not a historical accident but an 
outworking of the community‟s foundational belief in the present, risen Christ.  Yet Frei 
is obligated to show why that those normative rules were established as a result of the 
indirect presence of Christ in the Church, and not simply by a matter of community 
consensus.  Frei often grounds these community decisions in a robust view of God‟s 
providence, yet providence is too general of a category to describe the theological 
correspondence between Church and Scripture.
995
  Without some theological argument 
describing why the Church felt compelled to establish the literal sense as normative, 
                                               
993 Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 186.   
994 Ibid, 213.  As Mike Higton (“A Carefully Circumscribed Progressive Politics” 63), puts it, 
Frei views the Church as “an unsubstitutable corporate follower of an unsubstitutable Lord.” 
995 See Mike Higton (Christ, Providence and History, esp. 138), who, as the title of his book 
suggests, emphasizes that Frei‟s whole project depended on a robust doctrine of God‟s providence.   
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based on the intrinsic relationship between the identity of Christ rendered in Scripture 
and the identity of Christ experienced in the community, Frei‟s project is in danger of 
placing the construction of the Church‟s own tradition above the triune God who 
constituted the Church.
996
   
Tracy and the Identity of the Church:  It appears, then, that the disagreement 
between Vanhoozer and Frei about the location of Scriptural authority is a symptom of 
the same inability to show the intrinsic connection between the Christ rendered in 
Scripture and the Christ experienced as present in the community.  Here the insights of 
Tracy and de Lubac are helpful for resolving this difficulty, as they show why the 
experience of the Christian community inherently testifies to the authority of the literal 
sense to render the very identity of Christ that they experience.  In his later work, Tracy 
proposes an insight which, when combined with de Lubac‟s ecclesiology, may advance 
the projects of Frei and Vanhoozer as it shows the intrinsic connection between the 
identity of Christ rendered in the plain sense of Scripture and the self-identity of the 
Christian community as the locus of the presence of Christ.  Tracy claims that, in addition 
to the genre of narrative so helpfully emphasized by Frei, the genre of proclamation can 
also yield important insights about the nature of Christian identity.  Tracy defines 
                                               
996 This appears to be precisely the concern of Vanhoozer and Tracy about postliberal method.  
Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 11-12), seems to indicate that in the postliberal system 
“Tradition…effectively trumps Scripture” leading to relativism.  Tracy (David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New 
Program for Theology: A Reflection," 461), reads Frei more charitably, yet with in Lindbeck‟s work, Tracy 
suspects the possibility of “„relativism,‟ „confessionalism,‟ and even „fideism.‟”  Admittedly, Frei typically 
almost always settles for describing what the early Church did, rather than going on to explain why the 
Church felt compelled to do so.  See, for example, Frei (Types, 15-16), for his three rules for reading the 
literal sense:  The Church has reached such a consensus reading (first rule) and the contemporary reading 
community cannot go behind what is written (second rule) precisely because the words render the subject 
matter (third rule).  Frei‟s project always tends to remain simply descriptive rather than providing 
theological reasons for why it must have been the case.   
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proclamation as the “proclamatory or kerygmatic character of the gospel by speaking of 
the ecclesial Christian affirmation of the „event and person (not only the „event‟) of Jesus 
Christ.”997  While Tracy admits that reflecting on the genre of narrative is the only way to 
“show, and not merely state (confess), who this Jesus Christ, present to us in word and 
sacrament, really is for the Christian,”998 Tracy believes that reflecting on the genre of 
proclamation allows the theologian to see the “implications of the common Christian 
confession that „I (we) believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles.‟”999  Thus the genre of 
proclamation allows the theologian to articulate “the Catholic sense of how the Scripture 
is the church‟s book.”1000  Both narrative and proclamation, then, are complementary to 
each other and deepen the insights of the other.
1001
   
This connection between proclamation and the narrative rendering of Christ has 
significant implications for explaining the foundational identity of the Church, and hence 
for understanding why the Church has traditionally insisted on reading the plain sense of 
Scripture, why it has adopted certain books as its canon, and what capacity it has to 
receive the disclosure of Christ in Scripture.  Tracy‟s key insight (which remains implicit 
in his own work), could be summarized something like this:  The genre of confession 
                                               
997 Tracy, “On Reading Scripture Theologically,” 39.   
998 Ibid, 40.   
999 Ibid, 39. 
1000 Ibid, 37.   
1001 Ibid, 39.  Consequently, Tracy (ibid), claims, “The confessional genre and the kerygmatic 
categories do defend the first and dominant ecclesial and theological meaning of the „plain sense‟ of 
Scripture and thereby are appropriately Christian.  However, the confessional genre and the kerygmatic 
categories state but fail to show what can only be shown in explicitly narrative terms…just how and why 
the identity and presence of Jesus as the Christ is indeed confessed in the common Christian confession, but 
is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details of the interaction of the unsubstitutable character 
of Jesus and the specific circumstances of his passion and resurrection.”   
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reveals the particular identity of the Church, while the genre of narrative reveals the 
particular identity of Jesus Christ.    By analyzing the Gospels as proclamation, it is 
possible to recognize that the Church is that community which proclaims Jesus Christ as 
the Incarnate Logos and which experiences Christ as present.  By analyzing the Gospels 
as narrative, it is possible to recognize the unsubstitutable identity of that Jesus Christ 
who is present.  The way to encounter the living, present Christ is through the narrative 
rendering of His identity, whiles the way to reflect upon the self-identity of His body, the 
Church, is through analysis of the proclamation of the Church‟s common confession.   
Tracy rightly makes it clear that there can be no disjunction between the two 
modes of presentation of the living Christ, and that each genre reciprocally deepens 
reflection on the other.  Tracy claims, “If the Christian community means that „Christ‟ 
and the „Spirit‟ are present through proclamatory word and manifesting sacrament as well 
as through various Christian spiritualities of „presence‟, then the Christian community 
should try to clarify how Christ is present as none other than this narratively identified 
Jesus the Christ and the Spirit is present as the Spirit released by Jesus Christ.”1002  
Reflection on Christ‟s presence in the community naturally intensifies the emphasis on 
Christ‟s ascriptive rendering in the Gospel narratives, and focus on the particular identity 
of Christ in the Gospels deepens the Church‟s self-identity as the locus of Christ‟s 
presence.   
Tracy‟s insight, when combined with de Lubac‟s description of the Church as an 
incorporation of the Logos, goes a long way in clarifying the continuity between the 
                                               
1002 Ibid, 41.   
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unique identity of the Christian community and the plain reading of Scripture.
1003
  The 
Christian community is the locus of the presence of Christ and the Spirit, and that 
presence is manifest through the various incorporations of the Logos (i.e. Scripture, 
Church and Eucharist).  The Church proclaims this presence and interprets Scripture in 
light of that presence, recognizing the fundamental correspondence between the narrative 
rendering of the identity of Christ and its own story—with an insistence that Scripture be 
read plainly to render that identity.  In this self-understanding, the Church recognizes its 
participation in the Mystery.  As the locus of the presence of Christ, the Church cannot 
but interpret the particular identity of Christ and receive the disclosure of the Christ who 
addresses the Church.
1004
   
Together, the proposals of de Lubac and Tracy show the concern of Frei and 
Vanhoozer to locate authority in either Scripture or Church is a false problem.  The 
Scriptures do have an authoritative function of correcting the Church as they continually 
call Christians to the common confession “We believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles” 
through the realistic rendering of the narrative of Jesus Christ.  The self-identity of the 
Church does enhance the authority of the plain sense of Scripture as the Scriptures render 
the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ in a way that incorporates the reader into its 
                                               
1003 Significantly, Tracy (Ibid, 41), suggests that theologians have a responsibility to “clarify, 
beyond Frei‟s narrative analysis, the proclamatory (or kerygmatic) character of the passion narratives as 
gospel,” so that “the exact kerygmatic nature of the „manifestation‟ of Jesus as Jesus Christ in the passion 
narrative is clearer than a purely narrative account displays.”   
1004 Ibid, 41.  Tracy (ibid), provocatively suggests that “much could be gained and little lost by 
showing how these relatively late passion narratives with their „Jesus Christ kerygma‟ relate to the earliest 
apostolic witness of the historically reconstructed „Jesus-kerygma‟….Then one could show, through a 
modest genre analysis of kerygma, how the Jesus Christ kerygma of the passion narratives, i.e., the identity 
and presence of Jesus the Christ to the Christian community, is in direct kerygmatic relationship to the 
relatively non-narrative, but clearly kerygmatic, character of the Jesus kerygma of the original apostolic 
witness.” 
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story.  Since the Church already participates in the Mystery, the Church recognizes the 
presence of the living Christ and can do no other than to read the Scriptures in light of 
His identity.  A chief and authoritative function of the Magisterium of the Church, then, 
must be to safeguard the Christian hermeneutic in such a way that believers are able to 
encounter Christ in Scripture.
1005
  D‟Ambrosio‟s claim that “The fact that biblical 
allegory has the mystery of the Church as part of its very object means that the Church 
and its tradition must necessarily be a principle of interpretation,”1006 ought not give the 
Church an overly-confident reading of Scripture, but rather a chastened hermeneutic.  
The Church, by its own internal logic, must safeguard the plain sense which will allow 
the text to render Christ as present to readers, and must encourage rigorous self-critique 
based upon the plain sense as it attempts to understand the Christ who addresses it. 
IV. Conclusion:  Scripture and Church Unified in Christ 
 
This chapter has placed all four authors in dialogue within the broader context of 
the economy of redemption in order to show that certain impasses between them can be 
resolved when the whole context of Scriptural interpretation is considered.  As the 
relationship between text and reader is seen as only one part of the larger process of 
                                               
1005 The emphasis of Dei Verbum is decidedly on the safeguarding of a Christian hermeneutic.  
Dei Verbum II, 10, 755-56, claims, “But the task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, 
whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of 
the Church alone.  Its authority in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ.  Yet this 
Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant.  It teaches only what has been handed on 
to it.  At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this devotedly, guards it with 
dedication and expounds it faithfully.  All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn 
from this single deposit of faith.” 
1006 D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 189.  
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Christ‟s communication to the Church by means of the Scriptural texts, certain 
hermeneutical tensions are eased.  When Christ is articulated as both sole Object of 
Scripture and active Subject of Scripture, it is possible to show the harmony between 
Frei‟s insistence on the plain sense of Scriptural narrative and de Lubac‟s insistence on 
the spiritual sense of the texts.  This harmony establishes a pattern for reading in which 
the plain sense is understood to render the unsubstitutable identify of the same Jesus 
Christ who now mediates Himself to the Church in Scriptural reading.  When a unity is 
articulated between Scripture and Church as both are grounded in the same risen Christ 
and mediate the central Christian Mystery, it is possible to show the necessary harmony 
between the plain sense reading of Scripture and the experience of Christ in the Church.  
The Church, then, cannot usurp authority over the plain sense of the Scriptural texts, but 
neither is it only responsive to them.  The more integral the relationship between 
Scripture and Church in the practice of the Church, the more the risen Christ will be 
mediated by both.   
These insights ease certain tensions between the four hermeneutical projects.  
First, these insights show the disagreement between Tracy and Frei about plain sense 
reading and reading for disclosure to be two inevitable parts of the same interpretive 
process.  As Tracy corrects his own hermeneutical project to also insist on the plain sense 
reading of the Gospels to render the identity of Jesus Christ, he is able to better 
emphasize the disclosure of the risen Christ to the reading community.  A canonical, 
plain sense, figural reading of Scripture mediates Christ who incorporates readers into the 
Church.  Second, these insights show the disagreement between Frei, Vanhoozer and 
Tracy, about the location of authority, to be a largely false issue.  The Scriptures have 
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authority as the same Christ stands as Subject and Object of Scripture, and this authority 
can only be recognized in the community which experiences the authority of Jesus Christ.  
Vanhoozer is correct that Scriptural authority is properly grounded in God rather than the 
texts themselves, but this does not necessitate a doctrine of sola Scriptura, as Vanhoozer 
thinks.  Instead, it requires an articulation of the intrinsic relationship between Scripture 
and Church which Tracy helpfully identifies in hermeneutical reflection on the Gospels 
and de Lubac specifies as the mutual mediation of Christ in Scripture and the Church.   
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CONCLUSION: 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROJECT 
 
In this dissertation I have suggested that many of the hermeneutical impasses 
between Tracy and Frei, and consequently between revisionists and postliberals, are the 
result of narrowing the focus of hermeneutical reflection to the context of text and reader 
without describing the theological realities which always attend a Christian reading of 
Scripture.  The dissertation has placed in dialogue four theologians with very different 
theological emphases in order to show that when their hermeneutical projects are 
examined in the broader context of the economy of redemption, many of the apparent 
tensions in method are eased or shown to be mutually compatible.  As this broader 
context of Christ‟s self-communication to the Church is examined, it is possible to 
advance the discussion between Tracy and Frei.   
As these four different hermeneutical projects were placed in dialogue, it became 
apparent that the impasse in method between Tracy and Frei may not best be identified 
through the usual classifications (manifestation vs. proclamation, critical correlation, or 
narrative theology vs. foundationalism), but instead may be a result of a hermeneutical 
focus which examines only the relationship between text and reader.  Yet since the goal 
of both Frei and Tracy is to show how the texts render a spiritual reality, both authors are 
required by their own hermeneutical aims to discuss Scripture in the context of the 
economy of redemption in order to complete their hermeneutical projects.  The projects 
of both Vanhoozer and de Lubac successfully broaden the context of Scriptural reading to 
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include God‟s use of the texts and the Church‟s reception of the texts, persuasively 
showing that these realities are always necessary elements of reflection on a Christian 
interpretation of Scripture.  Consequently, the mediation of Christ through Scripture, as 
well as the Church‟s capacity to respond to that mediation, must be explained in the 
process of articulating a theological interpretation of Scripture.  This refocusing of the 
theological debates has produced several conclusions.   
First, the dissertation suggests that both what de Lubac calls „spiritual 
interpretation‟ and what Frei calls „realistic reading,‟ are inevitable and complementary 
aspects of a Christian reading of Scripture.  Not only have both been central practices of 
the Church, but both are dependent upon one another.  Here I suggested that de Lubac‟s 
claim that Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture accounts for both spiritual 
interpretation and realistic reading, as Christian interpretation always occurs within the 
dialectic of understanding Christ as sole Object of Scripture and as active Subject of 
Scripture.  Consequently, de Lubac‟s insistence that Christ uses Scripture to mediate 
Himself to the Church and Frei‟s insistence that the plain sense of the text renders the 
unsubstitutable identity of Christ are central parts of Christian interpretation.  Both poles 
are necessary for Christian reading, as both together allow for a sufficient articulation of 
Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption.  Any project that fails to emphasize 
Christ as Object will tend to make Christ a type to which some feature of the 
contemporary „situation‟ is the antitype, thus reducing Christ to merely one (if 
paradigmatic) instance of a contemporary ideal.  Any project that fails to emphasize 
Christ as Subject will tend to de-emphasize the believer‟s participation in the risen Christ 
and may deny the essential movement from text to spiritual reality.  This dialectic 
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between understanding Christ as Subject and Object, I suggested, is best seen in the 
different emphases between Frei‟s figural reading and de Lubac‟s allegorical reading, as 
Frei focus primarily on Christ as Object and de Lubac focuses primarily on Christ as 
Subject.  Here I suggested that Frei‟s project could be improved by more strongly 
emphasizing the implications of Christ‟s present address to readers by means of the 
Scriptural texts, while Tracy‟s project could be enhanced by developing a method of 
figural reading to relate all Scriptural reading to the identity of Christ rendered in the 
Gospels.   
Examining Scriptural interpretation within the dialectic of Christ as Subject and 
Object has allowed certain methodological strengths to be identified and weaknesses to 
be corrected.  The key methodological difficulty for Vanhoozer is his tendency to focus 
more on a particular philosophical construction of authorship than on the Christ who 
unifies the Scriptures.  Here the projects of Frei and de Lubac provide a correction to 
Vanhoozer as they show a method of figural reading that seeks to draw focus from 
particular philosophical constructs and onto the event of Christ.  The key difficulty in de 
Lubac‟s method is his ambiguity in showing the connection between text and event, and 
consequently in showing how the texts of Scripture themselves participate in God‟s 
communicative activity.  Consequently, de Lubac‟s emphasis on allegory tends to 
depreciate the importance of method for explaining the plain sense of the text.  Here 
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the closed, canonical sense as the literal sense provides a 
helpful solution, as it better regulates the Christian imagination in Scriptural 
interpretation.  Frei‟s emphasis on realistic reading also provides a helpful solution, as it 
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closes the gap between text and event in such a way that the text itself is able to 
sacramentally mediate spiritual reality.   
This proposal to articulate how Christ is Subject and Object of Scripture does not 
depreciate the emphasis on the text/reader relationship in hermeneutical discussions, but 
seeks to develop a richer hermeneutical project as it places this relationship in the larger 
context of Christ‟s relationship to the Church.  Articulating the intrinsic relationship 
between Christ, Scripture and Church upholds the plain sense reading of Scripture 
without leaving the final word about the meaning of the plain sense to the secular 
exegete.  Nor does it reduce the authority of the plain sense of Scripture by arguing for 
the necessity of a movement from text to spiritual reality.  Rather, it locates this authority 
in Scripture‟s intrinsic relationship to the Church as both mediate the risen Christ.  
Consequently, it upholds the authority of the plain sense of Scripture even as it describes 
why the Church had the authority to decide to read Scripture in this way and to establish 
its own canon.   
Second, the dissertation has suggested that because the primary role of Scripture 
in the economy is to mediate the communication of the risen Christ to the Church, then 
the Church must have some unique capacity for receiving the disclosure of Christ in 
Scripture (i.e. to make the movement from text to spiritual reality).  Here I proposed that 
de Lubac‟s structuring of the economy provides helpful categories for understanding this 
unique capacity, as de Lubac emphasizes that Scripture, Church and Eucharist are 
Incorporations of the Logos which are grounded in Christ the Incarnate Logos, and that 
all readers have the imprint of the Logos on their souls which enables them to recognize 
the intrinsic identity between their own narrative and the narrative of Scripture.  This 
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description is helpful as it illumines a qualitative difference between the capacity of 
believers for receiving the disclosure of Christ in Scripture and the capacity of all readers 
outside the Church, while grounding the capacity of both in the action of the Incarnate 
Christ.   
Furthermore, the description is also helpful because it shows the intrinsic 
relationship between Scripture and Church as both mediate the risen Christ.  Articulating 
the intrinsic unity of Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption shows that 
hermeneutical projects which attempt to locate authority in either Scripture or the Church 
pose a false dilemma before the theologian.  By comparing Vanhoozer and de Lubac, 
both of whom explicitly locate Scriptural interpretation in the broader context of the 
economy of redemption, it can be seen that the real difference between them is the way in 
which each understands the Church relating to Scripture.  Vanhoozer constructs his 
understanding of the Church in such a way that it is only responsive to, and does not 
mediate, the risen Christ.  This one-sided emphasis supports Vanhoozer‟s doctrine of sola 
Scriptura, yet it leads to a number of tensions in Vanhoozer‟s work which are difficult to 
overcome without granting some authority to the Church.  De Lubac shows that the 
Church is always dependent on the literal sense of Scripture for its life and nourishment, 
even as it has authority to protect the literal sense and enable believers to participate in 
the mediation of Christ through it.  This emphasis on the intrinsic unity between Scripture 
and Church has resources to ease Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutical difficulties without forcing 
Vanhoozer to yield his insistence on the authority of Scripture.   
By placing the discussion of Vanhoozer and de Lubac in dialogue with the debate 
between Tracy and Frei, I suggested that it is possible to advance the discussion.  Frei‟s 
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concern to preserve the plain sense of Scripture causes him to develop an either/or 
schema in which he must decide whether to place the authority for the plain sense reading 
in the texts themselves or in the Church.  Much of Frei‟s later argument against Tracy 
attempts to prevent philosophical analysis from overwhelming the plain sense of 
Scripture established by the Church, and to do this he insists on Christian self-description 
over philosophical description.  However, this dissertation suggests that it is because Frei 
fails to show the intrinsic unity of Scripture and Church and to ground both in Christ that 
his work has reached an impasse with Tracy‟s.  Here both de Lubac‟s project, which calls 
both Scripture and Church fellow incorporations of the Logos, and Tracy‟s project, which 
emphasizes the ongoing need to read the Gospels as both proclamation and narrative, 
provide insights for better articulating the intrinsic unity between the Church and 
Scripture.  Tracy‟s work is particularly helpful as Tracy suggests that the Gospels can be 
read as both narrative and proclamation so that they render the identity of Christ and 
reveal the identity of the Christian community.  This shows how the believer recognizes 
her own experience of the risen Christ as intrinsically related to the identity of Jesus 
Christ narrated in Scripture.  As a result, Christian Scriptural reading recognizes the 
intrinsic unity of the identity of Christ even as it draws the reader into the experience of 
that risen Christ.   
Ultimately, for the Christian, hermeneutical method for reading Scripture can only 
be developed as reflection is given to the mediation of Christ to the Church by means of 
the Scriptural texts.  By explaining the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption, a 
number of persistent hermeneutical difficulties which surface in describing the 
relationship between text and reader are able to be reevaluated and even resolved.  While 
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it seems both inevitable and beneficial that theologians will articulate the relationship of 
Christ, Scripture and Church in somewhat different ways, the absence of such description 
will deprive hermeneutical projects of the resources necessary for the completion of their 
tasks.  Fifty years after the Second Vatican Council‟s drafting of Dei Verbum, the 
Church‟s first major statement on revelation, it is hoped that the Church may be ready to 
further develop the implications of the relationship of Christ, Scripture and Church in the 
economy of redemption into a more complete system for a Christian reading of the 
Scriptures.  
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